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Drought and environmental change are often associated with deteriorating socio economic 
conditions, dispossession  and forced migration by herders  from  the  affected  areas. This was 
certainly the  prevailing  view  when I first  started  studying  post  drought  migration  as  an Associate 
Expert  posted  in Dakar in  late 1980s. At  that  time the issue of  drought  and  migration canied with 
it connotations  of crisk and  disaster.  The  pages  of  development  plans,  evaluation  reports  and  other 
types  of  grey  literature  were filled up  with  visions of a  population  of  destitute  herders,  advancing 
deserts and a shrinking resource base. Such reports conveyed the message of the need for 
immediate action to alter the imbalance between nature’s (supposedly shrinking) carrying 
capacities and the increase of livestock and human population. Hence, recommendations 
emphasised the urgency for establishment of stock  control  and for herders to diversify  their 
sources  of income and to find  alternative  ways of surviving  a  production  system in  crisis. 
In the late 198Os, many pastoralists were  living  a  harsh  life in the  aftermath of the  drought.  But 
the hdings of  even my first  field trips to the Ferlo - where my Senegalese  colleague and I set  out 
to find out what was indeed the nature of the crisis  of  pastoralism - turned  out  not  to fit this 
gloomy picture. This impression  was  re-enforced  during  the  succeeding  years.  Whereas I met 
many herders who could tell of considerable livestock losses during the droughts, I found 
relatively few destitute herders.  On  the  contrary,  a large number of displaced  livestock  owners 
were  actively engaged in adapting to new  conditions.  These  herders  had  been  forced by the 
drought to abandon  their area of origin  and  move  southward.  Nonetheless, it seemed  that  the  post- 
drought  period,  in  many  ways, had become a  period  of  increased  opportunities:  not  only  for  those 
herders  who had been  forced to migrate  but  also  for the indigenous  herders in the  areas  to  which 
the  migrants  moved. 
This  discrepancy  between  the alarmist recommendations  and  the realities  in  the  field,  has to a  large 
extent  been the “drive“ of  my  research.  This  may  help  to  explain  why I ave  dealt  at  such  length 
with certain stereotypes and theoretical models before discarding them altogether. For the 
dissertation is to a great extent an attempt to fit my impressions  from the field - and  not  least my 
fascination with the entrepreneurial herders of the Ferlo and their  conflictive  and  contradictory 
strategies - into the  somewhat  rigid  theoretical  moulds  often  put  forward  in  the  context of na ural 
resource  management. 
It is also an  attempt to explore  what  has  tended  to  become  almost  a  “blind  spot”  in  the  debate on 
environmental degradation and the decline of pastoralism: What actually happened to those 
herders who were forced to move southwards in the aftermath of drought?  Responding to this 
obviously implies wider queries into questions  such as: How  did  the  drought  refugees  deal  with 
1 
the new opportunities and  constraints  offered  in  their new  homes?  How  did  they  adapt  their 
income strategies to the new  situation in which  their  old  priviledges  based on group  membership 
were  left  behind?  And  not  the  least:  How  did  they  manage to renegotiate  access  to  land  and  water 
among groups of competing producers  with  whom  they  entertained  at  best  very  distant  kinship 
ties? 
Debates about the effects of the great  Sahelian  droughts of the  1970s and  1980s  have  tended  to 
focus on the physical processes of land degradation and overgrazing. Droughts have been 
perceived as the culmination  of  a  long  term  disequilibrium  between  the  carrying  capacity of he 
land  and the increasing number of animals  and  people.  The  general  understandings of the  effects 
of  drought  have  tended  to  rest on a number  of  general  and  simplified  arguments  about  how  people 
impact on their environment.  Drought  has  been  perceived as  more or less  synonymous  with 
environmental  degradation.  Hence,  the  effect  of  drought  on  the  livelihood f the local  population 
is discussed  within  a  crisis scenario where  the  decline of pastoralism is viewed  as an unquestion- 
able  and  almost irreversible fact. In this perception  drought-related  migration is considered to be 
the  ultimate exit option of drought-ridden  herders  who try to  avoid  total  destitution.  Migration 
movements are  therefore  treated primarily as  yet  another  indicator of the  shrinking  resource  base, 
just@ng an urgent  need for altering  the,  supposedly  unsustainable,  pastoral  production  systems. 
Indeed, the very limited number  of  studies  concerned  with  what  actually  happened to those  herders 
who where forced to migrate may be  seen as epitomizing  the  general  assumption of crisis  and 
decline  of pastoralism  For as ends (in terms  of  decline)  are  determined  in  advance,  further  scrutiny 
of the  adaptation of drought-ridden  herders  to  their new  environment  becomes  unwarranted  and 
unnecessary 
The unilineal results  of such models  present  a  number of methodological  problems. As “drought 
refugees” are reduced to the role of passive  victims,  almost  a  residual  category,  only  very  limited 
space is left for uncovering the unexpected  and  innovative  ways  in  which  drought  victims ay 
adapt or take  advantage  of new  situations. As a  result,  these  simplified  models  have  tended  to  cast 
a blind eye on the rapid developments  in  recent  history  in many  Sahelian  countries.  By  ignoring 
the  adaptive  capacities  of  the  local  population,  a  number of  local  skills  and  management  techniques 
are  rendered  invisible to researchers  and  policy  makers.  Instead  their  attention  is  directed  to  ways 
in which external intervention can alleviate an degedly stagnant and outmoded system of 
production  and  replace  it  with  something  more  efficient.  The  result is tha  interesting  opportunities 
for studying the resilience  and  the  adaptive  capacities of pastoral  societies  are lost. Similarly,  a 
unique  opporhmity for studying how  and  why  the  actors  and  institutions  involved in the  process 
of  transformation  act  and  operate will  be  foregone.  It isthis challenge  that  the  present  project  aims 
to take up. 
This dissertation  tries to evoke  a different picture  of  post-drought  rehabilitation  and  the  effects of 
drought-related  migration.  What ispresented  here is the story of  a  conflictive, but nonetheless very 
successful integration of a  large  group of  herders  who  were forced to move southwards in the 
afiermath of the  droughts  of 1972/73 and 1983/84. Confronted  with  the combined effects of poor 
rains and the proliferation of irrigated agriculture into former grazing lands, these herders 
abandoned  their  relatively  sedentary  agro-pastoral  lifestyle  along  the flood plains of the Senegal 
River  Valley  and  moved to  the  Southem  edge  of  the  Ferlo-region.  Many of these herders did not 
return to their  areas  of  origin  once  the rains resumed.  Instead  they remained in the southern Ferlo, 
transforming  their  productive  assets  into  a highly specialized  and  mobile production system based 
mainly on the raising  of  sheep. 
The outcome of this rather  massive influx of  foreign herders into the southern Ferlo was very 
different to what  was  anticipated.  Post-drought  migration acted as a catalyst for technological 
innovation and lead to a minor revolution in the herding systems involving increased herd 
productivity  and  a  dramatic  rise  in  prosperity  among  herders.  Within  a  very short time span, herd 
sizes  increased dramakally. For this reason,  many  herders  indigenous  to he area started copying 
the management  techniques  of  the  newscorners.  The  paradoxical  result  of this process of migration 
is therefore that, although  more  livestock is now living  in  a  smaller  area, it is in better shape and 
reproduces  faster than before the drought.  The  single  most  important factor leading to this success 
was the invention of a  new  device  for  transportation  of  water.  Huge tractor rubber inner tubes 
were  recycled  into  water  containers.  With a donkey  cart, these tubes can transport large quantities 
of water over long distances. 
Obviously the influx of  a  large  group  of  foreign  herders  into  this frontier zone between agricultural 
and  pastoral  production  provoked  important  changes  in  land use patterns and in herding practices. 
In this way post-drought  migration  contributed  to  intensify  the  inherent tenure conflicts in the 
repion. These tensions were,  however,  not  solely  the  result  of  increases in population and livestock 
numbers leading to greater pressure on the resource base, as stipulated by conventional 
environmental  wisdom. It was just as much the  result of changing relations of power within the 
institutions controlling  access to resources.  For  the  new  economic  and  political opportunities 
triggered  by  post-drought  development also entailed  the  development of new arenas of struggle. 
The FuutankoBe herders fTom the Senegal  river  valley acted as catalysts  of both conflict  and 
change. Their post-drought  migration  and  adaptation  therefore provide a convenient lens for 
examining the often intricate  processes of change in access  and control which followed the 
droughts  of the seventies  and  eighties. 
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Research  objectives: 
The  overall  ambition  of  the  dissertation  is  to  explore  the institutions and processes through which 
individuals  and groups  gain  access  to,  exploit and exercise  control over resources. Further, how 
these  processes  interact  with  other  social,  economic,  political  and ecological processes over  time. 
As the research was undertaken in an area of extensive livestock production systems it is 
concerned  mainly  with  resources held  in  common  i.e.  water  and pastures. 
More specifically,  the  project aims to analyse the  changes  in  access to water and pastures that 
post-drought  population  movements  have  txiggered.  But  at  the same time it aims at studying the 
changing  configurations  of  power  and  obligations  which  have  ensued. These developments have 
neither been  inevitable  nor  linear,  but  have  been  part  of  a process of  political  negotiation  and 
cultural  transformation  whose  ends  were  largely  unpredictable. The project is, therefore, also an 
attempt to reveal  the  micro-politics  surrounding  the  allocation f grazing  and  watering rights in 
order to understand  the  dynamics  of  these  transformations.  Getting politics back into the study of 
natural  resource  management  might  also  be a way  of treating  drought-refugees as active agents 
of change  rather  than as passive  victims of drought. 
‘Getting  politics  back into the  study  of  resource  management’  also requires an understanding of 
why politics  has  tended to evaporate in the  Natural  Resource Management ( N M )  framework. 
The first part of the dissertation is therefore  an  attempt to explore conventional wisdoms  and 
mainstream  theoretical  models  which  inform  most  development  planning related to post-drought 
rehabilitation and  range  management.  This  critical  exploration is carried out both in  relation to 
conceptions  of  the  physicavbiological  environment  and  in relation  to  the institutional environment 
which is supposed to ensure a more sustainable use of natural resources. In this way, the 
dissertation is an attempt to move away from the static, unilineal and degradation-oriented 
approach  of  the hXh4 framework  and  towards a framework  which is more capable of  explaining 
the  dynamic  and  successful  adaptation  of  the  FuutankoBe. Essential for such a framework is that 
it  provides a means for  conceptualizing  natural  resource nvironment  and the landscapes not  only 
as degrading  but as transforming  as  a  result of both  ecological  and social processes. 
The  dissertation  also aims to  steer  away  from a conception of institutions as only a  question of 
establishing a more  ef3icient set of  rules in order to  regulate  the conduct of local users. Instead the 
focus  will be on political  adaptation  involving  political  negotiation  and social manoeuvring  over 
rights to resources and  rights  to  political  voice. 
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The  study  of  the  migration process initiated by  the  FuutankoBe’  herders  provides  a  particularly 
interesting case or angle for analysing political negotiations linked to changing relations of 
property  and  access to  resources. On the one hand,  the  increase in population  and  animal  numbers 
contributed to intensify competition for natural  resources. On the other hand,  the  innovative 
production strategies developed by  the  newcomers  provided  new  opportunities  and  contributed 
to a  general  rise  in the prosperity of the micro region.  This  contradictory  relationship  between 
newcomrs and htcomers is reflected  in social manouevering  over  rights to resources  and in the 
struggles to gain  political power. It can also be traced in the  current  debates  related  to  political 
and social identity and in the political struggles over difference and belonging. Hence, the 
integration process of the FuutankoBe herders into the  agro-pastoral  societies  of  southern  Ferlo 
provides  an  opportunity  for  examjning the  intricate  ways in which  tenure  institutions  and  struggles 
over  access to resources  have  unfolded  in  a  particular micro region.  Hopefully  such  an  ‘unfolding’ 
may contriiute to revealing clues as  to  how political transformations  take  place  both  at  the  local 
and  at  the  national level. 
In order to study the effects of drought-related migration on land use patterns and tenure 
institutions,  the  study  will  address  the following questions: 
- How did the migrant herders adjust their production systems to the new opportunities 
- How did they adapt their income strategies in a situation in which access to resources 
offered by the  new environment? 
had to be negotiated fiom scratch,  with  a  group of competing  producers  with  whom  they 
entertained  at  best  very limited social relations? 
- In what sense has the influx of migrants shaped the production strategies in the area of 
reception  and  what effect has this had on the  local  institutional  mechanisms  regulating 
access  to natural resources? 
- How have  the  xisting resource management  institutions  (rural  councils,  deep-well 
management  committees  and  traditional  land  management  institutions)  been  able  to  cope 
and  adapt to new conditions? 
- What have been the effects of state policies of devolving control over natural resources 
- How  has this shaped the arenas of  resource  competition? 
to  local  level  institutions? 
The setting. 
The  Ferlo,  in  which this study was conducted, is the  northern  pastoral  zone of Senegal. This dry 
and  sandy  territory is circumscriid, so to speak, by the ‘bend‘ of the Senegal  river. As a  territorial 
‘Herders  from  the Fuuta area, along the Senegal River are refered to as FuutankoBe. Locally these migrant 
herders also refered to as egge-egge, from eggol- movement,  refemng to their  mobile  lifestyle. 
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entity, the term Ferlo is fairly vague. According to Ba  (1986)* and  Benoit  (1988),  Ferlo  was 
originally the hinterland of Senegal: the "non-region'' into which one could seek refuge, a 
'wilderness'  where mar@ people  and those excluded from power  could  hide  and  regain  forces. 
The Ferlo was a space of  security  and  of  peace  for those with  little  interest  in  the  exercise of 
power or those opposing it (Benoit,1988:97):  unlike  the  early state formations  located  along  the 
river  valleys - the  Jolof kingdom (in the south) and the  kingdoms of the  Waalo  and  Fuuta  Tooro 
along the Senegal  River.  While the Ferlo  originally  referred to one  of  several  hinterlands - the 
Ferlo  of  Matam3 or the Ferlo of the Fuuta Damgan - the  term is now widely  used  to  describe  the 
large  pastoral  zone located west  of Lac de Guiers and east of  Matam.  This  zone is distinguished 
in the  north  by the  flood  recession economies of  the  Senegal  River  Valley  and  in  the  south by the 
agricultural economies of the Peanut Basin  and of Senegal  Oriental. 
Map 5. 
The Ferlo (in its widest  sense) 
Source: Dipartement d'Histoire et de Gdographie  de  l'Ecole Normale Superieure de  Dakar,  1989. 
The  Ferlo is part of the ecological and cultural transition  zone  between  the  savanna  woodlands 
and  the  more  arid  environments to the north. This position  has  affected  both  its  land  and  its 
one  can sit crosslegged, as a  sign  of  freedom @a, 1986369) 
zAccording  to  Ba,  Ferlo  comes fromferlnade, sitting  cross-legged,  and  describes  a v st, forested area where 
where the  Fulani  subclan  named Ferlanke orginate  (see for example  Bonfiglioli  and  Diallo,  1988). 
Some  scholars  prefer to use Ferlo to refer only to the Ferlo of Maram, the  eastern  part of the  pastoral  area  from 
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people.  It is a  zone  in  which  the  flora  and  fauna of the  Sahara is mixed  with  the flora and fauna of 
the  more humid West African  savanna.  Although  the  absolute  plant  and  animal population is not 
large,  the  high  ratio  of species to  total  population - the  biodiversity  index - accounts for  the great 
resiliency  of  the  natural  environment  (Webb,1995:3).  Nonetheless, this richness in species is not 
matched  by  a similar high  biological  productivity  which,  in  these  areas, is governed  principally  by 
the  level  of  precipitation.  Rainfall is low  and  erratic,  (between 250-450 mm p.a.) concentrated in 
a single  period  of  three to  four  months of the  year,  and  extremely  variable  in  both a temporal and 
a spatial  sense. As a  result,  the  biological  production  and  seasonal  composition of the vegetation, 
on which  human  and animal population  depends,  varies  significantly: not only from one year to 
another, but also from one area  to  another. 
Recurrent  shifts in climatic conditions  have  contributed  to  a  constant transformation of Sahelian 
lifestyles.  During long periods of increasing  aridity,  agricultural  communities have been forced 
south while  transhumant  herders  have  been  drawn  into  areas  of abandoned,  once cultivated areas. 
Similarly,  herders  have  been  forced  northwards  during  periods of increasing  humidity  when  the 
risks of  trypanosomiasis  and  malaria  have  increased  in  the  southern areas.  In such wetter periods, 
farmers  have tended to move  northwards as conditions  for  rainfed agriculture in these areas 
improved.  Hence  mobility  and  flexibility  have  always  been  inherent features of the production 
systems  of the area. Not only the  livestock-rearing  Fulanis  but  also  the  agriculturalist Wolofs and 
other groups, have  retained  high  degrees of spatial  mobility. 
Hence,  when  the  Ferlo is portrayed as the  land  of  the  Fulani: ‘2es migrateurs a m  jambes minces4”, 
as they are depicted  by  Senghor,  the  former  president of Senegal, this image is not very acurate. 
For  the  Ferlo is also  inhabited by  Maures,  Wolof,  Serer  and  Toucouleurs. In the course of time, 
these people have  mixed  with  the  lifestyles of the  Fulanis.  Certain  Wolof  herders have taken on 
a Fulani identity. Likewise the sedentary Fulanis in Eastern Ferlo have become difficult to 
distinguish from the Toucouleurs of the Valley  (Grenier,1960:36). This reflects the fluid  and 
porous character of social relations  and  identity. 
In the same way,  flexibiliw  and  mobility  are  prominent  features  even at intra-household level. 
Individual  family members often  travel  extensively.  Young  men  with  access  to  a horse or donkey 
cart may  travel  to the irrigated  fields in the  harvest  season  to  offer  their  services transporting the 
harvested grains. Elder men frequently leave during long periods in the dry season to do 
‘maraboutage’  i.e.  commercialize  their  ‘Fulani  knowledge’ in the  form  of  amulets, grigri’s, and 
other forms of traditional  healing.  The  women may go to  ‘see  a  relative” or look for  short  term 
4 ~ ~ ~ e  migrants with  the skinny legs” 
To ‘go and see a  relative’ is a common paraphrasing for moving  over to a  richer  relativein  order to 
alleviate the charges  on  the  household  in  times of crisis. 
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employment in other  geographical  areas as part of a  risk-management  strategy.  Finally  settlements 
are  not  very  permanent as people fkquently move  to establish new  villages or sections of villages 
in previously  uninhabited  bush areas or in places  where  interesting  production  opportunities 
emerge. 
The  production  systems 
Map 6. 
Socio-economic  zones of the  Ferlo 
1. M 
2. R e m e  des 6 Forages. 
3. Delta of the Senegal River Vdiey. 
4. Nard Cayor-Gandiolais. 
5 .  Lawm vailey of the Ferlo. 
6. Upper Valley of the Ferlo. 
7 .  Eastem Ferlo. 
S. Southcm Ferio. 
(Source: Ousouby TourticSE, 1 B O )  
The  Ferlo  region  may  be  divided into several, but somewhat  overlapping  production  zones6; 
1) The proche dieri, the northern most region alongside the Senegal River Valley, where 
the pastoral  production  systems coexist with  irrigated  and flood recession  agriculture. 
For a more  thorough  eXplanatiOn of the  different  production  zones  see T o d ,  O., 1989:” Le zonage du Ferlo, 
analyse  des  modes  d‘exploitation du milieu et de leur evolution.”.  Rapport partiel, Centre de Suivi &ol0gique, 
Dakar. 
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It  is  from this region  that  the  majority of drought  refugees  stem. 
2) The ancient 'desertic'  region  of  the kooya, or zone des 6 forages, the  area in which  the 
first  boreholes  were  installed in the 1950s.  This  area is the  traditional  heartland  of cattle 
production but  agricultural  production is limited  due  to  insufficient  rains. As one  moves 
southwards  precipitation  increases  and  agricultural  production  becomes  more  prominent. 
3). The south-westem fringe  of  the  Ferlo,  which  forms  the  borderline  between the 
predominantly  agricultural  zone  of  the  south  and  the  mainly  pastoral  production system 
in the north. It is this area  which  constitutes  the core area of this study. 
The southem fringe of the Ferlo covers the upper Ferlo valley and eastern Ferlo in the 
arrondissements of Barkedji to the east and  the  communaut.4 male of Ranerou7 to the  west. 
Traditionally, the area has  been  dominated by semi-sedentarised Fulanis who  combine (cattle) 
herding with limited agricultural  production to cover  part of the family's  consumption of millet. 
Alongside  them, black Maures,  former  slaves  of  the  Arab-Berber  Mauritanians,  have  specialized 
in the  extraction of gum arabic fromthe Acacia senegal tree. This they  have  combined  with  small- 
scale ago-pastoralism whereas  Wolof farmers  provide  the  bulk of their  income  from  agricultural 
production. 
Sigmiicant  differences may,  however, be found  between  the  eastern  and  western parts of the area. 
The  sandy soils of the  eastern  part  attract  a  large  number  of  Wolof  groundnut  producers,  resulting 
in  significant agricultural encroachment on the  grazing  lands. In contrast  to this, the  Wolof have 
been  less  tempted  by the laterite soils of  the  east  which  are  more  adapted  to  millet  production, the 
extraction of tree products  and  livestock  production. In this  area,  raising  sheep  has  traditionally 
been more important than in the western  part of the  Ferlo  (Tour6,1989).  Population  pressure is 
considerably lower in this region  than it is in the  Barkedji  region  (4,85  inhabitants  per sq.km in 
Barkidji as opposed to  1,25  inhabitants  per sq. km in  the  vast  communauti male of  Ranirou)'. 
During the last 30-40 years several  processes  of  change  and  adaption  have  taken  place in th Ferlo 
region. On the  one hand,  a signikant enlargement  of  the  productive  capacities  of  the  region 
occurred  since the mid 1950s.  At this time,  the  drilling  programme of the  colonial  administration 
established  a network of mechanized  deep-wells  in  what  had  formerly  been  considered as the 
"Ferlo desert". Within  a  few  years,  a  large  majority of herders  had  re-organised  their  system of 
annual transhumance to fit with the new opportunities  offered  (Barral,1982:43-51; - 
the  vast communaut6 nuale of Ranerou is comprised  from  the  Arrondissement of Ogo. 
Whereas the study comprises  several  communaut6s nuales comprised in the  arrondissement of Barkklji, only 
l'Economie, des Finances et du  Plan,  Direction  de la Wvision et de la Statistique, 1988 Ripertoire des Villages. 
' The figures are calculated on basis of the  1988  population  census:  Republique du SCnigal, Minisere de 
Saints Louis, Louga. 
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Pouillon,1988:180). The  traditional  exchange  system  between  the  agricultural and  pastoral  zones 
was  replaced by a system whereby  most  herds  stayed in the  rich  pastures of the  Ferlo  during  the 
dry season too. One effect of the drilling programme  was  a  considerable  increase  in  herd  size 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. 
Parallel to this  process  of enlargement of productive  opportunities  went  a  process of diminution. 
With the expansion of the groundnut economy at the turn of  the  century,  a  process  started by 
which  large areas  of  former gazing lands in  south  eastern  Ferlo  were  converted  into  peanut  fields. 
This "colonization process" which is still ongoing,  was  further  spurred by the  improved  water 
accesibility  in the Ferlo. It included  both  large-scale  pioneer  farming  communities,  the  so-called 
daaru's organised  by  the  Islamic  brotherhood  of  the  Mouridesg,  and  individual  Wolof  smallholders. 
These  smallholders had been  pushed out of the  traditional  peanut-producing  areas  in  the  south  by 
population  increase  and  deteriorating soils. So when the  drought  victims  arrived  from  the  Senegal 
river  valley, the  southern  fringe of the Ferlo  was  under  pressure  from  population  movements,  not 
only from the north but also from the  south. 
The threat of agricultural encroachment on the  pastoral  economies  in  the  southern  fringe of the 
Ferlo has been  analysed  in  several  works  (namely Santoir,l983; Pellisier,l966; Weicker,l993 and 
Jua1993). This is not the case for the  influx of pastoralists  from  the  north.  Despite its profound 
effects on both production systems  and  institutional  arrangements  in  the  Ferlo,  the  influx of 
drought  victims from the  north  has  passed  relatively  unnoticed  so-far,  apart  from  certain  hints  in 
the articles on pastoral tenure by Oussouby Tour6 (1991)  and  in  the  works  of Santoir on the 
refugees  of the SenegalMauritanian conflict  in  1989  (SantoirJ990a; 199Ob;  1993).  Nonetheless 
the case is interesting since, on several counts, it challenges mainstream views on common 
property resource management. 
Some initial views: 
As mentioned above, a  major thrust of this research  project  has been to  establish  a  theoretical 
*work that could comprise all the  diversities  and  contradictions  observed  during fieldwork 
Such a framework should help me to avoid  the  perception  of  pastoral  societies  as  stagnant  and 
marginalized and enable me to go beyond  the  somewhat  unilineal  perception of  development 
characteristic of much of the NRM and  Common  Property  literature. 
'The Mouride brotherhood is one of the three Sufi Muslim orders which  between  them  claim  spiritual 
allegiance to the Muslim population  of  Senegal  .Since  the turn of the  century,  the  Mouride saints have  provided  the 
framework for a mass movement of agrarian  settlement  which  enabled  them to expand  their  activities  into vast, 
hitherto  uncultivated  areas.(This  will be explained in further detail in  the  following  chapter.) For an exploration of 
the  effects  of Mouride expansion on the  pastoral  economies of the  arrondissement of Barkedji, see Juu1,1993). 
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In order to develop  such  a  framework  a number  of  basic theoretical perspectives are presented 
here: 
a).  The  decline of pastoralism  or drought as a  revelatory  crisis? 
As mentioned abve, many authors speak of  pastoralismwithin a  crisis scenario (see Baxter, 1991; 
de Bruijn and van Dijk,1995; Markakis,l993; FratkinJ997). They consider the 'decline of 
pastoralism' as an  unquestionable,  and  almost  irreversible, fact. But, as shown by Dietz, they 
seldom  define  what  they  mean by decline. Is it  the  decline  in  the  absolute  number  of people that 
can be regarded as pastoralists or is it  a  question of a  decline in the  contribution  of pastoralism to 
pastoral communities? Is this happening  because  of  'depastoralisation' for a proportion of the 
households or because of a  growing  importance of non-pastoral  features  in the economy of the 
households? Or is it the absolute and structural  decline of the number  of animals in the pastoral 
area, due  to either drought  or loss of grazing  lands?  (Dietz,1993:85) 
Compared to decline,  the  term  'crisis'  might  be  considered  a  more  appropriate concept because it 
dows for  the  possibility of recovery (see. Markakis,l993:ix).  But as pastoralism  may be conceived 
of as a model of management in an unpredictable  environment it may be hard  to find periods where 
the term is not applicable.  Even  statements  such  as  Dyson-Hudson's: "The pastoral strategy so 
successful  in the past is no longer  possible"  should be the object of further scrutiny (Dyson- 
Hudson, N., 1985 qu. fromMarkakis,l993:ix). 
Looking at the Fulanis of the  Ferlo, it does  not  seem that an  uncritical adoption of a  'crisis' 
scenario is likely to generate  very  fruitful  insights.  Rather, the 'crisis' or 'decline of  pastoralism' 
scenario tends to work in a  unilinear  way  by  which  the nds are given beforehand and  which is 
insensitive to the positive  and  innovative  aspects of the  post-drought  migration  process. 
An alternative  and  more  open-ended  perspective on pastoral crisis such as droughts is offered by 
Jacqueline  Solway,  who  analyses  the  effects  of  the  1979  and 1987  droughts in Botswana in terms 
of a "revelatory crisis". The term revelatory crisis stems from Marshall Sahlins (1972) and 
describes  a  situation  whereby  socio-  economic  patterns  are  sufficiently interrupted by drought or 
the like, to lay bare contradictions in the  existing  order,  disruptions  that  may have been latent or 
contained  prior to the  drought  (Solway,1994:471). In this way,  drought  may disrupt conventional 
routines  sufficiently  to  allow  actors  to  innovate  normative  codes. Hence, drought becomes a time 
of experimentation  in  which  taboos may  be  violated  and  moral codes flaunted. A period where 
something  which  has  been  unaccepted  becomes  acceptable. 
Solway's  point is that  droughts  are  perfect  scapegoats, a  all  social  dislocations  and sufferings may 
be attriiuted to the drought.  Such  basic  problems such as inequality in access  and  power  relations 
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may be left  unacknowledged  and  therefore  not  confronted. In a paradoxical manner, the drought 
therefore  reveals  and  exposes  contradictions  and  deteriorating conditions, while at the same time 
permitting  them to  be concealed  and  mystified  (ibid.:473). 
In many  African  societies,  the  relations  existing  around  reciprocal access to, for example, water 
sources  play  a  significant  role  in  binding  communities  together  in n tworks of  rights  and  obliga- 
tions.  But  other items of  property  also  lend  themselves  to  reciprocal  use. In fact, local concepts 
of property facilitate  reciprocal  use as rights to property are simultaneously  individuated and 
dispersed. Most  items may  be  identified  with an individual,  but at the same time  a larger group 
maintains  use  rights  to  the  'family  estate'.  This  is  not  to  say  that there is no difference in access, 
rather  that  property  exists  in  a  continuum.  Commodification  may therefore grant greater, but  not 
complete,  legitimacy to the  rights  of  the  individual or the  narrow group of owners. But while  one 
person's  claims  may  rule  out  the  viability  of  others',  it  does  not  preclude the other claims, nor  does 
it  negate the legitimacy  of  these  claims.  Such a system  obviously  invites constant redefinition  and 
negotiation. often it  result  in  a  whole  series of counter  claims being made among kin (ibid.: 482- 
484). 
Depending upon  their  location in the politico-economic structure farmers and herders have 
&rent  and  at times competing  interests  and  interpretations  as  to  the xtent of legitimate  claims 
to property. Whatever their claims, local conceptions of property still render a variety of 
contradictory  claims  legitimate. To deny  such  claims  therefore requires a  rationalisation that is 
rarely  universally  accepted. 
In such a  situation,  a  locally  recognized  crisis  such  as  a drought, offers an opportunity for a 
redef~tion of the range and  priority  of  property  relations  and  claims. Drought to some extent 
becomes  a  licence or moral  pretext  for  the  denial  of  communal claims where  refusal,  before  the 
drought,  would  have  been  considered  anti-social. 
In Solway's  example, the local  emerging  commercial elite have  used the drought as a  pretext to 
withdraw  economic  resources  from  the  pool  available for communal  purposes.  This step by the 
local  elite is part  of a  process of  commodification  of  social  relations. Illustrations of this process 
are:  reducing  the sharing of milk as part  of a  shift  towards  commercial livestock production1o  and 
the  way in  which  richer  farmers  avoid  their  traditional  obligations  of lending their draught  oxen 
for plowing the  fields  of  their  destitute kin by converting to tractors that do not so easily  lend 
themselves  to  reciprocal  use". 
lo The  longer  the  calves  suckle,  the  faster  they  reach mahuity  which in turn means  more frequent calvings, 
"With  regard to transformations  occurring  at  other  more  ideological  levels,  Solway points to the experimenta- 
tion by some of the  more  wealthy  households  with  'new'  syncretic  religions based on  westem  Christian  individua- 
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As we shall see later on, the denial of access to water from certain  deep  wells in Senegal,  or  the 
appropriation  by  herders  of private grazing  grounds or privately dug wells,  are  similar  examples 
of transgressions on codes of conduct which,  due to the context of  drought,  have  become  less 
improper. 
Not only may the elite use drought as an opportunity for changing presumably fxed social 
relations.  Drought  may also provide an opportunity or  a  point of entry for the state to insert itself 
in the  life of citizens in new  and  unexpected ways e.g. as the  instrumental  effects of drought  relief 
measures12. 
In the pursuit  of a  less one-dimensional image of the  processes of adaptation  to  the  post-drought 
situation in Northern Senegal, I have sought to avoid the crisis  perspective and its derived 
orthodoxies.  By  analyzhg  drought in the  perspective of a  revelatory  crisis,  a  wider  perspective is 
retained. This perspective stresses the multiple and  often  contradictory  courses  that  development 
in the  region  may  take. It leaves open the possibility  that  counter-hypotheses  might  emerge. 
b). Stagnation or adaptation: 
In the 1970s and 198Os, pastoralist research was dominated by the cultural  ecology  framework 
of adaptation. In trying to explain  how pastoralists responded to drought and  environmental 
change,  anthropologists  and ecologists emphasized the rationality of pastoral  land  use  systems 
based on herd flexibility, diversity and mobility13. In order to  “rehabilitate”  herders  from  the 
perception  that  they are irrational destroyers of  their  immediate  environment,  a  counter  image of 
pastoralism was put forward. This image  views  herders  as  enaged  in  the  one  and  only  form  of 
resource  exploitation  which can  work  out in a sustainable  manner  under the difficult  conditions 
characterizing m s t  pastoral  areas.  Inherent  in this counter  image is a  tendency  to  portray  pastoral 
societies  as  timeless  and conservative, often with  a  “penchant”  towards  ecological  determinism. 
Because  nomads or pastoralist live under such  harsh  conditions, at great climatic  risk, it is held 
that  they are unwilling to change the well-adapted  and  balanced patterns of resource  use  which 
they  have developed  over  many generations.Consequently, difficult  and  risky  conditions  tend  to 
discourage openness to economic and social e~perimentation’~. In this way, this perception 
liim. This  illustrates  the  attempt by the elite to fmd cosmologies more consistent  to  their  emerging  world  views  than 
those  grounded  in the  ancestors  which a f f i i  principles of mutual  responsibility  and  where  ones’  wellbeing s 
in sepb le  from that of ones’ kin. 
”See  Ferguson, 1990, and also chapter 2. 
”See  notably  Dahl  and  Hjort, 1976. 
‘%S point is made  in Dahl and  Hjorts  volume  on  the  Beja Nomads of North Eastern Sudan with  the  illustrative 
title “Responsible  man” . It is,  however,  important to stress  that  although Dahl  and  Hjort  stress  the  conservative 
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contributes to re-enforce a picture of pastoral  societies as stagnant  and  unchangeable  (see  also 
Khazanov,  1984:69-71). 
But, as outlined  by Pouillon (1990),  pastoral  societies turn out to  be less secluded,  specialised  and, 
not  the  least, less static than  anticipated. As shown  by  Khazanov  (1984:82-84), it is hard  to find 
societies subsisting  only on pastoral produce.  Rather  than  self-sufficient  and  isolated,  pastoral 
societies relate actively to other parts of  society;  through  markets,  states  etc.  They  are  better 
characterized as a multi-resource system which is capable of adapting very quickly to new 
opporhmities. 
In a  recent  article,  Salzman  reflects  on  a  propensity in his earlier  works to deduce  the  character 
of social  institutions from the character of  the  env&onment". In doing so, he  emphasized  the 
environmental impact upon  social  institutions,  while  neglecting  the  underlying  cultural 
components.  Nonetheless,  adaptations  such as pastoral  nomadism  should  be  understood  as  cultural 
constructions brought to the environment, rather than behavior patterns generated by the 
environment  (Salzman,  1995:161).  For,  although  human  adaptation  to  an  area  takes  account of 
the environmental conditions, it is important to stress that there  are many kinds of adaptations. 
Many  independent  influences - in terms of  knowledge,  technology,  organization  and  values - which 
in  any  particular  chain of causality lie behind  a  particular  outcome.  Hence it is necessary  to  adopt 
a  pluralist  perspective that stresses multicausality and focuses  upon  the  interaction of many 
different factors as the processes generating  the  patterns  of human custom  and  action,  that we 
wish to understand  (ibid.:163). 
I do not adhere to a concept of adaptation confined to describe  the  slow,  and  unconscious, 
response to changes in the economic  and  natural  environment. On the  contrary, I conceive of 
adaptation as  the concious adoption of a  large  number  of  different  innovations  enhancing  the 
ability to cope  with constraints and to take advantage of new  opportunities.  Needless  to  say, this 
does  not  imply  that abilities for taking advantage of  new situations  are  equally  distributed among 
individuals. 
strain in  Beja culture, to explain the stn~ctural reasons why  innovations are likely  to  be  confined  rather  than  spread  in 
Beja  population,  they reject the timelessness  associated with  the  traditional  stereotype of herders  stressing  that  the 
Beja  have  adapted to changes in  their  surroundngs  but have  done it in a way as to saveguard  their  cultural  and  social 
identity as well as their resources from  external  intrusion.(Hjort af 6mXs and  Dahl, 1991:3,8) 
"The individualistic and uncoordinated  nomadic movements of Somali  herders were seen as resulting  from  the 
scanty,  erratic  and  unpredictable  distribution of rainfall and  pastures  white  the  regular  and  well-coordinated 
movements of the  Basseri of South Persia  resulted from the  predictability  and  generosity of their  natural  environ- 
ment On the  political  level the differences  between the contingent  polity of the Somali based  on  alliances  between 
political  allegiance to a central authority, the Tribal  Chief,  (i.e.  egalitarian  vs.  hierarchic  features)  could  also  be 
strong  corporate  groups of patrilineal kin of the  Somalis as opposed to the  tribal  organization ofthe Basseri  based on 
explained  with  reference to the specificities of the  climatic  conditions (Salman, 1995:159). 
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c). Pastoralists, Politics and the State. 
The  perspective  of  most  recent  nomadic  studies  argue,  explicitly or implicitly,  that nomads become 
increasingly  marginalized, not the  least in their  relations  with  the  state.  Klute summarizes some 
of  the  most  prominent  views of the  relations  between  pastoralist  and  the state (1996:3). Nomads 
are, in most cases,  perceived  as  victims of the  state.  The  relations  between  nomad  and state are 
characterized by  mutual  misunderstandings,  lack  of  comprehension  and  conflicting perceptions in 
almost  every  aspect.  According to Salih (1990) this is a  "hindrance  to  any  meaningful communica- 
tion  between the two parties".  It  is  also  argued  that nomadic groups  are put under enormous 
political pressure  which  leads  to  their  economic  and/or  political  marginalization.  Nomads are 
described as unable to cope with  decisions  imposed on  them  by administrators  and development 
experts. The reaction  of  nomads is described  as  refusal,  retreat  or  resistance. 
Attempting to give a  more  balanced  view of state-nomad  relations,  recent  studies  have sought to 
understand  nomads  not  only as passive  victims  of the  state  but  also  as  active  agents in the nomad- 
state  relationship.  Reviewing  the  histories  of n mdic groups  presupposes  a far more differentiated 
relationship,  ranging  fromconflict,  through  co-operation  to  incorporation. Just like other groups, 
they have  interfered  with,  and  manipulated,  the  colonial and  postcolonial state. Sometimes by 
reinforcing  their  ethnic  identity  and  strengthening  national  identies,  at  other  times  by incorporating 
themselves into the state apparatus:  by  acquiring  high-ranking  positions or well paid posts. 
At the local level too, herders  actively  manipulate  and  re-interpret  the  policy discourses offered 
by state administrators,  bending  them  to  their  own  advantage.  Not  least  because  of the physical 
distance between the state apparatus and the areas occupied by the herders, Sara Berry 
perceptions  of  state-peasant  relationshp as being  intrusive  rather than hegemonic  (Berry  1993:48) 
seems relevant  for  understanding the relationship  between  herders  and  the state  in the Ferlo region. 
Within mainstream NRIvl thinking, it has been fashionable to attribute detrimental resource 
management practices to the  effects  of  obtrusive  state  policies.  The  panacea to improve local 
management has therefore  been to  transfer  authority  from  centralist  state institutions to local user 
groups. Such groups are considered to be more  responsible  towards their common productive 
assets. 
But,  as shown by Goheen  (1992),  Peters  (1984;1994)  and  Berry  (1993;1994),  policy initiatives 
such as the  devolution  of  power  over  resources  to  local  institutions do ot function in a vacuum. 
Rather,  they  feed  into  ongoing  local  struggles  for  political  power  and  material  gain. For, contrary 
to what is often believed, these new state-sponsored institutions have not eradicated older 
political  formations. Rather, the new resources  generated  contribute to re-invogorating older 
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political  alliances  and  divisions or  to fuelling  new  ones  (Peters, 199445). Hence  devolution of 
power  from  state to local government contributes to opening new arenas for struggle:  arenas  in 
which  local  elites  can  manouevre to maintain or re-inforce  their  political  power. 
In this  process  control  over  key  resources  such as boreholes  becomes  a  means  to  acquire  political 
power.  The  new state-promoted institutions - such  as  borehole  committees  and rural councils - 
become  vital  institutions in local  political  and  economic  life and are  used  as  such by the local 
political  elite. Local struggles  over  access to resources  therefore  tend  to  become  politicized  as  they 
are mixed with  struggles  for larger political goals. For  these  reasons,  debates  about, for example, 
the  running  and  maintenance of boreholes  become  very  political. 
Consequently,  the  transformation of livestock  and  resource  management  systems  in  the  aftermath 
of droughts  must be regarded as both a social and  a  political  process.  Hence,  rights  and  control 
over  boreholes, land and livestock constitute highly  contested  terrains. 
It is this conception which will be adopted here.  This  is in contrast to the simplistic policy 
presciptions  presented  above. These policies  overlook  the  political  and  social  aspects of resource 
management. But by so doing, such politicies do not mesh  with  the  actual  realities  of  social  life 
and are therefore  not  very  meaningful. 
d)  Landscapes  and  the  transformation  of  the  environment. 
In much  of the  literature of an environmentalist  stamp,  landscapes  are  perceived as  being  almost 
inevitably  in a  process of  degradation. In the light of the Ferlo  case,  where  overgrazing in spite of 
rapidly  growing animal pressure  appears  not o  be a  pressing  issue,  the  need  for  a  more  ‘spacious’ 
framework for  understanding environmental change  has  surfaced  during  the  process of finishing 
this  dissertation. 
Such an alternative  view is offered by Leach et al.(1997:14) who stress that  landscapes  and 
environmental  change may be regarded as “the  result of combinations of contingent  factors, 
conditionned  by  human  intervention, somtimes the active outcome of management,  and  often  the 
result of uintended  consequences”. 
The  importance  of  regarding  landscapes a transforming,  not  only  degrading,  has  been  emphasised 
in recent  works  by geographers, anthropologists and others (see for example  Leach  and  Meams, 
1996; Leachet al.,  1997;  Parkin and Croll, 1992;  Fairhead  and  Leach, 1996 and  Peet  and  Watts, 
1996).  Such  works  have  tried to merge  the  insights  of  the  new  ecology  with  a  better  understanding 
of  the  land  use  practices  of  Africa’s  farmers  and  herders. In their  view,  landscapes  should  be 
regarded as the  product  of  both  ecological  and  social  history.  The  application  of  such  an  historical 
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approach may,  according to them, be a  key to reveal  the  logic  and  rationality  of indigenous 
knowledge and  organisation in NRM. For, as the  spatial  and  temporal  variability is stressed, 
together with  the  non-equilibia  processes  and  the  histones  of  disturbance  eventsI6 , a  different view 
of  landscapes as transforming,  instead ofjust degrading,  emerges”.  (Leach  and  Mearns, 1997:14). 
The  method proposed is to frame  environmental  issues  as  ‘people  in  places’  and  as part of a 
history. This sets  quite  different  questions  about  people-environmnt  interaction  and  the ecological 
processes  driving  environmental  change.  Instead  of  concentrating o   the character  and degree of 
degradation and on how  harmony  may  be  reinstalled, we  need to  ask  questions  such as: “Which 
social  actors see what components of variable  and  dynamic  ecologies as resources at different 
times?”,  “How do different  social  actors  gain  access  to and control  over  resources?’ or “How 
does natural resource use by different social actors transform different components of the 
environment?”.  (Leach et al., 1997:14).  Here  the  focus  is  on  local  communities  seen  as  a group 
of  differentiated  social  actors,  while  the  undifferentiated  ‘environment’  has  been  replaced or rather 
disaggregated into a  number  of  particular  environmental  goods  and  services.  What is being 
examined is the way  in  which  different  social actors gain  the  neccesary  capacities to legitimate 
command  over  resources.  Effectiveness  is  highlighted  in  order  to  emphasise  that  resource claims 
often are contested and  that,  in  the  power  relations  prevailing,  some  actors are  likely  to have more 
weight than others. In addition, some actors  may  be  unable to mobilize  the  neccesaty resources 
(capital or labour) in order to make  efficient  use  of  other  assets  (for  example  land).  Finally,  the 
issue of legitimacy is central  because  sources of legitimacy  may  conflict  and  different actors may 
expouse different views of the  legitimacy of a  given  activity ( Leach  et al.  1997:16-18). 
This very  interesting  point of entry  could  easily  have  been  developed  more  than  has  been th  case 
in the present work. Nonetheless,  the  need  for  differentiating  the  social actors and  perceiving 
environmental transformation  as  open  ended  are  central  understandings  to this dissertation. 
Methodology 
In the  introductoIy  comments  presented  above,  attempts have  been  made to establish a framework 
for  understanding  recent  developments in the  Sahel  more  fitted to embrace the often contradictory 
processes observed during fie1dwork.Crucial to this attempt has been the promotion of a 
perception  of  drought as a  process  of  change  containing  new  opportunities as well as constraints. 
The conventional wisdom  underlying  many projects  related to post-drought  rehabilitation  and 
improved  resource  management  tends  to  consider  drought  periods a  year  zero; to which  may be 
attributed a  ‘before’  and  an  ‘after’.  “Before” is synonymous  with  ‘the  traditional‘ , where balance 
These issues will be elaborated  further in chapter 2. 
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of nature prevailed,  while  'after'  refers  to  present  turmoil  or  'crisis'.  Obviously, such short term 
historical perspectives are not well fitted to understand  long  term  processes  of continuity and 
adaptation f?om  which  contemporary  pastoral  societies  are  formed. The  issue of time or historicity 
is therefore  central  to  the  conception  of  change as disruption or continuity.  Emphasizing  continuity 
and adaptation and  avoiding  characterizing  traditional  societies  as  stagnant entails looking at 
development in a  longer time span. 
But how  can one unravel  the  changes  occurring  at  the  local  level,  take  account  of the diversities 
and  contradictions  observed  and  distinguish  between  change  as  crisis  and  disruption or change as 
transition or even continuity? 
One possibility  is  the  detailed  historical  study, as the  one  offered in Pauline Peters' fascinating 
account of  the  process of division of the common  range  of  Botswana  since the days of the 
Protectorate. Peters  gives  a  detailed  account of  how the  shifting  discourses  of the alternating 
representatives  of  the  colonial  and  post-colonial  administrations  were  used  and manipulated by the 
Tswana elites to fit their own political purposes. This enables us to understand how the 
"traditional" institutions representing the interests of the tribe (kgotla) have adapted and 
transformed in such a way that  the  "modem  institutions in charge  of managing local resources in 
many ways function  as  a  mere  overlay  to  the  traditional  structures  of  dominance" . 
Such an in depth  historical  approach  has  not  been th  objective  or  ambition of this study. First of 
al, I do not have  sufficient  historical  material.  Although my field  area  covers more than 50.000 
square km, its classification, in a  geography  textbook,  as  "un  vide  demographique  a  l'est"", is by 
no means a  coincidence. The Ferlo  is  certainly  not  among  the  best  described parts of Senegalese 
hisrory. In spite of its all embracing  title: "Les Paysans  du Sknigal", no chapter is offered on the 
Fulanis  of the Ferlo in the  celebrated  volume  on rural Senegal  by  Paul  Pelissier." Although much 
work has  been  done in recent years to unravel  the  histories  of  the  powerful kingdoms of pre- 
colonial Senegal l9 very  few  attempts  have  been  made  to  establish  a  broad historical account of 
the Ferlo."  Singular  exceptions  are  Mark  Freudenberger's  dissertation from 1994 on the history 
" a demographic  void  towards  the  east" 
He does beat the  Mouride  encroachment on  Fulani  grazing  lands  but  only further  south,  in  Senegal 
Oriental 
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l'&; le Royaume du Galam" from  1989 and Abdoulaye  Bara-Diops  classic  account  of  Wolof  society:  "La soci6ti 
See notably  Bouhacar  Barry's "Le royaume  du Waalo" from  1985,  Abdoulaye  Bathily "Les portes de 
wolof'from 1981. 
2o A  few  more  contemporary  studies  such as Marguerite  Dupire's  study  of the  social  organization of the 
Peul  Djengelhe of Djoloff  (Dupire  1970) as well as a  few  mainly  descriptive  articles  have  heen  published  on  the 
region  (Adam, J: from  1915  and Oumar Ba  on  Fulanis of the  Djoloff  in  the  19th  century).  Finally  Grenier's important 
work in relation to  the  installation of the first boreholes  in  the  1950's as well  as the  historical  accounts in Santoir and 
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of gum arabic  production  in the Linguere department and  a short article,  by  Michel  Benoit  from 
1988, on the  historical  development of the landscape of  Ferlo". 
Obviously,  more  historical  material  could  have  been  found i  the accounts  of  the  administrative 
officers in  charge  of  the  area  during  the colonial  period.  Nonetheless,  that I have  limited my  visits 
to  the  hot  and  dusty  offices  of  the  "Archives  Nationales" in Dakar is quite  deliberate.  Rather  than 
being an historical  record, my work  has centered on recent change  as it is  perceived by the 
different  actors  in  the  field. Such accounts are rarely found  in the archives  and it has  been  time- 
consuming  enough to unfold  the intricacies  of Fulani production  patterns  and  local  politics in the 
field. 
Studying processes of social change in a relatively  narrow time perspective, as I have  done, 
involves  a  number of uncomfortable  methodological  problems: 
"Can  change be seen in  field  work  and can fieldwork be  done  with  a  historical  attitude even when 
there  are no historical  records?" asks  Sally  Falk Moore and continues with  a  number  of  pertinent 
but also  equally  disturbing  questions:  "How does one study how a transformational  sequence is 
generated over time", "how does  one  study social change as change-in-the-making, i.e. as a 
historical  process in constant  movement ?" And finally, " how does one distinguish the transitory 
from the durable,  cultural  change  from persistence  and  how  can one generalize from the local and 
time-specific, from the "small history" to a social and cultural totality (Moore, 1994371, 
1987:727). 
Drawing on historical  records  is  of course important as it is good to know as much  as  possible 
abu t  how  the  past  came  into  being  and  what  type of s quences  of  transformation came into being 
before the present acquired its shape (Moore, 1994:371). Without such information many 
relatively recent practices may appear utterly 'traditional' to the outsider, as was shown in 
Hobsbawm  and  Rangers  path-breaking  volume: "The Invention of Tradition"  (Hobsbawm et al. 
1983).  But as the  traditional lived in the  present no longer is the same object as it was in the lived- 
in  past,  little is gained if the social facts  collected during fieldwork are categorized in two different 
conceptual bins,  according  to  whether  they are old or new, traditional or  modem. Rather, there 
is a fair  chance  that  any  evidence  of  change is lost (Moore,  1994:371). As the object of dynamic 
analysis is how the  transformational  sequence is generated over time,  one  cannot, as stressed by 
Moore, content oneself  simply  with  an historical  account in which fieldwork is presented as the 
Bmals works &ve hints to  the  pre-drought  tenure  and resource management  systems of the  area. 
zlThis tendency  to  omit  the interior part of the country is also the case in newer biographies on  Senegal's 
recent  economic and political  development  such as M o m  Coumba  Diop's "Stntgal, Trajectoires dun Etat",  Dakar 
1992, or Makta~ Dioufs "S&n6gaI, les ethnies et ia Nation" UNRISD, 1994. 
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terminal  point. It  is  crucial  to  conceive  of the present as a  time  from  which  the  next  moment  will 
emerge. 
Moore  proposes  that we adopt  a  time-oriented  perspective on both continuiv and  change, by 
studying  events  as part of  a  processual  analysis,  a process perspective. This perspective  is in 
contrast to the idea of a  received order that is then  changed  (the crisiddisruption perspective 
mentioned  above).  The  analytical  emphasis  here is on continuous  production  and  construction 
without  differentiating  between  repetition  and  innovation.  (Moore,  1987:729). 
Obviously,  traditional  field  work - in-depth interviews etc. - is important for obtaining  a  general 
comprehension  of the  setting. But in consequence  of  discarting  the  unilineal  development  view, 
the  focus is more  directed  towards  peoples’  practices, situations and  events. So it becomes  crucial 
to adopt a field methodology that is open towards, and can capture, the unexpected and 
unintended. 
Events  have,  according to  Moore, the advantage of taking place  at  a  particular  moment  in  a  time 
stream,  giving  them a Merent standing from those forms of data  that  present  themselves a being 
timeless. This provides  the  data  with  a  sort  of  purity as spontaneous  local  information,  in  contrast 
to the  interview  material  elicited  and  generated  directly b   the  researcher.  Events  as  data  comprise 
both  observed  and  recounted  events as well as peoples’ reactions to  them.  The  action  and  reaction 
is locally  constituted  and  locally produced.  Most important, however, is that  events  often  involve 
a  number  of  persons,  who are so to speak situated at the crossroads,  where many different 
interests  and  visions  intersect. It is precisely  in  these  intersections  that  evidence of change may  be 
identified. In the  words  of  Sally Fallc Moore: 
“Events situate people in an unedited and pre-analyzed context,  before the cultural 
ideas  they carry and  the strategies they employ are extracted  and  subjected to the 
radical  reorganization and the hygienic order of the anthropologists  analytical purpose. 
They  contain  the possibility of  learning  something new”. (Moore,  1994:365) 
While  unfolding  an  event,  the  locus  of certain struggles of control  over the future, may be 
identified.  Because  the  people  involved are  acutely  aware of the ways in which  they  want  to  shape 
their  future, things that  were  formerly  veiled  may become visible  as  part  of  a  sequence. In this way 
a  processual  approach  conceptualizes  the  present as an emerging  moment,  and is concerned  with 
the present  as  a  point  in  time  from  which the next moment will  emerge. 
Obviously  not all events  have  the  same  explanatory  value. Some events  have  diagnostic  qualities 
and  contribute  to  identify  political  and economic change by  eliciting  the  interests  and  strategies 
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of p a r t i c h  social groups. Others  may be termed “articulated events  since  they  reveal  the  locus 
of different political interests (ibid.). As stressed by Lund (1994:13), diagnostic events are 
obviously not generalizable in  themselves, but give hints to certain  patterns of processes that 
should be looked for. 
Returning to the issue of  resilience  versus  change, it seems  that  many  cases  contain  part of both. 
Larger  processes are made  up  of  smaller  processes  and  these  processes,  often  seemingly  separate, 
interact and spill over into one another.  Accordingly  the  choice of  unit  of  analysis  and  time 
perspective  will  tend to be crucial  for  whether  continuity  or  transitory  features  predominate  in  the 
explanation of a particular sequence  (Lund, 199415). 
In the interpretation  of my  case material I have  used  the  notion of  ‘event’  in  two  slightly  different 
ways. In unraveling  the  immediate  effects  of  drought-related  migration  on  the  production  systems 
of the  Ferlo in chapter 4, I have  described  the  droughts  of  the  1970s  and  early  1980s as watershed 
events. In contrast to this, the disentaglement in chapter  5  of  the  political  processes of adjusting 
the political  and  social  institutions  to new  emerging  order  which  followed the  ‘watershed’  has  been 
treated as events of articulation. 
As wil be argued, the severe droughts of 1972/73 and 1983/84 brought about profound 
transforrnations of the  herd  management  systems as  well  as  of  the  social  relations.  Hence,  the two 
situations,  ‘before’  and  ‘after’  the  drought  were,  by  any  standard,  highly  dissimilar. In chapter 4, 
the  drought  and  the  consequent migration  will  therefore be perceived as the  events  which  form  the 
backcloth for the analysis of the  changes in the  production  systems  that  ensued.  Although  process- 
oriented, in the sense that the  open  ended  perspective hopefully  prevails, the concrete 
disentaglement of the logic of the new range management systems put into work by the 
newcomers is based on more  traditional‘  fieldwork.  It is a combination  of  in-depth interviews  and 
more quantitative research methods  involving  questionnaire  survey  and  collection  of  statistical 
data. This is in contrast to chapter 5, where the political  struggles  and  social  manoeuvring are 
described. Here  the role of  events,  understood as local  strife or conflicts or just ‘events’  are  far 
more central. 
Albeit more inclined towards qualitative  research  methods, t h i s  oscillation  between  quantative 
research and in-depth  interviews  proved  very  fruitful. In fact my initial  interest  in  FuutankoBe 
herding strategies was triggered by a  mapping  exercise  carried  out  in  1991while I was  working 
at the  Centre de Suivi Ecologique (CSE). With  a  compass  and  the  trip  controller  of the car I 
managed to map the differences m settlement  strategies  between  livestock-rich  and less livestock- 
rich agro-pastoralists. This proved largely  to  coincide  with the distribution  between  firstcomers 
and newcomers. This material, together with data on the  pastoral  production  systems  collected 
during  the  three years were I worked as a  sociologist at the CSE  in Dakar,  provided  a good 
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starting point to concentrate  more  specifically on the  FuutankoBe  herders  and  their  insertion i  
the  production  systems  of  Southem  Ferlo.  During  the  fieldtrips  which  followed  (between  february 
1993 and april 1995) I mainly concentrated on in-depth interviews with newcomers and 
firstcomers, state administrators  at  different  levels,  as  well  as  members of the  rural  councils and 
the  well-comittees.  Motivated  by  Christian  Santoir  from ORSTOM, who insisted  on  the  need to 
get  a  more  exact  picture of the  actual  dimension of the  post-drought  migration, I also carried out 
a  rudimentary  census on population  and  livestock  populations  around  the 7 wells  most favoured 
by FuutankoBe migrants in 1994. Finally, my assistant  conducted  a  questionnaire  survey on 
migration patterns among 53 households  in  April  1995. 
In general,  Sara Berry's  proposition  that we trace  peoples'  movements  through  interviews and 
observation, as a  means  of  understanding  the  porousness  and  flexibility  of  social  and spatial 
boundaries has  been  an  important  source  of  inspiration. In my own attempt to trace herders 
movements, I have  particularly  focused  on  the  opportunities  and  obstacles  faced  by  herders in their 
movements  and  settlements.  Following my informants  as  they  travelled  from  one  place  to an ther 
enabled me to gain  insight into the ways  in  which  they  organized  their  diversified patterns of 
income  generation,  the  labour  requirements  of  the  alternating  production  strategies  and  how social 
networks  were established  and  maintained  across  space  and  time. In certain  cases I have also 
visited  family members remaining  in the area of origin  in  order  to  grasp  the  diversity of outcomes 
ftom the post-drought  situation.  Many  hours  have  been  spent o  bumpy  and curved dirt roads in 
order  to join informants  who  had  suddenly  moved to new  grazing  grounds up to 100 km away 
from their original camp. Here, the precision by which neighbours could inform us of the 
whereabuts of our informants also gave a  good  impression  of  the  effectiveness of "radio-brousse- 
sans-fil"". This information is not  incorporated  in its entirity in this study, but has provided 
important background  material  for  understanding  strategies  pursued by the  various  herders. 
In many ways my  research  method  has  been as opportunistic as the  herding  strategies  employed 
by my informants. Often it has  been  more or less  by  accident  that I have learnt  about certain 
conflicts which later proved  very  informative. In general,  people in the  bush  are  not eager to 
recount  their  conflicting  relations  to  strangers.  But my interpreter  and I fmally  acquired  some fame 
as the odd couple crossing  through  the  Ferlo  that  people became  more  willing to reveal their 
knowledge  and  opinions on local  controversies.  Consequently our itinerary  has  often  been  changed 
in order to examine more  closely  certain  events  and  phenomena. 
In the course of  my  fieldwork I became  increasingly  aware  that  conflicts  related  to  management 
of  local resources were,  in many cases,  less  associated  with  competition access  to resources 
than  with  competition  over  political  and  economic  resources  generated  by  the  new  situation. These 
2z 'Wire-less bush radio", i.e. rumours. 
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are  the issues  discussed mainly in  chapter 5.  In order to unravel these intricacies, I realized  the 
need to concentrate  on  events  and c o a t s  to  understand the strategies and motivation as well as 
the  contraints  and  possibilities  faced by  the  diferent  parties to a conflict. 
Many of the insights I have  gained  during  my  fieldwork on pastoral  mobility  have  been  sparked 
off by such events - whether small  or big. In several cases events have contributed to modify 
stereotypes of power relations that I had acquired through my initial interviews. Such a 
stereotypes is that of the  politically  well-organized  sedentary  herders a being powerful  vis-&vis 
the migrating and therefore marginalized newcomers.This static picture of the relationship 
between  sedentary  and  migrants  obviously did  not  explain  why the migrants, who were  becoming 
progressively richer and more well established, apparently endured a situation of political 
subordination. It  gave  few  hints as to  the  room  for manoeuvre possessed by the newcomers. 
Hence,  it  was  primarily  the  insights  acquired  by  looking at events which enabled me  to look into 
the  unconventional  and  illicit  ways of gaining  control over resources. 
Furthermore,  departing  fcom  the  unfolding  of concrete events also helped  overcome  problems of 
discussing future strategies with opportunistic herders who for obvious reasons found such 
hypothetical  interrogation  thoroughly  nonsensical.  The actions and reactions of the various actors 
engaged in  a certain event or sequence  provided a far more useful platform for discussing  the 
various strategies and  tactics  deployed  as  well  as  the resources that the individual actors could 
dispose  of. 
Fblly, I have  not  had  the  opportunity  of  carrying out  a long unbroken period of fieldwork. Such 
an continual  stay  would  obviously  have  permitted  me  to  follow the evolution  of local conflicts  in 
a far more thorough and fmt-hand manner.  Nevertheless, the many but shorter trips  that I have 
made to the  region  over  a  period  of 7 years  have  enabled me to observe changes in  institutions  and 
practices  and to discuss  these  changes  with  my  respondents. In this way I have  been  able to trace 
at least some of the more  subtle  changes  in  the  arrangements  of ocial activity over time. 
This flexile attitude  turned  out  to be an  important means of  gaining  insight into the ways in which 
social relations,  which  are  under  continual  construction, reconstruction and adaptation to the 
current situation. It also enabled me to grasp the meanings that people attribute to rules, 
regulations  etc. 
Methodological queries: 
To evaluate whether the  events  observed  and the processes of which  they were part should be 
characterized as sequences  of  reproduction  or as processes of changes - and whether such changes 
are replicable - is yet  another  problem. 
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I have had the  opportuniw of coming  back to my field area on several  occasions  during  the  period 
1988 to 1995. I enabled me to observe  many  signs of the  rapid  growth of the  local  economy:  The 
dramatic increase m the mmber of small hasti constructed  shops in the  central  villages  and  in  tiny 
settlements,  the  upsurge and increasing  importance of the  itinerant  weekly  markets,  etc.  But  first 
and foremost I have been  alble to observethe  growing  wealth  and  general  well-being of my 
respondents  -the fruit of very  hard labor and  successful  economic  calculation. 
Nevertheless, I have relatively  few  tangible  indications  to  display  of  the  wonderful  success  story 
that I claim is taking place among  herders in northern  Senegal.  Being  neither  a  veterinarian  nor  a 
botanist  my  capabilities for making  an  independent  assessment as  to  whether  or  not  rangelands  are 
degrading is limited.  Nor have I the experience  to  evaluate  more  thoroughly  the  herding  skills of 
my respondents. Hence I have  had to accept  statements given  by  my  respondents  regarding  the 
development of the quality of the pastures,  accepting  that  when  neither  newcomers  nor frst- 
comers  regarded  degradation or overgrazing as a  pressing  issue,  the  acuteness  of  the  problem  was 
likely to be limited.  Where it has k n  possible I have,  nonetheless,  incorporated  available  data  on 
range and herd structures. But,  as I have  discussed  elsewhere,24  data  on  livestock 
numbers  and  herd size is notoriously  erroneous,  and  must be  used  with  great  caution. 
Evaluating peoples' level of wealth is equally an issue  apt to  give  the  researcher  a  headache. As 
I have normally stayed overnight with those families that have been my primary sources of 
information,  and whose households I have  visited  regularly  over  a  period f 5  to 7 years, I have 
been  able to observe pattern of expenditures as well  as  the  growing  number of  animals  returning 
to the paddock at night. On such  occasion I have  of course  tried  approximately  to  estimate  the 
cuurent sizdgrowth of the flocks. Such  a method is of course  far from conclusive  as  the  estimates 
had to be made discretely in order  not  to  offend my host.  Fortunately,  the  practice of lending  or 
borrowing of cattle between households well-known in other parts of the Sahel, is highly 
infrequent in th is  area. Hence, the estimations  are  primarily  disturbed by  those  frequent  cases  in 
which  part  of the  flock  was  lost in the bush  and  had to  be traced  by  the  herder  in  the  course of the 
night. Such assessments could, however, only  be  made  with the 3 or 4 families to whom I had 
particularly close ties. In order to assess  the  actual  increase in livestock  due  to  the new herding 
techniques, I have had to rely on the very  unreliable  statistics of the  Direction  de  1'Elevage  of 
Dakar  and a few other sources (this problem will be  taken up  in  chapter 3). 
In the early part of my fieldwork I have  also  tried  to  look at household  expenditures as a  means 
Miehe  1990, Tluczykont et a.l.1991). 
23 Notably the very  thorough work canied by Miehe  and the staff of the GTZ project in Widou  Tingol  (see 
24 Juul,  K.1990 "Animal Counting  in Northern Senegal, (Ferlo). Proceeding from the  Danish Sahel 
Workshop. 
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of  assessing  differences  in  standards  of livin?. The interesting result of this tedious work was that 
the  difference  in  terms  of  expenditures  between  households of the  various wealth categories was 
remarkably small. The goods purchased, mainly foodstuff, varied primarily according to the 
number of  household  members.  Even  among  the very  well-off  families,  very few luxury  items 
figured  in  the  (declared)  budget. This may be  explained  partly  by  a  mobile  and risk prone lifestyle 
where  the  amount of luggage is kept  to  a min ium and  where  luxury habits are restrained as the 
risk  of  drought,  disease  and  destitution  are  ever  present  prospects.  Nonetheless peoples’ abilities 
to invest in donkey carts, expensive tarpaulins and even the digging of wells etc. may be 
considered  as  reliable  indicators of, at  least,  some  herders’  ability to make  a substantial surplus. 
With respect to whether  the  events  unfolding  locally  in  Ferlo  villages  may be generalized on a 
larger scale, I shall  not  conceal  that  a  certain  uneasiness  crept  over  me as I pored over the 
thorough  study by de Bruijn  and  van  Dijk  on  insecurity  among FulBe  agro-pastoralists in Central 
Mali. Although  they  draw  on  much  of the  same  theoretical  inputs as I do, the conclusions drawn 
are quite di~simila?~. Framing their research  as  a  study  of  insecurity,  they infer that the situation 
is ”an example of economic,  social  and  moral  disintegration  in  a  context  of unremitting decline of 
ecological,  economic  and  political  conditions”  (de  Bruijn  and  van  Dijk,  1995:500). This is pretty 
much the exact opposite of my own  conclusions from Ferlo. 
Evidently, these  discrepancies  may  to  a  large  extent b  attributed  to differences of context. Mali 
was  far harder hit by the droughts of the seventies and eighties than Senegal was and the 
hierarchical structure of  FulBe  society  in  Mali  might  have  been  less adaptive to  the post drought 
conditions than the less  stratified  system of the  Senegalese  Fulanis. Furthermore, de Bruijn  and 
van  Dijk  did  their  fieldwork  between  1990  and  1992  when  recovery from the devastating drought 
of  1983-84 had only  begun.  Finally,  drought  recovery  in  Mali  was,  and co tinues to be,  severely 
hampered  by the conditions  produced by the  Twareg  rebellion. 
But is my own work just a  post-modem  happy-go-lucky  account from an area where  those  who 
were  victims  of the effects of development  are  simply  being  overlooked? 
The  evaluation  of just how  devastating  the  effects of the  drought  actually were in Senegal poses 
serious methodological  problems.  First of all it is  impossible  to get an accurate picture of the 
individual herd sizes before, during and after  the  drought.  Indeed,  the temptation for herders to 
glorify their past is too  great  for  the  answer  to  be  attributed  more  than anecdotic value. Secondly, 
those who  might  have been  identified as victims are most  likely  simply to be no longer present in 
the area as it is difficult to survive  in  the  pastoral  area  without animals. Interrogating those 
K.Juul, 1990: “Notes sur les Strat6gies des Eleveurs”  Unpublished draft, CSE, Dakar. 
My impressions stem from reading their introduction  and  conclusion. I have not had the occasion of 
reading  the entire dissertation of 540 pages. 
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households  remaining in the Ferlo  about  destitute kin mainly resulted  in  vague  and evasive answers 
as it is considered  improper  to  discuss the unfortunate situation of othersz7. Having already 
trespassed  on FuBe perceptions of proper  conduct  on  several  other  counts  in  my presumptuous 
questionning into private affairs, I gave  up. In fact,  the  core of my research was rather to show 
that a large majority of herders  had  been  able to recover  successfully,  than  to postulate that this 
was  valid for  the  entire  population.  Fortunately  my  general  impression  that  post-drought  recovery 
has  been  smooth  and  successful  for  the  majority of  herders  has  been  confirmed by other studies, 
such as ThkbaudJ995; Richter,l991; Tourk,1991  and  Santoir,1994. 
Another  question is to which  extent  my  findings  are  generalizable  and  representative, even within 
the boundaries of the Ferlo. Rather than attempting to unveil general mechanisms and the 
regularities of  common  patterns, I have  concentrated  on  finding out how a process works in a 
limited number of cases,  pointing  to  some of the  ways  in  which change  is produced in agro- 
pastoral societies.  This  corresponds  to  what  Sayer calls an intensive  research  design  (Sayer, 
1984242). Drawing  on  conflicts  and  events a  essential  parts of  my data  material, the focus has 
been on the extreme  and  ‘information-rich’  cases  rather  than  on  examining  the average case. 
Likewise, I have  made  relatively  few  attempts to ensure any representativeness in the choice of 
informants. 
Obviously my selection  and  interpretation  of  events  and  information  has  been coloured by  my 
initial  hypotheses and perceptions, which  although  somewhat  moderated  in the course of the 
research,  have  remained  valid  and  relevant to understandiug  the  often  contradictory fidings of  my 
fieldwork. The  result is of  course  an  indisputable  subjectivity of interpretation. 
Outline of the  dissertation: 
The thesis is  organised in two parts. One  is  mainly  concerned  with  the  ideas,  ideologies  and 
theories governing natural resource management. The other deals with events as they have 
unfolded in  the  Ferlo  region. 
The first part (chapters  2  and 3) discusses  what  is  considered  conventional wisdom on land 
degradation  and  its  causes  and  the  institutional  arrangements eccessaq to  resolve the problems. 
The limitations  and  shortcomings of these  widely  applied  theoretical  frameworks are discussed, 
as are the  reasons  for  their  longstanding  popularity. On the  basis of this an alternative  framework 
more capable of apprehending  the  intricate  and  often  contradictory  processes  of post-drought 
rehabilitation is developed. 
my  knowledge not common  any  longer. 
*’ On a few  occasion I have  met  destitute  herders  living off the  backs of their  richer kin, but  such  social  ties are to 
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Chapter 2 concentrates on issues  related to the  physical degradation of  the  environmental.  Here 
conventional  ideas on drought  and  range  management are explored. The chapter tries  to  unravel 
the  'technification'  and  'de-politicization'  of  development issues which results  from  the  tendency 
to  focus on biological  issues,  in terms  of  'the balance of  nature',  rather than on the livelihood  and 
adaptive  strategies  of  the  herder  population. In order better to capture the  variable  and  innovative 
ways in which herders of the  Ferlo  adapt to new  conditions, the contours of an alternative 
framework are developed on the basis of the "non-equilibrium'' paradigm. Crucially, this 
framework  recognizes  the  fundamentally unstable and unpredictable characteristics  of  the  natural 
environments  of  African  range lands. This approach,  which  stresses  resilience  and  flexibility,  seems 
more apt to apprehend  the  multiple  and often contradictory processes  of  post-drought 
rehabilitation. 
Adaptating to new conditions  and  opportunities also has a political dimension. In the case of the 
Ferlo this is related to the  regulation of access to water and  grazing  lands. In chapter 3 the 
influential contributions of the Common Property and Collective Action School concerning 
institutional arrangement  and  management  of  natural resources are discussed.  This  approach, 
which is criticized  for  overplaying  community cohesion  while  downplaying  inter  group  dynamics 
and social differentiation,  is  juxtaposed  with the contributions grouped under  the  heading  of 
"negotiated  development".  Much  in  line  with the above mentioned  non-equilibrium  approach, this 
framework  recognizes  historical  change  as  the  unpredictable result of  different  encounters  rather 
than seing it as  a unilineal  evolutionary  proces. Change is seen as resulting  from  a  variety  of 
factors  setting  limits  while  at he same tine offering opportunities for development. This stress on 
openness as far as outcome is concerned  hopefully provides  a  way out of  the  straight-jacket  of  the 
natural  resource  management  framework. 
The  second  part  of  the  dissertation  concerns  the  empirical analysis of  the  effects of post-drought 
migration. Here the conceptual analysis and methodology presented in chapter 2 and 3 are 
confronted  with  the  realities of the  Ferlo. 
On the  basis  of  the  theoretical  framework  developed in chapter 2, chapter 4 discusses  the effects 
that  the influx of a  large  group  of  drought  ridden h rders from the North  had on the production 
systems  of the South. This process is analyzed both in terms of constraints and  in  terms  of  new 
opportunities. The changing  productive  opportunities characterizing the region  since  the  turn of
the century are described in order to  understand the flexible and opportunistic  management 
systems employed  both  in  the area of departure and  in the area of  reception. On the basis  of 
surveys concerning  unequal  herd  distribution  and  diverging  herd  management strategies, the 
particularities of the  new  productions  strategies are depicted. So are the interrelations  between 
newcomers  and  first-comers. 
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Chapter 5 analyses  the  processes  of the political reception of the  FuutankoBe  herders  and  their 
impact  on  the  institutions  controlling the crucial resources  water and  pastures. This is examined 
on basis  of  the  discussions  and  hypoteses developed  in chapter 3. The  emerging  changes in rights 
of  acccess  and  control  to  these  crucial resources are analysed  through  the  uncovering of the often 
ruthless struggles  centrered  around  the boreholes and not the  least  representation  within  the 
borehole committees. These struggles provide a way of understanding the constant social 
manoueverings  and  ongoing  debates over political  and  social  identity,  often  played  out in erms 
of difference  and  belonging  which  constitute the core of local  politics in the Ferlo. 
The chapter is divided  into two parts. One concerned mainly  with the relations  between the 
herders and  the  state;  the  second  with  the manouevres and  strategies  undertaken by firstcomers 
and  newcomers,  respectively,  to  adjust heir political  power to the new situation. 
Chapter 6 contains  the  conclusion. 
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Chapter 2. 
The  desertification  debate,  the  Sahel 
region  and  the  non-equilibrium  para- 
digm. 
Chapter 2. 
The  desertification  debate, the  Sahel region  and  the  non-equilibrium  paradigm 
"Man has  punished this barren realm, stripping it of trees and 
bankrupting the  soil. Abetted, the desert advances and the  re- 
gion  edges  towards catastrophe", 
Subtitle 
National  Geographic  Aug. 1987 
"A new scienk9c  truth  does not triumph by convincing its oppo- 
nents and making them see the light but rather because the 
opponents eventually  die  and a new generation  grows up that is 
familiar with  it". 
Max Planck. 
The idea presented in the  introduction of drought  related  migration as a catalyst for technological 
innovation is m sharp contrast  to  the  generally  gloomy  picture governing most contributions on recent 
problems  and  future  prospects  for the Sahel  region.  Few areas of the world have been subject to as 
much  environmental  concern  as  the  Sahel,  where  the  public debate has  been dominated by  powerful 
notions such as drought,  disaster,  deseaification coloured by pictures of skinny cows in desperate 
search or tiny stalks of grass in an  immense  sea  of  barren land. 
Until recently  the  scientific  debate  has been dominated by two equally  forceful  and  interrelated 
perspectives:  one, the desertification  paradigm,  related to range science, and two, the Common 
PropertyKragedy of  the  Commons  perspective  related to  land use and range management.  Although 
the  first  perspective is  closely  associated to the biological processes of range science  and the latter 
more to human  action, to land  use  and  range  management, both have dealt with the interface of bi- 
ological and  economic/social  processes.  Anthropologically derived concepts such as Herskovits' 
'Cattle Complex (1926)' have, together with Hardin's 'Tragedy of the Commons' (1968), had 
considerable  influence on biologists'  perceptions of desertification. At the same time  pictures  of 
deserts advancing at x km a  year  have  impelled  range  managers  and govemment agencies to rapid 
action in order to  change' the negative  impact of  man upon  nature'. 
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Since the earliest versions’  considerable  critique  has  been  voiced  against  these  images,  but  attempts 
to breach the neo-Malthusian  assumptions  concerning  the  relationship  between  society and 
environmental change underlying  these  perceptions  have  not  been  very  successful.  It  was not until 
concerns  about  land  degradation  and  desertification  climaxed  during  the  two  large  Sahelian  drought 
catastrophes that the critique had  any  real  breakthrough.  The  breakthrough  was, inter alia, spurred 
by a general recognition that most  existing  blueprint  approaches  had  turned out to be basically 
unworkable m many  settings  and  had  failed to produce  satisfactory  solutions  to  the  perceived  immense 
problem  of  desertification.  Another  factor  was  the  breakthrough  in  the  natural  sciences  in  recognizing 
turbulence,  chaos  and  unpredictability as the  rules  governing  nature  rather  than  constancy  and  balance. 
On the basis of this, the contours of  what  has  been  termed  a  new  ‘paradigm’ in range  management 
theory, the non-eqdiirium framework,  began  to  take shape, encouraging  a  major  rethinking  of  some 
of the hallowed assumptions of  range  ecology  and  range  management  practice. 
The following chapter tries to do three  things.  It  argues  that  much of what  has  been  presented  as 
conventional  wisdom  about  environmental  degradation  tends to rest  on  a  number  of  rather  simplified 
and  generalized  arguments  about  how  people  impact on heir  environment.  It  also  tries  to  explain  why 
these arguments, in spite of  considerable  empirical  evidence  against  them,  continue to inform the 
majority of development plans and programmes (resulting in a remarcable similarity in project 
designs).Using the desertification debate as the  most  prominient  example,  the  chapter  argues that a 
proces  of  depoliticization  and  technification of environmental  problems  is  taking  place,  whereby  the 
animals and  the  grazing  environment  are in focus  rather  than  the  herder.  Consequently  herders’  own 
production objectives have  tended  to  be  ignored  and  successful  local  iniatives  to  adapt  to  drought 
and post-drought  situation  overlooked. F d y ,  an  outline is drawn of what  has  been  termed the “new 
ecology” or “non-equilibrium  theory”, as an attempt  to  establish  a  framework  for  understanding  the 
variable  and  dynamic  processes  which  were  observed  during  fieldwork  in  the  Ferlo. In this way  the 
chapter  provides  the  basic  theoretical  ‘ammunition’ for the  discusions of  what  changes post-drought 
migration has brought to the pastoral  production  systems  in  the  Ferlo,  which  will  be  presented  in 
chapter 4. 
Narratives in the  environmental  debate. 
When opening up a  discussion as to  whether or not  post-drought  migration  and the subsequent 
increased stocking rates lead to degradation, one inevitably runs into the problem of having to 
juxtapose  an old, worn out and heavily criticized  paradigm  with  its  forceful,  brand new  and still 
Hardin’s tragedy of the commons  can be traced  back to Aristoteles  and  the  British  Enclosure  Act. 
Bovill(l921) and Stebbing (1935) were among the k t  to introduce  the  idea of the  encroaching Sahara, while 
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relatively  unchallenged  successor.  Confronting  the  field data with the  old paradigm in order to 
proclaim the triumph of the  new is liable  to  produce  limited  intellectual s tisfaction, the  result  being 
mainly a  replication  of  critiques  already  voiced.  On  the  other  hand, co centrating entirely on the new 
theoretical approach might lead  to  neglect of  useful  insights into the logics goveming most of the 
policy  decisions  taken  in the field. For while the majority of researchers and even many donor 
agencies'  operating in the field of range  and  resource  management  agree  on the inappropriateness of 
battered notions such as "The  Tragedy of  the  Commons",  "The Cattle Complex", "Desertification" 
and "Canying Capacity" etc. the myths nonetheless exhibit considerable perseverance among 
practitioners,  bureaucrats or policy  makers  and  continue,  at  least  partially, to inform policies  operating 
at  local  and  national  level. 
The  appeal of these  myths or 'development  narratives' as they  have  been  termed  by Roe (1991) lies 
primarily  in  their  simplicity.  Because  rural  development i  many parts of the developing world is a 
genuinely  uncertain  activity  characterized by  high degrees of unpredictability, one of the principal 
ways that planners  and  policy-makers  make  sense of this uncertainty is to tell stories and set up 
scenarios  that simp@ this uncertainty.  According to Roe  (1991:288),  the more uncertain things seem 
at  the  micro-level,  the  greater the tendency  to  require  broad  explanations that can be operationalized 
into  standard  approaches  with  widespread  application.  This is particularly true of the pastoral sector 
where  planned  intervention  during  the  last 30 years  has  produced little but failure. 
Accordingly,  simple  theorems  like  the  Tragedy of the  Commons  (discussed  in detail below)  have 
provided the  practitioner  with  a  model  to  understand what is going  on  and what must be done - and 
continuously  do so. More  elaborate  and  demanding  analyses  are  troublesome for the decision maker 
since  they generate rather than reduce  uncertainty  and  raise doubts that the critique itself  cannot 
answer.  Thereby the very  assumptions  of  decision  making are.undermined (Roe 1991:290). As a result 
the unresolved failure  of  project  blueprints  derived  from  development narratives often serves to 
reinforce, rather than  to  lessen,  the  perceived  need  for  some sort of narrative that accounts for the 
resulting  increase  in  uncertainty. As will  be  shown  later  on,  the  presumably old fashioned and  worn 
out models  have  not  disappeared,  but  continue  to inform most national development  plans.  Explaining 
why  and, not the  least,  how  these  narratives  have  persisted  in  spite  of severe criticism  and strong 
empirical evidence against  the  reasonings  that  support  them  therefore se ms a valid task. 
Roe's  definition of development  narratives  stresses  their  status as stories or arguments. In contrast to 
Development  Agency  (ODA),United  Nationa  Soudano-Sahelian Ofice (UNS0)and the Danish International 
Development  Agency  (DANIDA). 
For example  the German  Gesellschaft fiir Technische  Zusammenarbeit (GZ),the British Overseas 
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other  notions  more familiar to the  development  practitioner, namely ideology,  myth  and  conventional 
wisdom,  they  follow  the  common  defintion f a  story: Each has a  beginning, a middle  and  an end (or 
premises a conclusion  when  presented  in  the form of an argument). They revolve around  a  sequence 
of events or positions  from  which  something will happen or from which  something follows (Roe 
1991:288). 
Also Sayer  (1992:259-262)  stresses  the  linearity of narratives: 
"By narrative I mean  an  account  of process or development in terms of a story in 
which a number  of  events  are depicted chronologically. In everyday life narrative 
is  the  taken for granted,  natural form of discourse,  through  which events 'seem to  tell 
themselves:  Its  power  derives from the way in which puning things in chronological 
order, in a story,  gives the  appearance  of a causal  chain or logic in which each event 
leads to the  conclusion" (Sayer  1992:259) 
According to Sayer this is  in  contrast  to analysis which is the explanation  of concrete cases by  the 
direct  application of abstractions  or  theoretical  models of what are believed  to be widely  replicated 
structures  and mechanism. Such  analyses  tend  to  abstract  from particdar historical  sequences.  Analy- 
sis  requires a leap across  the  immediate  step  between the abstract  and the concrete in the  hope  that 
the  model  will  serve  to  identify  key  processes  without  too much distortion. 
Although  narratives may  exhibit  considerable  explanatory  powe?, there is a certain danger  in  their 
lineal form. For  while  they may  causally  explain  some  events,  they are not  primarily  concerned  with 
explaining  the  nature,  condition  and  implications of social structure. Hence  they  tend  to gloss over 
the  differences  between  mere  temporal  succession  and  causality.  According to Abrams, this entails 
that  they  present  only  implicit,  under-examined  aetiologies.  The  principles of xplanation  underpinning 
the  research  are  buried  beneath t e rhetoric of the  story  (P.Abrams,  1982: 196 ). 
In the  present  context  the aim is not to discuss the  validity of narratives  explanations  versus  empirical 
analysis.  What is of interest  is  rather  the  perseverance of certain ideas and narrative explanations in 
development  rhetorics  i.e.  how  narratives,  in  spite of considerable  empirical evidence against  them, 
turn into models  informing  policy-makers  and  project  personnel. For  as expressed by Roe:  "Even 
Balinese Cockfight"  Daedelus  101  Winter  1972, see also Cohen  1985:63-69. 
Perhaps  the most prominent  example of nmtive explanation is C l i o r d   G e e '  "Deep  Play. Notes on a 
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when their truth value  is  in question, these narratives  persist  in  having  the  objective of getting  their 
hearers to believe  or do something" (Roe, 1991:288). As will be shown  below,  narratives  in  the  sense 
of  'stories  which  seem to  tell  themselves'  have  played  a  major  role  in  the  shaping  and  the  perceptions 
of development  rhetorics about desertification and  environmental  degradation. 
Balance of nature or the  equilibrium  paradigm. 
The narratives which influence contemporary range management policies and practices are all 
embedded in what  (more or less post-mortem)  has  been  termed the equilibrium  paradigm. 
This paradigm  has  formed  a sort of umbrella for the  following  mutually  interwoven  narratives: 
- the cattle complex, 
- tragedy of the commons, 
- the  advancing desert. 
Fundamental to the  'old'  range  management  approach is the assumption  that  ecosystems  are  equilibrial 
by nature. This conviction draws on Malthus'  ideas of populations  being  regulated by their  food 
supply,  through  density-dependent  feed-back  relations.  Added to this is Darwin and  Wallace's  theories 
of the  gradual  evolution of species through orderly  processes of competition  and  natural  selection. 
Both assumptions  presume that conditions outside the system  of  interest are relatively  stable  over 
time,  allowing the internal  processes of the  system to equilibrate and  regulate  the  system  structure and 
dynamics. This  equilibrium approach has been one  of  the  most  durable  ecological  theorems  since  it 
was launched on the scientific arena at the end of the eighteenth  century (Ellis et al.  1993:31). 
Conventional range  management  theory, which rests  on  plant  succession  theories,  was  developed  in 
North Anerica at the turn of the century; the most  celebrated  propagators  being  Cowles  (1899) and 
Clements  (1916).  According to what  was later known as clementsian  succession  theory  a  single, 
persistent  vegetation,  the climax, would dominate a  particular site according  to  the soil and  climate 
of the  site. If the climax vegetation was disturbed, the vegetation could return  through  a  successional 
sequence  to  climax.  (Behnke  and Scoones 1993:2). 
In an adapted  form  this  apparently  simple ogic has  been  the  driving  force  behind  most  range - and 
resource managemnt projects in the  Sahel. In principle,  the  African  pastoral  ecosystems  are  seen as 
stable. Therefore, it is  possible to identify a threshold of currying  capacity, a  balance  between  the 
grazing  pressure  and the  natural regenerative power of the plants.  Pushed  beyond this threshold,  this 
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balance  will be destroyed  and  the  condition f the range  progressively  deteriorate.  Ultimately this may 
lead  to desertification. 
Restoration of the  balance  of  nature  in  order  to  avoid  desertification  has  been, so to  say,  the  point of 
departure  of most range management projects  in the Sahel for more  than 5 decades. 
The  narrative of overstocking  and  overgrazing 
According to the mainstream  view,  desertification  was  speeded up during  the  seventies  due to a 
general  increase  in  livestock  densities  and  improper us  by pastoralists  that  destabilized  the  potentially 
stable range systems. Throughout the  1960's  and  1970's  preconditions  for  desertification  had  been 
exacerbated by local inhabitants through land mismanagement, excessive firewood gathering, 
deforestation and drilling of  wells  (Glantz  1977:3,  Picardi  and  Seifert 197644). 
The drought itself  was therefore seen  primarily as a  catalyst  which  exposed  the  deleterious  effects 
of  long-term  degradation  by  people.Besides  unwise  cultivation of rangelands  the  most  important  role 
in the on-setting of  the desertification process  was  attributed  to  overgrazing by domestic  animals. 
Increase in livestock numbers was  attributed to: 
a).  Increase  in the  number  of  pastoralists  triggering  a  demand  for  more  livestock  to  support  the  extra 
pastoralists and a supply  of  herding  labour  to look after  the extra stock. 
b).  Improvement of  Veterinary medicine  and  services  which  reduced  mortality4. 
c).  Traditional  and  'irrational'  social  systems  which  place  a  very  high  social  value  on  the  accumulation 
of  livestock  numbers rather than on the economic  output of the  herd or environmental  conservation. 
According to  this  view, animal population  densities  are  now far  beyond  carrying  capacity.  This re ults 
in "progressive reduction of  the  vegetation cover and  increased  wind  erosion,'trampling, sealing, 
increased run-off,  higher water tables  and salinity - all mechanisms  which  feed  the  desertization 
process" (Le Houkrou, 1977:25).  Overstocking is also  furthered  by  the  reduction of grazing  land 
through  the  progressive  creeping of  cultivation  into  pastoral reas - despite  the low  crop  expectancies 
which  can be found  in  such  areas. This unproductive  and  highly  risky  cropping  situation  results  in  the 
destruction  of  native  fodder  species.  Instead  they  are  replaced  by  either  annual  weeds  with  little  forage 
value or unpalatable  species.  Finally  deser&ation is explained by the  drilling of  boreholes  irrespective 
Already  in 1944 fear of overstocking  lead  the  colonial  administration of the Sudan Protectorate to keep  vaccination 
programmes to a minimum as they  were  supposed to be the  major  factor  behind  growth in stock  populations. (Adams 
1982271). 
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of  grazing  capacities  which as lead  to  the  destruction of  the pastures  within  a radius of 15 to 30 km 
around the boreholes.  According to Le Houirou, the end  product  in  most  arid zones is a  man-made 
desert strewn with  carcasses  all  over  the  Sahel (Le HouCrou 1977:25-30). 
For the range manager  the  task  must  therefore  be  to  return  these  systems to an equilibrial state 
through an alteration  of  the  system  structure  by  reducing  livestock  numbers  or  by changing livestock 
patterns  to  be more in accordance  with  the  carrying  capacity of the range.  Only at th is  level  can  a 
stable  sub-climax  be  established  yielding  a  profitable and  steady flow of animal products'. 
Interestingly,  the  obvious  Malthusian  tenets of the  argument  above  have  also inspired some policy- 
makers to stress the  need  to  stabilize  not  only  animal  but  also  human  population gr wth in order to 
deviate the causes  of  ecological  stress  in  these  generally  scarcely  populated r as (see for example 
Lester Brown 1974).  Few  have,  however,  gone as far as Garett Hardin,  who perceives food aid to the 
drought victims as senseless,  as it hinders  the  population  from  reaching  equilibrium (see Hardin 
1977:564). 
Although no thorough  critique  will be offered  to  this  argument  at this stage, it may be useful to point 
to the obvious contradiction  between  the  rather  mechanical view offered by Le Hou6rou - of  herds 
increasing  almost  automatically in accordance  to  population  increases - and the  view offered below 
of the  irrational  herder  accumulating  as much cattle as possible  mainly  for sentimental reasons. 
The  Cattle  Complex. 
The main source of  inspiration for the idea of the  irrational  social  values  governing traditional herd 
management  stems  from  the  title  of  Melvjlle  Herskovits'  article  of 1926:  "The Cattle Complex in East 
Africa". 
This narrative centers around  pastoral  conservatism and  the  presumed  lack  of economic rationality 
of African  herders. In contrast to the profit-maximizing  rancher from Wyoming, herders in  Africa 
accumulate  cattle  for  their  own sake rather  than  for  sustenance.  As  cattle is kept for social purposes 
as a sign of  wealth  and  prestige  their  owners  display an astonishing  lack of interest in exchanging 
cattle  for  cash.  Hence  they are prevented fromobtaining  the  benefits of the cash economy in the form 
of  consumer  goods.  According  to  the  'cattle  complex'  narrative  this  has  led  herders in many areas to 
"The Tragedy of the Commons in the  Sahel",1976. 
For an example of a clearly  equilibrial view see for example  Lamprey  1983 or picardi and Seiferts article 
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accumulate large herds which include excessive number of steers and bulls as well as old and 
unproductive  females.  Numbers  are  kept  in  excess of those  which  the  environment  can  properly 
support and to a degree inconsistent with ordinary economic rationality. Accordingly only a 
fundamental change  in  pastoralists'  social  values  and in their  traditional institutions can lead to a  moIe 
rational  emphasis  on  environmental  conservation  and  material  welfare  and prevent overgrazing6. 
To attribute these  derogatory and  value-loaded characteristics  of  African pastoralists to Melville 
Herskovits  nentheless  appear  quite  unjustified.  When  reading his original article of 1926, entitled  "The 
East  Afiican  Cattle  Complex",  one  finds  that  Herskovits'  objective was far from launching a  critique 
of the  behavior  of  African  pastoralists.  Quite  the  contrary, his work which is part of a doctorate in 
philosophy  attempted "to  demonstrate  that  the  culture of the  peoples  of East Africa could be grouped 
together,  the  most  outstanding trait in  all  their  cultures  and  that  most decisive for such classification 
king the cattle complex"  (Herskovits 1926533). Herskovits  used  the  word "complex" in the sense 
of "a whole"  embracing  a  number of interconnected or involved parts, a complex and  complicated 
whole.' However, posterity has come to use the notion in it's psychological significance, as 
emotionally  charged  ideas  arising  from  repressed  instincts, fears  and desires often  resulting  in  mental 
abnormity*  (The  Oxford  English  Dictionary). 
It is  in the course of his ethnological  endeavour  that  Herskovits describes the cultural importance 
attributed  to cattle in  relation to  marriage  and  divorce,  burial, inheritance and food custom etc. On 
the  basis  of  literature  studies  of  a  very  varied  character,  he  defines  some  common features in  what  he 
calls the  cattle  complex.  The  care  taken  of animals, the  affection  of their owners for them;  how  modes 
and  habits  of the  owners are subordinated  to  the  requirements  of their cattle;their importance as  the 
index  of their owners'  wealth  etc.  He  notes  how, for example  among the Dinka,  every thought is 
directed to how to get more cattle  and how whatever  concerned the beasts was important. When  an 
animal became ill it was put aside in a special hut and doctored. To slaughter his cattle was 
inconceivable  to  the  Mkambawho  would  neither think of  selling a cow even if  he was on the verge 
of starvation" (ibid:  258). Only those  that  died  were  used for food. The reason given  was:  "The 
For a summary  of these  discussions  see for example  Sandford  1983:12 and Livingstone 1977:209-210 
' Herskovits  does not  explicitly  define what he means by  complex.  However  he refers, critically, to the  German 
"Graebnerian  school " "kulturkxeis" notion as "conceived as an area wherein there prevails a given  culture-complex, . 
where all the elements of this complex  are  to  be  found  in  the  most,  approximately,  pure  form"  (Herskovits  1926:231) 
For example  Henriksen 1974, although  critical of the  notions  in  several  ways, writes: "There  can be no  doubt  that - 
the  Turkana  have  a c ttle comcdex in the  sense  that  their  herds  have  a  special  social  and  ritual  value".  (Henriksen 
1974:17-18) 
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owner  of  the  cattle  knows  his  animals  individually  and  loves  them”  (ibid.:259) 
Another  trait  identified  by  Herskovits, i  the connection between  cattle  wealth  and  social  position  in 
the  community  (ibid.:265).  Among the Nuer, for example,  wealth  is  judged  entirely by the  number of 
sheep  and  cattle  a man possesses.  Theft  of  cattle is often found  to  be  the  source  of  bitter  conflicts and 
feuds  (ibid.:257)  Cattle are  kept for pride and as a sign of  wealth  and  prestige  and  are  bred for milk 
and butter  (ibid.:255). 
In conclusion,  the presence  of cattle impresses itself as of  primary  importance  and  the  part  they  play 
in the  occasions  of  crisis n the  life  of their master show their importance for an understanding of  the 
culture of these  people.  Young m n  m s t  serve their time herding  the  chiefs cattle before  they  can  be 
circumcised or married  and  the cattle dowry common to all cattle  keeping  peoples  in  East  Africa is 
tranferred  before  marriage (ibid268). In fact the attachment to animals  can be so great  as is the  case 
among the Baheru  of  Uganda  where “cases are not wanting in which  men  have  committed  suicide 
through excessive  grief at the loss of an animal“ (Herskovits  1926:263)  Others,  like the Batonga 
living  along the  Zambesi,  knock out their front teeth, giving  as a reason  that their object is to be  like 
oxen and  those  that retain their teeth they consider as zebras”. (ibid.:268). 
Not least  the  last  parts  of  Herskovits account display an understandable  fascination  and  amazement 
with  these  peoples that he has not himself  visited. Indeed it is difficult  not to admire the relative 
absence of prejudice in his descriptions. It is therefore ironic that the notion of pastoral  economic 
“irrationality”which  continues to have currency as a  justification for development  interventions  is 
attributed  uncritically to Herskovits. 
The  case  provides an interesting insight into the ways in which forceful  narrative  such as “the cattle 
complex”  may be constructed  by  emptying, so to say, the argument of its original content. Taken out 
of its on@ context  and  through  the  mere  power  of  its  linguistic  features  the  relatively  neutral  notion 
of  complex,  used  by  Herskovits in the  sense  of  complexity,  has  been  transformed into its  value-loaded 
homonym, ”to have  a complex“, with all its connotations of mental  illness. 
Throughout  the  years  severe criticism has  been launched against this narrative  and its perception of 
pastoralists as economic  irrational  peoples.  Critiques  have  mainly  come from anthropologists,  (see  for 
example D& and  Hjort  1974)  who have  contemplated the differences  in  rationality  between  African 
and  ‘Western’  herdsmen.  African  herdsmen attribute more  value  to  the  pastoral  by-products  such as 
milk, calves,  blood  reason  for  which  they k ep large herds as part  of  a  strategy of subsistence or risk- 
avoidance.  Other studies  have  revealed that if one focuses on herding  as  a  balance  between  risk  and 
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reward  instead of  focusing on overstocking  as  a  store of value, it turns out  that livestock herders are 
just as profit-maximizing as the  afore mntioned Wyoming  rancher’. This point  was made most clearly 
by Sandford 1983 who showed  that  less  conservative  stocking  rates  are  more  efficient even if this 
leads to die-offs  in bad years because it allows  the  benefits of good  years  in  terms  of grazing which 
cannot be “carried  over” from one  year to  anotherto be captured  (Sandford,  1983:67). Finally, the 
original reasoning of Herskovits with regard to the centrality of cattle in social transactions 
(bridewealth) as well as their  salience as political  currency  has  been  rehabilitated  by researchers such 
as Comaroff  and  Comaroff  (1992) and Kuper  (1982).  Notably  the  Comaroffs  have tried to look afresh 
on the role  of  cattle m social  processes  by  understanding  its  significance  in  the  way it links processes 
of production  and  exchange,  the  embodiment of  an  order  of  meanings  and relations and its capacity 
through its circulation to reproduce a total social system (Comaroff and Comaroff 1992:128). 
According to them cattle in precolonial African societies should be understood not merely as 
commodities in the strict sense of the  word  but as commodities  in  the sense of transformation, in a 
total  economy of  signs  and  practices,  between  the  material  economy  of  things  and the moral economy 
of persons (ibid.). 
Nonetheless, the idea of the immense ‘social constraints’ hindering the  successful  application  of 
technical  solutions  in  terms  of  controlled  stocking  rates  and  desertification  control lingers on in many 
quarters. This is  illustrated by  the  general  and  overwhelming  concern  with  control and stabilization 
of  livestock  numbers (see for example  the  infuential  article  by  Picardi  and  Seifert  1976). Because of 
the  idea inherent in the narrative of cattle being kept in the herd far too long - imposing an 
unproductive and  unnecessary  pressure  on  the  grazing  lands - many livestock projects throughout 
Afiica  have  tried to bring  about  greater  stratification f livestock  management  by  trying to persuade 
herders to sell their  animals  (mainly  steers)  at  a young  age  to  specialist  fatteners. In the Ferlo region 
this approach is represented by  the  Senegalese  livestock  para-statal SODESP. Other projects in the 
Ferlo, such as the  ‘Projet  Senegal0  Allemand, have  had  as a major ambition  to  teach herders that a 
limited but healthy  herd  was  more  productive  and  rational  than  the  traditional  herd-maximizing 
strategy. This project  model also drew  heavily  on  the  next  development narrative, the Tragedy of  the 
Commons. 
The  metaphor of the  Tragedy of the Commons, 
The  mataphor of the  Tragedy of  the  Commons  was  presented in its most  famous  (or notorious) form 
by Garett Hardin  in  1968  who  turned it into “the dominant  framework  within  which social scientists 
portray environmental  and  resource  issues”  (Godwin and  Shepard  1979:265). Its popularity  can 
mainly be attributed to Hardins  insistence  on  the  presumably  irreconcilable contradiction between 
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individd and  system,  which  reflects  a  common intellectual tradition in the English speaking  world 
about  common  property  and  individual  interest. This debate can be traced  back  both  to disputes on 
the English  pastoral commons of the  eighteenth century and as far back  as to Aristoteles who 
pleaded 'that  which is common  to  the  greatest  number has the least care bestowed  to  it". 
W i g  back to Hardin's  original  article,  however,  one finds that, as with  Herskovits'  cattle  complex, 
the  narrative so well known to us all is more  linked  to the title of the article than  to its actual  content. 
Hardin's original preoccupation was not that of range management but rather 'the population 
problem'.The  scope  of  the  article  was   critique  of  the dominant tendency  of  thought  which,  inspired 
by  Adam Smiths'  invisible hand, assumes  that  decisions  taken  individually  will  be  the  best  decisions 
for  the  entire  societK a policy which according to  Hardin,  'Ijustifies our present  policy of laissez-faire 
in reproduction  (Hardin  1968:  1244).  The  metaphor  of the herders in the commons  was  used  only as 
an illustration of a  general  concern  over  problems which according to Hardin  had no technical 
solution. "No technical  solution",  he  concludes,  "can rescue us from the  misery of overpopulation. 
Freedom to breed  will  bring  ruin  to all" (ibid 1248). 
Hardin's source for the allegory  of the  pastoral  commons  was an early  nineteenth centuy political 
debater,  WilliamLloyd,  who was engaged in the debate on population, labour and the Poor Laws and 
at  the same time  one  of  the  propagandists  of  parliamentary enclosure  (McCay  and  Aacheson,  1987:2). 
In an analogy  between the pastoral  commons  in  old England and the labour market, which  supported 
Malthus'  pessimistic  views on population,  Lloyd  deplored the freely obtainable - common  rights- to 
enter  both  the  labour  market  and  the  pastoral  commons, which inevitably  would  lead to overstocking 
of  pastures  and  oversaturation of labour  markets, causing respectively resource depletion, low wages 
and  miseries  to  the  labouring  classes. 
Hardin's argument, which combines Lloyds images of English Commons with the language of 
economic  marginal  utility  is  the  following: 
"Picture a pasture open  to  all ... "he starts and  ventures into an  argument on the behavior  of  "the 
rational  herdsman" p i n g  his animals on  a  pasture that he uses  in  common  with  other  herdsmen. I 
spite of signs of overgrazing the herder will continue to add new animals since the effects of 
overgrazing is thus  shared  by all, while he  receives the full benefit from the production  of extra 
animalS. 
"..but this is the conclusion  reached by each and every rational herdsman.  Therein 
lies  the tragedy. Each  man  is  locked  into a system that compels him to increase his 
herd  without  limit - in a wrld that  is  limited.  Ruin is the destination to which  all  men 
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rush eachpursuing  his own best interest in a society that believes in thefreedom in 
the commons. Freedom in a commons  brings  ruin for all" (Hardin, 1968:1244). 
The  tragedy in Hardin's  version is thus  both  economic  and  environmental.  It is in  no-one's long term 
interest  but is nonetheless  inevitable  unless  something is done to  intervene in the management of the 
commons;  eventually  by  changing  tenure  from  common property  into private property.  According  to 
the  model it is  unlikely  that  the  users  will  change  the  system  themselves. 
While Hardin's  argument  on  overpopulation  would  seem  utterly  unpalatable to most people', his 
model of the  immutable  logic of  individual  self-interest  has been lauded throughout the world. The 
Tragedy of  the  Commons  model  presents all the  disarming  simplicity required for a development 
narrative, furnishing the  practitioner  with  a  combined  diagnosis  and  prescription. For as noted by 
McCay  and  Aacheson  (1987:5)  the  popularity  of  the  model  lies not the least, in its ability  to  yield  both 
liberal and  conservative  solutions.  Cleansed of Hardin  original  intentions the model  may  be  used as 
an argument  both  for  more  state  intervention  to  regulate  problems of population or environment.  It 
is, however,  equally  forceful  as an argument for privatization  of resources and for governments to 
leave management of local  resources  to  individuals  and  the  private s ctor. 
But  the  tragedy  of  the  commons is a model  and as such  abstract  and  simplified.  As  a  result  even  many 
people  who  agree  with  Hardin  that  range  degradation is taking place and the  commons  today  are  a 
free-for-all,  feel  obliged  to  part  with him over  cause.  A  number  of have pointed to the  failure  of 
Hardin to distinguish  between  common  property as a theoretical condition in  which  there are no 
relevant  institutions  (open  access)  and  common  property  as  a  social institution (the commons)" in 
which a number  of  owners  are  co-equal in their  rights to use the resources" (Cyriacy-Wanthrup  and 
Bishop,  1975:714;  Bromley  and  Cernea,  1989)". In Hardin's  argument common property is the  same 
as open access. But common  property is not everybody's  property  and  many  commons, it is argued, 
were  in  fact managed in a  restricted  fashion  until  exogenous  pressure  undermined  local  management 
efforts (see  for  example  Bromley  and  Cernea,  1989:17). 
breed  with  the belief that everyone  born  has an equal right  to  the  commons is to lock the world  in  a  tragic  course of 
He  goes as far as to dismiss  the  Universal Declaration  of Human Rights:" To couple  the  concept of freedom  to 
action.  Unfortunately this is  just  the  course of action  that  is  being  pursued  by  the  United  Nations"  he  writes  referring  to 
the 1967  declaration  which  stipulates that any  choice  with  regard  to  the  size  of  the  family  must  irrevocably  rest  with  the 
family  itself.  (Hardin,  19681246).  See  also his critique  of  well-meant  famine  relief  "in a world of irresponsible 
reproduction"  (Hardin, 1977565 "Living  in  a  lifeboat"). 
lo This argument  will  be  developed further in  the  next  chapter. 
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Others  have  directed  their  critique towards  the  individualistic  bias of the  model  and  the  predominance 
of  game theory  which  underlies  many  interpretations of the  individualistic  and  self-interested  user of 
the  common.  Runge (1981595) for example, stresses  the  interdependence of decisions  among  users 
and  the  need for "assurance mechanisms" among users to limit the effects of uncertainty.  Users  do 
cooperate,  he  argues. Institutions and  rules are therefore  not  external  and  imposed  on  the  individual 
users,  rather  they are responses to the uncertainty of social and economic  interaction.  The  tendency 
of Harms  model to  restrict  solutions to external  authority  (state or privatization)  has  therefore been 
criticized  for neglecting the potentials of other solutions  such  as  those  offered  through  management 
by local  community or local user groups (Anderson  and  Hill,  1977  and  Ostrom,  1977). 
Focusing on local  ability to resolve problems related to  resource  management  has,  nonetheless,  often 
incured a tendency to assume that community entails solidarity, cooperation, homogeneity and 
collective  action.  Often  such  views are blended  with a  certain  degree  of  mythologization  of  indigenous 
people as  being 'real' ecologists or conservationists as  long  as  they  are  isolated or protected from 
commercialization, state intervention etc. This point  will  be  taken  up in chapter  3. 
Contrary to the Cattle Complex  narrative, the Tragedy of the  Commons as a narrative  preserves 
Hardin's original perception of the herdsman as economically rational. In the course of its 
transformation into a narrative certain adjustments have  nonetheless  occurred.  Hardin  does  not,  for 
example,  say that commons cannot be managed. In fact  he  recognizes  his error of  mixing  common 
property  with  open  access  in a later paper (Hardin 1991)  and  admits  that  the title of his  paper  should 
have b e n  "The  Tragedy  of the Unmanaged Commons".  But  as  stressed by Peters  (1994239),  ideas 
are  not  always in the control of their makers and its revision  has  not  received  the  same  attention as 
the  original  version which continues to inform range  policies  in large parts of the  world. 
In reality  none of the above mentionned  criticisms part fundammentally  with  the "old resource 
management paradigm. They do not challenge the  ideas  that  rangelands  are  being  degraded  through 
overstocking nor do they question the presumed  imperative  to  increase  temtoriality  and  rights of 
controlling the behavior  of outsiders through  institutional  arrangements  based  on  exclusivity.  None 
of  them  address  fundamental  issues  related to the dynamics  of  and competition  between  different 
social  groups  located in history  and  social systems of conflicts  and  competitions  between  users  over 
scarce  resources.  Rather,  they  tend to reduce history  to  unilineal shifts and to  ignore  the  contingent 
and indetenninate character of social institutions (Peters  1987:177).  These are, however, all issues 
which  will be taken  up in the next  chapter. 
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From  narratives to standard  specifications. 
In the  context of the desertification  debate, it has  been  interesting to observe  how  certain terse 
expressions or terms such as the cattle  complex  or  the  tragedy of the  commons  have  become  almost 
standard  specitications,  while  few  of  the  propagators  or  critics  have  read  the  original  article  or  sought 
to  understand  it  within its original framework. This is particularly  with  case of Herskovits,  criticized 
on somewhat unjustified grounds by for example Sandford (1983:15). But, to use Andersons 
expression: “the genie was let out of the  bottle all the  same,  and  the  ghost  of  the  ‘cattle  complex’ 
paracllgm has lingered on, not the least in the  writings  on  development  and  pastoralism”  (Anderson, 
1993:124). 
It is obviously difficult to trace the  ways  in  which  these  transformations  take  place.  Elaborations on
Herskovits’  original concepts in articles  such as ’Pokot  resistance to change’ by the  anthropologist 
Harold KSchneider (1959), obviously  added  fuel to the  idea of pastoral  conservatism  through  its 
emphatic  title”.  Nonetheless, over the  years,  the  amount  of  literature  has  increased  exponentially,  and 
stiu fewer  policy  makers  and even fewer  extension  workers  are  informed  directly  by  anthropological 
or other  scientilic  literature.  By  far the largest  amount of information  and  interpretations  are  diffused 
through so-called grey literature in  the  form of project  documents  and  short  term  evaluations  based 
on relatively short term studies. Such literature is often  characterized  by its conformity  with  already 
existing  images of problems  related  to  the  environment and  pastoral  society  and  therefore  serves as 
good  hunting ground  for  development  narratives”.  It is therefore  not  surprising  when  Lane  (1990: 16) 
recollects his encounter  with  a  government  official in Tanzania in  1989  who  almost  verbatim  expresses 
the  tragedy of the commons  thesis13.  Nor is it astonishing  that  the  ideas of the  ineffective  or  irrational 
herder so often are being  replicated in government  programmes or in the discourse of  government 
European  innovations  among  Nilotic  peoples  in conh-ast to the  apparent  receptivity of their Bantu  neighbours  interesting 
explanations are given to the  failure of colonial  attempts to promote  sale  and  export of cattle to  other  areas.  According to 
Schneider,  Pokot  objected  to selliig their  cattle to foreigners  because of  their  mutual long term  obligations  to  help  and 
support  each  other. This was secured through cattle sharing and  trade but would  be lost in  outright  sale  (Schneider, 
1959:155) 
l ’  Schneider  has also to some degree suffered  from  a  biased  lecture.  In  order  to  explain  the  marked  resistance  to 
I2 See for example:  Conseil  Interministeriel  sur  l’Elevage,  Rapport isenti par  Monsieur  Robert  Sagna,  Minisae 
d’Etat, Ministre  de  l’Agriculture ,Dakar aofit  1993.,  Plan Daction  de l’ elevage, Ministire du  Developpement  Rural et 
de  L‘Hydraulique, Dakar nov. 1992, or no. 35 mars 1988,  notably  the  interview  with  Ibrahima  Diem&  Directeur  de 
l’Elevage. 
l3 I have  experienced  similar  situations  several  times  during my  own  fieldwork  where  extension  officers  despite 
conaasting evidence  experienced  in  the  field  suddenly have  switched to uncritical  reproduction  of  the  Tragedy of the 
Commons  thesis. 
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officials or even, as is the  case of Botswana,  the  thesis of the  tragedy of the commons becomes 
enshrined in national  livestock  policy  (Peters  1987:  173). 
The  use of  narratives is,  nonetheless,  not  confined  to  development  practitionners a d policymakers. 
In spite of their simplification, narratives are often incorporated in the discourses of the local 
population as part of calcutated  interpretation of reality.  The  rhetoric of destruction of the commons 
through overgrazing by  individual  herders  may  be  used  by  herders as  a part of their own political 
struggle  to  gain  control  over  key  resources  such as watering  holes or grazing  lands. As will be shown 
in the  chapter 5, these  rhetorics  are as integral  a  part  of  the  political  gamble  in pastoral Senegal as they 
have  been in the  process of  privatization of boreholes  in  Botswana. In the  latter case, the Tswana elite, 
in  their own push to develop  private  rights  in  the  grazing areas m the 1930s, showed themselves adept 
at  taking on the  mode  of  discourse of the  colonial  administration. Peters (199464)  cites the following 
exampk In connection  with  the  initiation  of  the  borehole  syndicate  schemes in Kgatleng in 1943, the 
Tswana  chief  Sefhako  Pilane  explained  the  advantages  of  the  semi-private  borehole syndicate system 
to the Native  Advisory  Council: 
‘Where  everything is used  tribally,  no proper care is taken of that  thing because any 
man  can  come  along and use it, well  knowing  that  any  expenditure attaching to it he 
has not to  bear alone. But where the (pumping) plant belongs  to a syndicate of 
members ... have  to  take it upon  themselves to see $any damage  is  done ... and find 
out  who is responsible”. 
The  chiefs  described  the  management  problems  with  the  new  boreholes  as  deriving from the inability 
of  tribal  systems to sanction  proper  use. In such  a way  they  presented  their own tribal or communal 
system  as  flawed  and  as  inhibiting  economic  progress.  The  interpretation  presented was based on a 
very  selective  appeal to tradition,  a  redefinition  that was  part of a  strategy of private appropriation. 
(Peters 1994:65) 
What makes this contribufon  particularly  interesting is the duality of the  discourse. As Peters shows, 
on other occasions  the  same  chiefs  saw no problem  in  arguing  that  the  communal system was not a 
necessary obstacle to progress: on the  contrary, it was  held, it was flexible enough to allow for 
mdivida to adopt  progressive  innovations  and  promote  economic  change. The explanation for this 
apparent  contradiction is the  dual  interest of the  elite to  maintain  open  commons as part of their very 
mobile  herd  management  strategy  while at the  same  time  expanding  their control over private or 
privatized lands.(Peters 1994:67)  This  stress  upon  the duality  of interests,  which  will be taken up 
further on in the  dissertation,  introduces  a  struggle  for  power  perspective  which is virtually absent in 
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the  above  mentioned  narratives. 
Depoliticizing  environmental  change;  the  desertification  narrative. 
Development narratives  such  as  the  cattle  complex,  the  tragedy  of the commons and the 
desertification menace all hint  at  the  close  kinship  existing  between  environmental concerns and 
Malthusian  economics:  The  more  people  there  are  the  more  they d stroy the long term potentials of 
fragile  environments and the poorer it makes  them  and their  descendants.  Consequently, many  aid 
inventions are based  on  the  premise  that  the  African  environment is under immediate threat from 
overuse and that open  access and  communal  tenure  exacerbated  by population growth prevents  a 
change  towards  more  productive and  less  damaging  patterns of use,  i.e. sustainable development. 
The  ostensible  need  for  urgent  action  is among  other  things  the  result  of an undue weight  which is 
given to recent changes  in  areas unfamiliar to  the  observer. This was  particularly the case with  the 
large  Sahelian  drought  in  the  beginning of the  seventies.  The  enormous media coverage contributed 
to transform the  drought into what  Morton  has  termed  'the  epochal change' in  relation to which 
everyhng that happened in the region  could  be  explained.  What happened before the drought was 
labelled 'traditional' as if unchanged  since Noah's flood,  while  recent changes are considered to be the 
first changes  in  centuries. 
As a result "a  series of  gloomy  analyses  marked  by  apocalyptic  interpretations  of what happened  and 
correspondingly  radical  predictions of  what  would  have to be  done if disaster is to be averted 
(Morton 1994:60) was  produced. 
But in fact, the processes  described as the global deseaification threat in the seventies and eighties 
are not so novel as  is  often  assumed.  Already  in  the  nineteenth  and early twentieth century  theories 
of progressive desiccation of the African continent were proposed by explorers such as David 
Livingstone (1857). By 1932 grandiose schemes were introduced to divert rivers and flood 
depressions in order to  reverse  the  threat of ever worsening droughts (Thomas and  Middleton 
1994 19). By  the  turn of the  century,  these  environmental  concerns had merged into a  picture  which 
was  to  have  long-lasting  effect  on  western scienac thinking, the  idea  of the encroaching Sahara. The 
Sahara was said to be  encroaching  southward  onto the Sudan  zone along its entire southern front, 
leading to wells drymg up,  lake  levels  falling,  pastures  being  depleted an  trees dying (see for example 
Stebbing 1935 and  Bovill 1921)). Alarmed by  what  Stebbing  alluded to as 'the threat to  the West 
African colonies' the French and British colonial offices sent off a Anglo- French Forestry 
commission  in  the  late 1930s to  conduct  field  investigations into the problem. 
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Ever since, doomsday trumpets have sounded regularly to prophecy forthcoming or ongoing 
environmental  degradation.  Tiffen et al. (1994) make references  to  the serious concern  among  the 
colonial  administrators  already in the 1930's to arrest the cycle of degradation  observed in the 
Machakos  district  of  Kenya. In northern  Senegal, colonial administrators  voiced their concern  for  the 
accelerated felling  of trees  along the Senegal River  allready  from  the  middle  of  the  18th  century 
(Bernard,  1993:49)  and  by  1920  several  afforestation projects  had  been  launched on both sides of the 
Valley.  When  the  French  forester  Aubreville introduced the  notion of desertification in 194914  it 
therefore  fell on fertile  ground. 
Also the  relation  between  degradation and overstocking is an old  0neI5.  Even the contemporary 
problems  related to imposing  more  sustainable  management practices on local  users  were  experienced 
m earlier  periods, as may be seen in Schneider's  description of the  struggles of the  colonial  authorities 
in Kenya  to  limit  stock size and preserve the environment among  the  Pakot: 
"The  Pakot  argue  that  the government exaggerates the problem of erosion: even 
though  there  are  large patches  of  exposed  red earth on the plains, they  maintain  that 
the area has always been that way. They regard government officials as perennial 
pessimists  who  constantly complain that  the  land is washed  into  the rivers, and  they 
ignore  these  warnings became their cattle continue to be fat and sleek. (Schneider, 
1959:156) 
But apparently nothing is new under the sun. As Morton suggests,  the  impact of recent  events 
although  they  may  overawe the  outsider often seem less devastating  in  the longer perspective. But if 
this is so, then  how come  that environmental concerns suddenly in the  mid  seventies  turned  into  the 
major  global  environmental issue perceived to threaten  not  only  the  drought-ridden  Sahelian  countries 
but  also  the  more  developed economies of  USA,  USSR  and  Australia? 
14Aubreville  actually  referred to the creation of desert-like conditions in humid  parts  of West  Africa  (notably 
C6te  d'Ivoire),  in  his  contribution:  "Climats, for& et desemfication de 1'Afrique  Tropicale". Later on  the  concept  has 
primarily  been  used  as  a  characteristic  of  "the  extension  of desertlike conditions in arid and semi-arid areas  (up to 600 
mm)due  to  man's  influence or to climatic  change" (this definition by  Rapp in 1974 was later  adopted  by UNEP (Glantz, 
19772)). 
l5 In the  Bechuanaland  Protectorate,  the f ar of  unconuolled  grazing and  degradation  of  the  range  that  emerged  in  the 
1930's in  relation  to  the first drilling of boreholes  mounted  steadily  in  the  succeeding  decades. Experts warned  that  stock 
l i s  might be necessary to prevent  damage to the pasture around  boreholes  and  rules were issued  ordering chiefs to lay 
down  a  maximum  number  of  stock  which  may be grazed in reach area (Schapera, 1943 cited from Peters, 199479). 
According to Peters  this  suggestion seems not to have been followed  up,  possibly for technical  reasons.  Nevertheless 
stock  limitation  were'incorporated  into all the later borehole  schemes. 
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Among  the  most  obvious  explanations,  one  finds  the  enormous  media-coverage that the drought 
received, the growing concern for environmental issues in general as well as the fact that 
environmental  issues  had  gained  political  credibility  in  both  the left and the  right. Far more important, 
however,  was the way  in  which the  issue  was  institutionalized  through  the UN system, achieving  a 
level  of  representation  and  concern  within  both  the  donor  community  and national governments of 
the  affected  countries  that  no  other  environmental  issue  has  gained so readily. This institutionalization 
turned  desertification  into  big  business,  a  politically  sensitive  and  major  North/South iss e (Thomas 
and  Middleton, 1994:2) 
The United  Nations  interest  in  drylands  dates  from the 1950s with  the establishment of  UNESCO's 
Arid Zone programme. In 1973 the specific problems related to the Sahel drought lead to the 
establishment  of UNSO (United  Nations  Sahelian16  Office),  charged  with coordinating relief effort in 
the  drought  affected areas. Nonetheless, it was  the UN conference on desertification (UNCOD) held 
in Nairobi in 1977 that provided  the s e a t  watershed. This conference, attended by representatives 
of 95 countries, 50 UN ofices and a myriad of  NGO's, opened  a  new epoch in  which the term 
desertification entered the popular and scientific vocabulary as a representation of a major 
environmental  problem  of  great  importance  for  the  political  agenda  (Thomas and Middleton, 1994: 1 
and 3). 
By placing desertification as  one  of  the  highest  priorities  on the environmental agenda, the United 
Nations has, according  to  Middleton and  Thomas,  contributed to a  politicization of the concept and 
to the creation of what  they  call  an  institutional  myth of desertification.  Certainly desertification has 
involved  the  interest  of  state  elites  and  donor  organizations,  but  the  politicization  of  the issue has also 
resulted  in  the  omission  of  politics  from  the  conceptualization  and  perception of he problem.  Instead 
of addressing the role that land  use  policies  and  agricultural  interests  play in 'the desertification 
process, it  has  been  easier to view the problem  in  an  environmental  light. Rather than  blaming 
internal  political or social issues, the  Sahelian  problems  could  now  be  presented in an environmental 
context where  politicians  from  the  developing  world  legitimately  could ask for assistance from the 
developing world17. 
%ater  the  area of coverage was enlarged  and  the  name c h g e d  to  UN Sudano-Sahelian Ofice. 
I7The  political  potential of the  desertification  argument  could  also be used internally as is illusmted by President 
Middleton, 1994: 2) 
Kountche's  use of the need  to fight desertification as an  excuse  to  halt  the  democratic  process  in  Niger (Thomas and 
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Desertification  became a common  word, representing an environmental  and  social  problem  of  serious 
dimensions,  long  before it had the appropriate  scientific  and  social  imprimatur. It also turned into 
what has been  called  an  ”ecological  taboo”, controlling  political  action on aprimufucie basis  without 
examination of the  context  and  underlying issues (Middleton  and  Thomas,  1994:99). 
An obvious result of this taboo - which  was  aided, not the least, by the enormous  amounts  of  aid 
money  flowing  within deserttkation circuits - was a limited interest in exploring  and  questioning  the 
(social) content of the  concept, and  instead  focus on technical  solutions and  blueprint  approaches 
which  to  a  large  extent  were  informed  by  the above mentioned  narratives. 
From the outset, it was  presumed  that the technology  was  available to bring  desertification  under 
controL  Therefore  the  agenda of the UN Plan of Action (1977)  was  to  ’bring  a h lt to  desertification 
before  year 2000. In fact,  the  delegates  at the UNCOD conference were  told  to  accept he existing 
level of knowledge as adequate  for  establishing  a  Plan of Action  as  their task lay in the immediate 
adaptation  and  application of existing knowledge (UNCOD 1977, cited from  Spooner  1982:5)” 
Research  and  data  collection has generally  focused on ecological  explanations and technical  solutions, 
operating almost exclusively with biological rather than with social indicators. W P s  anti- 
desertification efforts  did  not  shed  much  light on the problem,  dominated as it was  by attempts to 
present  data  on  the  sheer  magnitude  of the  problem. In fact,  the  acknowledged  limitation  of  available 
data - together  with  serious  doubts a to  how  to conceptualize desertification - ensured  that  mapping 
the  extent of desertification  never  could  be characterized as more than  an  educated  guess.  And 
consequently figures assessing  the  global extent and  effect  of  desertification  often  varied 
tremndo~sly’~. Tothis adds that  because desertification  became  a forum for  airing  national  interests, 
not  the  least  with  the  emotional  rejection  of  any  doubts  cast on the  scientific  foundation of the  issue  in  connection  to  the 
It is tempting to draw a  parallel  to  the  level of debate in the contemporary  discussions on global  warming, 
recent  climate  conferences. 
l9 Assessing  the  global  impact of desertification  Mabutt and Dregne  came  up with  very different  figures.  While 
Mabutt’s  total  figure  for  the  area  affected  by  desertification was 2001 million hectares,  Dregne,  using  slightly  different 
criteria for classifying  desertification  came  up  with 3271 million  hectares.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  both  figures are 
based  on  much  guesswork  and very little hard data,  a  secondary  reason for the  gap  was  diverting  opinions f what  was  to 
While  Dregne  in his assessment  excluded 6M) millions of hectares of slightly  desertified  rangelands  in  natural  deserts 
be identified as rangelands  likely  to  be  affected,  again  an  issue  relying  primarily  on  subjective or personal  opinions. 
where  precipitation  and  biological  productivity were considered too low to support grazing  activity,  Mabbutt  in his 
assessment  also  excluded  large  areas of rangeland  which he found were too remote,  underwatered or otherwise difficult 
to  put to productive  use  as  rangelands.  Confronted  with these discrepancies UNEP proposed that Mabbutt make a 
second estimate  including  the %unproductive rangelands”. The figures produced  were  now of 3475 million.  hectares, 
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it  was also under  heavy  political  pressure fiom governments  of  the  more  humid  countries  of  the  region 
to be  included  in  the  comfortable club of  countries  threatened by desertification  and  waiting for the 
aid  flow to arrive.  This  politically  conditioned  'flexibility'  obviously  did not ease  the  process of 
instituting  a  workable  definition  of the problem''. 
The  focus on biological  processes also lead to a  revival  of  Bovill  and  Stebbing's  old  theory of the 
encroaching  Sahara.  Much rhetoric was squeezed out of  the  metaphor  of the moving  sands,  often 
without  a  shadow  of  empirical  evidence.  Rather further confusion  was  created by  implying  that 
desertification  might  well  happen beyond drylands  and in fact  affect all climatic  zones2'. 
Very early in the  debate,  critics pointed to the lack of scientific  foundation for this view  of  the 
advancing desert. Le HouCrou, a  well-known  researcher  of  desertification  processes,  characterized 
the images  of desertization as progressing at a  more or less  constant  speed, as "one of the  nicest 
pieces of climate  fiction  that  one could probably  find in the specialized  literature" (Le HouCrou, 
1977:29). 
In 1975, however,  a  research project launched by Lamprey in 1975 to provide  scientific  evidence 
from the Sudan of the  presumed  advance  of  the  southern  front  of  the  Sahara.  By  comparing  a  survey 
of Sudan's vegetation  drawn  in 1958 by Harrison  and  Jackson  with  a new  map  of the  vegetational 
edge  of  the  desert  Lamprey's  team  was  able to estimate  the  advance of the desert to be on  average 5,5 
km a  year  (Lamprey,  1988). 
Lamprey's  study  was, however,  severely  criticized. First of all the  general  validity of assessing  the 
average  rate  of  advance  by  just  two  snapshot s w e y  17  years  apart  in  a  region  characterized  by  highly 
v&ble  climatic conditions  was  questioned.  Using  remote-sensing  techniques  in  the  area  studied by 
Lamprey,  Hellden  (1984,  1988)  was able to show  that  'there is no creation  of  long  lasting  desert-like 
showing that  the total desertified  area  on  earth  covered no less  than 75 per  cent of the  roductive  area of the  worlds 
drylands  or  40% of the  worlds  productive area (Middleton  and  Thomas, 199453-56). 
degradation  in the sub-bumid  zone.  Often  the  term  also  includes  salinisation of land  within  irrigation  systems,  which s a 
very different kind of problem  from  that of soil erosion  in  dryland areas (Toulmin,  1993:2). 
"Since 1984  the t a m  'desertification' has been  extended  from  arid  and  semi-arid  lands to  cover  the  problems of 
a  little  less  than 200 years  there  will  not be a single, fully  productive  hectare of land  on earth" (UNEP DC/PAC,  1987 
quoted  from Thomas and  Middleton, 199460) 
*'III 1987 UNEP writes:  "At  a  rate of 27 million  hectares lost a  year to the desert or to zero  economic  productivity, in 
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conditions during the 1962-75  period in the area  (described  by  Lamprey)  and  ’that  the  impact of the 
Sahelian drought was short lasting  followed by fast  land  recovery’.  Still  referring  to  the  same area, 
Olsson (1984) could demonstrate  how “the boundaries  between  different  vegetation  associations 
appear to be the same as  they  were 80 years  ago”. 
Nonetheless,  it is not until recently  that  these  statements  have  been  heard  and  accepted  and  then  only 
in some quarters. In the donor  community  desertification  remains  a very  important  issue. In spite of 
mixed experience” with  most  anti-desertification  activities,  the  validity of the  Plan of Action to 
Combat  Desertification  was reconfmed in 1990 by  an external  review. At the  Earth  Summit  of Rio 
in 1992 commitment was given to negotiate  and  agree  on  a  formal  convention  which it became 
UNSOs mandate to coordinatez3. In the  convention  signed in 1994,  the  term  desertification  was 
applied  very  broadly to “land  degradation in arid,  semi-arid  and dry sub-humid areas”. (UNCED, 
1992: Convention on Desertification;  article 1). 
Desertification has, in the  words of Warren  and  Agnew  (1987:7), become an ‘institutional  fact,  defined 
as one an  institution  wants to believe  because it serves  its  purpose,  in this case  presumably  to  preserve 
the institutions themselves andor the  flow of aid  to  the  countries  affected 
In fact, the debate on desertification  remains  noteworthy for its lack of conclusions. In the words of 
Farmer  and  Wigley  (1985)  we  remain  in  a  situation  where: “we don’t  know  why the  present  drought 
exists, we don’t know why droughts  have  occurred in the  past and  we  don’t  know  how long the 
present drought will last“ (cited  from  Morton,  1994:154). And one may add,  with  reference to the 
large amounts of  government  and  donor  agency  reports  lamenting  the  drought long after  rainfall in 
the Sahel had  normalized in the late 1980s, that  we  don’t  even  know  when to define it as having 
ended. 
Obviously  the  mythologization  and  establishment  of  ecological  tabooing  have  underpinned  a  general 
tendency for simplified and  generalzed  solutions as those  offered  by the  afore  mentioned  development 
narratives. But $desertification is really  a  minor  problem in relation  to  larger  political  and  social il s, 
how come that it has been  granted  such  an  important  role  and  has  been  considered  to  be  among the 
the omission of socio-economic  factors (Toulmin, 1993:14). 
22Among the shortcomings mentioned by the external review were its lack of focus, the very ambitious goals set and 
1992 a new ‘geen party (Parti africain  6cologiste  du S6nigal) was  formed  in  Senegal (*d, 199483). 
23 The old deseaification jargon of the  desert  advancing  at 5 to 10 km’s a year was also stated afresh when  in 
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major development issues for almost two decades? 
Part of the  explanation  might be found  in  what  Ferguson  terms  'the  anti-politics  machine'. Inspiration 
for the  'anti-politics  machine'  term  comes  from  the wondrous  'anti-gravity  machine' made famous in 
science  fiction  stories  that  at  the  flick  of  a  switch  suspends  the  effects  of  gravity. In Fergnsons world, 
it  refers to the ability  of the 'development  apparatus'  to  do  almost  as  good  a trick The suspension of  
politics from even  the  most  sensitive  political  operation  (Ferguson,  1990:256). 
This is  hardly  a  calculated  part  of  the  planners  intentions,  but  is  rather  a sort of  unintentional  side- 
effect or instnunenteffect of 'developmnt'  ideology.  Ferguson  argues  that  through these side-effects 
many  development  projects,  although  'failing' on their own terms,  have  "regular effects which include 
the expansion  and  entrenchment of bureaucratic  state  power,  side by side  with  the projection of a 
representation of economic  and  social ife which  denies  'politics'  and  to  the extent  that it  is successful, 
suspends its effects"  (Ferguson, 1990xv) In this way, he argues,  the  hegemonic  problematic of 
development has become one of the principal means through which the question of poverty is 
depoliticized in the world today (ibid.:256). But while the anti-politics machine depoliticizes 
everything it touches, it also  performs,  although  almost  unnoticed,  "its  own  preeminent  political 
operation  of expanding  bureaucratic  state  power"  (ibidxv).  And  here may lie a  possible clue to explain 
why  many  development  projects  in  spite of being  overtly  recognized  as  'failures'  are plicated again 
and  again. One may  even  suggest  that it is precisely  because  development  projects urn out to have 
such  uses, even if they are in some sense unforeseen,  that  they  continue to attract so much interest and 
support (ibid:256). 
In the case  of  the desertjkation bussiness,  the  elevation  of the problem,  by UNCOD and its entourage 
of environmentalists, to be a global environmental problem has contributed to transform the 
environmentaliddesertification establishment  into  an  anti-politics  machine.  For while  making the issue 
hghly political  at  the  global  level  (not  least  via  the  significant  amount of donor  money involved), an 
effect  of this globalization  has been a  depolitization  at  the  local  level.  Although  environmental  plans 
are formulated as benign and  universal  human  projects,  social  and  political Us eventually causing 
desertification  are no longer  addressed.  Blueprint  plans  are  therefore not simply  the result of poor or 
inadequate information.  Rather,  plans  reflect  political  ambition  both  at  international  and at national 
level and act, as in Ferguson's  Lesotho case, as  a  smoke  screen  for  other  agendas  being played out in 
the development  men&  agendas  involving  the  expansion  of  state  control r the  assertion  of authority 
by  local elites. 
By reducing the issue to a  technical  problem  and  even,  as  is the case  in  the  desertification  debate, 
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shifting the perspective from people to the politically more neutral natural resource and soil 
conservation,  problems  fundamentally  related  to  poverty  and deprivation are no longer  addressed as 
political  problems. When  establishing  ranchesB or rotational schemes"  the de facto privatization 
which takes place when  some  groups  are  given  priority  access to the range at the expense of  others 
is seldom addressed.  The same goes for the sinking of boreholes, the  establishment  of  grazing 
associations or even tree planting,  where the issue of  who is to hold control over these  key  resources 
is  most often ignored. 
The tissue that much  desertification  /environmental  assistance is made out of, makes it particularly 
suitable as an 'anti-politics machine'. The central features in this process are: The way in which 
interventions  are  remarkably  standmlized  and u iform &om  place to place. Relatively  little  importance 
given to understanding  the  specific,  historic  and  social context of a  given  country.  Instead  projects 
become context-independent  governed as they are by free floating and  untied  development  expertise 
that is easily  generalized  and  equally  easy to insert into any given  situation.  Development comes in 
a  package  of  standard  available  inputs  with  a  development discourse attached to it which  seems  to 
form a  world  unto  itself  (Ferguson, 1990259). 
The  focus  on  technical  solutions,  on  context-independent expertise and standardized approaches and 
the  extended  use  of  developmnt  narratives n the  desertification discourse are partly a product of this 
globalization  However  the  global  solutions  imposed on local problems, such as the ranch  model,  the 
rotational  schemes  and  the  fenced  paddocks,  have turned out  not to work. This has been  particularly 
true for the  livestock  sector which,  in the  vocabulary  of the World Bank,  has  been  a  'disappointing 
experiencea6  (de Haan, 1990:43). Millions of dollars have been spent, with few obvious  returns  and 
many donors and other international agencies have effectively abandoned the dry zone in their 
development efforts (Scoones 19943). 
"As was tried by the GTZ project in  Vidou lingoly in  northern Senegal or at the  Ranch  de  Doli. 
25F0r example  the World Bank funded PDESO project in the  Tambacounda area. 
discouraging  sector.  After  a peak  period  in 1974-79 where the lending programme to the  livestock  sector  reached 340 
26As a  result of poor performance the  World Banklie many other donors, hastily  withdrew from this 
million US dollars a year,  it  declined  to 240 million  dollars  in  the  period 1980 to 1985. In the  second  half of the 1980's it 
has been at around 100 million dollars  a year (de Haan 199043). 
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It is t h i s  generalized  failure  within  the  livestock sector as well  as the general  high cost and poor 
performance of  many afforestation  or  other conservation projects which  has  brought  (part  ofz7)  the 
development  establishment to look for a  new  theoretical  framework  more  suitable to the 
unpredictability  of  the  Sahelian  environment, a framework  relying on principles  and  guidelines  rather 
than  blueprints  and  prescriptions. 
Whether  or  not his new  non-equilibrium par- which  will be described  more in detail  below,  will 
succeed in  reorienting  development  policies in the region towards a  more  flexible  and  adaptive 
management  depends  on a  range of circumstances.  Obviously  management  practices  which  are  less 
centrally directed  and  are  more  open to the objectives of the local  producers  might  contribute  to 
curtail  the  reach  of  state  power  and  therefore act as  a constraint to the  interests of state bureaucracy. 
However  one  should  not  exaggerate he extent to which expansion of state  bureaucratic  powers  has 
been only a side-effect  of  development  projects (as a crude reading of Ferguson  might  imply). As will 
be shown  later on, the  relation  between  the  local resource users and  state  bureaucracy is of elder  date 
and is practically  embedded  in  every-day  life  in the Ferlo  region. 
Uncovering  uncertainty,  the  contours  of the non-equilibrium  framework. 
When  working  with a 'balance  of  nature'  concept  in  relation to  grazing  systems,  outside  perturbations 
must  be  treated  as  'noise'  which  confuses  and obscures an  underlying  equilibrium  pattern. In dry 
savanna  ecosystems,  however,  disturbances, 'noise' and random events turned  out  to  be so dominant, 
that it proved  more  useful to think of  the  'noise as the system itself (Scoones  and  Benhke 1994%). 
High degrees of  uncertainty  seemed  to  be characteristic of  many  African  ecosystems.  Therefore 
predicting the levels  of  production  that  the  systems  might  yield  from  one  year to the  next  proved 
increasingly  dif€icult or  even  impossible,  not o  mention  prediction  of  how  ecosystem  structures  would 
change  over  time. 
Searching  for a way  out  of this impasse, a  number  of researchers in the late 1980s tried to  change  the 
focus of research by  applying the  emerging concepts of complexity,  turbulence  and  non-linearity to 
ecological systems.  These  concepts,  derived from theories of chaos, complex  dynamics  and non- 
equilii- (as presented  by  Prigogine,  Nicolis, Glieck), stressed the  random  occurrence of external 
events  and the idiosyncratic  and  unpredictable ffects of  externalities on ecosystems  dynamics  and on 
populations and  species  (Ellis et al. 1991:2). 
27 Namely UNSO, the german GTZ., and a  number of international NGOs. 
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According to chaos theory,  turbulence and  nonlinearity  are as evident as  periods of stability  and  order. 
Both phenomena occur in  different  phases  and  time  scales of dynamic  patterns  of  cyclical  evolution 
(Spooner, 1993: 157). Virtually all processes  periodically  pass  through  phases of turbulence,  but if 
turbulence is to been seen in its entirety the  world  must  be  viewed as a  continual  process of dynamic 
change over time. 
The  general principles of chaos theory  have  been  summarized  by  Spooner  (1993:159): 
Complexity  and  Multilinearity : Systems  are  being  influenced by a  multitude of factors that 
interact to change  the  conditions  and  nature  of  the  system  and  thus  the  tenets of which models 
can be applied to  understand  what is happening. 
Unexpected  Sensitivity.  Even  small  change in conditions  in  any of the  influencing  factors  can 
produce disproportionate effects. This so-called  'butterfly'  effect  implies  that  these  systems 
are  inherently  unpredictable. 
Although prediction is impossible, patterns and  shapes  can  be  discerned  that do exhibit  a 
regularity  establishing points of stability, structure and  order, if one  knows  where  and  how 
to look  for them. These have become  known  as  strange  attractor  or  fractal  patterns, 
The  evolution and  adaptability of these  systems  is  regulated by the  quality of information  i.e. 
feedback mechanisms between  innuencing facton. The capacity  for  feed-back  determines  the 
adaptability and  survival  status of the  system  in  times of rapid  and  unpredictable  change. 
Fmdy the  systems  exhibit  discontinuity  and  persistence  meaning  that  when  conditions  change 
they do so almost  arbitrarily  fast,  cascading  over  a  threshold,  but  having  reached  a  new  stage 
that state will tend to recur or remain until the next  phase  changes. This means that the idea 
of statistical randomness  must  be  carefully  reassessed  in  each  case  where it is applied. 
As one  of the pioneers of applying  chaos  theories  to  ecological  systems,  Holling  (1973)  focused  his 
work on the  relations  between  resistance,  resilience  and  stability,  advocating  the  need  to  explore  the 
conditions  necessary for systems  persistence.  "If we are  dealing  with  systems  profoundly  affected by 
changes external to it, and  continually  confronted by the  unexpected,  the  constancy of behavior 
becomes less important than the  persistence of relationships"  (Holling  1973:l).  Undisturbed  natural 
systems, as well as those under  the  influence of man, are  likely  to  be  continually  in  a  transient  state. 
Therefore  useful. insights might be gained,  he  supposed, by shifting emphasis  from  the  equilibrium 
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states  to  the  conditions  for  persistence. In contrast  to  stability,  which  represents  the  ability of a  system 
to return  to  equjliirium  after  a  temporary  disturbance, persistence is measured  through  resilience i.e. 
through the ability of the system to  absorb  change  and  disturbances and still maintain the same 
relationship  between  population  and  stable  variables  (Holling,  1973:14). Therefore random 
perturbations such  as  forest  fires,  pest  attacks  etc. may produce instability  in the sense of large 
fluctuations  but  may also introduce  resilience  and  capacity  to  persist. In short, Holiings  insistence  on 
persistence  emphasjzes  the  need  for  keeping the  system  open, to view events in a  regional  rather  than 
local context,  emphasize  heterogeneity,  and  accept  the  unpredictability  of future events (Holling, 
1973:21). 
Building  on  these  insights  Weins  (1977)  and  Walker  et  al.  (1981)  and later Caugley et al. (1987), Ellis 
and  Swift  (1988),  Westoby  (1989)  and others were  able to demonstrate that unstable  non-equilibrium 
conditions  characteristic  of,  for  example,  African  savanna  ecosystems was a  fundamental  condition 
producing  a  highly  resilient  system  capable of repeating  itself over time  until  a  disturbance  restarts  the 
sequence. In these  areas  which  are  dominated  by  frequent droughts, population fluctuations  prevent 
plant  and  herbivores  from  developing  closely  coupled  interactions  as ecosystem development  and 
succession  are  abbreviated  or  non-existent  and  ecosystems seldom reach the climatically  determined 
equilibrium point which is central to plant succession theory and the equilibrium paradigm as 
mentioned above (Ellis, 1995:38). In such non-equilibrial systems, the complex dynamics they 
manifest  and  the  resulting  uncertainties,  arise  because  of  the amplification or positive  feed-back  within 
systemsz8 or due  to  external  forcing. 
In the case  of  dryland  ecosystems,  external  climate  forcing is the  primary case of  complex  dynamics. 
This is in contrast to equilibrium systems where populations are more or less in balance with 
resources,  other  populations or  external  forces  like  climate (Ellis, 1995:37). 
A multi-year  study  carried  out  by  Caughley  et aL in 1987 - analyzing  the  interactions  between  climate 
variability and plant production, plant composition, sheep and kangaroo population in eastern 
Australia - contributed to establish  the  scientific  basis  for  a  distinction  between  equilibrial  and  non- 
eqdibrial  ecosysted9. Caugley  and his colleagues  concluded that  highly  variable  systems  differ  from 
The so-called buttefly effect  (see  Glieck, 1987) 
the  mean. The effects on  pastures  and  herbivores  was  substantial  and  changed  dramatically  with  rainfall  patterns. 
29 In this area  rainfall  averages 200-300 mm a  year  but is highly  variable,  varying  between 45 and 50 per cent  from 
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slightly  variable  systems  in both degree and kind. By  focusing  on  the  interannual  variability  of  the 
system instead of measures  of  mean  value  they judged that the  threshold  where  a  system  becomes 
dominated by variability more than by average conditions occurs when rainfall coefficient of 
interannual  rainfall  variations (CV) nears or exceeds 30 per  cent. In such  a  system,  they  concluded, 
the  concept  of canying  capacity is largely  an  abstraction  and  not  very  useful  (Ellis et al.,  1991:3)  They 
also suggested  that  where CVs were below 20 per cent,  animal  populations  would  remain  relatively 
stable  and  strong  feed  back  would  develop  between  herbivores  and  plant  i.e.  equilibrium  conditions 
prevailed  (Ellis,  1994:39)30. 
It  may,  however, be dif6cult to  distinguish  sharply  between  systems  governed by equilibrium  or  non- 
equilibrium  characteristics. Much seems to point towards Wein's suggestion  that  ecosystems  exist 
along a gradient with dynamic behavior patterns ranging from equilibrial to non-equilibrial 
charactexistics  with  considerable interannual  and local variation.  (Weins,  1984,  cited  from Ellis et al., 
1991:4,  Scoones,  1995:2)). 
Implications for range  management. 
But what  implications do these insights  have for range  management? In their  study of Turkana 
ecosystems  over a  period of 10 years Ellis and Swift questioned the applicability of traditional  range 
management  and  livestock  development procedures. If, as hypothesized,  it is external  factors,  such 
as rainfall, that  determine  availability of forage  altering  the  grazing  pressure is not  likely to have  much 
effect. Instead  of  trying to manipulate  and control the  system,  both  animals  and  herders  are  in  a 
position  to  respond to externally  driven  change.  Therefore,  pastoralists are likely to move  their 
animals to more  favourable areas as forage  resources decline. As a result,  they  argued,  pastoralist  have 
little  capacity  or  imperative to control localized  fluctuations in rangeland  productivity.  Instead  they 
have  adapted  to  instability through so-called  opportunistic  management  strategies. 
In short, livestock  populations may  decline because of lack of fodder, but fodder  is  scarce  because 
there is too little  rain not because of excess numbers  of animal (Behnkhe  and  Scoones, 19949). 
Overgrazing  and  range  degradation is therefore likely to occur  only  under  special  circumstances  such 
as when drinking water  is  a  limiting factor or mobility  of  the  herds i s  constrained (Bartek et al., 
30 'Ibis is in  line  with  research  carried out by Coppock in  the  Ethiopian  highlands  where  annual  precipitation s 
relatively  high (400-700 mm) and droughts are infrequent.  Here  livestock  population  appears to be  near canying 
capacity  much of the time and there seems to be cyclical  patterns of overgrazing. In this area canying capacity, 
successional rends ahd  population dynamics are all viable concepts  (Coppock, 1993:60). 
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1991:26)  According to Ellis and Swift (1988), livestock  numbers  are,  in fact, never  given  a  chance 
to approach  ecological canying capacity because major  droughts  are  frequent  and  drought  recovery 
slow.  This  is,  however,  one of the points that will be  discussed  below. 
Recognition  of  unpredictable variability as the  governing  principle in range  ecosystems  has  lead  to  a 
growing  understanding  of pastoral strategies geared towards  seizure  of  opportunities  and  avoidance 
of  hazards.  This  insight is by  no  means  new, as numerous studies by ethnographers  have  documented 
in great detail  the  way  pastoral  livestock  keeping is adapted to environmental  variability  (Gulliver, 
1955; Dupire,  1962;  Dyson-Hudson, 1966; Dahl,1979).  Nonetheless,  conventional  ivestock 
development has been  dominated  by  technical  disciplines, as  veterinary  science  and  livestock  breeding 
receiving  very  little  input from social sciences (Scoones,  1995:8). 
One of the fmt from  within  the establishment to question  conventional  range  management  practice 
was the economist,  Stephen  Sandford. In 1982, he  made the important  observation  that  as  rainfall 
variability  increases, so do the opportunity costs. This means  that  conservative  grazing  strategies a
those recommended by most  livestock  development  projects in  Africa,  (i.e.  ranches  with  fenced 
paddocks,  rotations,  controlled stocking rates etc.  dictated by the long-term  carrying  capacity of the 
system)  are likely to prove  uneconomic under highly  unpredictable  rainfall  conditions.  Under  such 
conditions  a  conservative  strategy,  defined  as one which  maintains  a  population of grazing  animals 
at a relatively  constant  level  without  overgrazing through  good  as  well as bad  years,  would  imply  that 
during  good  years  livestock  numbers were not allowed to increase to utilize all the additional  forage 
available. 
In contrast,  opportunistic  herd  management strategies, where  livestock  numbers  vary  in  accordance 
to  the availability  of forage,  enables the extra forage available  in good years to be  converted  directly 
into economic output ( m i l k  and meat) or into productive capital in the form of a bigger herd 
(Sandford,  1982:62).  Obviously  such  a  strategy carries the  implication  of  heavy  losses,  periodically 
and  unpredictably  whenever drought occur. But such  losses  can  be dealt with  in  several  ways,  for 
example  through  insurance,  diversification  and  not least spatial  mobility. 
Several  earlier as well as later  studies have backed this view  by  showing  how  productivity  in  pastoral 
herds managed  through  opportunistic strategies are similar or even  superior to those  managed as 
commercial  herds,  eventually  on  ranches3'. 
the amount of protein  per  hectare per year compared to both sedentary agro-pastoralists  and  ranchers in the US and 
Australia.  Evamples  from  Botswana,  Kenya,  Tanzania, Uganda and  Ethiopia  confirm  these  findings (see Scoones 
31 Breman  and de Wit (1983:1344) have  shown  that  transhumant  systems  in  Mali  yield on average at least  twice 
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The competitiveness of  indigenous  systems of  herd  management  are  closely  related  to the concepts 
of  resilience  and  adaptation  introduced  above.  One  of  the  principal  forms  of  adaptation is through the 
matching of available  feed  supply  with  animals at a  particular  site  (Scoones,  1995:9)  i.e.moving 
animals to areas where  fodder is available. In tb.k way mobile  livestock  producers  can  maintain  a total 
livestock  population  within  a  wide  geographic  area  which is in  excess of  what could  be  sustained  by 
several herds confined to their individual  area  (Benhke and  Scoones,  1993:15). 
Another  aspect  of  adaptation  and  resilience  which has been overlooked  in  previous range  management 
efforts  mainly  concerned  with  production  increases i  the  adaptation of  animal  physiognomy.  Recent 
research has revealed that indigenous  zebu  cattle, for instance,  have  energy  sparing  mechanisms that 
act as an  adaptation to undernutrition  and  water  deprivation.  Such  mechanisms  may  off-set  increased 
mortality and increase recovery  after  drought3’  (Scoones  1995:18) This shows that a) indigenous 
animals are well adapted to uncertain  fodder  and  watering  availability  and  b)  that  more  animals can 
be  sustained on a  given  amount  of  fodder  during  periods of drought  due  to  reductions  in  fasting 
metabolism. 
Finally one could point to the possibilities  provided  through  increasing  locally  available fodder by 
importing feed from elsewhere (hay or industrial feed) or by  enhancing  fodder production through 
investment in key resource sites. 
All this  points to the difficulties of assessing  an  upper  limit to the  amount of cattle  which can be 
sustained on a  given  range.  It  also  helps  to  explain why  the  explosive  livestock  growth  experienced 
throughout  the region from the  beginning  of this century  has  failed  to  the  produce  the  anticipated 
1995:12-13). Between agro-pastoral  and  transhumant  production  research is ambiguous.  Scoones  refers to research 
carried out in Mali where no  significant  differences  were  found  between  transhumant and agro-pastoral  production 
(Wilson  1982).  while  van  Ray and de Leeuw  (1974) in northern  Nigeria  found  settled  livestock  to be more  productive 
because  of their preferential access to  prime  grazing.(Scoones 199513) 
32 A trial carried out by Finch  and King  (1979)  showed  that  increasing  the  walking  distance  and  decreasing  the 
watering  frequency, as might  happen  in  periods  of  drought,  did  not  result  in  any  sisnificant  loss of weight  in  African 
zebu. Similar adaptation bas been  observed  among  calves of Borana  Cattle in Ethiopia.  Here  reduction  in  milk  supply to 
the calf did not affect the longer  term  target  weight of the  calf,  despite  reducing  the  growth ra e in the  short  term. 
Recovery following drought was  equally  rapid  (Coppock,  1992). According to Western  and  Finch  forage  need  during 
droughts may be reduced by as much as 30 per cent through  changes  in  metabolic  rate. Thii is liiely to reduce  drought 
induced mortality among zebu cattle considerably.  (Scoones,  1995:18) 
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catastrophe and  hecatomb  in  terms  of over~tocking~~. A possible  explanation  might be that, seen in 
a longer perspective, the  ecosystems  in  these  areas  are  not  fragile. On the contrary they  display 
considerable resilience  and are able to absorb  considerable  change. 
The strategies adopted by herders  to  mitigate  risk  display  similar  flexibility.  According  to changing 
economic, environmental  and  personal  circumstances  herders may  divers& theiz'production assets 
by a) keeping a mix of livestock in terms of species  and  class,  which  enables herders to exploit 
seasonal and  annual  variability  as  well as forage  quantity  and  quality  on  a  local  and  regional  basis;  b) 
by  diverslfvlng  their  livestock  production goals  for  livestock  production  to  include  not  only milk and 
meat  production  but  also  animal  transport,  traction or capital  accumulation  and c) diversifying their 
economic activities into  cropping,  wage  labour or  commerce (Pemer 199454). This flexibility also 
involves  a far more  free flow of investment  between  different  sectors  than  is  usually  assumed, often 
involving a  certain  degree of occupational  straddling.  For  some it is  more  profitable  to invest surplus 
from cropping in livestock, for others it is the reverse (Morton 199435). If it turns out more 
profitable herders may take up  agriculture  or  farmers  start to  nomadize  (or  hire  a  herder). In short, 
people direct their investments  and  labour  efforts  towards  the  most  profitable  activity at any  given 
time. 
Finally local  producers  are  opportunists,  who  manage  for  current  conditions  rather  than for lo g term 
means or possible  future  calamities  such  as  extreme  droughts. In highly  variable  and risk prone 
environments  planning is often  a  very  individualistic  undertaking.  The  tendency of mainstream range 
management to assume homogeneity of both  social  group  and  landscape,  and  consequently planning 
for averages, has therefore  meant  that  diversity  is  unaccounted  for.  Often it is precisely this diversity 
that allows the pastoral system to  sustain  itself. 
Diversity  and  flexibility  give  rise to opportunistic  management,  management for current conditions 
rather than for long term  means or for rare events  such  as  extreme  drought  (Sandford 1983). This 
means that conservation  of  rangelands is of  secondary  concern to  pastoralists. Because land is in 
surplus  in  large  parts of the  Sahel,  especially  those  which  are  governed  by  non-equilibrium conditions, 
it has  relatively  low  value.  Herders  have  little  motivation  to  manage  for  stocking rates and rather 
manage for  the ratio of livestock to other  limiting  factors  such  as  labour  and  water. The benefits to 
be gained from controlling  stocking are simply too small to j u s q  the  efforts  of enclosure and 
Baggara territory was considered  to be 20 per  cent  overstocked  while  between  1953  and  1976  the cattle population more 
than trebled (Morton, 1994170) 
Morton reports on the inconsistency of several  reports on the Sudan  claiming  that  already  in  1955 the 
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negotiation  (Morton, 1994:177). 
Turning a  blind  eye  on  local  initiatives  and  the  effects of change. 
Also the brief  historical  focus,  the  tendency of viewing environmental problems  in  terms  of  'before' 
and  'after' the drought and  the  predilection  for  characterizing  indigenous production systems as 
stagnant has  furthered  a  tendency  to turn a  blind  eye to the rapid change which  has  characterized 
recent  development  of  most Sahelian societies.  Far from being stagnant these societies have  to  a  very 
large  extent  been  able  to  adapt  effectively  to  changing  circumstances  when  given  the  chance. In most 
cases  where  technological  innovations  have  proved practical  they have also been  adopted  by the local 
population,  although  sometimes  in ways  that  differ  from the original  intentions. 
Often  these  developments  have  been  almost entirely  the  result of private initiative. This has  been  the 
case of the adaptation of  donkey carts  and  rubber  inner tubes, discussed at length in the present 
dissertation.  These  innovations  are  examples  of  key  technologies wh ch have contributed  to break two 
of the principal  constraints  of  the  region:  water  and  transport. Similar cases are reported by Morton. 
In the  case  of D& major  expansion  of  farming  of  the  previously waterless goz regions  did  not  come 
from sinking  of  boreholes  alone.  Due  to  the  considerable costs involved  in  borehole  drilling,  the 
number  of  fields  which  can  be  cultivated  in  walking distance of the waterpoint is  fairly  limited. 
Therefore  credit  for  effectively  bringing  vast  areas  of land under the hoe  also  goes to the local 
adaptation  of  old  Bedford  truck axles into  flat  one-horse carriages fit for  carrying  water in old  fuel 
drums. In the same way the  transformation by local  blacksmiths  of old car springs into cheap tools 
for clearing and cultivating has played no little role in the expansion of agriculture (Morton, 
1994:75). Simple  new  inputs  like  hessian sacks or second hand containers in the form of plastic cans, 
tins and  bottles may also have a  crucial  impact on boosting domestic markets  and exports on a 
regional level as it helps overcome constraints related to transportation of goods over longer 
distances. In most  cases  these  innovations  have  been  provided  solely  by  local  traders. 
But not all innovations  concern  low  technology  input.  Often,  considerable  local  activity remains veiled 
to the observer simply  because  the  right  questions are  not asked.% Often one is surprised to find 
large  investnents,  such as expensive  four  wheel-drive  pick-ups  or private  wells  financed by individual 
herders, or by the  large amounts of  money  which can be raised in the local community  when funds are 
consumption  habits was interrupted  in his listing of the family's properties i terms of torches,  mats,  kitchenware  by  the 
respondent  drawing his attention to the  brand  new  Mitshubishi  pick-up  parked outside  the  hut (O.Tour6  1990). 
34This point  was  well illustrated by a  Senegalese  colleague  who in the c o m e  of a  survey on wealth  and 
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raised for building  a  mosque. 
A  paradox  exists  between  underdevelopment  explained as lack of capital  while  herders  are  blamed for
accumulating  too  much  capital  in  their  herds. Although  unevenly  distributed,  much  seems  to  suggest 
that  considerable  amounts of  money  may be mobilized  locally  in  cases  where  interesting  investment 
objects  occur.  At  least Mortons experiences fiom Darfur as well as my own from the Senegalese  Ferlo 
accounts of several  local  millionaires  and  considerable  investments  directed into trade and  public 
transports. Obviously, all theses  activities  have contributed to a  considerable  development of local 
markets.  One  of  the  reasons,  however,  why this remain  largely  unaccounted  for in aid  circles may  be 
the tendency  the  see a need  for  foreign capital as more or less axiomatic to developing  countries.  For 
when  capital  intensive  development  projects are present  with  their  capital  intensive  portfolio  there is 
no  need  for  local  herders  or  traders  to risk their own capital.This  dilemma,  which  can  be  dealt  with 
only  superficially in the present context, is summarized  neatly  by  Jean-Pierre  Joseph:  "Le 
d&eloppement,  c'est  l'entrepreunariat sans le risque35" (see Jean Pierre  Olivier  de  Sardan, 1995:191). 
Apart from the tendency of concealing local potentials for rapid growth, the anticipation of 
catastrophe and tabooing of ecological issue may also lead the observer to perceive  environmental 
change  in a more  gloomy  perspective than is necessary. Focusing  on  resilience  instead of stability,  and 
adaptation and  absorption  instead  of  equilibrium and degradation, for example, may change  the 
perception  of  some  of  the  phenomena,  considered  by  the  mainstream  view  to  be  indicators  of  future 
turmoil. Too often  degradation  and erosion are defined  in terms of  reduced  productivity,  while the 
question  of  its  sgmiicance in terms of impact on peoples  ability  to  make  a  living s left  unaddressed. 
Erosion for example is not  disadvantageous per se. In some  cases  some  groups  might  be  perfectly 
happy for the change.  There  might  be no need to lament high soil erosion on slopes if it proves  to 
provide  valuable soils and  nutrient  for  production systems that use the  valley  bottom  lands36.  Equally, 
the  costs of reducing  degradation  in  terms  of the opportunity costs of  output  foregone  of crops and 
animal produce may be  very  high  in  relation to reduced levels of soil erosion  (Toulmin, 1993:5). 
Migration is another  example  of  issues  which  almost  automatically  are  perceived  in  a  negative  light, 
35 "Development is entrepreneurship  without  risk-taking" 
36 Erosion  may be seen  not  as  a  hazard but as aresource. By  directing  the flow of the  eroded  material,  Mixtec 
farmers  can annually  feed  their  fields  with  fertile soils and can  even  extend  their  agricultural  land.  Before  large  scale 
permitted  them to  convert  poor  hill-top  fields  into  rich  alluvial  farmland  (Spooner, 198219). 
gullying  began,  the  agricultural  productivity of the  valley  was less than it is today as the  judicious use of gullying  has 
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being  interpreted  mainly as an effect  of  droughts  and  degrading  resources  forcing  local  population  to 
move  southward to less  uncharitable  environmental  conditions.  One  may,  however,  turn  the  argument 
upside  down,  seeing  migration as a search  of  opportunities.  Migration as exploitation of opportunities 
has long traditions in West Africa  and is connected to both  agricultural  expansion,  to  development 
of  trade  and to nomadic  pastoralismAS  many  areas re characterized  more by scarcity of labour  than 
by  scarcity of land  (Berry,  1989),  influx  of  migrants  has  often  been  acted as catalyst  for  development 
of new productive activities as is the case in the  Ferlo.  Far  from  being  restricted many traditional 
Aliican  societies  are  highly  porous,  a fact that  does  not  exclude  the  existence of dispute  and  conflict 
over  resources. But conilict is not always  negative,  it is also the  means  by  which  groups  can  overcome 
inappropriate or ‘unjust’ distribution of  resources  (Morton, 1994246). 
In conclusion: 
In the course of this chapter I have  shown  how  “conventional  wisdoms”  on  range  management  based 
as they  are on simpfied and  undocumented  assumptions  fail to understand  the  production  objectives 
of African herders and the dynamics of the African  rangeland  systems.  Obviously,  the  complexes of 
signs and assumptions interwoven into narratives  such as  the  degrading  range,  the  tragedy  of  the 
commons and the predilection of  African  herders to accummulate  large  and  unproductive  herds, 
contain bits and pieces of valuable and  pertinent  information.  They  are  therefore  inadequate  rather 
than totally untrue: Herskovits’ insistence that livestock serve other purposes than merely as 
marketable commodities, or Hardins’  insistence  on  perceiving  herders as rational  producers  provide 
valuable points of departure for further  analysis. But in the massive  and  uncritical m e r  in  which 
it is most frequently used, the effect  has too often  been  that  attention  has  been  focused  on  poorly 
defined problems and  misguided  solutions  focusing on technical  rather  than on political  issues. This 
focusing on environmental explanation  and  technical  solutions,  has  together  with an emphasis on 
biological rather than social  indicators,  resulted in a  concentration on the animals and the  grazing 
environment rather  than on the herders  and  their  production  system. This has  been  further  aggravated 
by the adoption of a very  short time perspective  @fore  and  after  the  drought)  which  has  contributed 
to create an image of African environments as standing literally on the verge of catastrophe. 
Consequently,  rapid  action to restore  ‘balance of nature’  has  been  on  the  agenda  rather  than  achieving 
in-depth understandings of  the  complex  dynamics  governing  the  African  environment. 
In spite  of accumulating documentation of its innacuracy  and  evidence  that  the  policies t uggested 
were at best inefficient  in  dealing  with  dryland  degradation,  desertification and  its  accompanying 
environmental  narratives  exhibited  considerable  perseverance. This was  the  case  not  least  because  of 
convergent  interests  between  local  governments  and  the  international  donor  community.  Through its 
properties as an.‘anti-politics machine’ the desertification  debate  has  functionned  as  a  means of 
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suspending  politics  from  discussions  of  dryland degradation,  removing the focus of discussion  from 
politically  sensitive  issues such  as  rights  and  control over resources towards the politically  more 
neutral  ‘environment’.  For  national  governments the ‘crisis’  scenario  served as a  justification  for 
authoritarian  interventions in rural  land  use  and for claiming rights of  stewardship over resources 
previously  outside  their  control, as local  herders  and  farmers  were  assumed to act merely as destroyers 
of their  environment.  For  the  international  donor  community the desertification amative served as 
a  pretext  for  an  unprecendented  swelling  of  aid  flows  and  hence  of  aid  bureaucracies  enabling  them, 
as stated by Swift (199688), to  assert  rights  as  stakeholders  in the drylands  of  Africa37. In this way 
they  managed to gain  legitimacy  to  participate  in  the  decision  making over dry-land resources’and a 
platform  through  which  they  could try and  impose their views. 
Although  these  narratives,  more  or  less  intentionally,  have  served the above  mentionned  purposes, 
they  have turned out to  be  poorly  fitted  to  provide explanations for the  changes  actually  occuring  in 
the rangelands  of  the  Sahel.  Contrary to the  alanning  scenarios  generated  by the desertification  debate, 
the rangelands in the  Sahel  have  turned  out to be far more  resilient  than  anticipated,  and  should 
therefore  be  analyzed as such.  Rather  than  perceiving of the  African  environment  as  stable  systems 
which  have  been  disturbed  but  which  eventually  may have been brought back to their  previous  state 
of  equilibrium,  more  explanatory  weight  should  be  given  to  understanding the “n0ise”i.e.  accepting 
the  randomness and  unpredictability  of  the  system. Instead of  viewing the system  as  stagnant and 
unable to develop  except  through  external  interventions,  emphasis  should be turned  towards the ability 
of the system to absorb  change  and  disturbances  i.e. towards the resilience of the system  and  its 
capacity  to  persist. 
In the same vein,  herders  should be regarded  not as either  passive victims or active destroyers of their 
otherwise  stable  environement.  Rather a new understanding  of herders as creative and  opportunistic 
entrepreneurs  who  are  able  to  adapt  and  even  take  advantage of changes in their environment  should 
emerge. It is this approach,  stressing  resilience  and  adaptation  as well as fluidity  and  indeterminacy 
with  regards to outcome  which  will  provide  the  theoretical  background  upon which  the  environmental 
and  productive  changes  generated by the  post-drought  migration will be measured. 
Hence a number  of p r e h m y  assumptions  may be extracted kom the “new ecology”  approach  which 
will  serve as guidelines  for  the  analysis  in  chapter 4 
provided justification  for  large scale  funding for the  development of remote  sensing. 
37 swift (199689) also points to the  convenience ofthe crisis scenarios for part ofthe scientific  community as it 
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- Most rangeland ecosystems and pastoral development are governed by a multitude of factors 
which  interact  and change the system  making  prediction  almost  impossible. 
- h spite of high variability and unpredictability the systems display high degrees of resilience 
both with regard to biomass  and  livestock  production.  Adaptation of  flexible  and  diverse 
management strategies ensure that in cases of severe  droughts  mortality is limited  and  herd 
recovery  rapid. 
- This high degree of resilience also goes for adaptation of various technological innovation. 
Far kombejng stagnant  pastoral  societies  have  shown  the  ability  to  incorporate  technological 
innovation when these suit their production  goals. 
- African  dryland ecosystems are not as extremely  fragile as anticipated.  Recognizing this 
implies parting  with  a number of anthropologists  and  'deep-ecologists'  who  have  focused on 
extremely difficult ecologic conditions  which only pastoralists  with their ancient,  fine-tuned 
deep  ecological  insight  can  exploit  without  disturbing its delicate  balance,  and  for  whom  any 
c h g e  in tern of  introduction  of  new  technology  would  alter this balance and plunge  these 
proud people into ecologic disaster. 
- Most pastoralists have turned out be far more concerned with profit maximizing than with 
environmental  concerns.  Few  of  them  adhere  to the idea of 'the catastrophic  threshold'  implied 
in  the  notion  of  carrying  capacity. Too often  ecological  change is perceived a priori as 
deterioration, even in cases where such perception is not  shared  by  the  local  population. 
Finally it should be stressed, that although it is true that most 'traditional' methods of range 
management  have turned out  to  be far better adapted to the highly  variable  environment  than  the 
methods  offered  by  'modem' range management,  focusing on the harmonious  herder  exploiting  the 
resources  in  a  sustainable  manner  dismissed the central  point: that any  management  system  is  the 
result  of  specific historical conditions affecting  the  relation  of  power  between  different  groups, 
including the role of new technologies  likely to influence  patterns of use  and  the  control  over 
resources.  Rather  than the myths  of the 'pastorale'  where  herding  is  regarded  as  a  'natural  proces' 
betraying all the qualities of aboriginal  harmony, it seems  fruitfull to look at herding  as  a  "social" 
process which  requires  political, economic and  cultural  investment  in  land,  social  relations, animal 
capital  and  labour  and  political  institutions.  Before  passing  on t   the  analysis  of  Senegalese  reality  the 
next chapter  therfore  offers  some  reflections  the  political  institutions  involved  in  herd  management. 
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Chapter 3. 
Commons,  institutions  and  boundaries; 
fitting  social  dynamics  into  the  study of 
common 
property. 
Commons, institutions  and boundaries; fitting  social  dynamics into the study of common 
property. 
An issue of primary  interest  to  the  present  research  has  been  the  ways in which access to grazing 
lands  and  water  have  changed as a result  of  the arrival of a  large  contingent of 'foreign'  pastoralists 
to the  boreholes of the  Ferlo  region.  Understanding  how this has  affected the indigenous, relatively 
sedentarized agro-pastoralists of the  area  and  what  changes it has brought about in  terms  of 
changing  social  relations  requires  an  analysis  of  the  institutional arr ngements related to regulating 
access to water  and  grazing  lands.  It  also  requires  a  more  general understanding of  how  groups 
of people  and  societies  innovate  technologically  and  institutionally, to accommodate and  respond 
to  environmental  change. 
According to mainstream views, environmental degradation arises from unclear institutional 
arrangements  (including  property  rights) and  from  the  absence of an authority structure to  give 
meaning to such  rights  (Bromley  and  Cernea, 1989:55). In pastoral societies, crucial resources 
such as water or grazing are  seldom  held as private  property.  Enhancing more clear use rights on 
territories  attributed  to  distinct  groups of resource  users  has  therefore been the prefered panacea 
among policy-makers. This is designed to avoid further degradation and restore the balance 
between the resources  available in a  specific  setting  and  the  number of users. 
But  how  does this fit with the  many  controversies  and  intense  struggles concerning access to and 
control over resources  observed  during  fieldwork? Is it likely that these may be solved just by 
establishing  a  more  comprehensive and  efficient  framework  of  rules  to defend resources against 
(ab)use  by  foreigners?  Can  one  assume  that  people  share  a  common interest in planning for long 
term  conservation  of  their  resources? Do all rural  dwellers  perceive  environmental  problems in the 
same way? Or  do they  have other, equally  important, resource priorities? And is it possible to 
distinguish 'members' of a  community  from  the  outsiders  against  whom  they are supposed to 
protect their resources? 
As shown above, the balance of nature view  is  prominent not only  in the understanding of the 
biological  processes  goveming  semi-arid  lands,  but also in mainstream considerations on the social 
processes  related to local  management  of  natural  resources.  Many  policy interventions depart from 
the  assumption of a distinct and  relatively  stable  environment  which  has succumbed to degradation 
and  deterioration  but  with  potentials  to  be  restored  and  managed  sustainably. Rural communities 
are  seen as the  appropriate  body  to  execute  this  restoration,  governed as they are by an underlying 
common  interest in preserving  the  natural  resources  in their previous (undegraded) state. 
Within such  a framework, conflicts of interest  or  diverging resource priorities tend to be perceived 
as exceptions,  disturbances  or  "noise",  which  will  vanish  once  harmony is restored. Nonetheless, 
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this  dismissal of disturbances,  which  is  analogous  to the situation  of  'equilibrium  view',  often 
results  in  rather  sterile  conceptions  of  the  institutional set-up  of  rural communities. For, just as in 
the case of the  physical  environment  described  in  the  previous chapter, it turns out that it is the 
"noise",  the  exeptions  and  the  random  events  rather  than  a fictive regularized enactment of rules 
that  hold  the  clues to the workings  of  the  systems.  Rather than assuming an affiity of interests 
between  a  distjnct  group  of  users,  it  seems  that it is is precisely in the open struggles over access 
and control  and  in  the  constant  social  manoeuvering  over  rights to resources that an understanding 
of the institutions  and  their  transformation may  be  found. 
The following chapter is a mainly theoretical argument which discusses the limitations of 
mainstream  views  on  institional  aspects  of  natural  resource  management.This,  maybe  somewhat 
tedious, examination  of  the  shortcoming of  an  influential approach (the common  property  and 
collective  action  approach)  has been a neccesq exercise  as it enabled me to  idenm why this 
straightforward  and  easily  applicable  framework  ends  up  with  such static and  undynamic  visions 
of local communities  and of  peoples'  handling  of  their productive  assets.  On the basis of these 
insights,  an  alternative frame  for  studying  institutional  dynamics s developed  exploring  the  ways 
in which differently  positioned  actors gain acccess to and control over the resources that are 
instrumental to their  weU-being.  Here  rights  to  resources are  perceived as a  highly  political  issue, 
subject to constant  social  manoeuvering  and to ongoing  disputes  about  political  and  social  identity 
in terms of difference and belonging. This is in contrast to the de-politized vision of the 
homogeneous  community  offered by the  conventional  management  approach 
While the  present  chaper  will  limit  itself to the  theoretical  argument, its empirical  implications  will 
be illustrated when the Senegalese  case  material is analysed in chaper 5.  
Approaches  to  the study of institutional  aspects of natural  resource  management: 
Issues of institutional  arrangements in relation  to  resources  held  under common property (as is 
the  case  with  water  and  rangelands)  have  been  discussed  intensely during the last 30 or 40 years. 
Three  different  arguments may  be  distinguished': 
a) the  transformation  approach, which is closely  linked to the Tragedy of the Commons model, 
refers to common or 'traditional'  property  rights  as  causes  of  environmental degradation. This 
approach  stresses  the  need  for  thorough  change  of  the institutional setting governing land  tenure 
and  natural  resource  management. It points  to  individualized  and exclusive titles of land  as  a sine 
qua non for improved  economic  performance (North and Thomas, 1990; Demsetz, 1967; Feder 
'The distinction between the transformation and the perservation approach bas been inspired by a 
unpublished  working  paper  by  Christian  Lund. 
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and Feeny,  1990). 
b)  the  preservation or rehabilitation school which is opposed to the  transformation  approach. It 
argues that  traditional tenure systems, as  for example  common  property, may be  superior  to 
private  property  systems as they are more  adapted  to  the  specific  social  and  ecological  conditions. 
In this approach,  which  might also be termed the 'Common  Property  and  Collective  Action 
School',  the  most prominent contributions are the  works  of  Ostrom (1985,1990), Bromley  and 
Cernea (1989), Berkes (1989), Oakerson (1992),  Thompson  (1989)  and Wade (1987). 
Characteristic for this approach is the focus on the "development,  evolution,  performance  and 
survival  of  institutional arrangements in order to  ensure  sustainable and  optimal  resource  use".  It 
builds on an idea of communities as sites of consensus  and  sustainability. 
c)  the negotiated  development approach which  stresses  how  diverse  and  conflicting  values and 
resource priorities -rather than shared  beliefs  and  interests - pervade  social  life  and may be 
struggled  and  bargained over. The aspiration  here is not on a  reconstruction  of  more or less 
imagined traditional institutions. Instead the focus  is on the  complexity,  the  ambiguities  in  local 
land tenure  systems  and on looking for possible  ways of adapting  local  practices to modem 
1aw.This  view is embraced by, among others, Beny (1994),  Moore  (1987)  and  Peters  (1994). 
During  the  last 20 years  the  transformation  view  which  governed  most  development  policies  in  the 
1960s and 1970s has  largely been superseded by the preservation  view. In recognition of  their 
overt  failures  in  reaching the expected goals, the large  scale  external  interventions  proposed by 
the transformation  approach,  have to a  wide extent been  abandoned.  The  scene is gradually  being 
taken  over by the  preservation  view,  carrying  with it an urge for community-based  sustainable 
development.  Hence the  transformation  approach  (touched  upon  in  the  previous  chapter)  will  only 
be  mentioned  briefly  here. 
The question is, however, whether the image of local communities as responsible resource 
managers,  promoted by this new mainstream view, is fitted to understand  the often complex  and 
contradictory  social  relations  underlying  local  resource  management  practices; or whether it is too 
simphied and static. The aim of this chapter is to discuss the validity  and  appropriateness of the 
common property model  and  how it has  been  constructed. This exercise aims at elaboring an 
alternative  framework for understanding the commons  as  socially  embedded,  i.e.  a  view  that 
focuses on differentiation. 
A short outline of the common property framework. 
The  Common Property  approach encompasses a  wide  array  of  different  scholars  and  a  myriad of 
both  theoretical  and  empirical contributions. What  binds  them  together  is  perhaps fust of all, as 
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summarized  by Li (1996:504), that they are writing  against  currently  dominant  notions,  such  as 
the Tragedy  of the Commons thesis, the alleged  inevitability  of  private  property  and  individual 
acquisitiveness (see Berkes and Farvar,1989; Gibbs and Bromley, 1989) and the assumed 
managerial  capacity and wisdom of  governmants  (see  Thomson et al.,  1989). 
On closer examination, however, it turns out that the transformation and the preservation 
arguments,  in  spite of their apparent disparities,  have  much  in  common  when it comes to their 
perceptions  of the ways in which  people  impact  on  their  environment. Bo h are  deeply  implanted 
in the equilibrium paradigm described in the  previous  chapter,  with  its  paraphernalia of  neo- 
malthusian  environment-population  nexus,  and  unilineal view  on  development.  Despite  mutual 
disagreement,  the transformation and the preservation  approach  share  common  grounds  and 
perceptions.  They assume that  the  causes of land  and  vegetation  degradation lie in the  absence of 
specific  regulation, long  term investment or technology to  make it otherwise  (Fairhead  and  Leach, 
1996:13). Although distinguished by their choice of means, both approaches believe that 
technological solutions, to restore the  previous  harmony  between  nature  and  society,  exist. 
One reason for these overlaps is that both perspectives  draw  heavily from common  theoretical 
grounds such as the New Institutional Economics2, Rational Choice and Game Theories. 
Prominent for both views is the emphasis  given to the  role of transaction costs in  comparative 
institutional  analysis:  "When it is costly to transact, institutions matter" (North, 1990:12) As 
resources become more scarce, and thus more valuable as a  result of increased population 
pressure,  market  demands,  etc. the costs of controlling  them  (the  transaction  costs)  will  decrease 
in relation to possible  benefits. In such cases  institutional  arrangements  ensuring  exclusivity  will 
emerge. 
The  management of common property  natural  resources is furthermore  approached  theoretically 
by both groups as a collective action problem,  which  arises  in  consequence of the  nature of the 
resources i.e. their subtractability in use and the difficulty of excluding unauthorized users. 
Inspiration  for this view stems from  Rational  Choice  Theory,  but  in  contrast  to  the  transformation 
variants  built  on the Cartesian image of man as a  lone  hunter  for  benefits (de Groot et al., 
1995:212),  the preservation school stresses the  cooperative  outcome of the  models.  Because of 
the  uncertainty  about he decisions  of  others,  interdependence  among  users is required  to  provide 
"insurance mechanisms". Cooperation is therefore  likely  to  arise  (Runge,  1981). 
influence economic dvities and human  exchange by  creating  incentives or disincentives (North, 1990). As laws,mles 
New Institutional  Economics  have  emerged  during  the  last two decades. Its major  idea  is  that  institutions 
and n o m  change in space and over time, so does the  profitability of various activities. This will  influence  the  behavior 
of the various economic actors accordingly. 
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Accordingly,  Common  Property  theorists a Bromley  and  Ostrom agree  with North and Demsetz, 
that problems  in  rural  managerial  capacity  arise a  a  result of unclear  institutional arrangements 
including property rights  and  from  the  absence of  an authority  system to give  meaning to such 
rights (Bromley and Cemea,1989:55). But, it is held, absence of an authority system is 
characteristic  only  of  open  access  regimes  (see  previous  chapter)  where  problems arise from free 
and unregulated  access. In relation to common  property,  problems  stem “from tensions in the 
structure of joint use rights  adopted by a  particular  village or group”  (Runge, 1986:624). Such 
tensions,  likely to undermine the local  system  of  authority  and  regulation,  may arise from a  variety 
of complex  causes,  including  population  pressure,  changes in  climate or technology or political 
forces. 
The presumption  made  by the transformation  view, that central  government rights or private 
property rights is the only way to avoid the Tragedy of the Commons is rejected by the 
preservationists’ (Ostrom, 1988:107; van der Brink, Bromley and Chavas, 1995:375). Under 
specific  circumstances,  communal  resource  management  systems may still prove to  be the most 
economically rational  form  of  property, and “solutions (...) worked out by those individuals 
directly affected  [may] prove more  successful  and  enduring than resource  regimes  imposed by 
central authorities”  (Keohane  and  Ostrom, 1994403). Collectives,  they stress, select property 
regimes on the  basis  of their suitability for the  resource  in  question - its variability, its productivity 
and so on. Therefore under the appropriate  conditions  voluntary  collective  action is feasible and 
effective (Feeny et al. 1990). 
Among Third World villagers there are particularly strong incentives for collective decision 
making  and  common  property  reginaes,  it is held.  According to Runge the  relative poverty of many 
villagers  contributes  to  eliminate  a  myriad  OpporVmities  acting  alone. These l i t a t i o n s  can make 
joint-use rights a necessity. In particular the transaction costs of well-defined and enforced 
property rights may be too great for a  subsistence  economy to bear. Furthermore basic natural 
resources of  which  the  villagers  are  dependent  are  often  quite  random over time and space, 
therefore  assignment ofjoint rights of access  will  give  a  more  equitable  result  than exclusive, and 
therefore  inherently unfair, distrhtion of resources.  Finally it is  held,  villagers face a high degree 
of uncertaiuty  with  respect to incorne  streams. As no  individual  can  be  assured that he/she will be 
spared  failure,  common  property  institutions may  be  created,”providing  the right of the many as 
a hedge against uncertainty” Wunge,  1988:19-21;  Runge, 1986624-25). 
The degree to which  homogeneity  within  communities  is  taken  for  granted  varies  considerably. 
On the one.  hand  Berkes  assumes  that  local  resource  management  systems  normally provide 
mechanisms for the equitable  use of the  resources  with a minimum of internal strife or conflict. 
enhance  efficiency  in many situations  (see for example Ostrom, 1988:196). 
Both Ostrom and  Bromley recognize that dividing a commons  and  asigning  individual property rights may 
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This is because  rules  mutually agreed  upon by  all  the  members  usually  provide  an  efficient  means 
of  conflict resolution and reduce transaction costs in the enforcement  of  these  rules  (Berkes  and 
Farvar 1989:  11). On the other hand Ostrom (1986) limits herself to listing homogeneity  of the 
group as one  of the  central  preconditions4 for efficient  local  institutions  to  emerge.  Nonetheless, 
Ostrom  does  presume  that  community  members "share a  common culture, knowledge of the 
resource  and  knowledge  of  the  resource use rules,  facilitated by  the  simple  rule  that  you  must live 
in this community  to  use this resource" (Ostrom, 1985 in Berkes  and  Farvar,  1989:12). 
In general  the  assumption  goes:  When  a  relatively  isolated  set of individuals  live  in  a  slowly 
changing  environment,  they  will be able to devise  institutional  arrangements  well  matched to  their 
situation  and  problems  (Ostrom,  1987:251).  When resource degradation occurs, it is therefore 
attributed  to the dissolution  of local level institutional  arrangements  "whose  very  purpose  was  to 
give  rise to  resource use patterns  that were sustainable"  (Bromley,  1989:7).  Such  undermining of 
local  authority structures is seen as the result  of  external  interventions of the  colonial 
administration  and  later  the  nation  state.  Although some  consideration is given  to  socio-economic 
differentiation and growing stratification within communities "that initially were much more 
homogeneous" (ibid.),  the  blame is placed  primarily on obtrusive state interventions  such as 
nationalization  which  have turned controlled-access  commons  into  de  facto  open  access  resources. 
(See for example Thomson, 1987; Moorehead, 1991; Lane,1993). Where nation states have 
stepped in to  control  resources,  inefficiency  and short term profit  seeking by the state has, it is 
held,  resulted in rapid  deterioration of the resources. 
Consequently, a vast  number  of recent  policy  reports  have  advocated  the  merits  of  decentralized, 
local  management  of  communal  resources  (see for example Thompson,l989;  Bromley  and  Cernea, 
1989;  IFAD,1995;  UNSO,1994,etc.).  According to then the aimis turning resource control away 
fiom the  state  and  private  capital towards  the  rural  people  whose  livelihood  depends  most  directly 
on the resources.  A  central issue in this context has been the granting  of  legal  rights to local 
communities  to  enforce  rights  of  exclusivity  thereby  controlling  attempts at free riding. 
the  emergence of institutions  able to deal  with  local  natural  resource  management: 
' Drawing  6rom a large number of case studies  Ostrom lists a  number of variables  which are likely  to  enhance 
1). With regard to the resources it is advisable that the common property regimes are sufficiently smal1,so that 
the appropriators  can  develop  accurate  knowledge of external  boundaries  and  internal  microenvironments, 
and  that the  boundanes of the CPR are sufficiently  distinct so appropriators  can  develop  accurate  knowledge 
2). 
of the  external  boundaries, 
with regard to the  appropriators:  the  number of appropriators should  be  sufficiently  small so that  costs of 
communication  and  decision can be kept  low,  that  the group is homogeneous  with  regard to use  patterns 
perceptions of the risks of long term, that there are not  substantially different exposures to risk  present  in  the 
group (se OstromJ992 299).Further  design  principles  presented  in  her  previous  book  are: 
3) that appropriators that violate operational rules are likely to be sanctioned 
4) that low cost arenas exist to resolve conflicts between members 
5 )  that the rights of the users to devise their own institutions are not challenged by external government 
authorities. (Oswm 199091-101 
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Opening a new space for policy shifts 
There  can  be no doubt of  the  significant  impact  which  the  preservation  approach  had  on the 
practical political-economical  level. In particular  the  works of  Ostrom  and  Bromley  and Cernea 
have  contributed to changing  the  outlook  of  practitioners  and  policy  makers  towards  a  recognition 
of the potentials of common  property  resource  management i  "a  climate  otherwise  dominated  by 
structural adjustment and free market  mania"  (Li, 1996505). The  creation of a  "counter-image'' 
of successful intact resource managing communities in harmony with nature has provided 
important: justifications when NGOs and  major  donor  agencies  have  adopted  more  community- 
based approaches to development in the  course of the 1980s and 1990s. 
It may,  however, be held  that  apart f?om  delivering a  persuasive  counter-argument  to the Tragedy 
of the Commons model, the preservation  argument  has little to  offer.  This  is  particularly so when 
it comes to understanding  how  ecological  and  social dynamics  influence  the  natural resource 
management  activities  of  diverse  groups  of  people  and  how  these  dynamics i  turn help  to  produce 
and to shape particular kinds of environment. 
As will be argued below, the preservation view remains stuck with a number of common 
assumptions about community and the environment and the relation between them. These 
assumptions obscure an understanding of the complexity  and  ingenuity of human adaptation to 
environmental change. Hence,they  are  unhelpful  in  describing  the  course of historical  change  in, 
for example, herders and farmers  relations  to  local  resources  such as land  and  water. 
Images of communities. 
In  the previous section the construction  of  narratives - stories about the world that frames 
problems  in  certain  ways  and  in tur justify  particular  solutions - was  discussed. As shown above, 
the community-based sustainable development approach carries with it as many simplified 
assumptions on the nature of  community  and  its  relation to environment as did its counter- 
argument the Tragedy of  the  Commons. 
Often the communities  described are ideal  types,  unlocated in time and space. But they are 
portrayed as if they exist - or existed until recently - and as representing  a  viable  alternative (LI, 
1996504). In the same way, a strong tendency exists to overplay community cohesion  and 
downplay  mtra-community  issues  such asgoup dynamics  and  social  differentiation.  The  question 
is however, whether one can  assert that people in a specific  setting  have  common  interests  and 
goals, and to what degree can  one  talk of a  distinct  community. 
As pointed out by Leach et aL(1997: lo), the assumption  that  community  can  be  treated  as st tic, 
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relatively homogeneous entities  has  identifiable roots to  earlier  social  theory  which  conceived 
society as a bounded object or a  closed  social  system.  Notably in  the  structural-functionalist 
approach of the 19409 and  cultural  ecology  of  the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~  social  structure was  seen  to  drive  rules 
which  governed  people's  behavior  and  maintained  social  order.  Much  in  the  same  way  as  Berkes 
portrays  local  communities,  societies  were  seen as functionally  integrated  with  their  environment, 
linked in harmonious equilibrium. Culture  was  perceived as having  adaptive  value  to  the  general 
goals of living  systems.  Myths,  rituals and symbolic systems were interesting because of the 
regulatory role they  played in shaping  land  use  and in ensuring  that  ecological  and  social  systems 
remained  in  equilibrium  @airhead  and  Leach, 19968). Social structure and  institutions  such as 
traditional  authority  were  seen as rnaintaining this functional  adaptation:  often  over  and  above  the 
consciousness of community members  (Leach et al., 1997:lO  and  Ortner, 1984133). 
Such  functionalism',  may  also be found in much  work  associated  with  the  preservation  view. In
the  work of Runge and Berkes, for example,  tradition  is  envisaged  as  a  comprehensive  set of 
binding  rules  (Li,1996:504),  when  'traditional'  societies  are  described  as  providing  "mechanisms 
for the equitable use of the resource with  a minimum of internal  conflict  or  strife"  (Berkes  and 
Farvar, 1989: 11).  Likewise  rules  are seen as ensuring  livelihood  security by  providing  guaranteed 
access  rights to vital resources so "that  everyone in the  community is assured  of  the  opportunity 
to  meet their basic needs"(ibid.)*. 
But although such idealized images of community  have  the  advantage of parting  with the image 
of pastoralists or other resource users,  as  prime  destroyers of their own environment,  these 
generalized representations have  their  drawbacks  as  they  tend  to close our  eyes  to  other  equally 
'Radclie Browne  (1952)  and  Fortes  and  Evans-Pritchard  (1940). 
bits of particular cultures in terms of the  adaptive and  systems  maintaining  functions of these  bits. As pointed  out  by 
NotablyRoyRappapm(l967) and Marvin Harris (1966)  who sought to  explain  the  existence ofparticular 
Sherry Ortner, the interests shifted from how  the  environment  stimulates  (or  prevents)  the  development  of  social  and 
to maintain an existing relationship with  the  environment  (Ortner, 1984133) 
cultural forms (the Sahlins and  Service  version  ,1960) to the  question  of  ways  in  which  social  and  cultnral  forms  function 
be  understood as contructions  brought to  an  environment  rather  than  behavior  patterns  generated  by  the  environment 
7See also the  reflections  by Salzman on  ecological  determinismin  the  introduction.  Social  institutions  should 
(Salzman,  1997:161) 
'A famous example  being  Rappaports  account on  energy  streams  from  New  Guinea.  Here  a  small  society 
(?vlanng) lives of their  agricultural  prcduce and raise pigs.The pigs  live from  garbage  and from the  agricultural  products. 
If the  number of pigs exeeds a certain  number  they  will be competing  with  the  human  population for food.  The  Maring 
According to this view culture is understood as behavior  subordinated by the ecosystem.  (Hansen  og  Kristensen, 
Kaiko rid where largmounts of pigs are eaten in  a  large  feast  therefore  serves to prevent  environmental  degradation. 
1991:lS-20). 
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important aspects of  the  commons. 
a). Idealizing  community of interest. 
An obvious  issue  neglected  by  the  image  of  the  homogeneous c mmunity is the question of social 
differentiation  within  and  among  communities. Also the  incentives  of the villagers to cooperate 
is  neglected.  Incentives for collective action often  vary  widely  between  different  members of a 
community as rural  producers  usually  employ a  whole  range  of  different strategies when pursuing 
a  livelihood.  One  reason  for this variation  is  that  natural  resources used by  villagers are both 
private  and c o d  m character  and  (contrary to the  underlying  assumptions  in Runges'  version) 
the principal sources of agricultural  income  tend  to  come  from crop production on individual 
holdings,  not  fi-om the  commons. As villagers  are  part of larger  economies  than those posited by 
Runge, individuah will m most  cases  have  alternative  income sources  to  often declining commons. 
In such situations steps may  eventually  by taken to  develop  private sources of  supply.  (Lawry, 
19908). 
If crucial issues, such as  whose  economic  circumstances or security of tenure is at stake, are  left 
unclarified enhancing  the  resource  rights and  the  security  of  tenure  of  the community as  a  whole 
(as proposed by the  "preservationists") may  not  work  out as anticipated (Leach ,1991:18). In "real 
life" benefits derived from the commons are rarely equally distributed. On the contrary, the 
asymmetrical  benefits from the  commons  tend  to  be  underwritten  by local power structures. The 
poorer  segment  of  society  who  may  be  more  dependent on resources  held in common often lack 
a  power  base  within the community  fi-om  which to assert  control.  Therefore, marginal groups such 
as  women might  find  their  specific  interests ubmerged  by a  community  focus. 
In fact,  collective  solutions  are  infkquent  when  the  importance  of the resource as income and the 
strategies employed by the  users  vary.  Even in the  case of grazing  lands, where users have  a 
common interest in the  range,  herders  tend to have  limited  incentives to coordinate. Individual 
grazing strategies are dictated by a  variety  of  factors,  such as availability  of herding labour, herd 
sizes and  species  composition as well  as  household  characteristics  and the relative importance of 
livestock production and  remittances  as  income  sources (ibid.:l5). To this adds, that while the 
discourse  of  traditional  property  rights  may  privilege  certain  indigenous r "tribal" groups, other 
groups such as  mobile  pastoralists  or  migrants  to  marginal  areas  with little or no community 
cohesion  are  neglected  (Li  ,1996:505).  These  Circumstances  may contribute to reduce the stimulus 
for collective action. Greater  competition,  rather  than  enhancing  collective action, may be the 
result (Lawry,19909) 
F i i y ,  scarcity  does  not, as proposed by  Runge,  necessarily lead to  common property solutions, 
but  may as well, as shown  by B e m e  (1986)  from  the  Sudan,  lead  to "spontaneous privatization" 
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when  individuals  attempt o enclose the commons  for  private  use. Similar privatization  movements 
have taken place  on  the  range  lands of East Akica and  Somalia. Whether private or collective 
solutions  will  occur  depends hst and  foremost  on the  nature of the resources and the local social 
relationships  in  question. 
b). Exaggerating the authority of traditional  leadership 
While  incentives  for  individuals to participate  in  local  management arrangements tend to be 
exaggerated, problems  related to the,  often  weak, structures of  local authority designated to 
enforce rules, or the  role of leaders as catalyst  in  initiating cooperation, tend to be omitted. 
With regard  to extensive  livestock  and  range  management  in  Africa, centralized control  has 
generally not been a  feature of pastoral  societies  in Sub-Saharan  Africa. As mentioned in the 
earlier chapters, independent,  opportunistic  decision-making is essential to successful  livestock 
production in the  Sahel. Hence most pastoral societies are characterized by  high  degrees of 
individual autonomy  where no  individual  can  tell  any other members  of his community  how  he 
should handle  his animals. In many cases,  local  institutions wiU therefore be unable to generate 
sufficient  sanction  locally  to  enforce ules and restrictions  of  action.  (Lawry,  1989:lO) 
c). Free  riders  and boundaries. 
As common property is property  defended  against  the  outsider, the crux for common  property 
management is how to  counteract  the  logic of the free rider with the logic of the common  good, 
worked  out in collective  rules  for  decision  making  and  enforcement (de Groot et al.,  1995:211). 
Hence, clear definition  of  boundaries  is  regarded  as a  central issue for determining the  potential 
of  common  property  resource  regimes.  "The  more  clearly  defined the boundaries , the better  the 
chances for success", says Wade  (Wade,  1987,  quoted  from FAD, 1995:119). 
The  establishment of clear use  rights  through  delimitation  of  a "community resource space"  has 
also been  central  in  recent  attempts to jmprove  local  level  management  in West Africaro. Similarly, 
the  World Bank has  supported  efforts to produce  social  maps  of  traditional  community  land  in, 
for  example,  Indonesia  (Li, 1996:507). 
As a framework for understanding local-level dynamics of resource use, the approach has 
sigdcant limitations. First of all, most of the  contributions  are somewhat unclear as  to  how such 
a  boundary  should  be  understood,  not to speak  of  how to delimit  and control it.  Ostrom, for 
See also Ostrom, 199091-101 who  deals at  length with issues of membership deliitation and  boundaries. 
Notably in the  so-called Gestion de Tmoir Approach  (see  Painter, 1994 and  Degnbol,  1996). 10 
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example, states that 'shared knowledge', or 'shared culture' is of major importance for the 
establishment and defence of a common. But, as noted by de Groot et al. (1995:214), the 
explanations  as  to  how cultural factors achieve t h i s  remain  unclear. 
Secondly,  the focus is on the management  of  natural  resources  in  a  bounded  and  static  resource 
action  space.Thereby the use of natural  resources  across  larger  areas  (potentially  several  terroirs) 
is omitted.  Similarly it fails to recognize the multiple strategies  used  by  people  to  gain  access to 
exercise  control  over  a  broader  range  of  natural  and  non  natural  resources  over  a  much  larger  and 
changing  action space (Painter, 1994:12). 
Thirdly, the approach is primarily concerned with sedentary agrarian communities, thereby 
neglecting  how (the same) resource spaces are used by different  groups of users,  among  them 
more  mobile  communities such as pastoralists.  Considering  the  porousness of African  societies, 
it  may turn out  to  be difficult to distinguish  'members' of a  community  from  the  outsiders  from 
which  they are supposed to protect their resources. 
Fourth,  the  assumption  underlying the argument for creation  of  boundaries  is that a  framework 
of  rules can be  devised  based on the expectations and  calculations of users  and  policy-makers 
about  the stream of costs and benefits from the resources. In practice,  however,  these  costs and 
benefits are difficult to predict, especially  in  semi-arid  regions  where  the  water  resouces  and 
biomass  production fluctuate  enormously  (de  Brujjn and  van Dijk,  1995:25).  And  if it is weather 
rather than society  that is decisive  for  the  possibilities  in use, the  determination of clear boundaries 
becomes  rather  an  academic exercise for the  users  involved. 
F d y ,  such  mapping  and  delimitation of the community  sphere are not neutral.  Rather  they 
provide a  perfect means for  re-interpretation  and  re-alignment of local  spheres of resource  control 
vis-&vis other  villagers  as well as foreigners.  Therefore,  when  Bromley,  Ostrom  and  others  talk 
about the  need for a  well-defined  membership  and  clear  boundaries  they  forget  that  multiple 
interests  are  at  stake  even m the definition  and  interpretation  of  who is a  legitimate  member  or  user 
of the resources and  who is not. This  becomes all the  more  serious as these  competitions  are 
articulated in terms of competing  representations  of  community  itself. 
In short, this vision  evidently fails to understand the nature of most  African  societies.  Dfot  more 
than anything  these are  characterized by  flexibility,  mobility  and  a  very  broad  resource  base  where 
producers shift between  preferred  resources as a  reaction  to  internal  and  external  change,  adopting 
more  mobde or less  sedentary lifestyles accordingly  (Niemeijer,  1996:98). This argument  will  be 
further  elaborated later on in the chapter. 
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d). Pastoralists,  boundaries and property  regimes. 
Obviously, the establishment of stable (but hflexible) resource  regimes  through  delimitation  of 
boundaries  and  strengthening  local  enforcement of exclusive  right  is  particularly  problematic n 
pastoral societies. Such societies are distinguished by mobile and opportunistic management 
systems  (see previous chapter). 
Recently  van der Brink,  Bromley  and  Chavas  have  tried  to  solve  some  of  the  above  mentioned 
paradoxes  by  looking at the relations  between  herders  and fanners in  an  economic  behavior  and 
property rights perspective. Inspired by the "New Ecology11" and its call for more flexible 
management strategies (Benkhe and Scoones, 199112),  these  authors  have  tried  to  solve  the  free 
rider  problem  while at the same time  maintaining  spatial  mobility  among  pastoralists as a  strategy 
against the temporal uncertainty characterizing most pastoral environments (van der Brink, 
Bromley  and Chavas,  1995:375-376).  Unfortunately,  the  endeavour  does not  conclude  anything 
very  satisfactory,  as the solutions appear  largely  cosmetic. 
One reason  for  this is that,  due to the  effects of risk and  uncertainty  (namely the extremely  variable 
rainfaU pattern), the herder values property rights that ensure him spatial  mobility  rather  than 
exclusive rights (ibid376). Therefore exclusive  rights to a  particular  production  location  do  not 
exist among  pastoralists. 
So far so good.  The  range is then  open  access,  one may presume,  But No! This is not  open  access, 
they  claim,  because  rights  of access exist that  are  restricted  to  a  well-defined  number of p operty 
holders.  Under  open  access,  no  coordination  would  exist,  and  the  number  of  potential  users  could 
be  unrestricted  (ibid.:  377). The  rights  of  access  of  herders  are  therefore  defined  as nomadic non- 
exclusive rights i.e. property  rights  that  secure the profit stream of livestock  production  wherever 
such  production takes place. 
The authors depart from the correct observation  that  pastoral  property  regimes  "do n t attempt 
to establish  exclusive  rights to a particular land per se", and  "display little concern  with  territorial 
identity or the defense of particular  grazing  areas, being more  interested in rights  of  access to 
pastures  water  and salt for their cattle". But as the  exact  definition of the  rules of access  are left 
rangelands  which  recognizes  non-equilibrium  dynamics a inherent to semi-arid ecosystems.. 
" The tern a s s e m b l e s  a varied  group of researchers  trying to establish  a new understanding of Sub-Saharan 
12 See also previous chapter. 
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unspeciiied13  it  does  not seem that the Hicult questions  as  to  how,  why  and  when some potential 
users should  be  excluded or how  to  delimit  and  define  membership,  access rights or boundaries 
has  advanced  significantly. 
Indeed the imperative for squeezing this relatively  unrestricted  form  of  landholding into the 
category of common property seems of limited analytical interest. Claiming that territorial 
exclusion is indirectly  achieved  when needed, by  controlling  access to  crucially  scarce factors, such 
as wells,  does  open our eyes to some  of  the  means  available  to  pastoralists  to control access over 
resources. Nevertheless, it does not tell much us about  the  ways in which  African farmers or 
herders  actually  acquire  and  make use of such  key  resources.  Nor  does it indicate much about the 
dynamics of tenurial  change. 
The sharp distinctions  drawn by  many  researchers  and  policy  makers  between 'interest groups' - 
defined according to unambiguous  and  sectoral  locations - as  well as the sharp division between 
public  and  private [and  we  may  add  communal]  have  little  empirical  relevance in Africa, because 
the public and  private  sectors  are  interwoven,  intermeshed and  even  indistinguishable  (Gibbon 
from Berry, 1994). 
As 'idealtypes', the distinction  made by the common  property  theorists between the  four of 
property  regimesI4  may  be a useful  although  restricted  analytical  tool.  In  practice, however, what 
one finds will  often be a  confusing mix of different  systems,  partly  common, partly state control, 
open access and (eventually illegal) private control. And it seems that it is precisely in the 
paradoxes and  conflicts  resulting  from  these  overlaps and  from  the  creative ways that people 
realign and  manipulate  them that crucial  features  for  understanding the dynamics of tenure and 
agrarian  change  may  be found15. 
13 
Suffice it to say that such rules generally  solve  a  cooordination  problem,  which in the  empirical case of Sahelian 
On page  377  they write: 'We leave the  exact  definition of these d e s  of access  unspecified to this point. 
pastoralists are typically  solved in  a common props9 regime.  Under  open  access, no coordination  would exist and the 
number of potential users could be unrestricted"  (van  der  Brink  et al., 1995:377).  The  issue isnot pursued further on 
in the  article. 
One  the  one  extreme  one  finds  the op n access regimes i.e. where  access is open and unregulated and 
open to anyone, on the  other  hand private  property where  rights  to  exclude others  from use and regulation of the 
resource are vested in the  individual. Communal or common property, in turn, refers to resources held by an 
identifiable community  of  interdependent users. These  users may  exclude  outsiders  while regulating use by  members 
of the local  community. Righ6 to these resources are unlikelly  to  be  either  exclusive or transferable,  they are often rights 
of equal access and use. F d y  ownership  and  management o resources  held  under state  property are held  exclusively 
by the state while,  in  many  cases, use rights and  access  rights  have  not  been specified  (Berkes and Farvar, 1989:lO). 
15 Hence it a m  somewhat of an absurdity  whenLe Roy, KarsenQ and  Bertrand  in order to develop more 
exact  conceptions of tenure,  than  the usual 4 squared matrix propose a combination of in total 25 different forms of 
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The  distinction  made  between private and  communal as mutually  exclusive - each  giving  rise to 
distinct  resource  management  systems - tends to reduce  the  complex  and  varied  patterns of 
interaction into predetermined categories. This precludes  investigation of the  fluid  and  dynamic 
nature  of  property relations  and tenure institutions.  As  will  be  shown  later  on,  property  relations 
are  neither  predetermined nor fixed but are, just as  social  identities  in  terms of insiders  and 
outsiders,  etc.  under constant debate. Rather, than  an  issue  of  responsible  users  defending  a 
distinct territory against  the use of (foreign)  free-riders,  rights to resources  are  the  subject of 
constant  social  manoeuvering  and ongoing debates over political  and  social  identity in terms of 
difference  and  belonging. 
e).  Institutions and the  role of rules. 
Similar to the  assumption that proper resource management  requires  a  clear  understanding  of 
boundaries  and  membership, is the assumption that a  clear  and  unequivocal  framework of rules 
is  the  only  desirable  solution for d e f ~ g  access to resources. The analysis  of  institutions  as 
producers of rules is therefore central to  the  analytical  framework. 
According  to,  for  example, North, 1990; Ostrom, 1986;  Bromley  and  Gibbs,  1989,  institutions  are 
seen as the rules  of the  game' while organizations  may  be  thought of as  the  players, or as  groups 
of individuals  bound together by some common  purpose  and  objective.  According to some, 
organizations in fact only exist because there is a  set  of  working  rules  or  underlying  institutions 
that define and give  them  meaning.  (Bromley,  1989) 
Inherent in this view is a  tendency  shared  with  earlier  structural-functionalist  anthropology to 
assume that rules and  behavior are synonymous, and  can be reduced  to  one  another  (Leach et al., 
1997:25.'6). Tbis view has been contested in recent  post-structuralist  literature  which  criticizes  its 
inclination to reduce human organization and consciousness to mechanisms for preserving 
equilibrim thereby  denying actors any  conscious  agency.  According  to this position,  rules  do 
not  automatically  determine  peoples'  behavior. In many  situations,  people  chose  or  may  be  forced 
to countervene  the  rules,  and such action - or non-action - may be important  ways of challenging 
legal  rules in order  for  people to gain  command  over  commodities.  Often such  actions,  which  have 
been labelled 'unruly social practice'!', contribute to contesting legitimacy, thus challenging 
prevailing  power  positions. 
tenure (Le Roy, Karsenty  and  Bertand,  1996) 
16 For a  general  critique see also  Grannovetter, 1992 
1985 and Gore, 1993 who  have  provided  a  substantial critique of the  structuralist  position. 
I' This notion  was  developed  by  Thompson,  1971  and  further  elaborated by for example  Scott, 1976 and 
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A second criticism is a tendency to look at resource management institutions in a rather 
disembodied  manner, as single purpose  institutions.  Institutions  for  the  management  of common 
property are, as  stressed by Mearns  (1995:6),  much  more  than  that.  They are often based on 
kinship  relations  and  co-residence  and may have  religious,  ritual  and  other  cultural  dimensions.  In 
the same way, the single  human  being  participates  in  a  multiplicity of institutional  relations at the 
same time. This multiple belongingness of individuals  in  social  environments  requires  that we take 
account  of the embedded social context of natural  resources  management,  rather  than treating it 
as an activity in isolation  (Peters,  1987:  178, 1994 passim). 
In order to give  more  attention to the  role of  human  agency, it is necessary to distinguish between 
institutional  rules  and  peoples'  behavior  and  to  clarify  the  relations  between  them.  In this way we 
gain  a  more complete picture  of  the  dynamics  of  institutional  change. In short, there is a need to 
study tactics and strategies,  not  merely  the  rules of the  game. 
Finally,  it is essential  to  consider  dynamics  over  time  and to see how,  and  with  what consequences, 
sets of rules  influencing  patterns  of  interaction  between  resource  users  may  change. Change must 
be regarded as an ongoing  process of continuity and  not  merely as  disruption. 
The perspective on the  relation  between  ecology and  society  offered  by the preservation school 
reduces human  organization  and  consciousness  to  a  regulative mechanism for preserving an 
equilibrium. Hence the  question  of  ecology  becomes  framed in such as way that peoples own 
understandings  of  their  environment  are  silenced or re-interpreted  in  a  manner  which obscures the 
parameters  of local struggles. In consequence,  change is interpreted  as  disruption or breakdown 
and attention shifts from  peoples'  action  and the way  they  handle  their environment on to sterile 
studies of  degradation. 
The criticisms offered  below  have  serious  implications  for  the  study of resources  held under 
common property. Among other things, it questions previous assumptions that changes (or 
decline) observed in  grazing areas held  under  common  property  are  derived  solely from outside 
intervention.Instead, it opens up  for  an  understanding  of  change as resulting not the least from the 
active manipulation by local agents  of  rights  to  resources. 
Fitting  social  dynamics  into  the  study of common property: 
Negotiated  development 
But if we discard the static image of homogeneous community, how can we study African 
economies in motion, in order to gain insight into the dynamics of resource access and 
management? 
71 
As emphasized  above,  models  based  on  dualisms - such  as  private  versus  communal, individual 
versus society, self-interest  versus  altruism - fail  to  understand  the  paradoxes and conflicts of 
Africa's  grazing  lands. An alternative to this, is an interpretative  framework which incorporates 
the historical  processes,  social  organization and the  structures of  meaning (Peters, 1987:174). 
Such a  perspective,  stressing  the  need  for  seeing  resource  use  as  the  subject  of ongoing struggles, 
has  been  developed  by a  number of authorsl*  who  adopt  a  critical,  culturally informed analysis of 
African  rural  development.  These  authors may  be  classified  under the  heading of negotiated 
development. 
Central to the framework is an emphasis  on  human  agency or  praxis  i.e  the  creative ways in which 
cultural ideas are  adapted to new conditions and how culturally informed practices in turn, 
structure daily Me and  shape  and  reshape  institutions  at  various  levels.  Drawing i spiration from, 
among  others,  Giddens  and  Bourdieu as well as from  feminist  literature, this view examines how 
distinctions such as gender,  class,  age,  origin among  others,  shape  the  practices  of  differently 
situated  and  positioned  actors  within  contradictory  social  relations  (Roseberry,  1989:  10).  In doing 
so, concepts such as community  are  understood as political  associations  formed through processes 
of  irnagjnation  and cultural  creation - as the generation of meaning in contexts of unequal power 
(Roseberry, 1989:14). 
The concept of negotiated  development  itself,  refers  to a situation  where different groups come 
into contact with each other  and try to  lay  claim to a  specific  issue.  What is of interest is that, in 
this process of negotiation, old social groups tend to be recomposed or new ones created. 
Likewise peoples perceptions of the object of negotiation may change, just as the social 
relationships between the negotiating parties are changed during the process of negotiation 
(Sepalla, 1996:84). In contrast  to Bromley  at al., who  place  the  emphasis on the finetuning of 
institutional  arrangements,  the  actual  object  for  negotiations  may in fact  be  placed in the periphery 
of  the  analysis.  What  matters i the  social  groups  and thek perceptions.  And, since different groups 
have different  perspectives,  their  negotiation  must  necessarily  entail  contradictions  and co flicts 
(ibid). 
In line with  the  'chaos  theories'  presented in  the  previous  chapter, the negotiated  development 
approach  stresses  multilinearity  and  resilience.  If  one  feature  changes,  changes occur in the whole 
system. Hence, the negotiation process results in certain changes which have expected and 
unexpected effects  requiring  analysis."Negotiation  is  a  metaphor,  that  emphasizes openness of 
interaction as far as  outcome is concerned (Sepsilla,  1996:85). 
This c o q h  alarge goup of rather  different contributions  concerned  with  studies of agrarian change 
@my, Guyer  Carney  and Watts, etc), local  politics (for example  Peters,  Goheen),  customary  law  (Sally Falk Moore, 
Michael Chanock etc)  and ecology and  society, (Leach, Mearns,  Fairhead,  Scoones,  Shipton).  Many of these  have 
published in "Africa":  the  Journal of the  International  African  Institute. 
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The  indeterminacy of social  formations, 
As a  first  step  to  pay  justice to  the  complexity  of  reality  (Peters),  the  variability  in  time  and  space 
of social  relations  must  be  acknowledged. Further, historical  change  must  be  recognized as the 
unpredictable result of different encounters rather than a unilineal, evolutionary process. 
Obviously,  systems of common  ownership are not identical in time and  space. Therefore the 
historical  and  contemporary  situation  of communal  range in Senegal  must be grasped  through  the 
particular  detail of its  political  and  social  organization and culture: 
“Changes in commons (...J lie in the historically specific conditions that 
include  the  state,  claiming  authority over locally managed  resources, the role 
of new technologies in changing patterns of land use and assessment of value 
for different  categories of users  and in the increased disparity in wealth ana! 
influence  within  a c o m i t y  of  users  which makes it more dificult to regulate 
use and enforce  rules.  The transformation of cattle keeping must therefore be 
regarded  both as a social ana! a political process leading among other things 
to the  readjustment or creation of hybrid forms of social formations” (Peters, 
1994:7). 
What  leads to change is therefore  rather the complex interaction of  environmental,  economic, 
social  and  political  factors  operating  in a given  geographical setting. Together these factors set the 
limits as well as offering  opportunities for change. Within this broad  framework,  collective and 
individual creative choices lead to specific subsistence patterns that change over time as 
constraints, possibilities  and  choices  change  (Niemeijer,  1999:93). Indeed, it is precisely  the 
acknowledgement of local  variation  and of the historical  development  of  relations  between  land 
and group that  enables  an  understanding  of  economic l fe as a  creative  process  that  can take many 
forms, as the  unpredictable  result of different  encounters. 
Just as the ~ N a l  environment  of SubSaharan Africa  can be characterized by its unstableness and 
irregulanty, so can  the  social  environment. As mentioned above, this is often overlooked  by  those 
advocating  the  re-establishment  of  more or less imagined local resource  management  institutions 
with  clear  and  stable  boundaries.  Hence  a central point is missed as to the incentives to establish 
firm boundaries and to  exclude  foreigners. 
Boundaries are difficult  entities to operate with in relation to African  societies. As shown in the 
previous  chapter,  African  societies19  tend to be porous  and  many  societies  have  mechanisms  which 
allow  individuals  or  groups  to  modify  their id ntity and transgress ethnic boundaries. 
l9 See. also Tania Murray Li 1996. 
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In his essay  on  what he terms  "The  Internal  African Frontierzo",  Igor  Kopytoff  shows how  African 
social  groups  show a  considerable  tendency  to fission and  segment.  Population  movements  have 
been  brought  about  by  famine,  civil wars,  ethnic  rivalries,  despotic  regimes  and  conflicts  between 
polities.  To this we  must  add  innumerable  local  movements to  local  frontiers-  movements of more 
modest  scale  but  of great systemic  importance  in the shaping of  African cultural  history.  In  all 
these instances,  displaced  Africans have had to face the problem of forging  a  new  'social  order  in 
the  midst  of  an  effective  institutional  vacuurd'. As a  result, the formation of  new social groups  has 
been  a  constant  theme  in  the  histories  of  African societies (Kopytoff,  1987:18).zz 
This ceaseless flux among populations has, according to Kopytoff, made Africa a 'frontier 
continent',  the  stage  of  population  movements  of  many  kinds  and  dimensions,  where  populations 
m comparison  with  other  continents are relatively recent occupants of their  present  habitat.  This 
has  given  rise to a  continuing  reorganization  of  ethnic  identities, and  what  Kopytoff  terms  a 
frontierconditioned ideology  (ibid.:7). 
In  consequence of the  low  population  densities  and  the  high  levels of  mobility  an  important 
structuring  principle is for example the rights  of the first-comer.  Being the first-comers  gives 
certain rights of seniority,  as it gave one the  right to show  the  place  to those who  came  later 
(ibid.:22).  Hierarchy  was  established where  first-comers  in  principle  could  claim  superiority  over 
newcomers  (ibid.:  31).  Nonetheless,  this  remains a fluid relationship.  There are many  examples of 
situations in which  immigrant founders who took over local political  systems  and  remolded  them 
to their own purpose  by skjlKd political  manoeuvering.  Furthermore,  the  principle  of  precedence 
-which  ties frst-comers to late-comers  in to a  chain  of  hierarchy-  represents  in  itself  a  paradox, 
as no one  can  ever  claim to be  really the frst (as shall be seen in the  Ferlo  case). 
Consistent with this mobility  and  flexibility,  Kopytoff  identifies  a  relative  indifference  among 
Africans  to  rootedness in physical space and  a lack of  permanent  attachment to a  particular 
geographical place. "African space is,  above al, a  social  space" he claims, their roots being 
major  role  in  the  shaping  of  the  American  political  character.(Kopytoff 1987:3) 
2oKopytoff  draws on Frederick Jackson Turners famous thesis of the  frontier  ideology  which he assigned  a 
settlement  some  institutions  have  already  been  in  place  and it has more  been  a  question of remolding  and  merging of 
I'm not so sure of the  expediency of talking about an  effective  institutional  vaccuum. In many cases of 
existing  shuctures, than of creating new ones. 
22 According  to  Kopytoff several  cultural  principles  and  cultural  mechanisms  were behind  these  cennifugal 
forces  among others two conmdictory  principles: that authority  in  the kin group lay  with a  gerontocracy  that  controlled 
its  collective  resources  and often used it at its own advantage (ref Meillasoux) and  the  conflicting  principle of essential 
equality of members in a corporate Idn group. This principle is not an egalitarian one, but rather  one of equal  potentiality, 
embodied in the  equality of potential  access to authority.  The  co-existence of two  principles of hierarchy  and  essential 
equality between  members  easily  lead to resentment by the  younger  members of the  unarguably  legitimate  yet  anoying 
authority of the  elders  (Kopytoff 1987:18). 
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primarily  conceived  in  a kin group, in ancestors  and in genealogical  position  (Kopytoff,  1987:22). 
Much in the same vein,  Goody  (1971:30)  has  argued  that  African  societies  have usuaUy faced  a 
shortage of  people  rather than of  land.  Abundance  of  land  allowed  them  to  secure their livelihood 
by  mobile  and extensive exploitation  of the land,  through  shifting  cultivation  or  pastoralism. The 
political  consequence of this has been  that chiefship  has tended.to be over  people  rather  than  over 
land; and these the leader had  to attract as well as restrain.  The  drive  to  acquire  adherents  and 
dependents and to make  alliances  and keep them  attached to one-self as a kind of political and 
social  'capital' is, according to Goody,  characteristic  of  Afkican  political  processes. Like Kopytoff, 
Goody emphasizes the social  space  rather  than  geographic  control and  stresses the general lack 
of a rigid rootedness in  physical  space. 
The search for adherents as a source of power is also  stressed by Peters,  Goheen  and  Berry. In 
many  &an  societies,  a  person's  status  and  influence  depends  directly on the  ability  to  mobilize 
a following. And if access to resources  and  opportunities  depends  on  one's  ability to negotiate 
over  property  rights,  production  or  exchange d  influence is enhanced  by  followers,  then it is not 
necessarily advantageous to exclude  people  from  social  networks,  even if these  networks  also 
serve  as channels of access to resources  (Berry,  1993:15).  Consequently,  people may be  more 
interested in keeping options open  than  in  cutting  them off, a  factor which  might  explain the 
relative reluctance or lack of incentives for excluding foreigners found in many settings. 
Frequently,  interests  are  ambiguous  and  give  rise, a  will be shown in the  Ferlo  case  below, to both 
exclusive and inclusive strategies of social  mobilization  and  resource  control. 
With this indeterminacy in mind, it should be obvious that it is not possible to explain the 
fundamental features of an  existing  social order from  what  can  be  seen  here  and  now,  as do the 
Common Property adherents.  Nor is it possible  to  treat  the  workings of a  system as isolated in 
space and time. Such simplifications do  not relate the actual  realities of social lie and  therefore 
are not meaningful. Quite on the  contrary,  it is precisely  many  of  the  features  presented above  that 
have  provided some of  the  constants  on  which  on-going  social  relations  rest  and on which  any  new 
social relations are built  (Kopytoff,  1987:39). This fundamental  indeterminacy  of  African  social 
formations is stressed by Peters, Goheen  and Beny who  emphasize  that  the  social  construction 
of economic  life  must be seen as a  creative  process,  whose  end is not  given  beforehand.  The  social 
construction of economic life  can take many  forms. These forms are not  necessarily successful, 
depending  among other things on the ability to create some rudimentary  order in competing claims 
and rights. 
The  embeddedness of social institutions. 
Contrary to the NRM/Common  Property  framework  which  conceives of resource  management 
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institutions as single purpose,  well-defined  rule-making  authorities,  the  negotiated  development 
view stresses the  need  to see institutions as socially  and  politically  embedded,  emphasizing their 
contingent and indeterminate character. Hence, institutions are seen as regularized rules of 
behaviour that emerge from  the  underlying  structures  or  sets of  'rules  in  use'. 
Arguing for the  embeddedness of a  commons  helps  to  avoid  falling  into  the  polemic extremes of 
the transformation view  which,  according  to  Peters:  "casts  its  lot  with  the  individual actor,  the 
social  realmbeing at best  but a context  in  necessary  opposition to the  individual's  self-interest or 
the  "models  of  an  idealized  past".  It  also  avoids the extreeme of the  preseraation  view that casts 
its  individual  as  non-actors,  only  a  figure  inscribed  in  the  hidden  logic  of an eco-cultural system" 
(Peters, 1987:178). 
Understanding commons as socially embedded means emphasizing the interdependence of 
decision-makers. In this way the  institutional  dimensions of  individual  action is incorporated.  By 
looking  at  the  structures of  relations,  the  distinctions  between  groups  and the  shared or competing 
meaning  and  value attriiuted to  a particular  commons  and  its  use it becomes  possible  to  avoid the 
unattached,  autonomous  and  asocial  individual  on  the  onbe  side.On  the  other  side,it also becomes 
possible to avoid the view  of  the  undifferentiated,  homogeneous  and  harmonious  community. In 
doing this, the  contemporary  situation of the  commons may be  described  not  by  absence  of links 
between  the  individual  herder  and the group,  but  rather as a result  of  competing  rights  and multiple 
claims to legitimate  use. Such rights  are,  as  will  be  discussed in further  detail  below,  not  only 
embedded in  specific  historical  sets of political  and  economic  structures, but also  in cultural 
systems  of  meanings,  symbols  and  values  (ibid). 
Structures,  rules and  norms  are  thus  seen as maintained by  (and  only  existing  because of) peoples' 
active investment in  them,  through  practices  and  actions,  both  intended  and  unintended. These 
structural  forms  subsequently shape peoples  actions,  not by strict  determination  but  by providing 
flexible  points  of  orientation  which  may  either  constrain  or  enable  what is possible23.  But, whilst 
some  routinized  actions  serve  to  reproduce  structures,  rules  and  institutions, others have agency, 
serving to change the system  and  perhaps  in  time  remake  the  rules  (Leach et al.,1996:11  with 
reference to Giddens,  and  Long  and  van  der  Ploeg). In this way,  history  may  be  seen as a  manifold 
process  of interaction  between  external and  internal  actions  in  which  contingencies  and path 
dependencies play  a sigmhant part (ibid.: 11). 
Rather than existing as a fixed framework,  as  anticipated by the Common Property School, the 
negotiated development view perceives rules as being constantly made and remade through 
decision  making and strategizing by people  with  free  choice (See Ortner, 1984146) 
23Transactionalists l i e  for example Barth have  been  criticised  for  portraying social life in terns of active 
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peoples' practices. In order to discern how, for example, rights of access and control over 
resources changes  over  time, an understanding  of  'rules  in  use' based on analysis of peoples, 
regular  everyday  practices i required. Such a  conception stresses difference and the appreciation 
of  power  relations.  (ibid.:27) To "trace  peoples  multiple,  sometimes  contradictory  and  ambivalent 
actions  and  experiences"  as  proposed  by  Berry (199433) may therefore turn out to be  a fruitful 
way to gain insight both into the dynamics of institutional structure and of the fluidity and 
complexity of institutionalized  rules  and  practices. 
Power, wealth and meaning. 
Central  to  contemporary  discussions of agrarian  change is to investigate how land use is shaped 
by the  dynamics of resource  access,  use  and  control; relating  these to questions of social form and 
process.  Disputes  and  negotiations  about land are therefore, as stressed by Shipton and  Goheen, 
not  only  about  particular  tracts  of  lands, but also  about the very meanings of  the lands itself  and 
of  the  customs  and  conventions by which  humans  relate to it.  Hence, three perspectives are sought 
integrated the political,  the  economic  and  the  cultural. This, acording to Shipton  and  Goheen 
(1992397), means bearing in mind three kinds of human  ambitions: Power, wealth  and  meaning -
and  looking for the  linkages  between  them. 
This perspective  enables us to  highlight  that  people use land for many purposes: not just  to 
produce  the  material  conditions  for  survival  and  enrichment, but also to gain control over others 
and  define  personal and  social  identities. 
Although coined somewhat differently this is  analogous to the three primary roads to social 
analysis  suggested by  Sally Falk Moore: via relations,  via resources, and  via  'representations' 
(Moore, 19869). As these  dimensions  are  present  in  every  institution,  in  every  social  field  and  in 
every  social  situation,  although in variable  and  complex ways,  an approach made in terms  of these 
dimensions opens the possibility of analyzing dynamic shifts in their patterns, content and 
connections over time  (Moore  19986:9). 
Shipton and  Goheen  propose an  analysis  of  changes in resource access and control to start by 
posing  three  simple  questions: 
1). What  does  land mean, to whom? 
2). What  kinds of social  affiliations  affect  land  use  and control? 
3).  Who controls the  terminology? 
Ad 1). This question  stresses  the  heterogeneity  of  the  user groups as well  as the different  use  made 
of  resources  by merent groups.  Not all groups  perceive the land in the same way.  Resources that 
are valuable  for sone are  not  important  for others, just  as  the groups of users may  vary  according 
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to seasons. Thus, on the same piece  of land, people  may  hold  different  rights  to  different  resources 
in  different 
The  categorization  of  land  and  its  resource may also be the  subject of different  interpretations.  For 
transhumant  herders,  the  routes  traversing  a  certain  piece  of  land  may  be  more  important  than  the 
actual  grazing potential, just  as  fanners may  be less attached  to  a  particular  piece of land  than  to 
the  right  to farm in an  area. Likewise people  may be less attached  to  fixed  points  on  the  ground 
but  rather  understand  their  rights "as elastic  spaces  on  a  rubber  map"x , defined  in  relation  to  other 
kin and neighbors (Shipton  and  Goheen,  1992:309).  The  meanings  attributed to land therefore 
vary as part of the struggle  for  control: as, for  example,  when  fallow  lands  or  lands  with  absentee 
owners  are, for purposes of  contestation,  classified  as  vacant by other  potential  claimants. 
Ad 2). As mentioned  above,  rural  African  do  not  generally  hold  land as i ividuals  and  power  over 
land is largely a  function  of  membership in  social  networks.  Hence it remains  contested  and 
negotiable. As described above in  discussing  the  indetexminacy  of  social  formations,  the  social 
networks through which people pursue  access to resources and  opportunities  have  not  been 
consolidated into closed corporations which act to exclude outsiders, as suggested by the 
transformation and preservation approaches. Instead they continue to operate as arenas for 
individual  accumulation  and  mobility.  For,  in  order to gain  sufficient  authority  to  enforce  exclusive 
rights,  it is crucial to expand  the  number  of  supporters. As stressed  by  Berry (1994104), authority 
rests  partly on inclusionary strategies which  are  undermined  when  authority s used  for  exclusive 
ends. 
A fascinating insight into the challenges  related to dealing  with such networks of political  and 
social  alliances is provided through Pauline  Peter's  accounts of the establishment  and  partial 
privatization of boreholes and range in  Kgatleng,  Botswana.  Here, as elsewhere,  the  authority of 
the  Tswana  elite  depended on their  ability to construct  working  compromises  and  alliances.  These 
were, in turn, based on the expectation of  reciprocal  benefits  among  persons of  unequal status. 
Obviously, t h i s  facilitated the reproduction of  privilege,  but it also  provided  space  for  the  more 
disadvantaged, as poorer families were incorporated in the borehole syndicates and thereby 
granted access to pastures and pastures. Such  patterns  of  spreading  economic  advantage has 
remained  a  significant  dimension  of  the  political  economy of water  and  rangelands  as  well  as  of 
broader district and national politics. (Peters, 199474). 
and 198%) 
24 These.  hierarchical  and multi-usage dimensions oftenme have been dealt  extensively  with  by  Bruce  (1988a 
on the  ausmlian  aboriginals in "Songlines".  See  also  Ingold, T. 1986 "The  appropriation of nature"  for  a  discussion of 
zs ?his classic  example is provided  by  Bohannan  from  Tiv. For a more  'poetic'  expos6 see Chatwins  account 
territoriality  and  movement, 
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As highlighted by Peters, the existence of networks based on both inclusive and exclusive 
strategies  does  not  preclude Merential access  to  resources.  On  the  contra.ry, the question of who 
gets  the power to interpret and  define  the  meaning,  not just of  the  land per se, but also of the 
group itself,  is  central. For, as  noted by  Leach et al.  (1997:23),  how people gain  influence on 
decisions  regarding  resource  allocation and resource distribution must be understood as the 
outcome of  negotiations  between  different  social  actors  involving power relations and debates 
over  meaning,  rather  than  the  result of fixed  moral  rules  encoded  in  law. 
Another  important  issue  highlighted by the  Botswana case, is that transformation of the land  in 
terms  of,  for  example, the ongoing  process  of  privatization  of  the  Botswana r nge is as much the 
result  of the manipulations of the  ‘commoners’  themselves,  as  a  result  of utside interference as 
proposed by the preservation  view. 
Rather  than  treating  state  interventions  as  obtrusive,  Berry  and CO. stress that the presence of the 
state has been  intrusive  rather  than  hegemonic,  and  that rural  producers have entered negotiations 
with  their own agenda, and have  had  the  power  to  manipulate  the  outcome or partially withdraw 
from social  processes  which  they  perceive as unfavorable.  (Berry  1993:48) 
In their  interrelations  with the  state, m a l  dwellers  often  ‘straddle’  between formal and  informal 
institutions in an effort to diverse their  options  and  maintain  flexibility  in the face of uncertain 
opportunities and  constraints.  According  to  Berry,  the  result of this is neither effective state 
control over the countlyside,  nor an uncaptured  peasantry.  Rather it is a situation of multiple 
linkages  between  farmers  and  states  which  affect  patterns of resource allocation and agricultural 
performance  partly  by  encouraging  mobility  and  diversification  of  networks  and i come sources 
(Berry  1993:66). 
In such  structurally  unequal  relationships ower  can  always  be  contested. Hence, people do not 
passively submit themselves  to  external  interventions  in  terms  of  projects, plans and  regulations. 
Rather they  acquire or pick  up  the  current  discourses  and  transform them so as to fit into their 
own  interests  and  goals.  Obviously  some  will  be  in  a  better  position  than ot ers to present local 
problems  in  such  a  way s to reikct thejr  own  resource  priorities.  It is therefore also important to 
focus on differentiation as such claims not always are identical to  those of the rest of the 
community. 
ad  3). As stated by  Berry  (1988:66),  struggles  over  meanings are as much  a part of the process 
of resource allocation as are  the  struggles  over  surplus or the  labour process. In the context of 
struggles  over  resources,  multiple  conflicting  discourses  arise  and  different visions of  community 
are  articulated.  Such  representations  are  important as  hey form part of what may be termed the 
practical  political  economy  through  which  different  parties  defend  their in erests and advance their 
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claims (Li, 1996503). 
Hence, processes of transformation  commonly  involve  contestation  and  revision of the  meaning 
of  key  terms  such as property and  community.  Images of community,  for  example, are central  to 
questions of resource  access  at  the  local  level:  not  because of guaranteed  rights provided by rules 
and traditions (as  proposed by Runge)  but  because it provides  a  "culturally  available point of 
leverage in  ongoing  processes of negotiation"  i.e.  a  vocabulary  of  legitimation (Li, 1996: 509). 
Returning to the issue of boundaries, a lucid  example  of  such (re)interpretations or 'struggles over 
meanings' is given  by  Pauline  Peters  when  showing how the  administrative requirement of a 
minimum distance of five  miles  between  boreholes has led to  the  interpretation, that an area of 
approximately  five  square  miles  belongs  to  each  borehole.  Furthermore,  technical processes of 
measuring  and  mapping of areas  surrounding  the  boreholes  obviously  give  support t   the notion 
among borehole owners that a  right to land  is  as  much as  a  right to the water that has  been 
allocated to borehole  owners.  (Peters  1996:  11 1) As will  be  shown  below, similar processes can 
be observed in Senegal. 
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Chapter 4: 
Post  drought migration and 
technological  innovations. 
Chapter 4: 
Yerim Sow, Barkedji: “ The  drought  enabled  herders to get  acquainted with new  pastures” 
In March 1989, when I fust  met  Yerim  Sow  and  his  family,  they  were  living  in a temporary camp 
north  of  the borehole at Velingara.  The  family  had no hut, and  their  scattered  belongings  were 
either attached to the branches  of  the  few small acacia trees encircling  the  camp or placed on a 
rack  made  out of branches in order to keep them out of reach of the  lambs  and  kid  who were 
toddling  peacefully  around  the  camp.  The  family  had  stayed  in this camp  less  than  a  week.  Before 
that  they  had  camped  at  two  other  localities  at  a  distance  of  around 1 kilometre  from  one  another, 
three months  at the 6rst camp  and  one  month  at  the  second.  Because of the  frequent  movements, 
the wife had not yet begun  the  arduous  work  of  constructing a rass-hut.  There  were just some 
mats in the shade of a  few  scattered  trees. 
Although  moving  throughout  the  year,  camping  in  the  area  around  the  deep  well  at  Velingara  was 
unusual  for  Yerim Sow and his family.  They  normally restrict  their  area of  movement  to the  north 
of the Barkedji borehole. In the year  1989,  however,  the  gazetted  forest of Barkedji-Dodji  had 
been  ravaged  by large bush-fires  and  the  family had preferred to  move 40 kilometres  further  south, 
where  pastures were still to  be  found.  Before  the  rains  started  again  in  June-July,  the  family  was 
likely to move their camp another few times before returning to their usual wet season 
encampment in the Barkedji-Dodji  forest. The frequent  movements of the  camp  was  part  of  the 
dry season  mobility  pattern  which  the  family  had  pursued  since its arrival  in  the  area  following  the 
droughts. 
Yerim Sow and his family  originate  from  Ganina  in  the Kooyu, some 50 kilometres  south of the 
Senegal  River  Valley.  Here  the  herding  system had k e n  fairly  sedentarized. In years  with  plentiful 
rains animals could be watered  throughout the year  at  shallow  wells. In other years  they  were 
taken up  to the  Senegal River.  When the deep  well  of  Ganina  was  constructed  in  1969, movements 
were restricted to occasional visits to the salt licks near Lac  de Guiers. 
When the first drought hit in 1973, the family  moved south to  Velingara,  where  they  stayed at 
Merent locations until the  rains  resumed  and  they  were able to  return  to  Ganina. But as noted  by 
Yerim: “ The drought enabled  herders to  get acquainted to new pastures”.  Already  in the dry 
season  of 1975 the family  decided to spend  the dry season  in  Barkedji.  The  next  year  the  rains 
failed and  the  family  stayed  in  the  south  and  did  not  come  back  to  Ganina  before  the  rainy s aso  
of 1977. In the following years  transhumance  was  not  possible. 
With the second  drought  1983/84, Yerim‘s son moved  south  with the sheep  and  goats  while  Yerim 
stayed back with the cattle. But when  they  returned  in the rainy season,  the  pastures  where so 
poor that the family  decided to move  south  with  the  entire  herd.  From  then  on  they  have  restricted 
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their normal  radius  of  movement to  the  forest  of  Barkedji-Dodji,  oscillating  between  a  wet season 
camp  located  besides  a  large  pond  approximately  20  kilometres  north  of  the  borehole  of Barkedji 
and several temporary dry season  camps  closer  to  the  water  point.  Every  year, at: the  end  of the 
dry season, the family goes  on  a  shorter  trip  southwards "to meet  the  rains''  i.e.  move some 20-40 
km's southwards  where  the rains have  set  in  earlier to  ensure  fresh  fodder as early as possible  and 
to "shorten  e dry season".  They  usually  return to  the  wet  season  camp  within  a  few  weeks,  but the 
late return makes it difficult  to  embark  on  any  agricultural  activities. 
The  family  consists  of  Yerim,  a  tall  and  bony  elderly man whose  working  abilities  were  seriously 
reduced by  an accident  with  his  horse-cart  in  1988, his wife,  their  only  son,  his wife  and their 4 
children aged 1 to 10 years.  There  is  also  a  niece,  who  undertakes part of  the  herding  and the 
water transportation. The family  has a serious  shortage of  manpower and,  usually,  a  salaried 
herdsman is engaged. This is however  a  rather  unstable  worldorce  since,  according to Yerim,  he 
often runs off,  sometimes  with  a  few  animals,  leaving  the  rest to  roam  around  unguarded in the 
forest. Due to shortage of  manpower,  Yerim  has  not  undertaken  longer  transhumance trips in the 
last 7-8  years. 
In contrast  to most  of  his kin, Yerim  spent  even  the dry year  of  1991-92 in the  Barkedji-Dodji 
forest. Due to lack of  manpower, the family  had  waited  too  long  to  move. The animals got sick 
and  weak.  Moving them would  have  resulted  in  considerable  losses.  Instead  the  family  invested 
all their  manpower in limiting  the  energy  losses of the  animals.  Instead  of  sending the animals on 
the  long trip to the  borehole,  they  were  watered  either  at  shallow  wells'  where  small  amounts  of 
water is "fished"  out of the dry river  bed  with  a  2 litre can  tied  to  a  stick - like a  fishing rod - or 
by  bringing  water  out to the  camp from the  deep  well by  donkey  cart.  This  very time-consuming 
watering method obviously  reduced  the  amount of  time  the animals could  spend  grazing. The 
heavy labour input  required by this system  was  however  partly  compensated  by the absence of 
other  herds  competing  for  the  meagre  fodder  resources  in  the  area.  Nonetheless, losses during the 
dry season of 1991 were considerable. But, according to the estimations of the head of 
households,  they  would  have  been far greater  had  they  left  while  the  animals  were  weak. Sp ring 
the ewes for the  long trip to  the  well  also  limited  the  number of abortions. 
In spite of very  serious diffkulties during the years I visited them the family  has,  nonetheless, 
fared  well. As mentionned  in  chapter 1, it is  impossible  to  get  an  accurate  picture of the number 
of animals owned by the family  before  and after  the  drought.  Nonetheless  herd  development 
between 1989 and 1996 appeared to be  reasonably  successful.  In this period  the  herd  increased 
ftom approximately  500  head  of small stock  and 44 head  of cattle to  approximately 900 sheep and 
goats and 120 head  of  cattle. 
are usually reinforced by interlacing  branches. 
I BuZli in Fulani and ciunes in French,  are holes of 2-3 meters  dug into humid  depressions.  The  brinks 
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When Yerim first settled in the Forest of Barkedji-Dodji, he made a courtesy visit to the 
neighbouring  village  of  Belkagne,  to inform the village  chief  of  his  settlement i  the  bush some 10 
kilometres east of  the  viuage.  According  to  Yerim,  this was taken  badly  by  the  village  chief  and 
initiated a relation of perpetual disputes between them. The village  chief,  however,  had  no 
authority  to  keep  the  newcomers  out  of  the  area.  On the contrary, the newcomers  could  back  their 
rights of  occupancy  under  the  law on the  National  Domain  which stipulates the rights  of  any 
Senegalese to settle in areas under  state  ownership.  Over the years Yerim has invested quite a lot 
of  effort (as well as sheep) in maintaining good  relations  to  shifting sous-pr6fets, the  administrative 
officers in charge of the  area.  Nonetheless,  the  status  of  his  ‘village’  and its location  within  the 
boundaries of the gazetted  forest  is  a  matter  of  constant effort. 
Yerim’s  settling in the forest of Barkedji-Dodji soon attracted  a  number of other herders from the 
Fuuta,  the  majority  of  whom  were  his kin.Being  the fKst ‘permanent’ occupant of this bush area, 
he acquired status as  a  ‘village  chief  for  the  scattered group of  newcomers  of  his kin group, a 
position which was later recognized more or less officially by the local administration. This 
recognition  was,  as  will be  discussed  in  chapter 5, not without it’s  contradictions. 
Bathil Ba, Ranerou: 
”The Fhtcomers don’t want us here, they are just waiting for an occasion to  get  rid of us”. 
When  the  drought  hit in 1973  Bathil Ea lost his entire  herd,  which was said to  be of  moderate size. 
B a a  however,  had  married  the  daughter  of a  very  rich herder who was able to advance her part 
of  her  future  inheritance  to  provide  the  means  for  the  survival of the  family. The exact  size  of  this 
remittance is not known  to  the  author. 
Bathil  had  quit he area  of  Kasskass in the Wmlo shortly  after the drought had set in, but returned 
to Kasskass where  he  combiied  livestock  rearing  with flood recession and rainfed  agriculture. By 
1977, however, he left the wad0 and  spent  the  following twelve years moving  around  the  deep- 
wells  of  Djagueli,  Louggere  Tioli  and  Ranerou  on the  southern fringe of the  Ferlo.  At  the time of 
our first  encounter, he  had  limited  his  movements o the vicinities  of the deep-well  of  Ranerou, 
moving seasonally between  different  camps in the  area.  At  a certain moment Bathil Ea had even 
taken-up  cultivation, an occupation  which  was  later  given up due to meagre results and shortage 
of  manpower. 
In 1989 we estimated his herd  (formally  belonging to his wife) at 500 head  of  smallstock,  primarily 
sheep, and 40 head of cattle. In 1996, on our last  visit, the number of sheep had  increased to 
around 1200. In 1989  Bathil  went  on a pilgrimage to  Mecca,  a symbolic action directed,  not least, 
at displaying  his  prosperity  to  his  neighbours  and kin.
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Apart from his temporary venture  into  agriculture,  Bathil  has no occupation  apart from keeping 
his livestock.  On  some  occasions,  however,  he is consulted for possessing  certain ‘connuissuncm 
peds’, a  quality  which  presumably is testified by his  current  prosperity. In spite of having  left  the 
waalo more than 20 years ago  he  still  holds  rights  to  his  lands  on  the  flood  plains  near KassKass, 
a claim which he recently  attempted to renew*, as  the  land  was  to  be  included  in  an  irrigation 
project. 
Bathil has a  relatively large family  which,  apart  from  his  wife,  consists of 4 daughters  and 3 sons 
of  which the eldest  (twins)  were 13 years  old  at  the time of our f i t  encounter.  Bathil  employs 2-3 
salaried  herders  whom  he  treats  well,  reason for which  they  stay  with im longer  than is the  case 
in other families.  Although  he  normally restricts  his  movements  to  around  the well at Barkedji, he 
had no major  problems  in  moving 100 km’s south  to Loumbi Aly  Thedy  near  Payar,  when the  rain 
failed in 1990/91. But the trip was  hard  and  expensive,  both  in animal losses  and  in  bribes  and 
watering fees at foreign wells. 
Although  he  has  been in the area for almost 15 years,  Bathil  does  not  have  very  warm  relations 
with the leading  group  of  herders  in  Ranerou. On several  occasions  he  has  been  brought to court 
after having been  involved in  fights  with  members  of  the  well  committee in Ranerou  who  have 
tried to limit the access of foreign  herds  to  the  drinking  troughs. 
Some introductory remarks 
The two cases cited a b v e  are  representative  for  many  of  those  herders  who  were forced  to  move 
southwards.  Characteristic for these  herders  was  that  they  gave  up  a  fairly  sedentarized  lifestyle, 
often  involving important agricultural  activities in the  Senegal  River  Valley.  Most  of  the  herders 
started  out with  a  period  with  no fvred abode,  but  after  a while they limited their radius  of 
activities  in years of ‘normal’  precipitation to the vicinity  of a single  borehole.  Characteristic  of 
these herders is that a  high  degree of mobility is maintained  during  the dry season. 
Another particular trait of these  herders is the  specialization  in  smallstock,  notably  sheep.  Based 
on  very elaborate cost-benefit analyses a variety of strategies are employed to ensure high 
reproduction rates. First of all, considerable  amounts of labour is invested  in  sheep  rearing,  a 
strategy  which has proven  to be extremely  successfuL  Distinctive  for this group  is  furthermore  that 
they  consider themselves, and  are  considered by the indigenous  population,  as  outsiders.  Hence, 
they may  be forced to employ other means  than  the  insiders  to  gain  their  rightful  access to 
resources. In short,  the movement into these  new  areas  has  provided  new  opportunities  as  well 
as new constraints. 
the  attempt  was  successful. 
He tried to get his sons and  daughters  registered as rightful  owners of the  land. It is not  known  whether 
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Perceiving  drought in a more  open-ended  perspective. 
Senegal and  particularly  the  Ferlo,  are  drought-prone  areas. Droughts occur relatively frequently, 
although  with  varying strength. As mentioned  in  the  introduction, it  is not fruitful to perceive of 
drought  and  drought-related  migration  only  in terms of crisis and  socio-economic  decline.  Instead 
adopt a more open-ended approach must be adopted. In this approach, drought may be 
comprehended as an  opportunity  for  experimentation  and  change  both, in production patterns  and 
in social relations i.e.  understanding  drought as a  revelatory  crisis. 
As droughts  vary  in  strength  and  effect, it may  be  useful to distinguish  between  droughts  acting 
as ‘watershed  events’  and  drought  acting  more  as  ‘events  of  articulation”. The severe droughts of 
1972173  and  1983/84,  were  watershed  events,  where  changes  in  meaning  and  practice  reached  a 
point  where it became  obvious  that  pre-drought  production patterns would not return once  the 
rains  resumed. In contrast to this, the dry years of 1991/93  had more the character of  an  ‘event  of 
articulation’, in  which  opportunities for questioning  existing power structures and of adjusting 
them  to  the  new  emerging  order were  enhanced. 
The  present  chapter  deals  with  the  profound  effects  which the two large droughts of 1972/73  and 
1983/84  had  on  the  production  systems  in  the  Ferlo.  It is therefore primarily concerned  with  the 
watershed effects of the drought in terms of the changing practices of herd and pasture 
management.  The  changing  structures  of  authority  over  land  which t s has entailed will be. treated 
in depth in  chapter 5. Here  the  processes  of  political  adjustment  are  uncovered  through an analysis 
of drought conceived of as  an  event of articulation. 
The aim here is to analyse  the  effects  that  the  arrival  of  a large group of herders had on the 
production  systems  in  the  southern  fringe  of  the  Ferlo.  Surprisingly little has  been  written on the 
profound  but to a  large  extent  unexpected  changes  which the herding systems of the Ferlo  region 
have  undergone  during the last  twenty  years.  Data  material for the analysis is therefore mainly 
based on my own case mated, collected  in the  Ferlo  between 1989 and 1995. This data material 
comprises  both  in-depth  interviews  with a large  number of herders  and representatives from the 
state  administration  and the extension  services,  and  more quantitative data such as questionnaire 
surveys and  mapping  exercises. This data  is  examined  in order to reveal the logics of the new 
herding  strategies  put  into  effect  by the intruding  herders  and  to analyse the impact of this on  the 
resource management system of the area4. Throughout the analysis, these findings will be 
(Moore 1994365). See also chapter 3. 
S& Sally Fak  Moores distinction  between  events  with  diagnostic qualities and events of articulation 
over  the  natural  resources  in  the  Ferlo,  rather an to  document the  functioning of the new herd  management 
strategies, not all this material is presented  here. 
As the  objective  here is to  analyse  the  effects of the  drought-related  migration on the access and control 
91 
confronted with the myths and narratives discussed in chapter 2: notably the perception of 
degradation and productive decline as the neccessary outcomes of drought and increased 
population  pressure,  the  understanding  of  range  degradation as resulting from external  intervention 
in an otherwise  stable  environment,  and the image of pastoral societies as 'traditional"  and  unable 
to  adapt  to  the  new  conditions  unless  helped by xternal  interventions. 
The  local  context 
Before  passing to the recent  history  of  post-drought migration  and  rehabilitation, it may be useful 
to briefly  recall a  few  features of the  history of the Ferlo region that are relevant for this project. 
Pastoral rangelands,  such  as  the  Ferlo  region, are often  analysed  in  terms of their economic, 
political  and  social  marginalization. This is  illustrated  through the continuous loss of rangelands 
due to insecurity  of  tenure  and  agricultural  encroachment  and the neglect  of  productive  investment 
in  infrastructure by  the  state. 
Continual  loss  of  rangelands  and  insecurity  of  tenure  are also characteristic of  the  situation  in  the 
Ferlo.  Nonetheless,  productive  opportunities  in  the  Ferlo  have  expanded  tremendously  during  the 
last 40 years. In fact, the  recent  history  of  the  Ferlo  region is best understood as a simultaneous 
process of diminution  and  enlargement.  The  physical  diminution is the result  of  a  continuous 
squeeze on the  pastoral  zone  from  agricultural  encroachment.  At  the  same  time,  however,  the 
digging  of  wells  and  improved  conditions for  mobility  have  provided  new  production  opportuni- 
ties, enlarging, so to speak,  the  pastoral  area from within. This situation has profoundly  altered 
the relations between the wetlands of the Senegal River Basin, the "wuulo", and the dry 
hinterlands,  the 'yeer?'. In this way,  even the early  history  of the region  dismisses  any  stableness 
of the environment or inability  to  adapt  to  new  conditions. 
Landscape as a  largely  anthropogenic  creation 
Chapter 2 introduced the mainstream perception of the environment as being largely in 
equilibrium  According  to  this  view  relatively  stable  conditions utside the system would  allow the 
internal  processes of the  system  to  equilibrate  and regulate system structures and  dynamics. 
According to the  records  of  the  early  French  explorers,  the Ferlo region was,  by  the  end of the  last 
century, covered  with  dense  forest.  According to the chronicle of  Lieutenant  Monteil  of his 
exploratory journey in  the  Ferlo  in  1879,  the  Ferlo  was  a park of forest so dense that it in  places 
was impossible to advance without first buming off the bush. (Monteil in Pouillon, 1990). 
Furthermore,  large  mammals  such as elephants,  girafs  and crocodiles could be found in the  area. 
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Today the Ferlo is characterized by open grasslands. Fine-leaved annual grasses such as 
Schoenfeldia grasilis, Cenchrus biflorus, Dactyloctenium aegyptium and Aristida mutabilis are 
the main components of the  herbaceous  layer in most  of  the area. To the  south  and east some  taller 
grasses  such as Pennisetumpe  dicellatum become  more  common  (Hanan  et al., 1991:175).  Tree 
cover canopy is less  than 5% in the north, increasing to 15-20% in  the  south  and  south  east 
(Marks and  Faye, 1990),as the soil structure changes  from  sandy soils overlying  stabilized  dunes 
in the  north  and  west o gravelly rock and laterite plateaux in the south and east  (Hanan  et  al.). 
Wildlife is reduced  to  a  number of antilopes  and  jackals  while,  in  rare  cases,  a  solitary  ostrich may 
be observed. This situation has, by m y  development  practitioners  and  scholars,  (for  example 
Tow&,  1986  and Banal, 1982)  been  interpreted  as  a  sign of severe  degradation,  due  to  increased 
dissecation  of  the climate combined with  the  effects of overgrazing. 
According  to recent findings, this biological structure is not  the  outcome of recent  degradation, 
as presumed in current development discourse.  Rather, it results from a  long  term  construction/ 
modification  of  the landscape conditioned  by  human  intervention,  sometimes  the  active  outcome 
of management  sometimes  unintended  consequences. In the Ferlo,  as in the  rest  of  the  western 
Sahel,  “the  mixing  of animals and plant species of the  desert and  savanna  eco-zones  have  been, 
in part , the result  of long centuries of  human  land  use  practices  whereby  livestock  herding  and 
agricultural  practices have produced a derived natural  environment”  (Webb,  1995:3) 
Indeed  the recent forest cover of the region  seems  to  be  a  largely  anthropogenic  creation.  When 
the tint colonial  administrators anived in the area by the turn of the  century,  large  clearings were 
ftequently  interspersed with the wooded  landscape. Along the  River  Valleys of the Bounoum and 
the  Ferlo,  forest  cover  was  largely  replaced  by  fields,  a  vkible sign of the grain  export  to  the  desert 
economies  of the North (Freudenberger,  1992:84,85). 
The  pastoral  Fulanis also contributed to the change  in  the  landscape.  Livestock  grazing a d  field 
crop cultivation by herders transformed the tree cover from one  in which  broad-leafed  trees 
(Sclerocarya  birrea and Pterocarpus lucens) dominated  to one where  hardy,  short  leaved  species 
such as Acacia  raddiana and Balanites  aegyptiaca were  more  prominent  (Benoit,  1988:106; 
Freudenberger, 199298). The dense stands of Acacia senegal, so appreciated by the  colonial 
administrators for their valuable production of gum arabic,  are not reminiscenses  of  pristine 
vegetation  but  result from this “humanization” of  the  area  by its pastoral  population.  In  the  same 
way,  fires  designed to clear the grasslands and  forests of disease  vectors  such  as  ticks  and  at 
controlling the population of  wild  animals  encouraged the development of fire  tolerant-tree  and 
grass  species.. In many cases these species  proved  more  palatable for livestock  than  the  previous 
vegetation. 
Hence,  pre-drought Ferlo was far from the image of a  pristine or virgin forest which  had been 
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depleted  within  recent  history  through  the invaion of unprecedented  numbers  of  livestock.  It  was 
an environment already moulded  and  transformed by  human  intervention.  And  albeit "disturbed 
by  human  intervention,  these transformations  contributed  largely,  not  to  degrade, but  to  improve 
the productive potential of the area. 
Nonetheless, human intervention in the  interior of the  Ferlo  was,  until  the  end of the 1950s, 
limited to a the few months during the  rainy  season. This situation  was  completely  altered  when 
the colonial administration started its drilling  programme  in  the  pastoral  Ferlo. 
The  borehole  revolution. 
Access to water has been the structuring  element in the  history of the  Ferlo.  Until  the 1950s, the 
area was  largely  inaccessible during the dry season  due  to  lack of water.  Only  a  few  artisan  wells 
existed,  and the vast areas of the interior  Ferlo  was  exploited only  occasionally  by  black  Maures 
engaged  in the collection of gum arabic. 
In 1937 a large fossil  acquifer  was  discovered  covering  most of Northern  Senegal. In order to 
exploit this enormous water potential,  a  large  drilling  programme  was  launched by the  French 
colonial administration. By the end of the 1950s a  network of boreholes had  been  established. 
Each of these  boreholes  was  equipped  with  a  diesel  pump  enabling  water  to  be  pumped  from  the 
aquifer 8O-400 metres  beneath  the  pastoral  zone  (Freudenberger, 1992:  175,176). This opened  the 
area for all-year grazing. 
Map 7: 
Date of installation of the first boreholes of the  Ferlo. 
Source: Tour6 and Arpaillange, 1986. 0 10 XI $ O h  'U
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The aim of the colonial  administration  was  first of all to improve pastoral production. Once 
permanent water sources were  accessible  herds  would  no  longer be forced to return to the river 
during  the dry season  but  could  exploit  the  rich  pastures of the  Ferlo  even after the surface water 
ponds had dried out.  Over  the  next ten  years  large  numbers  of Fulanis gave  up their annual 
transhumance  journeys  and  settled  in  the  vicinities of the  boreholes.  The intensified use of the vast 
pastures of the jeeri, combined  with  improved  veterinary  services,  allowed for considerable 
increases both in average  herd  size  and  in  the  total  number of livestock in the region (Mathieu, 
Niasse and Vincke, 1986:227;  Richter,  1991:12). 
The success of the drilling programme  was  spectacular. Within a  few  years the system of seasonal 
migration  had  been  completely  transformed  by  the  new  opportunities. Separated by a interval of 
only 7 years, the surveys  of  Bonnet-Dupeyron  (1950)  and  Ph.  Grenier  (1957) show a significant 
difference in transhumance  activities  before and  after  the  installation of the boreholes (see map 
below). 
Map 8. 
Dry season  movements in northern  Ferlo  before  installation  of  the  boreholes 
1. Pastoral  movements: 2 Movements  by herders who are cultivating  the  Waalo; 3. Southern l i t  of dry season  grazing 
of waalo  herds, 4. Areas occupied  mainly  by  herders  cultivating  the waalo; 5. Borehole;7. Well; 8. Artisan shallow  well 
(ciune); 9. Wet season  Fulani camp; 10. Village or aglomeration 
I. Sedentarised  Fulanis and  Toucouleur; II. Sedentarised  Fulanis  (HaboBe); III. Sedentarised Fulanis (JenguelBe) 
IV. Fulanis of the central  Valleys; V. Fulanis of northern  Ferlo. 
Source:  Grenier, 1960. 
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Map 9. Actual main axes of transhumance. 
1. Area  where  sedentary  Fulanis,  Wolof  and  Serer are dominant. 2.Rincipal migration  routes. 
3. Dry Valleys, 4: Sedentary Village. 5. Fulani camp. 6. Artisan  Well (C&@, 7. Pond, 8. Well, 9. Railroad. 
I. Sedentarised  Fulanis  of the East and  Toucouleurs. E. Sedentarised  Fulanis  of the south and HaboBts. III. JengelBe 
Fulanis. IV. Fulanis of the  Central Valleys. Fulanis  of the North. 
Source:  Grenier 1960. 
While 60% of the  heads  of  households  interrogated  in 1950 declared that they regularly sent  their 
animals to the wualo pastures, 52% of  those  households  who  had formerly  practised  transhumance 
declared  they  had  abandoned this practice  between 1952 and 1962. Abandonment of the binary 
transhumance  practices  was  further  accelerated, in the  following years, not the least in response 
to the rain-deficits  and  droughts from 1968 and  onwards.  By 1975  Barral(1982:44) notes that 
only 3% of  the  herders  in the area  were still keeping  up  their  previous transhumance schemes’. 
Movements on the  southern  fringe of the  Ferlo  were  altered  also by the construction of the 
boreholes, although  in  a  less  spectacular  manner.  According to Barral (1982:51), 40% of the 
households  used to carry  out  regular  movements  towards the Djoloff and the Ferlo Valley  prior 
to the establishment of the boreholes.  Between 1952 and 1962,5276 of these households  have 
given up  tranhumance  on  a  regular  basis  and  by 1978 only 10% of the livestock was undertaking 
regular  transhumance  movements. 
As transhumance  movements  were largely  abandoned,  the tight relations  previously  connecting 
the pastoral and the agricultural  zones  tended to evaporate.  A  pure ‘pastoral area’ was created, 
5 .  I.e. 22% of those. previously  practicing  annual waalo-jeeri movements  of their herds (ibid). 
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ked &om  the  perpetual confrontations between  farmers  and  herders.  Herding  was now  reduced 
to simple  surveillance as herds no longer would  be  trespassing into the  flood  recession  fields. 
Likewise, the labour inputs required for watering were greatly reduced at the mechanized 
boreholes  which  were  equipped  with watering troughs  (Pouillon,  1994:180; To&, 1990;  Barral, 
1982). 
Nonetheless, the construction of the boreholes did not give  way to a full sedentarisation of the 
herders  nor  to  a  concentration of settlement along the boreholes.  Dry  season  camps  remained 
dispersed in  the  bush  within a radius of 5-10 km from the borehole, and  a  system  of  micro- 
nomadisations  (see  Barral,  1982:  63-67) was put into effect. This  involved  pendular  movements 
between  the dry season camp  within reach  of  the  borehole  and  wet  season  camps  installed  further 
away in the bush in the vicinities of rain water ponds where  water was free and  readily  accessible. 
According to Pouillon  (1990:181), the dispersion  of  camps  also  had  a  political  dimension, as it 
limited tensions between the quite heterogeneous selection of clanic groups who had been 
attracted by the borehole. As can be  seen on the map  of  the  settlements  around  the  Velingara 
borehole  (p.  116-1  18),  a  certain  tendency  may  be  traced  of  settling  according  to  clan  groups.  This 
structure,  which is far  from  absolute, may also be read out of the  selections of village  chiefs.  These 
are  frequently  not only representatives of a particular area (section in  the  local  French  vernacular) 
but  frequently  also  represent  a particular sub-fraction  (FafaBe,  DiawBe,  WodaaBe  etc). 
In consequence  of this dispersion of settlement,  the  villages or grouping of houses in the  vicinities 
of the  borehole are usually occupied primarily by Mauritanian  shopkeepers, state employed 
technical  or  administrative  personal,  Wolof farmers i.e. people no or with  limited  herd  ownership. 
It remains  important o stress, that although patterns of  transhumance  movements  have  changed 
in  character,  mobility has preserved its importance.  The  highly  variable  rainfall,  the  frequent  bush 
tires and the  recurrent  breakdown  of  the  borehole  pumps  make  transhumance an indispensable  exit 
option in an environment characterized by  variability  and  unpredictability. In fact, mobility  was 
greatly eased  through the construction of boreholes,  as  compared to the former  hazardous and 
risky transhumance across territories marked by absence of accessible water sources. With 
boreholes within reasonable reach it now became possible to reach distant pastures without 
significant  increases of animal energy loss. 
There  can  therfore  be no doubt that herders took full advantage of the new  opportunities  created 
by the wells6.  Once  more  interesting  productionopportunities  were  created,  the  binary  system 
notably  botulism,  which  very  significantly is labelled ‘la maladie  des  forages’  by  the  local  population.  These  illnesses 
can to a  wide  extend be attributed  to the mineral deficiencies of both  water  and  pastures of the  Ferlo  River  (Miiller, 
1989;  Pouillon, 19901982). This  issue is, however, not within the scope. of the  present  study. 
60bviously the new  opportunities also carried  with  them  new  constraints  such as the  new  diseases, 
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structured  around flood  recession  agriculture  and ry season  grazing  in  the waalo and wet season 
grazing in thejeen' hinterlands,  was  quickly  abandoned  by  a  majority  of herdershstead herdrs 
adapted to the new  system  and  moulded it in  such a way as to best  souit  their  own advantages. 
Such adaptive capacities  onviously  contradict any  assumptions that  herding  systems  should be 
stagnant and  unable  to  change. 
But contrary to the  expectations of the  planners,  herders  preserved  a  mobile  lifestyle,  moving 
between  the distant  wet  season camp  and  a dry season  camp  within  reasonable reach of the 
watering  facilities. 
Boreholes  and  environmental  degradation. 
As mentioned  in  chapter 2, it has  been  common  to  attribute  to  the  boreholes  a detrimental effect 
on the vegetation  around them Le Houirou (1977:  25-30),  for  example,  states that  they have lead 
to the destruction of pastures within a radius of 15 to 30 km around the borehole. Such 
destruction has  been  termed  'desert  patches' by  more  alarmist  researchers such as Rapp (1976) 
and Glantz ( 1977). 
The  idea  that  boreholes  lead to destruction of the  vegetation  was  seriously challenged in a study 
carried out in  1987 by researchers  from The Centre  de  Suivi  Ecologique in Dakar (Hanan et al. 
1991). Using  a  satellite  image  derived  map of  biomass  production to measure east and  west 
transects  at  twenty  selected  deep-wells  in  northern  Ferlo,  the  researchers  showed that patterns of 
changes  of  production  were  variable  across  the  individual  well.  It  was,  however,  not possible to 
establish a  relation  between  changes in productivity  and  distance to the  well. The variations 
occurring  were frequently related  to  factors other than  grazing. This indicates  that the deep wells 
of the Ferlo  have  not  caused  the  formation  of  desert  patches (at the  limits  of  resolution used (1 .l 
km)). In no case did  production  alongside  a  well  decline  to  near  zero,  although f r just over half 
of the transects a significant relationship existed between distance and production. This 
corresponds with the findings of Valenza from 1981 showing that herbaceous vegetation is 
primarily  dependent  on  rainf'  and  that grazing  has  little  effect.  Although it is common at the end 
of the dry season to observe large areas  of  bare  ground  around  some of the  deep  well, these are 
the  effect  of 9 months of livestock gazing and trampling en  route  to the drinking  point. According 
to Hanan et al. the desert patch prescription does not apply to this phenomenon as total 
productivity  during  the  rainy  season  appears  to be little  affected.  Hence,  nothing seems to indicate 
that the  establishment of boreholes  increased  desertification  in  the  Ferlo. 
The findings of this study confirm the hypothesis of researchers within the 'new ecology' 
framework presented in chapter 2. They stress that it is rainfall, rather than grazing, that 
determines biomass  production  in  non-equilibrium  environments. 
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Boreholes and  agricultural  encroachment. 
Originally, the aim of the borehole  programme  was  primarily to facilitate the transport of livestock 
by  hoof to  the  urban  markets  and  to  provide  meat to the booming  peanut  economy  (Freudenber- 
ger, 1992 177).  The  grandiose character of the  colonial  vision is well  illustrated  by  the  following 
quote: 
"We recognized straight away that the deep boreholes were' the dream 
technology  which  would permit all the animal trails in  the  sylvo-pastoral  zone 
of the Sahel to be bordered by modem, well-equipped  drinking  troughs.  One 
can imagine the borehole as destined to satisfy the water needs of these 
transhumance  herds in much  the same way that train  station  cafeterias  or drink 
stands  meet  the  needs of rail  traveller^"^. 
Boreholes  constructed  between  1942  and  1951  met this objective. By  the  early  1950s,  however, 
new options emerged. In fact,  the  opening  up of a  new  all-season  pastoral space tumed out  to 
provide an  unexpected  solution to a  difficult structural crisis. For, together with  a  significant 
increase  in the number  of  livestock  due to  the  improved  veterinary  services  and  favourable  weather 
conditions thoughout  the  1950s  and  1960s,  the groundnut economy in the south was  putting 
increased  pressure  on  the  pastoral  zones  and conflicts between FulBe and  Wolof  were  increasing 
dramatically. 
Through  the  borehole  development  scheme,  the  colonial administration  hoped to persuade herders 
to  settle m the proximity  of the  boreholes  and  leave  land further south to cultivators. The idea was 
to establish a sort of  "pastoral  sanctuary"  where herders coud graze their  animals  freely.  Around 
the  borehole  it  was  envisaged  that  economic growth poles  would  form. In the  optimistic  view of 
the  colonial  administrator  Grosmaire, it was envisaged that: 
"By attaching  life in  the region as a result of water availability, the  borehole 
will enable a whole geographic area to be opened for modem economic 
activities and call forth all manner of human enterprise" '. 
This  suggestion  of a specialized (but also signiscantly reduced) pastoral area was  promoted under 
quoted in Freudenberger's  translation 1992177). 
Grosmaire 1957 in: Elements  de  Politique  Sylvo-pastorale  au  Sahel du Senegal  Fasicule 15 p. 41, here 
quoted in Freudenbergers  translation 1992179) 
' Grosmaire, 1957 in: Elements de Politique  Sylvo-pastorale au Sahel  du  Senegal  Fasicule 15 p. 41, here 
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the heading  "zone  sylvo-pastorale"  (Pouillon,  1990:lSO).  As  will  be  shown later on, this merely 
verbal distinction between an agricultural and a pastoral zone, did not effectively halt the 
expansion of the  groundnut  economy. 
Agricultural  encroachment on  the  southern  part  of the dry hinterlands, the so-called  Ferlo,  goes 
back  to  the  turn of the  century  when  a  cash  economy emerged, based on production and sale of 
groundnut  for  the  colonial  market.  The  expansion  of  peanut  production into the inhospitable  and 
remote  areas  of  Senegal's  interior  was  largely  undertaken  by disciples of the Islamic brotherhood 
of the Mourides'.  Through  a  social,  economic  and  religious  organization of pioneer  farming 
communities,  the  so-caUed daar~s '~  they  were  able  to  resist the hostile pastoral population of the 
area  and  clear  vast  areas  for  groundnut  production.  The methods  used  by Mouride disciples  to  get 
control over Fulani grazing land were often extremely aggressive, frequently involving the 
expulsion and  destruction of Fulani  settlements 'I. 
Before  the  creation  of  the  boreholes,  the  expansion  of gr undnut production northwards from  the 
central  peanut  basin into the  case  area  in  the  "cercle"'2 of Linguere, was relatively  unimportant. 
Competition between Wolof  and Fulanis  in  terms of land  and other natural resources was  limited 
to  the key  areas  around  the dry river  valleys.  According to Santoir (1983:43),  the  increased 
contact  to  Wolof  farmers  even  provoked  a  phenomena  of  assimilation.  Many  Fulani's  residing  in 
the  area  took  up  groundnut  production,  and  some  even  converted o Mouridism. The increasing 
importance of faming also  entailed  higher  levels  of  sedentarisation. The effects of Mouride 
expansion  were  therefore  not nly  detrimental  or  one-sided. 
Nonetheless,  creation of the  boreholes  in  the  beginning  of the 1950s increased conflicts between 
herders and  farmers,  notably in the southern part of the Barkedji arrondissement (Thiel, &de, 
Gassane). In spite of their  designation by the  colonial  administration as "pastoral  deep-wells''  (as 
opposed  to  agricultural  or  mixed  wells  further  south),  they were soon invaded by Mouride tuZibis 
who, together with other Wolof  farmers, started  clearing large tracts of  land in a  completely 
anarchistic  manner.  Numerous  conflicts  can be listed  about conflict over land being illicitly  cleared 
' The  Mouride  brotherhood is one of the three major Sufi sects in Senegal. It is built  on the spiritual 
allegiance to a  local Moslem  spiritual  leader,  the  marabouf  but  also  implies a number of reciprocal  responsibilities 
between  the  marabout  and  the tali&, his  disciple.  Tne  Mouride  brotherhood  has  been  described among others by 
Cruise OBrien, D., 1971  "The  Mourides of Senegal"  and  1975,  "Saints and Politicians'. 
Daara's are pioneer  villages of young  single,  male  disciples (tulibh) of a  Mouride  saint (marabout). 
" In the  case of Kael  in  1914,  the  creation of a daara implied the expulsion  and  destruction of 8 Fulani 
settlements (J. de Bevert,  1937:  "L'exode  d'une  race"  Rev. OutreMer, here from Santoir 1983:43). 
The coloNa~ 'kercle" was  more  or  less  equivalent to the  contemporary ePrefecturets 
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by  Wolof farmer  and about animals captured and  beaten  by  the t~Zib6s. '~  
Faced  with the anarchistic expansion of the Mourides,  a  number of gazetted forests and  "sylvo- 
pastoral  reserves"  were  created  by the colonial  administration  during  the 1950s. Within  the  limits 
of these  reserves  cash-crop  production  was  formaly  prohibited.  But  due  to  the  increasing  political 
weight  of the Mourides within the administration,  the many cases  where  these  restrictions  have 
been  ignored  have  not  lead to any legal proceeding. And in  several  cases,  the  administration have 
even  taken to declasslfying large areas of forest in order to satisfy  the  demands of the  Mouride 
SaintSl4. 
While the opening  of the boreholes in the south lead to a  process  of  'Wolofization'  of  the  villages 
where the Fulanis to a large degree moved out  to avoid  conflicts  and  the  persecutions of the 
powerful Mouride~'~, it is interesting to note that,  in  some  cases,  opening  the  boreholes,  such as 
Barkedji,  had the opposite effect: of  marginalizing  the Wolof vis-&vis  the  Fulanis. 
Before  the construction of the borehole,  Barkedji was a  Wolof  village,  in  fact  the  westem-most 
Wolof agglomeration in an otherwise Fulani  pastoral  area.  The  drilling of the  borehole  attracted 
large  concentrations of herds during the dry season,  creating  problems of cohabitation  between 
Fulani  herders  and  Wolof  farmers. As a result, the Wolof population  stagnated  between 1953 and 
1957 after  which it started to decrease (Santoir, 1983:72). In order to avoid  conflicts  with  the 
herders, farmers  increasingly  moved  their  fields  away  from  the  borehole  towards  the  east. This 
"liberated space" was  largely  taken  over by Fulani  immigrants.  This  process was further  enhanced 
as the Fulanis  in 1961, due to their the increased  political  importance,  were  able to establish  a 
regulation prohititing all cultivation  within  a  radius of 1 km of  the borehole. Today  the  village  is 
divided into aW part and a  Fulani part of  approximately  equal  size.  But,  due to the  numerous 
l3 Ssee also Weicker, 1983, 
A prominent example from 1951 is the  borehole of  Deali,  where  the  Mourides  exherted  very  strong 
pressure to be attributed a large piece of land near the newly opened borehole.  Within  3  days  around  1200 ha  of  land 
was cleared by Mouride  disciples,  leaving  paralyzed the administration  who  did not dare to  protest  against  the 
seizure  of  land  and  who  prefered to close their eyes to the  violent  injustices  carried  out by the Talibk's. In total 8250 
hectares  of  hitherto  classified  land  were  attributed to the marabouts  in  1962.  Between  1965  and  198Omore  land  was 
attributed to the  variuos  mouridemarabouts.  By  1980  only 49.275 hectares of the  formerly  75.900  hectares 
constitating the gazetted forest remained classified. Also other forests  in  the the Departement of Linguere (forest of 
Boulel) or depamnenet of Kaffrine ( Kassas, Delbi and later Mbigui) have been partly  declassified  in  order  to  satisfy 
the  demands of the Mouride saints. (Archives  de la Direction des Eaux et Farets, Dakar). Notably  the  declassifica- 
tion of 45.000  hectares in the forest of hfbigui (also  called Khelkom)  in 1991  gave way to furious protests by 
herders  and  en&onementalists.  (see  Schoonmaker  Freudenberger  1991.) 
population  had  fourdoubled  while the Fulani  population  decreased from 130 Fulani inhabitants of a total of 250 to 
only 58 persons out of a total of 612 inhabitants in 1979 Santoir, 198357-66). 
Santoir's  survey of the borehole of Linde , south of Barkedji,  shows  that  within 10 years  the Wolof 
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Fulanis settled  in the surrounding  bush,  it is the Fulanis that  constitute  the  dominant  political  force 
in the  area. In. spite of having  a  majority in the  Rural  Council  since its establishment  in  1976,  the 
Fulanis have,  nevertheless,  been  unable  to  control  the  anarchistic  clearing  of  rangelands  by  Wolof 
farmers.  This process has  become  even  more  important  since  1975, when Mouride disciples 
started entering the area in search of lands  for  organisation of  new daara's (ibid.:80). 
The  actual  amount of land currently  converted  from  pastures  to  farmland, is ifficult  to  evaluate 
as fields are  spread  throughout  the range and  often  not  registered  properly by the  rural  councils 
in charge  of  land  registration? h several cases,  the large tracts of land  attributed  to  the  Mouride 
marahuts are not  put  under  hoe. In other cases, the daara's expand  over  the  boundaries of  what 
is attributed to them. In addition,  many  individual  fields  are  cultivated  by  Wolof  newcomers.  In 
some cases,  this  land is cultivated  illegally,  while m other  cases  it is attributed by the  rural  councils. 
' In reality, it is not so much  the actual plot  under  cultivation  that  poses  problems  but  rather  the 
aggressive  attitude  of  the  Mouride  disciples. In order  to  avoid  having  their  animals  impounded or 
beaten herders tend to evade  vast  areas in the  vicinities of the daara's. The  scattering of  fields 
over  a  large  area, therefore represents a  bigger  problem  than  what  can be read  out  of  the  actual 
acreage  under cultivation. 
Faced with  this sort of  problems,  herders  dispose  of  few means to  defend  their  pastures  from 
agricultural encroachment. The legal framework is strongly biased in favour of agricultural 
produ~tion'~ and the state and the rural councils  are  generally  unwilling  or  unable  to  confront  the 
Mouride expansion".  Nonetheless,  more  resistance  has been demonstrated by the new rural 
councils elected in  1991. On a  few  occasions,  they  have  managed to either  refuse  or  postpone 
further land allocations to Mouride saints. Recently, councillors of certain localities where 
Mouride expansion is particularly  threatening  have also started attributing very large tracts of 
lands  @tween 10 and 20 km? to themselves  and  their "allies" in  order to create  a  buffer  zone  vis- 
&-vis the  expansion  of daara's''. The  consequences  of  these  'spontaneous  privatizations' in  terms 
of rights of exclusion are  yet to  be seen.  But it is noteworthy  that, in spite of their  obvious 
discrepancies  with the legal  framework  governing  land  attribution,  they  have, so to  speak,  been 
de facto accepted by the state administration  in the area,  and  have  contributed  to  block,  at  least 
temporarily, Mouride expansion  in the area. 
to the  Mouride daaras between  1984 and 1990. Even  in an arrondissement as vast as Velingara  (261.170  hectares) 
l' According M the registrations of the Nral council of Velingara  13.040  hectares of land were attrihted 
this is a  considerable  portion. I do not dispose of reliable figures from  the communaue rural of Barkedji, but they are 
considerably  lower. 
'' The legal  framework  will be discussed in  more detail in  chapter 5. 
'* The cases of E a l i  and Mbigugut discussed  (see  note  14)  are  examples of this. 
l9 For a  discussion of this  phenomenon,  see Juul, 1993. 
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Post-drought  Ferlo as a  porous  and  dynamic  formation. 
As can  be seen from the  above,  the  area  into which  the  "drought  refugee's'' from the North 
migrated was characterized not by stable and homogeneous communities but by perpetual 
population  movements in a  very prous social  environment. The  period leading up to the droughts 
had  provided  a  number  of  new  opportunities  which  were  readily  seized  by the Fulani population: 
such as the  venture  into  groundnut  production  by the Fulani JeengeZBe in  the southern fringe of the 
Ferlo or the  extremely  rapid  adjustment of herders  to  the  post-borehole situation in terms of new 
patterns of  mobility  and  increased  market  integration, to mention  a  few of the most important. 
As will be shown  below  these  so-called  stagnant  herders  have  been able  to face profound changes 
such as the perpetual squeeze on grazing  lands from the  agricultural encroachment in the south 
and  the  expansion of irrigation.  At  several  occasions  herders  have  managed to restrict agricultural 
encroachment,  proving  to  be  less  politically  marginalized  than  often  anticipated. 
The  effects of drought:  expansion  of  irrigation  and  out-migration. 
Irrigation along the Senegal River has been a major policy option in Senegal even before 
independence.  Nonetheless,  the  effects of  irrigation  on the  herding  system  of Northern Senegal 
were relatively  negligible.  With the creation of  the SAEDZo in  1965,  the para-statal in charge of 
promoting  irrigated  agricultwe  along  the  river,  the  state  hoped  to attain two goals. 1) To reduce 
the country's food deficit.  2) To mobilize the  population of the  Valley  in order to improve their 
standard of living. Due to bureaucratic inefficiency, soaring costs and unresolved technical 
problems  related  to  irrigation,  the  production  results  obtained  were,  until 1972, very poor.  It was 
fust in  connection  with the drought  periods  of  1972/73  and  1983/84 that considerable investments 
were  made  to expand both large scale and  small  scale  irrigation  schemes along the river. 
The year  1968  marked  the  end of a  period  distinguished  by  particularly favorable conditions for 
pastoralism. In the following  20  years,  annual  precipitation  rates  in the waalo and the adjacent 
jeeri were  very poor and  reached  a  nadir  during  the  2  great  Sahelian droughts of 1972/73 and 
1983/84". The combination of  failing  rains  and  absence  of proper flooding over several years 
severely affected  both  pastures  and  flood  recession  agriculture.  The wuaZo practically lost its 
Sinigal et de la Falimi. 
2o Societ6 dhinagement  et d'Exploitation  des tmes du Delta  du  fleuve  S6nntgal et des  vall6es du fleuve 
mm, 178 mm, and  299 mm as compared  to  317 mm 317 mm, 518 mm between  1918  and  1969.  (Profil de 
1'EnVirOMement,l99@4) 
*' In Dagana,  Podor  and  Matam the mean annual  precipitations from 1970 to 1987  were  respectively 192 
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importance as dry season or drought  refugeu  and  the  on-going process of differentiation  was 
further  accelerated. 
One of  the  reasons  why  the  drought  of  1972173  hit  particularly  hard  was the increased sedentarity. 
This had been prompted by generally favorable climatic conditions and in particular by the 
improved  watering  situation in the jeeri. By  1970  75%  of the  FulBe JejerBeZ3 of the Valley  were 
sedentary  the  entire  year in proximity  to  the  borehole  (Santoir, 1994242) while those cultivating 
in the wmlo limited  annual  migration to a few  family members with  perhaps some sheep and  goats. 
This hampered  former risk management  strategies  based  on  mobility  and  herd dispersion. 
When the  drought  struck,  most  herders  therefore  remained  in  their  wet season camps and  waited 
until the end  of  the  rainy  season  before  they  finally  abandoned  the  most dr ught ridden  zone  and 
moved  southward. By  that  time  the  animals  were  already  extremely  weak  and therefore less able 
to endure the  long  trip and to  adapt  to new  fodder  regimes.  They were also far  more vulnerable 
to animal diseases encountered in the  south  (Santoir,  1977 cited by Santoir, 1994:243).  Although 
60 % of the herds and 40 % of  the  families  ended  by  having  left the Valley to seek refuge in  the 
Peanut Basin herd  losses  were  considerable. Santoi estimates that around 60% of the cattle of  the 
Senegal River valley  was lost  during  the  drought%  and that by 1973 more than 114 of  Fulani 
households  had no cattle  leftz. In general,  those  families  who  left early and  went  furthest  south 
were the ones to  endure  the  least  losses. 
Many  of those  Fulanis  who  had  suffered  too  heavy  losses  to  continue  making  a livelihood solely 
fiom  pastoral  production  were  left  with  little  alternative  than to opt for an irrigated plotz6. Wmlo 
possessing  small  numbers of sheep  and  goats  sought  refuge in the  waalo  during the 72/73  drought.  (Richter, 
1991:23) In general  the  survival  rate  for  these animals  was  low. 
'* In Vidou  ThiengOly, a  area  haditionally  closely  connected  with  the waalo, only  the  poorest  herders, 
23 FulBe  JerjerBe are  the  Fulanis  settled  on  the  sandy  dunes jeeri bordering the Valley  wetlands  the 
waalo .In contrast the FulBe  WawalBe are  those  who  have  retained property rights  in  the waalo. These have in 
general  preserved  an ago-pastoral lifestyle  cultivating  both  flood  recession  crops  (primarily  sorghum)  in  the waalo
and millet on rainfed jeeri land. 
50% of the cattle  population  and 30% of the  smallstock  population 
Tourrand (19894) estimates  losses  in  the  Senegal  River  Delta for each of the two drought periods to 
25 Santoir (19796) Unfortunately  no  figures  are  given for smallstock. 
made  by Santoir in  the  Nianga  scheme  near  Podor.  From  a  total of 62Fulani  households cultivating in the  scheme 
z6 The degree. of impoverishment of Fulanis  cultivating  in  the inigated schemes is indicated  in  a  survey 
only 15 possessed any cattle (Santoi, 1979:14) 
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cultivation,  which  had  previously provided an important  supplement  to  pastoral  production, had 
diminished  sigmficantly  due to the limited  flooding. It  was  therefore  primarily  in  the  irrigated  fields 
that herders  could  hope to produce sufficient  agricultural  surplus to prevent further sales of 
animals and to ensure their annual cereal consumption. Also a large number of Wolof and 
Toucouleur fanrers were  mobilized.  From 1975 to  1988  the  area  under  irrigation  increased  from 
9,000 ha to 35,000 ha. (Seck, 1991:lS.). In th is  period,  village  schemes  funded  and  operated 
either by the SAED and by various external donors or NGOs or by the  villagers  themselves 
mushroomed along the valley. As part of the privatization efforts of the state, peasant 
organizations  were  now  granted  legal  recognition  and  credit  facilities. These  efforts  resulted in  the 
conversion of another 20,000  ha. into irrigated fields  between  1988  and  1992. This massive 
mobilization  of  producers in search of alternative  subsistence  contributed  to  make  the  period  from 
1975  to  1988  the  peak  expansion period of the SAED. 
Not all destitute  herders,  however,  were  able to gain  access  to  land  in  the  irrigated  schemes. A 
large  group  of  those Fulanis living in the  numerous  villages  along  the Waalo road  are  now  earning 
their living as occasional  workers  in the rice fields during harvest,  sometimes  in  combination  with 
limited  rainfed  millet  and  sorghum  cultivation on jeeri land. 
It was,  paradoxically,  the  government  policy of increasing  food  security  that  has  provided  the 
most  important  obstacles  for  livestock  rearjng  in  the w d o  which until then, had  been  an  important 
element  of the  agricultural  economy  of the areaz7.  First  of all, the  development  of  irrigation is 
taking place  in the depressions  which used to contain  some of the  best  pasture  land.  Secondly, 
access  to the river  has  become  increasingly  difficult  as  few  cattle  tracks  have  been laid out, and 
even  fewer respected. It  has therefore become  very  difficult  to  avoid  animals  trespassing  into 
jnigated  fields  and  the  exorbitant  fines  make it a  hazardous  undertaking to keep large herds  in  the 
vicinities of irrigation  schemes.  Thirdly, the dikes hamper  the  filling of ponds  which  used to 
provide fksh water  in  those  areas  where  the  aquifers a e salty  (Santoir,  1983:151). As a  result  the 
majority  of  herds are now  kept all year  round in thejeen’ at  distances  of  30 to 40 km. from the  rice 
fields. 
Apart  from  the  spatial  constraints, labour demands  of  pastoralism  have  also  proved  difficult  to fit 
into  the &mands of jrrigated  agriculture. Whereas labour inputs  in  flood  recession  agriculture  are 
low  and fall outside  the  peak periods of pastoral production, labor requirements in irrigation  are 
considerable in terms  of  sowing,  weeding,  and  timely  application  of  insecticides  and  fertilizers,  etc. 
Ifthese activities are not  carried out in accordance with  the  agreed  schedules  farmers ri k being 
expelled tiom the  irrigation s c h e m e .  Many  herders  lack s m i e n t  manpower to split the family  into 
’’ In this  sense it is yet an example of the  cases  highlighted.by Galaty and  Bonte (1992) of development 
policies aiming at diversifying  income source contributing to the  undermining of otherwise  relatively ‘sane’ 
production  systems. 
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two units  during  the  cultivation  season.  They  therefore  show  poor  agricultural  (and pastoral) 
results as they are  forced to be  constantly  moving  between  their  herd  in the jeeri and  their 
agricultural  production  in  the wuulo (interview  with  Santoir,  April  1994)". 
With  the  drought  of  1983184,  the  increasing  split  between  Fulanis  involved  in irrigation  and  Fulanis 
maintaining  a pastoral lifestyle  escalated. On the  one  hand,  Fulanis  in mas such, as  the Lower 
Delta,  hitherto  relatively  untouched  by  the  expansion of irrigation  schemes, started demanding the 
transformation of certain  grazing  areas  into  rice  fields  (Tourrand,  1989:5). On the other hand, 
Fulanis with  important  numbers  of animals remaining in the  area  started  moving southward to save 
their animals. These  movements took place on a far  larger  scale  than  had  been the case in  1972/73. 
While the 'skewed'  development of the  irrigation  proces  is  well  described in the literature on 
Senegal (see the articles in Crousse,  Mathieu  and Seck1991 as  well as Schmitz, 1986a;  1986b; 
Tourrand and Jamin, 1986; Jamin, 1986  etc), few  scholars  have dealt  with the  fate of pastoral 
production  along  the  river  (Santoir,  1982,1983  and  Tourrand,  1994)  and even fewer with the fate 
of these  migrants  once  they  left  the  Senegal  River  Valley.  It is the latter process that the rest of 
this  chapter  will  deal  with. 
The  Egge-egge's in the  Linguere-Matam  area. 
The principal  reception  area  for  drought migration  has  been  the southern fringe of the Ferlo, 
mainly  along  the axis LinguerelMatam This does  not,  however  imply that  the herders have settled, 
rather  they  have jnstded a  more or less  permanent  wet  season  camp.  During the dry season they 
continue to depart  on  transhumance  trips of shorter  or  longer range  depending on the availability 
of  pastures.  Referring to their  mobile  lifestyle  or  their  zone  of  origin,  they are called either "egge- 
egge's",  which  in FulF3e means "those  who  are  always on the  move"29 or" FuutankoBe's" referring 
to  the Fuuta area which  includes  both  the wuulo and  the  northern fringe of the jeeri. 
But as could be seen fromthe two  cases  cited  in  the  introduction  of this chapter, settlement in the 
new area  did  not occur in  a  single  blow.  The  large  majority  of  herders  moved back to the wuulo 
once  the  rains  had  resumed  after  the  first  drought.  Only in the  second  drought did they settle on 
a  more  permanent  basis  in  the  south  (the  example of  Yerim Sow). A smaller group continued to 
and flood  recession  agriculture  which is less demanding in terms of labor  and  financial  investment. 
As the  rains improved  after  1984  many  farmers  in fact abandoned their inigated plots to take up rainfed 
usually  caused by drought.  These  hesitant  movements often lead to permanent  change  of  the area of residence.@, 
29 According  to  Cheick  Ba  1986,the  term  "egge-egge"  comes  from  "eggol",  exceptional  nomadisations, 
1986 p.137). 
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roam  without fixed settlement  around the deepwells along the MatamLinguere axis (see  Bathil 
Ba). By the  end of the  1980s  also  this group had  become  relatively  settled. 
As can  be  seen  from  the  chart  below30,  a large group of herders  (25.6%) claim to  have  departed 
definitively  from  the  Senegal  River  Valley in 
connection  with  the  first  drought  (i.e. betwe- 
-..---__--"I"__" _____L .,....................,.,,..., ".l,"l,."lI 
en 1973  and  1975). Agroupofalmost similar FuutankoBe seidement I i Totdl % m ~ M ~ l d s 2 ! 5 0  I size (26.4%) claim to have arrived in the I 
I 
intermediate period of 7 years between 1976 ~ m 
and 1982. The second drought of 1983/84 i 960 
precipitated  the  settlement of another 32 ~ 
households (12,4%). Most surpising is, ho- d 30 
6 20 
wever, the important number of households ' S; 
which  ave  settled  after  1986  when more ~ 0 -  
normal precipitation patterns had resumed. i 
Although  on  a more  moderate  scale this ' 
mgramn process 1s ongoing. Sqpficant L .~.".~~,.-,..,~..---_____I__ 
for this last  'wave' of migration is that it is 
made  up  of  herders  who  have  only  recently  managed to  built  up  a  herd  sufficiently  large  to  be  able 
to resume a purely  pastoral  production  strategy.  Once this is accomplished  they  move  to j in their 
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Obviously  the two short  drought  periods account for a far most  important influx (note that the 
time intervals  of  the  the 'x' axis in the  chart are not equivalent) as  38% of all resettlements  within 
a period  of 20  years  took place during the 4 years of heavy drought.  Nonetheless,  the  important 
resettlement  taking  place in the interndate periods  may be attributed  to at least three factors:  a). 
that  precipitation in the  intermediate  years  remained  very low, b)  that  the  expansion of irrigation 
creating  increasingly  diflicult  conditions for livestock production in the  valley  and  was  an  equally 
important incentive  for  out-migration and c) that some herders who had lost a lot of  livestock 
could not move  immidiately, but had to wait until their herds  were sufkiently reconstituted. 
Finally, d) the  rain  decifit  in  the  Valley between 1991 and 1993 also prompted some herders to 
leave the  more  drought prone pastures  of northern Senegal for good. 
To estimate  the  number  of  herders involved in the  post-drought  migration  proces i a  hezardeous 
endeavour.  First  of all, it  was  impossible for the researcher to cover all borehores in the  vast  Ferlo 
region. No official  statistics  are  available on these population movements.  Local  administrators 
have no means  of  evaluating  their  real  number,  as  very  few  of  the immigrants are registrered 
Djagueli,  Yonofere, Fourdou, Ranemu). The boreholes of Naore  and Velingan are not  included. 
%ab for the  chart was collected in October 1994.5 boreholes are comprised  in the sample  (Barkedji, 
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residents-  and tax payers- in the area of settlement.  What  is  clear  is that the  largest  contingents 
may be found  around  the  deep  wells  between  Linguere  and  Matam in the  arrondissements of 
Barkedji and Ranerou (see map 1). FuutankoBe herders  are  also well represented  at  several 
boreholes  further  south. 
In order  to  get  a  more  acurate picture of the  actual  number of FuutankoBe  immigrants  present  in 
the Southern Ferlo,  a  field  survey was carried out in October 1994 around  those 7 boreholes 
where FuutankoBe presence, according to local sources, was most prominent. This survey 
revealed  a  FuutankoBe  population far larger than  expected3'.  It  turned out that  the  number of 
immigrants at certain deep-wells even exceeded  the  indigenous  population  (see  table 1). On 
average,  they  constituted 1/3 of the total population or user group  around  a  deep  well. 
Table 1. 
Distribution of indigenous and FuutankoBe households (hh.) around 7 deep-wells of 
Southern  Ferlo, 
October  1994. 
TOTAL 1227 407 (33%) S20 (67%) 
The  large  majority (60%) of the FuutankoBe herders come from a relatively  small area in the 
cover  a  relatively  large  geographical  area, the data was  collected  through  interviews  with  representatives  from  the 
31 It is important to stress the indicative character of this population  and  herd  property  survey. In order to 
well  committees at 7 selected  boreholes and (in the cases  where  such  lists  existed)  consultation with  the list of  users. 
At  each  borehole  the data was  verified  with  both  FuutankoBe  and se entary herders,  and  whenever  possible  with  the 
village  chiefdsub-clan  leaders  representing the existing  groups. The sampliig unit  was  the galli, the  Fulani 
household or family unit, at which  level  decisions  about  herd  management  are  made.  These  households  are  usually 
nuclear  families  eventually  with  the  presence  of  old  parents.  They  may  however  vary  considerably  in  size as several 
adult sons in  some cases  remain  together and manage  their an imals  as a single herd. This  obviously makes the data 
less  reliable  when  assessing  the  pressure of the newcomers  vis h vis the local population. 
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arrondissement?*  of Kass-Kass and  Salde33. At the  boreholes  located  in  the  westem-most part of 
the area of incursion one also finds immigrants  coming  from  the  western  parts of the waalo and 
northernjeeri (from the arrondissements of  Ndioum,  Thile  Boubacar  and "bane). 
Despite the individualistic  decision-making  that all herders  profess, it is, at least  in  some  periods 
of the  year, possible to distinguish a  tendency  to  cluster - according  to  kin/clan.(see  maps  p.  116- 
118 on distriiution of  Fulani  clans  around  the  borehole f Velingara).  When  questionned on this 
subject, herders admit that it is easier  to  settle  in  areas  where  some  relatives may be  found. 
"During my transhumance trip I have  mainly  settled  near my kin. It's in order 
to be close to people I can trust, that I chose  this particular itinerary" (Herder 
fiom Mbiddi, on  transhumance near Loumbi Aly Thedy febr. 1993) 
In certain  cases  large  groups of herders from the  same  area  and  clan  appear  to  have  moved more 
or less simultaneously  thus  creating  one or several  new  "villages"  in  the  area  of settlement  (as was 
the case  of Yerim Sow). The most  spectacular  cases of  "villagization"  are found  in  Diagueli and 
in Barkedji. No less  than 68 UunuBe Daka  households  have  left  the  small  village  of  Ban0 from 
1973 onwards to settle in the UuurBe Daka  settlement  called  Fidjiti  near  the  Djagueli  borehole. 
Even in 1994 new  households  were  still  joining.  From  the  area of Namarel22 households from 
the  UururBe Ndioum  subclan  broke  away in 1973 to establish  2  new  villages in the south of 
Barkedji. 
Ifone considers  the  important  scale of this immigration  wave  and,  not  the  least, its impact  on the 
production  systems both in the area of  out-migration  and  in  the  area of reception, it is surprising 
what little notice it has received.  Until  recently  the  phenomenon,  and  especially its extension, was 
almost unknown to the  Senegalese  administration,  especially  at  higher  levels.  Indeed  FuutankoBe 
herders tend to be perceived as a tmyt miuoriv by  stateadministrators  who  become  aware of their 
existence mainly in cases  of  dispute  and  open  conflict. 
Apart fiom the obvious  problems  related  to  monitoring  of  such  a  fluid  population, one reason for 
3z An "arrondissement" is the  intermediate  administrative  level  in  Senegal  constituted  by 2 or 3 
"communautes males" and  headed by a  centrally  appointed  civil  servant,  the  "sousprefet".  Higher  administrative 
levels are the "departement"  and  the  "region". 
33 170 of the  egge-egge  households  registered in the  survey,  originate  from  the  areas  of  Madina  Ndiatebe 
(28), Gollere (35), Men (6),  Mboumba (7), Haire La0(6), Bold Diallobe(6)  and  Louggue  Foulbe (6), all located 
within  a distance of 25 km along  the tar mad  running  alongside  the  Valley.  The  village of Bano  located 20 km south 
of Gollere,  in the Jeeri, contributes with  the  largest  share  (68 hh). 8 households  originate  from  Yare Lao (50 km 
south-east of Gollere). 
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such a  blind spot to emerge,  is  that  the  process  of  ‘repastoralisation’  carried out by the post- 
drought migrants, for many state administrators,  represents  a  ‘regression’  from the higher State 
of sedentarised agro-pastoralism, which does  not fit within  the  models  received during their 
education. 
Uneven  herd  distribution. 
The extent  of this in-migration  and its impact  on  the  existing  production  systems becomes all the 
more spectacular if one  looks at the  distribution of  animals  among  sedentary34  and FuutankoBe 
households.  Such  diffrences  in  herd  ownership  was  investigated as part  of the survey  of October 
1994. 
Ifcollection of  acurate  data  on  population  movements  is  difficult,  data  collection  herd ownership 
is even  worse,  being  both  extremely  time-consuming  and full of pitfalls  and inacuracie~~~. Hence 
I have  chosen to present  data  of  a  more  indicative  character , but to  restrain from futher “fudging, 
cooking and manip~lating”~~ in order not to conceal  the  inherent  validity  problems of the  data 
material. 
In order to cover  a  relatively  large  geographical  area,  the  data is not collected  with  the individual 
herder  (indeed  no  indicator  of  its  validity),  but  through  interviews  with  representatives  of th  well 
committees at 5 selected  boreholes.  These  representatives  listed  the  names of regular borehole 
users  and tried to  recollect  the  size of  the  herd  possesed  by  each  user (not  the  amount of animals 
paid  for). In those  cases  where  a  list  of users existed this list  was  also  consulted.  At each borehole 
the data was  verified  with  both  FuutankoBe  and  sedentary  herders,  and,  whenever possible, with 
the village chiefshb-clan leaders  representing  the  existing  groups. 
Nonetheless,  data on herd sizes and  herd  ownership  remains  a  sensitive  issue. This is even more 
so in cases as this, where  livestock  wealth  is  used as  an indicator of power  relations between 
FafaBe,  HaabooBe and  YalaBe)  who were  present  in  the  area  before  the anival of the  FuutankoBe  migrants.  Wolof 
’‘ The term “sedentary” is used to describe  those  Fulani  agro-pastoralists  (FerlankoBe,  SannaraaBe,  JaawBe, 
and Maure households are also  included in tbis group. It is important  to stress, however, that  the  term  sedentary does 
not exclude annual  migrations  between  wet  and dry season  camps,  nor  exceptional  nomadisations  prompted  by 
drought,  breakdown  of  the  deep-well or other types of calamities. Although some  exceptions are found  within  the 
goup, these  households are predominantly  agro-pastoral  with limited possibilities  of  mobility  on a larger scale. For 
the sake of variation  the terms “indigenous” or “fmt-comers” have  equally  been  used for this  group. 
1991a. 
35 For a  discussion of the  reliability of different  methods of collecting  livestock  data see Sutter, 1987 and Juul, 
36 See Polly  Hill (198630-50) for a devastating  critique of the way data material is rreated  in  Development 
Economics. 
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various  internally  competing  groups. As the  focus  of  the  research  presented  here is on FuutankoBe 
migration  rather  than  on  the  actual  herd  development, or grazing  pressure, the informants  were 
asked to give  only  rough  indications  of the  sizes  of the herds  using  their deep well on a regular 
basis.  These  were  grouped in 5 categories.  Consequently I have  refrained from calculations  of 
average herd  size  etc.  Finally,  the  survey  was only carried out at 5 boreholes.  Due  to  ongoing 
confhcts at the  borehole of  Naor6. between  firstcomers  and  newcomers (treated in chapter 5) ,  I 
found it more prudent to refrain from examining  herd structures here.  Investigation  of  herd 
ownershq  at  the borehole  of Vehgara also proved to be problematic. As in the population  survey, 
the sampling unit selected  was  the  "galle",  or household at which level the  animals  are  owned  and 
decisions  concerning  the  herd  are  made. 
However,  a  number of pitfalls  exist. As we have  not  collected  data on family  sizes it is not  possible 
to control to what  extent  the  very  large  herds correlate with  very large families  and  thus  with 
several  owners of equal  status  i.e.  not  wives or children.  One  could suspect this to be  the case with 
some of the very  large  herds  of  smallstock  of several thousand head. 
The survey reveals a very skewed 
distribution of cattle and smallstock 
ownership. Indeed, the first impres- 
sion of the situation at the boreholes 
is, that  not  only  have the local popula- 
tion in the south of the Ferlo endured 
the reception of a  very large number 
of  foreign  herders,  but  they  have also 
been  'invaded'  by  foreign animals. But 
as will be  shown  later on, this deve- 
lopment is not quite as conflictive  as 
could be anticipated. 
Not  surprisingly,  households  posses- 
sing  no animals at all (135 households 
or are found entirely among sedentary households3*, as destitute FuutankoBes herders have 
little reason to remain  in  the  southern  rangelands. 
5 ltO9 1049 50-98 >l00 
size of herd 
Data from Velingm and  Naore are not  included  in these figures. 
Including  both Wolof and  Fulani. 
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. .  . Among  both  sedentary and newcomers, 
households  are  found  who do not  have 
cattle.  However , the  number  is  more 
simcant among  sedentary  households 
where  46% have no cattle as compared 
to 15% among FuutankoBe. In con- 
trast the  large  herds of over  50  heads 
are  owned  almost  exclusively  by  new- 
comers  (8%  by  sedentary  against  43% 
by  FuutankoBe). 
The  uneven  distribution of livestock is 
even more  pronounced  when  looking 
at sheep and goats, which constitute 
the  core of  FuutankoBe  herding  strate- 
ip of srnal 
October 1994 
gies.  Consequently  the  very large  herds of smallstock (2300 heads)  are  almost  entirely  owned by 
FuutankoBe households.  By contrast, the small herds  between  1 and 49  heads  are  owned by 
sedentary  herders.  However  12%  of the sedentary households  dispose of herds  of 50 to  99  heads 
(i.e.  a  herd  of  quite  significant  value). 
With this uneven  herdownership  in  mind, it is not  surprising  that  FuutankoBe  herd  owners  often 
are referred  to  as  "Jaarga"  i.e.  very  rich herd owners.  Nonetheless  the  survey  reveal  exhibits  a 
certain differentiation within the FuutankoBe group. According to the survey 15% (or 37 
households) of the  FuutankoBe  households  possess  only  smallstock. Of these,  14  own  less  than 
50 sheep. Part of these  households  consist of former WodaaBe captives  living  near  Barkedji. 
The picture  revealed  by  the  survey  generally fits well  with a  previous  mapping exercise carried  out 
by the author  around  the  deep-well  of Vehgara in  199139. In that case  (Juul,  1991b) it was  found 
that, of the 109 pastoral  camps  located  within  a distance of  2-20 km from the deep well", 41 
households were  installed  after 1973, the majorily  indicating  1984  as  the  year of settlement. A 
the  existense of  GPS  (Global  Positioning  System) was put to our knowledge.  The  location of each  camp  was 
measured by means  of a  car and a compass,  driving  in as straight a course as possible  from  the  point of departure 
(the  borehole).  For  obvious  reasons  this  methods oes not  give  very  exact  locations.  The  method  was  however 
reliable  enough  to  prove  the  initial  hypothesis  that it is the most  livestock-rich  herders who live furthest away  from 
the  borehole. It turned out to be extremely  time  and iesel consuming,  reason  for  which we  refrained  from  repeating 
it at the 6 other  wells as initially  planned. 
39 This  mapping  exercise,  carried  out  by  my  patient  assistent,  a  local  guide  and  myself,  was  made  before 
" While  included in the 1994 survey,  the  central  village of Velingara  inhabited  almost  exclusively b
Wolof fanners was excluded in the 1991 survey. This gives the 1991 survey  a  bias  towards  pastoral  producers. 
112 
large majority of these households  originated  from  the  Senegal  River  Vallef'. 
The 1991 survey (see below) showed a similarly uneven distribution of animals between 
FuutankoBes and  sedentaries.  While  households  settled  in  the  area  prior  to  1973 owned a total 
of 560 heads of cattle  and  1107  sheep or goats,  the  "newcomers"  owned  a  total  of  2092  heads of 
cattle and 5029 heads  of  smallstock.  Only 6 of the  households  present  in  the area before  1973 
disposed  of herds of more than 30 cattle,  while  none  had  flocks of smallstock of over 100 head. 
All the large herds of smallstock  were  owned by herders  from  the  Senegal  River  who  have 
specialized in th is  type  of 
pastoralism42. On the basis  of  these,  still  quite  unreliable  answers,  a  very  tentative  average may be 
calculated  according to which  average  herd  size  among  sedentary  households is 8 heads of cattle 
and 16 smallstock,  while  among  the  newcomers  the  average  was 5 1 heads of cattle  and 122 sheep 
and goats. 
More  important,  however, is the  correlation af the  two  findings of the  surveys.  The 1994 survey 
revealed that, contraq to what  was to be expected, it is  the  newcomer  population  that posess the 
bulk of livestock in the area. This prosperity  (especially  in  sheep  and  goats)  is  closely  interconnec- 
ted  with  the  findings of the  1991  survey,  showing  that  those  herders  who  lived  furthest  away from 
the  borehole also tended to to  be  the  most  livestock-rich.  It  also  turned  out  that  the  most  distant 
camps were  those  belonging  to  FuutankoBe  herders.  Hence far from being  a  sign of marginalisa- 
tion, the 'distant' location of FuutabkoBe  camps  is a conscious strategy by resourceful  and 
speculative herders who  smve to  be as close as possible  to  the  pastures. 
from  Tesselcre, Amali and Ganina in  the north western  Ferlo. A few  Fafabe  households had arrived  from  Ndiayene 
Fuuta in the noaheastern Ferlo. 
4' Mainly Gollere,  Ndioum,  Haire Lao, Kass Kass in the Middle  Senegal  River  Valley  and  in  a  few  cases 
households  encountered  in the area. Most of the  "newcomers"  interviewed  from  1989  to  1994 on migration  patterns 
42 The herd sizes expressed in the 1991 census  seem  surprisingly  modest  compared to other  egge-egge 
indicate ownership of flocks of sheep and  goats  ranging up to 400,700 or even 1000 heads. Such  herd sizes have 
also  been  confirmed  by the well committees as well as by  the  veterinary  doctors  in  the ar a as well as by the  1994 
survey. 
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Distribution of households  by clan groups. 
Velingara 1990. 
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Distribution of cattle and smallstock around the borehole of Velingara, 1990. 
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But in order  for this strategy  to be viable, the key  problem  related  to  watering  had to  be solved. 
And it is here that a  simple  technological  device,  the tracor inner  tube,  proves to be the most 
important single factor for the  highly  successful1  herd  management  strategy  of  the  newcomers. 
The inner tube and  the  donkey cart. 
The invention of a  new  way  of  transporting  water  over  long  distances by recycling the huge 
tractor-type  inner  tubes from the  bulldozers  and  the  heavy machinery  employed in the  laying out 
of rice fields into huge water containers in fact  provided  for  a  minor  revolution in the range 
management systems  of  northern  Senegal. 
As mentionned in the introduction, the  ground  water  table in  most  parts  of the Ferlo  region is 
several  hundred mters below surface. The  pastoral  space is therefore  structured  above  all,  by the 
boreholes  placed at a distance of  approximately 30 kilometres  from  eachother.  These  deep wells 
occupy a central position in pastoral  resource  management. 
In the extensive Sahelian  livestock  systems,  a  major  difficulty  during  the dry season consists in 
simultaneously  ensuring  optimal  fodder  conditions  while  limiting  energy  losses  related  to watering. 
For as the dry season progresses, the  distance  between  the  watering  point  and the fresh  and 
untrampled  pastures  increases.  If  cattle is grazed  further  than 15 to 20 kilometres  away from the 
well too much  energy is spent  on  getting  to  the  water.  For  sheep  and  goats  the  maximum distance 
is considerably shorter. 
Among the indigenous  herders  of  the  Ferlo egion, the dry season  strategy  consists in approaching 
the camps to within 5 or 6 kilometres from the  deep  well  once  the  natural  pools  have dried out. 
The animals are then grazed in a  centrifugal  movement  reaching  pastures  still  farther  away as the 
dry season progresses.  With  this  system  energy  losses  by  the  end  of  the dry s ason  are significant. 
By means of the  tractor inner tube,  herders from the  Senegal  River  Valley,  are  able  to  attack the 
problem in a radically  different  manner.  While  the  adult animals may continue to water at the 
borehole  every  second day, the  ingenuity  of  the  new  system  consists n paring  the  youngest and 
the sick animals from the long and  constraining  trip  to  the  well.  For when lain on a  donkey cart, 
these  tubes can transport  large  quantities of water  over  long  distances,  enabling the weakest part 
of  the herd to be  watered at the  camp. This considerably  reduces  energy  losses.  The  younger 
animals that graze in  the  vicinities of the camp have  easy  access  to  fresh  pastures  and the herd is 
ensured optimal fodder conditions. This situation i s  maintained  by  frequent  movements  of the 
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camp during the dry season (see the case of Yerim In this way the newcomers are able to 
live closer  to the fresh  and  untrampled  pastures, at a  distance  of  up to  20 kilometres from the 
wells. 
The radius of pastures  accessible to the  herds  is  now  considerably  enlarged as compared to the 
“centrifugal  grazing  strategy’”  employed by the  more  sedentarized  households. The result is a 
considerable  decrease in  mortality45  and  an increase in  reproduction  rates  and  other parameters of 
herd productivity.  For these reasons  the  tube is often  referred  to  as “the secret of the  Fulani”. 
According to my  informants,  the  ‘invention,  was  rather  accidental: 
It  was Harouna Mody Ciro from Gollere,who  invented  the  tube for  water 
transportation. During  the  drought  he  was forced to go very far away to get 
fodder and every day he  brought  with him a 4 litre  can  to  carry water. One day 
the can fell off the cart and  broke  and he was forced to use  a  tube  he coin- 
cidentally carried with  him to cornserve  the  remaining water. People had told 
him that  the  tubes  were  poisonous,  but  the  experience  showed  him  that  they 
weren’t.  From  then  on,  he  started  experimenting  with  still  larger  tubes. (Herder 
Fourdou  febr. 93). 
It is indeed ironic that it is  a  spill-over  effect of the  irrigation  process,  itself  a major factor in 
evicting  herders  from  the  Valley,  that  constitutes  the  key  factor  in this ew  and  higly productive 
herd management  system.  Nevertheless, the use of  rubber from inner tubes is in itself no new 
invention. Rubber  is  used in  many  pastoral  societies  for making different  utensils such as soft 
buckets for drawing  water &om wells,  strings for different sorts of attachment,  shoes  etc. The use 
of  inner  tubes  for  water  transport  was,  for  example,  observed by th   author  in  Mauritania in 1986, 
where car inner tubes were cut and attached at both  ends  and  lain  over  a  donkey-back to carry 
quantities of around 40 litres of water  from the well to  the  household.  Similarly,  expansion of 
grazing l a n d s  through  regular use of  donkeys to  cany water  for  young  livestock and human 
consumption has  been  described  by  Jacobs (1980287) as one of the  management techniques 
43 Seasonal  movements  along  the same gradient from the  borehole are carried  out by most of the herders 
interviewed,  however  the  frequency  varies  considerable  according to precipitaion  and  pastures as well as availability 
of labour, size of herds  and as herders  repeatedly  stress:  the  “devotion of the  herder” 
“See L‘Hoste,  Ph.  and  P. Milleville 1986 
45 Not  being a veterinarian I have  not  been able to verify  these  statements  in  a  scientific  manner. 
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employed by the pastoral Masai to conserve and improve their pastures. Nonetheless, the 
transformation ‘%waste” tubes fromthe irrigation schemes into containers suited  to  transport large 
quantities (300,600 or  even lo00 liters?  of  water on donkey carts to camps located 15 to 20 km 
from  the  borehole,  seems  to be peculiar  to  northern Senegal. 
The ‘triumph of the tube’ relied on a number of contingent factors among which the most 
important  precondition  was  the  diffusion  of horse and  donkey carts among  herders.  During the 
seventies  attempts to introduce  carts  had  been  had  been  made  as part of  the  general attempt to 
mechanize  the  agricultural  sector.  Results  had  nonetheless  been  meagre  and by the  beginning of 
the eighties the  number  of  pastoral  households  with access to a cart was  extremely l i m i t e d 4 7  
(Santoir,  1982:30). 
Between  1975  and  1991,  however,  the  number  of carriages increased tenfold (Santoir,  1994:251) 
from  one  carriage  per  24  households  to  a  carriage  and  a horse for almost  every  second  household. 
This booming  period  coincided  with the  massive  migration of the FuutankoBe  herders.  For  these 
herders the carts became a sine  qua  non  for  the d velopmnt of new  herding  strategies.As we shall 
se further on, the  cart-and-tube.  system  was  promptly picked up by the local  herders. 
what makes  the  development  even  more  extraordinary is that  these  rather  substantial  investments4’ 
were  made  during a period  characterized  by  serious drought - largely  without  external  assistance 
(ibid).  From  1983  onwards,  private  traders  in the area report a  rapidly  growing interest in carts 
and  tubes.  Today  there is a flourishing  market  for used inner  tubes  as  well as second  hand  tires  and 
spare  parts  for  carts.  Local  manufacturers,  mechanics  and  specialists n vulcanization are present 
in every village which  has  a  borehole. 
At present most  pastoral  households  dispose  of at least one, but often two or three, carts49. 
liters. I have  observed  larger tubes at  several  occasions  but  they are less popular as they  are  difficult o handle  and 
4&Ihebaud  1994, registered 3 sizes of tubes  around  the  borehole of Widou  Thiengoly, 200,400 and 600 
require  many  donkeys  to  pull.  Furthermore  they are diffcult to get  hold of. 
According to a  survey made  by Berot-hard and Di Meo in the mid eighties only  l  out of 5 fulani households  in 
Labgar,  where  the  main  center of SODESP is located,  disposed of a  cart.  SODESP  (Societe  de  Developpement  de 
1’Elevage dans la zone  Sylvo-Pastorale) the  parastatal in charge of livestock  development  in  northern Senegal was 
the  main  distributor of carts. 
‘’ In 1982  Santoir (198230) states  that  Fulani  herders  rarely dispose of horse or donkey caniages. 
48 In 1998  the  local blacksmith of Barkedji  indicated to sell a locally  produced cart at 75.000 F CFA. Factory 
produced carts are considerably  more  expensive. 
34% of 2  and  21% of 3 carts.  Three  households  claimed  to own  between 7 and  9 carts while  only  one  family  claimed 
49 Tbe  questionnaire  survey comprised 53 households and  showed out that 32% afthe sample  dispose of 1 cart 
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According to OW questionnaire  survey of April  1995, the average  number of carts is 1.88 for 
sedentary  households,  while it is 2.39 for F~utankoBe~~.  
The  carts  are pulled  either  by  horse or by donkey.  When  used for the  transportation of water,  the 
cart is usually  pulled  by  2-4  donkeys.  The  number  of carts exceeds the  number  of  tubes,  indicating 
that the carts are used for multiple purposes. Besides transport of water, they are used for 
travelling. In case of  transhumance  they cany young  and older members of the  family,  luggage, 
poultry, water  and sometimes industrial feed  concentrates to ensure proper  feeding of the  animals. 
With the carts  herders  are  now  able to transport the newborn  lambs or sick  animals  otherwise 
unable to accomplish  the  voyage". As  can  be seen from  the  quotation  below, this development is 
not  neccesarily an advantage for the  local  population: 
The  transhumants are useful,  there is no reason to limit their number. If they 
are  close to you, they  may  offer you some animals and if they leave they will 
give  you  the  newborn lambs, who c m t  survive  such  a trip. (Resident of the well- 
committee,  Lombi  Sanrabe  1989) 
As to the number  of  tubes, 43 % of housholds  indicate that they  dispose of 1 tube5'. Herders 
possessing more  than 1 tube  are  found  mainly  among  the  newcomers.  The  average  number  of 
tubes per household is 1.8 among sedentary households and 2.28 among FuutankoBe. This 
obviously  does  not  indicate  anything  about the size and  capacities of the  individual  household. 
The number  of daily trips vary  seasonaly as watering  needs  increase  significantly  by  the  end of the 
dry season. As  camps  are  placed as far as 15 km from the borehole the  women,  usually  those in 
to posess none 
'%ese findings  are  more  or  less  equivalent  to  those f und by Thebaud  in  1994 in  Bouteyni (m north-western 
Ferlo).  According  to  Thebaud  pastoral  households (galles) in  Bouteyni  disposed  of  an  average of 1,62  carts. 
(Thebaud, 199424). In some  parts of eastern  Ferlo  (Lonmbi Sanrabe and Dendoudi,  however, a large group of the 
18 of the 33 households  included  by  Thebaud  had  at least one c m  while  the  richest  households  disposed of 3 to 6. 
poorest households  do  not  to  dispose of any  means  of transport. 
transhumance. This statement  does  not  correspond  with the fmdings  of  the  present  author. On the contrary  donkey 
and horse  carts  play  a  crucial  role  in  maintaining  mobility. 
For unknown  reasons Berod-hard and  Di  Meo  (p.101) claim that the carts rarely are used for transport  during 
sedentary  households)  this is not  neccesarily  very representative. 
2 households  indicated  not to posess  any  tubes, but due to the  selection of respondents  (only 1 0  was  local 
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charge of supplying  water,  easily  spend  7  to 8 hours  a  day  fetching ate?^. By  the  end  of  the dry 
season it is not  unusual  that  several  women in a camp  are fully occupied  with  water  transportation. 
It is usually those households  located  furthest  away  that  dispose  of  the  largest  number of tu s. 
From cattle to sheep. 
The full extent of the utility  of the new water transportation  technique is perhaps  best  understood 
when it is linked to the development  by the FuutankoBe  herders of a highly  specialized  herding 
system based on the raising of  sheep  rather than on cattle. 
Herders as well as researchers  have  a long tradition  for  putting  emphasis on cattle,  considered as 
the  superior and most  valuable  part  of the herd.  According  to Fulani herders  "It's  the  cow  that 
constitutes the only real  prosperity"  (Bonfglioli  et Diallo, 1988).  Indeed  many  surveys  hardly  take 
into  account other species (see for  example Barral, 1981; Fayole,  1974;  Lhoste et Milleville, 
1986). The general assumption is that  smallstock  is  raised  mainly to limit off-take on the cattle 
herd. Because of their  shorter  reproduction cycle;"  they  provide a  means  of  restoring  (cattle)  herds 
after drought or diseases, as surplus  head of smallstock may be exchanged  for  heifers. Once the 
herd  was reconstructed, smallstock is l ie ly  to lose its importance  and be limited  to  a  few  animals 
kept for slaughtering at festive occasions. 
Since the drought periods of 1972/73 and 1983/84, smallstock, notably sheep, has acquired 
considerable importance and is given a  dominant  role in many  herds in the  Ferlos5. This may 
largely be attributed to the  influence  of  the  FuutankoBe  herders. 
of Widou Thiengoly in April 94,  (Thebaud,  1994  p.25). According  to  them,  queuing  at  the  water  source and filling 
53 A measurement of time consumption for filling of tubes  was  carried out by  the team of Thebaud  at the  borehole 
of the be amounted for approximately one  hour.  Unfortunately  the  study  does  not  comprise  the  time  spent  traveling 
the long distances to and from the camp and the boreholes is by  far  the  most  time  consuming.  According to my 
findings it is not unusual to spend  more than 2 hours  each way if the  camp  is  located  more than 15 km away. To this 
adds time spent doing the shopping,  the  laundry as well as time  spent  on  renewing  social  contacts. 
"According to Projet Senegala-Allemand d'Amenagement et de  Reboisement  Sylvopastoral  de  la  zone  Nard 
(€'.S.A.) in Widou Tbiengoly the fertility  rate  in  traditional  herding  systems in  the  Ferlo  is 32 5% (of 
reproductive females) for cattle,  82% for sheep  and  100 % for goats (PSA 1991  annex 21) Offtake  of  smallstock for 
meat for sheepis made at the age  of  9 to 15  months,  while for cattle it is between 3 and 4 years (Wilson,  1988.) 
Thebaud 1994. 
The growing importance of smallstock has been  reported  by  Boniiglioli  et  Diallo  1988, A.T. Diop  1991  and 
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Even  before  the  drought,  the ago-pastoral Fulanis from the waalo tended to put  more  emphasis 
on  the rearing of  smallstock  than  did their  relatives in thejeeriS6. But when  moving  southward  in 
the  aftermath  of  the  drought  the  rehabilitation  strategies  of the FuutankoBe herders  were  centered 
primarily on the  sheep.  This  was  a  way  of  adjusting herd composition to suit the new and  more 
djflicult  ecological  conditions  since  a  large  part  of fodder requirements of sheep and goats can  be 
met through  browsing  on  tree  products  which  are less affected by  failing rains. Contrary to what 
might  have  been  expected, this strategy  was  not  abandoned  once  precipitation  resumed  more 
normal  standards  after  1988. 
Indeed, the rearing of  sheep  has proved to  be an  extremely  viable strategy. Due to the higher 
drought resistance  and  shorter  reproduction  cycle  of sheep, herders  originating  from the Fuuta 
area  were  able  to  recover  their  losses  very  quickly  and  today  most of them dispose of flocks far 
beyond  their  pre-drought size?'. Among  FuutankoBe herders residing in the southern  of the Ferlo 
region it is not  unusual  to  see  herds of 400  to 700 or even 1000 sheep and  goats. 
Table 2 showns  the  distribution of those  101  households  (43% of the October 1994  sample) 
posessing  more  than  300  heads of smallstock 
Size: > 2000 1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 
3000 
No. 2 4  7 0 5  4  10 6 22 41 
This shift in herd  composition  was  only  possible due  to the improved  watering  and  grazing 
conditions  facilitated by  the  tube  and the  donkey cart, enabling herders to keep far  larger  flocks 
of  sheep than had  been  possible  before.  But while the tube and cart system contribute to limit  the 
energy  losses of the animals, it is  important to stress that the new  system of water transport is 
consisted of 18  heads  of cattle and 69 heads  of  smallstock,  while JerjerBe households  would  have 39.2 heads of 
56 According  to  a  survey made  by Santoir  in  1978  the  mean  herd  held  by  WalwalBe  (FuutankoBe)  households 
cattle and 34  heads of smallstock  (Santoir  1982  p.4).  Variations  between  households  were,  however,  considerable. 
in  the  Senegal  River  Valley after 1975  report of average flocks of smallstock of 30,9  (Blanc SEDES 1975, 
downstream  of  the  Valley)  40,6  (Santoir  1975,  Mbane  and Thille Boubacar) 21,3 (ibid  Matam  1979) 35,l(ibid. 
Senegal  River  Basin  1979)  pr.  household.  Tourrand and Direction de L'Elevage estimates drought  losses for 
smallstock  in  the 2 drought periods  to  be  between  30%  and 50% (Tomand 1989 p.4.  and data from DIREL. 
statistics unit). 
Unfortunately no studies of flock sizes before  72/73  seem  to be available. Studies on herd  composition 
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extremely  labour  demanding  in  terms  of  surveillance  and  water transpoaation and  leaves  little  time 
for  supplementary  income  activities. Also in  terms  of  labour  investment, the new  system  challenges 
conventional wisdom on pastoral herd management. 
Drought  recovery  through  specialization  instead of diversification. 
According to  most accounts on drought recovery  in  pastoral  societies,  the  principal  remedy  for 
herd reconstitution is to limit  off-take  on  the  herd  through  the  creation of alternative  income 
source?'. The  primary  strategy  for  risk  management  consists  in  diversifying  into  other  economic 
activities  (into cropping, wage labour, collection  and  sale of  wood  or fruits gathered  in  the  bush, 
etc.).  With income generated from other sources,  grains  and  other  necessities  can  be  purchased 
without  selling off animals. In successful cases,  surplus  income  might  also be used  to  purchase li- 
vestock to ensure  faster  reproduction  of  the  herd. As mentioned  above,  smallstock  in  such a model 
is regarded  mainly as an intermediate category,  which is later  to be exchanged  for  cattle.  (see  for 
example  Richter,  1991:22) 
Although  effective,  especially  in  cases  where  little  livestock  is  left  or  where  families  have  sufficient 
manpower  available, the diversification  strategy  has its disadvantages.  It  often  involves  at  least  a 
seasonal limitation on mobility to give  time to cultivate,  to  build  up  a  clientele, or to create a 
network of people who might  help  in  specific  ways.  As  stated by  Khazanov (1983:19)  "even 
limited agricultural production exercises  a  considerable  influence on many aspects of the life  of 
semi-nomads, for example on herd  composition,  routes  and  prevalence of pastoral  migration". 
Increased emphasis on agriculture  limits  mobility  particularly  in  periods  critical  for  herding  such 
as the end of the dry season where  water and pastures  are  scarcest and  labour  requirements 
highest.  At a  certain stage of the herds reproduction,  the  herder is therefore  faced  with  a  choice. 
He  can choose to limit  weight  losses at the end  of the dry season by  migrating to more  remote 
areas with fodder resources remaining and later continue southward "to meet the rains"59. 
Alternatively  he can  stay  at  home  and  prepare  the  fields for a new  agricultural  season. This choice 
is conditioned on the one hand by the availabfity  of  labor (to enable  successful  diversification)  and 
on the. other hand by the size of the herd  and its ability  to  cater for the  consumption  needs of the 
family. 
See for example  Dahl, G., 1979 on the Was0 Borana,  Bonfiglioli et Ddlo, 1988 on  the Senegalese Fulani 
subgroup, the FerlankoBe. 
59 i.e. moving to areas where the rain have started and new  grasses  have come up. 
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Even though the FuutankoBe herders were agro-pastoralists before moving southward, the 
majority of those remaining  in the  southern  Ferlo  seem  to  have  opted  for  increased  specialization. 
Hence, supplementary income-generating activities besides pastoralism are rare. Instead of 
reconstruction through restriction of off-takes , as in the  diversification  model,  the  strategy of 
FuutabkoBe  herders aims at keeping  reproduction  rates as high as possible  by  ensuring  optimum 
fodder availability throughout  the  year.  This ensured  through  increased  mobility. 
According to herders it was the wish to  "spare  the  lives of their  animals"  which  determined this 
choice  of  strategy.  Obviously  other  factors  are equdy at  play,  such as limited  labor  availability  due 
to nuclearizationm of  households,  the fact of  being  "foreigners"  lacking  the  necessary  social 
network to get  access  to  alternative  sources of income  etc.  But  first  and  foremost, it is the  size of 
the remaining herds that  determines  the  number of  alternatives61. 
"It's only three years  ago that I started transhming regularly. It has a good 
effect on the general shape of the herd. Before I couldnk  leave  because I was 
in charge of my old folk. Now the size of my flock  forces me to  move" 
(Transhumant, Well of Belel  Touffle  Feb.  1993). 
For  contrary to the poetic statement of Lattimore  (1967,  cited  from  Khazanov,  1983:70)  of  "the 
poor  nomad  being the true nomad, mobility  was  and  is  not a  real  option as a  survival  strategy  for 
the most  impoverished  herders.  Only  richer  herders  dispose  of  sufficient  animals  to  depend  solely 
on the herd. Poorer herders are forced to seek supplementary sources of subsistence, often 
involving sedentarkation. Such "forced"  sedentarization need not,  however,  be  permanent.  Once 
the  herd has reached  a  certain level,  other  activities  may  be  abandoned  and  mobility  resumed. This 
seem  to have  been the case for many (younger)  households  who  have  left  the  Fuuta  area  after 
1990. 
Changing  herding  strategies 
The  turn  towards breeding  of  sheep  has  a  number of consequences for the  herding  strategies 
of production.  At  present  most  households  consist  only of the nuclear  family,  the  average  number  of  people  pr. 
household being 8.3 (Sutter, 1983 p.200). 
Since the advent of the boreholes  there has  been a  radical  shift  in  the  extent to which  labor  is a  critical  factor 
61 Although it does not  fit into the  idealized  picture of the  specialized  herder  that  the  FuutankoBe  herders  like  to 
make of themselves, more herders  than  anticipated  have  turned  out to cultivate , though  not  in a very  systematic 
manner.The  survey from April  1995  showed that many  of the  poorer  FuutankoBe  households  had  some  agricultural 
fits with the case- s tory  told in the introduction to the  chapter of  Bathil  Ba,  who  maintained  some  cultivation  while 
activities. However this was  the case of only 1 of  the  households  possesing  more  than 300 heads of smallstock.This 
waiting for his flock to grow to a  suitable  size to provide for the  entire  income of the  family. 
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adopted  and  the  amount  of  labor  invested  in  livestock  herding.  For  although  herds are still mixed, 
it is now the sheep rather  than  the  cows  that  determine  the  herding  and production strategy. 
In herds  based  primarily  on  cattle,  the  principal  production g al  among Fulani herders is to ensure 
constitution and  growth of their  herd,  and  to  increase milk yields  (Niamir,  1990:20). Although 
rearing of sheep  is  compatible  with  a  milk-oriented  strategy  (Thebaud,  1994:24)62 it is meat 
production  and  commercial  sale  that  constitute  the  essence  of  the  system. Owing to their inferior 
market value,  goats are normally  a  smaller  part of the  herd.  Being good milk producers they  act 
primarily as support, providing milk for the  young  lambs  in  the dry season when milk production 
kom ewes  tends  to run shod3. Cattle are kept  for milk production  and as savings. They are mainly 
sold to cover large expenditures such as purchasing horses or donkey carriages, vehicles, 
machinery or to pay for a  pilgrimage  to Mecca". 
Since  the  establishment  of the boreholes  labour  demands  for  cattle  rearing have  been fairly limited. 
Due to the safe environ~nent~~ and the  reduced  mobility the herd is normally not guarded (see 
TOL&, 1990)  except  during  the  agricultural  season  to  prevent  them  straying into cultivated fields. 
During the dry season  cattle is only  chased  off  in a  specific  direction  by the herder. In the evening 
the  milking  cows  will  return  by  themselves to the  camp.  After  milking the herder  might chase them 
off for  night  grazing.  With  regards  to  watering  the  cattle  herd is also able to move unguarded to 
the borehole. Here  the  herder  is  present to ensure  proper  watering  and to avoid mixing with 
foreign  herds.  Most  herders also visit the  pastures  regularly.  Finaly fodder quality is controlled by 
the  herder  once in a while  by  examining  the  dung  and the  general state of the animals. This is used 
as  an indicator for when  a  change  of  pastures  is  needed. 
ewe  milk  very  good for production of butter  which is highly  esteemed in the  local  "cuisine"  and  an  important  source 
@In many families  a  large  part of the  milk  consumed is ewe and  goat milk. The high content of milk fat makes 
of income for women  during the rainy season. 
63 An important task of the  women  and  young  children  is to ensure  that  those  lambs  who d not get sufficient 
milk from their mother  can  suckle  by  a goat.  Considering  that  many flocks have  very  large  numbers of lambs, this is 
in certain pericds very  time-consuming. 
M This is of come a  function of the  general  economic  standing  of  the  family.  Poorer  households  may be forced 
to sell  even  reproductive  females to ensure  family  subsistence  (see Sutter, 1987). 
In order to f i t  the  number of predators  attacking  cattle in the  Ferlo,  the  colonial  adminismation  carried  out  a 
strychnine  campaign  between  1950  and 1955 (Tour6 and Arpaillange, 198641). Considering the exEemely  limited 
number of predators  (apart  from jacMs) inhabiting  the  area  at  present, it is l i l y  to have  been quite efficient. 
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In the traditional  sedentary management  system,  the rearing  of sheep and goats has  normally 
consisted in  having a few  heads  grazing  freely  in  the  vicinity  of the camp,  sometimes  under  the 
supervision  of  the  youngest members  of the  household66. As a result, production results have 
generally  been  poor,  and  mortality  among  smallstock high6’. 
In contrast to this  system, labour inputs  in  FuutankoBe  flocks are  considerable. Firstof all, herding 
of the flock  is  carried  out  either by  several  adolescent boys  and/or adult herders already  well 
initiated into herding  practices.  Furthermore,  the animals are subject to intensive  care.  Suitable 
pastures  and  fodder  are  carefully  selected6*  in order  to  ensure  proper feeding. Intense surveillance 
is accried  out  both on the  trip  to  deep  well  and  to  the  pastures: This contributes to reduce losses 
due  to  attacks  fiompredators  or animals lost  in  the  bush  considerably.  Finally arge flocks  are  split 
into  several  units,  often  separating  goats  and  sheep  while th  youngest  animals are kept  near  the 
encampment and  herded  by  the  women  or the  youngest  members of the family.  This  enables  a 
more careful1  selection of the  pastures  most  suited  to  each  category  of  animals 
But if mobility  increases, so does  labour  requirements.  During  transhumance also cattle must  be 
closely  guarded  to  avoid  straying  and  losses  due  to  theft  and predation (Sutter, 1987:212). They 
also need to  be guided  to  the new  pastures  until  the  animals  are familiar with  the routes and  can 
find  their own  way. 
All this  makes  the  system  very  demanding i  terms  of  labor  requirements  and skills. In those  many 
cases  where  herders  make  use  of hired labour  they  often  complain  of  many  difficulties in nsuring 
proper care of the  herd by hired staff. The  often  quite  mediocre salaries paid to the hired  labour 
contributes to make  hiring  such  herdsmen  a risky business. In the course of the fieldwork many 
stories were told  of  animals  that  were  lost or abandoned  in the bush. In some cases the hired 
herdsman  had  fled his post  leaving  most  of  the  flock  unguarded  while  bringing a smaller  part of 
the flock  with him to sell to the  first  buyer.  In other cases theft and  sale  of  smallstock  was  the 
work  of  adolescent sons unable  to  convince  the  head  of  households  of the need for some pocket 
money. 
age of 9 to 10 years  they  have  the full responsibility of taking  the  sheep,  goats  and  calves to the  pastures.  At  the  age 
66 From  the  age of 5 children  take care of  the  youngest  animals  kept in  the  vicinity of the encampment. From the 
of 12 they are considered  able to take care  of  the  cattle  herd @a, 1986 p.142). 
Region  in  Northern  Senegal. 
6’According  to IsRA, 1992,  mortality  rates  for  newborn  lambs  (between 0 and 1 year) was 17%  in  the  Louga 
and  by  leading  them to low grounds where  they  can  browse on nee foliage and where pods from certain tree species 
can be provided  through  shaking of the tree (see  Thebaud,  1994). 
A  good  herder is supposed to ensure  a  varied  diet to his  animals  by ensuring access to different  types of grasses 
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Increased mobility and new grazing techniques. 
As mentioned  earlier, the high  survival  and  reproduction rate of  FuutankoBe  herds  is  closely 
related to the higher  mobility  and the enlargement  of  the  range of accessible  pastures  both  of 
which  were  facilitated by the new means of  water  transportation. 
Pastoral  mobility covers a range of  different  practices.  It may therefore be  useful  to  distinguish 
between  "migrations" and "micro-nomadisations".  Migration n o d y  refers  to longer 
nomadization,  mostly  inter-seasonal. In many cases, it is related to a  shortage  situation  in  the  area 
of out-migration. 
In contrast to this, the term micro-nomadization  is  used to describe  the  short  range  pendular 
movements  between a dry season  camp  close to the  borehole  and  a  wet  season camp located  away 
in  areas  where  surface water sources can be exploited.  Such  annual  movements  between dry and 
wet season camps are carried out by both  newcomers  and  the  locals.  The  main  purpose  is  to  move 
the  animals  away from the fields to avoid  straying.  Another  objective  is to reduce  individual 
watering  expenditures  and to preserve  the  pastures  closer  to  the  deep  well  for  the  beginning  of  the 
dry  season (Sutter, 1987:197). In the current context micro-nomadizations  also  refers to the 
frequent  movements of camps within the range of the  same borehole carried out during  the dry 
season  by  the  majority of FuutankoBe herders. 
Nomadization  over  longer  distances  are, in principle,  kept  to  a  minimum. In years  where  rains  and 
pastures are relatively abundant, most herders with  moderate  herd  sizes  prefer to remain in the 
vicinities  of a single borehole. In years where fodder  is  insufficient,  nomadizations  over  longer 
distances are employed.  Although  inherent  in  the  pastoral  lifestyle, it is obvious  that  nomadization 
is a risky undertaking, involving considerable  obstacles  for  both  family and  herd.  The  individual 
decision to stay or move is therefore a  calculated  assessment  based on a  number of parameters. 
The most  important  are  herd size and  labor  availability,  access to  markets  for  live animals and milk 
and disposal of sufficient technology. The advantage of limiting weight losses through 
nomadization  must be balanced  against  the  considerable  constraints  related  to  moving a imals into 
areas to which  they are  not  acquainted  and where the  number of predators  make  unguarded  night 
pasturing  of  cattle  more or less impossible.  Finally, migations over long distance  practically  inhibit 
engagement in agriculture or other supplementary  activities. The complex nature of the cost- 
benefit analysis carried out by the individual herder certainly contradicts any assumption of 
economic  and  technological stagnation among  Senegalese  herders. 
In recent years the number  of herders migrating  regularly  over  longer  distances  has  increased 
considerably. This  can partly be attributed to failing  rains,  especially in the  Northern  parts of the 
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Ferlo as was  the case in 1991  and  1992. In that  period the boreholes in the south were  practically 
swamped  by drought-ridden herders from the north. However,  the  number of migrations  carried 
out  even  in  relatively  good  years,  together  with  the  considerable  length  of  the  journeys,  show  that 
risks related to transhumance  have  diminished  along  with  the  spread of donkey carts and  inner 
tubes. As stated by one herder: 
"Many  things have changed for pastoralism since 1973. This is due to the 
arrival of  the  donkey carts, the water inner  tubes  and  the  industrial feed 
concentrates6'. All three ease mobility''. 
It's difficult to make an exact evaluation of  how  transhumance  patterns  change, as peoples' 
decisions  depend on a  wide range of  factors,  from  rainfall  patterns  to  the  age of family  members. 
In our survey of 1995, we tried to investigate  mobility  patterns  from  1988 and  onwards.  During 
1988  and  1989  (years  of  good  rains)  the  large  majority  (83  and  81%)  of  herders  stayed  at  the  same 
borehole all year round. In 1990  (rain  deficit  year m the  north)  13%  had  moved. As the  rain  deficit 
cointinued in the year 1991 the number of nomadising  herders  increased  slightly to 17%. This 
upward trend continued in 1992: Here the number of households  going  on  longer  transhumance 
t r ips increased to 21%,  a  trend  which  was similar m 1993 (21%).  What  was  remarkable,  however, 
was that  in  1994,  when  rains  had been normal all over  the  country,  as  many  as 23% spent  the dry 
season  in the pastures of the Saluum7O. 
This tendency to move more  and  earlier  was  also  expressed  during  interviews  with  herders, 
notably  among those from Djagueli: 
"Before I stayed  put in Djagueli, for l have  seen  that it's here  that the animals 
develop. All those who have many  sheep  now  go on transhumance  every year. 
Its not possible for all the  animals  to stay in  Djagueli  all year r o d .  There 
isn't enough of neither water or pastures. And  more  and  more  transhumants 
season is another example of herders  "unwrapping" of selected  project  interventions. Feed  concentrates  were 
69 The use of ago-industrial by-products  and  feed concentram to  supplement  the poor  pastures  in  the  end of dry 
origjnally  promoted  by  various  livestock  projects as a means  to  improve  milk  production  and  increase  fertility. It is 
now  widely used by herders. In most cases, however, it is not  applied Systematically but is given  mainly to weak  and 
sick  animals.  In  a  survey  carried  out in 1989 by  the  author in collaboration  with 0. Tour& 58% of the  herders 
indicated  that  they  used  agro-industrial  by-products  and feed concentrates. Only 15%. however,  indicated  to use 
more than 50.000 CFA (i.e. 750 French Francs pr.  year). 
number of households is likely to have  been  larger, than what is revealed, as some  already might have left in  April 
'O Amethodological problem  arises,  when  trying to access  mobility  in  the  area of out-migration. In fact  the 
when the  survey  was  made. 
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am've. If we stay in Djagueli in  the dry season the flock will not grow, and the 
lambs will die" (FuutankoBe  from  Djagueli  on his way  to the Saluum, 1994). 
Nonetheless,  nomadising  continues to be  a  strenuous  endeavour,  where people easily  walk 30 
km's a day, and  up 2-300 km in total  to  reach  the  pastures  in  the  south. 
What is most  tough  about  nomadising is walking  long distances. When the 
lambs are transported on the carts, you have to do the distance by  foot 
yourself.  Besides watering  is too  expensive.  Animals  have to be looked after at 
night so you have to stay  awake and  be  on  guard. What is tough is also that 
before  installing  yourself  at  a  borehole you have to negotiate  with  the borehole 
committee. " (FuutankoBe herder from  Ranerou on transhumance in the  Saluum, january 1992) 
But also with  regard to comfort,  the  FuutankoBe  harders  have  been  innovative. By the end of the 
fieldwork  period, the growing  popularity of large  tarpaulin  cloths from trucks became apparent. 
This turned out to  be yet  another  sign of the  increased  importance  of  mobility. Being the owner 
of such  a  tarpaulin cloth enhances  possibilities for mobility  during  the  rainy season. One is no 
longer  forced  to return (or send some of the womn) to  the  wet season camp before the rains start 
to collect dry grass to repair  the old and  damaged  grass  huts or to construct new ones. Now 
shelter  can be found  by  making a  sort of tent by  draping  the tarpaulin  over one or two of the carts. 
As construction of huts  is  a  both  time  consuming  and  meticulous  work7' this means sparing 
important  manpower  in th7'e  most  intensive  labour  period of the  year. This new practice is also 
important as it  enhances the possibilities of  short  term  mobility, 'to meet  the rains'. This practice, 
which turned out  to  be carried out regularly  by a maj~rity'~ of the  newcomers,  considerably 
improves the productive  conditions of the  animals. 
Apparently this new  practice  has  gained  momentum  since  the Mauritanidsenegal crisis of 1989 
where  tarpaulin  cloth  were distniuted among the refugees  to  serve as tents. Due to the size of the 
investment (between 50.000 and  250.000 F CFA) they are, however, not within reach of all 
herder^'^. As was the case with  Yerim  Sow  and his family,  most  herders continue to endure many 
tasks related to household  and herd. 
"According to the women  interviewed  it  takes  between  1  week  and IO ays  as it has 10 fit into their other 
73 78% of the  newcomers,  according to the  1995  survey. 
case,  they were all FuutankoBe  households. 1 family  claimed  to  possess  5  pieces. 
74 Only  21% of the  herders  comprised  in  the  1995  survey  indicated  to have such a "tent". Apart from one 
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rainy  nights  without  shelter  during their transhumance  trips. 
Apart  from  mobility  directly  related to drought or the breakdown of borehole  pumps,  movements 
generally aim at  reducing  weight losses during the dry season. It is  especially the search  for 
leguminous plants, preferably Zonzia glochidiata7’, a leguminous plant that is particularly 
appetizing for smallstock, which motivates herders to extensive nomadization. FuutankoBe 
herders  may  travel  several  hundred kilometers south of their usual zone of interest to reach  areas 
with  large  stands of zonzia. 
I take  my flock of  sheep  and goats to the Saluum  every year in  the  dry  season. 
My cattle  herd stays with my brother back  home in Ganina  where  the  pastures 
for cattle is better. For the  smallstock  it is good to leave to get  access to  zomia 
and to  browse  the  tree foliage.  But it’s important to be  back for the  rainy 
season. If not  your anima& will not  reproduce  properly”. (Transhumant  herder from 
Ganina, april199S). 
Marketing  strategies. 
Obviously this considerable  increase  in labour input in the new small  stock  based  herding  systems 
is  motivated  not  only by the  higher reproduction rates of small stock. It is  also  caused by the 
substantial  rise  in  market value of notably  sheep,  which  has  been  experienced  during the last one 
or two decades76.  According to calculations  made  by Tyc (199443) the financial  productivity of 
sheep is estimated  at around 5,000 CFA pr. animal pr.  year as compared  to  9,400  CFA  pr.  cattle 
and 2.500 CFA  pr.  goatn. However, due  to the higher  reproduction rate of sheep,  a  herder 
proliferation  was by some  researchers @mal 1982,  Santoir  1983: 80) considered as a sign  of  range  degradation. 
Herders  were  equally hesitant to use  the pastures as the  young  shoots  can  be  toxic (Thebaud28). At  present zomia 
is cited  unanimously  by herders as one of the best types of forage for sheep.  Another  valued  species  is Borreria 
radiata/Boveria stachydea. 
Zomia glochidiuta has  spread on the  Sahelian  pastures of Senegal  since  beginning of the  seventies. Its 
was 368 F CFA  per  live  kg for bulls, while adult rams were sold at an average of 712 F CFMive kg.  Young  females 
(cheapest  categories)  were sold for 322 F CFAnive kg (calves)  and S70 F CFA  (sheep)  Source D I W  annual  report 
1992. 
In 1992  mean  prices for adult  males (The most  expensive  category)  registered on Senegalese  markets 
productivity  gives: 
15.740  CFA for cattle (28 kg of meat a 335 CFAkg and 53 kg of milk a 120 CFA kg) 
5.824  CFA for sheep  (1  1,2  kg  of  meat  520 CFAkg and  4,4 kg milk a 120  CFA  kg) 
2.144  CFA  for  goats  (6.4  kg  of  meat a 335  CFAikg  and  7,9 kg milk a 120  CFAkg). 
Ti These figures relate only to meat production. If milk  production is added a calculation of financial 
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disposing  of  few  heads  of cattle but an important  flock of sheep  is  better  off  than  a  herder  with  a 
majority of cattle (Thebaud,  1994:19).  This  has  been  confirmed by other  producers: 
"One is  better off with I O  cows and IO0 smallstock  than  with a cattle herd of 
50" (herder  from  MbiddiJ989). 'With 100 head of mllstock you  can  have 30- 
40 lambs every year" (Wolof  Peasant,  Dodji  sept. 89.) "If you sell zwo sheep 
you can buy one  heifer, with three a cow'' (Tessekre  1989). 
In addition, small stock is  easier to commercialize,  especially  at  village  level,  and  they are, in 
contrast  to  cattle, usually  paid  for  in  cash.  Furthermore,  the  revenues  from  sale  of  one or two 
heads  of small  stock tend to fit better  with  the  cash  needs of the head  of  household, who is under 
considerable pressure from his family  members if a  large animal is  sold  and  large  quantities of 
unspent cash is available.  As  stated by one  herder: 
"The sheep is closer  to the  mouth, you can  slaughter if you  have visitors and 
sell it if you have needs". 
Finally, commercialization of rams for religious  feasts  is  a  rapidly  growing  market. There were 
particulzly favourable  marketing  conditions  after  the  1989  crisis  between  Mauritania  and Se egal 
which led to important reductions in imports  from  this  important producer'*. Prices of rams 
skyrocket on the eve  of  Tabaski  and  the  prices  of  a  big ram in  the  Tabaski  season  will  easily  reach 
three times that of an adult  female. 
Making a good "Operation  Tabaski"  might be  extremely  lucrative  but  is  also  a  gamble.  During 
1990 and 1991, many  herders  were  seriously  trapped  when rumours of prices  up  to 50,000 F CFA 
per ram where reported from Dakar. Around the boreholes,  the air was  thick  with rumours of 
enormous profits made overnight. The case of  one  particularly  rich  and  entrepreneurial  herder 
who had been  able to sell 4 million  CFA worth of rams in order  to  buy a  4-wheel-drive  truck for 
public transportation (taxi-brousse)  particularly  intrigued many  herders.  Many local producers 
therefore rushed to buy up large quantities of rams  to  supplement  their  own  produce  and  to hire 
trucks to transport  large flocks  of  rams to  the  capital.  Here  fodder  had  to  be  purchased just  as the 
installment  and  surveillance  of  the  animals  had to be  paid  for.  Supply,  however,  quickly  exceeded 
demand and many harders were forced, at considerable  loss, to move  their  animals  back to  the 
If calculated  in terms of Tropical  Livestock Unit (TLU) i.e. a nuninant of 250 kg,  the  financial  productivity of
19.675 CFA for  cattle, 60.495 for  sheep  and 38.650 CFA for  goats (Tyc, 1994434) .  
production is sufficient to cover demand  in  Senegal. 
m In 1988 the annual  demand for rams at  Tabaski was estimated  to 320.000 head. It is estimated  that  local 
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Ferlo again. In fact, 25% of the rams available on the market in 1991 were not sold7'. . 
Nonetheless,  it seemed that  pastoralists  were  increasingly  learning  how to carry  out  the  operation" 
and  many of those  interviewed  indicated  the  intention  to  group  their  rams  in  order to sell  them at 
favourable prices on the  eve of Tabaski. 
This is another sign of pastordkts being  extremely  speculative  in  their  herd  management  and 
marketing strategies. Rather than autarchic, herders must be characterized as fully market 
integrated  and  adapt to the  new  opportunities  offered by  the  expanding  market.  This  rapid  switch 
from cattle to sheep-production  conveys  a  quite  different  picture of the entrepreneurial and 
market-oriented herder than  the  one  created  by  the  cattle-complex  narrative. 
The  new  herding  strategies  and  the  orthodoxies of overgrazing. 
Inspired by the success of the FuutankoBe herders and the new and interesting market 
opportunities,  the on@ inhabitants  in  the  Lingukre  and  Matam  area  are  now  beginning  to  copy 
the  FuutankoBe  herding  strategy. As a  result, the livestock  population,  the  stock  composition  and 
the geographical distribution  of  the  herd  have  been  substantially  modified  during  the  last two 
decades. 
According to figures from the  National D e p m n t  of  Livestock  (Direction  de  l'Elevage,  DIREL), 
the  growing importance of  sheep  and goats in  the  southern part of the  Ferlo  has  resulted  in  an 
increase of 162% in the smallstock  population  in  the  Dkpartement of  Lingukre  from the  pre- 
drought level in 1971 (286.000) to 1993  (751.200)*'. Part of this boom  may  be attributed to a 
transfer of animals from the north to the  southern  fringe of the Ferlo.  According to Santoir 
(1994233) the density  of  smallstock jn the  south  has  increased  five  times  between  1970  and  1990 
(from a density pr. km' of 8 to a densi@ld of 41 in 1990) This is in contrast to a far more 
moderate development in the North  from 24.5 in 1970  to  34.4 in 1990. 
The  same  tendency  may  be  observed  for cattle, although  in  a  less  spectacular  manner.  Here  the 
movement is from 10 head  of  cattle/km* to in  1970  to  12.4  heads of cattlefloll  in  1988. In the 
79 See ISM, 1992: Group de  Travail sur l'autosuffisance  en  moutons  de  Tabaski au Sinkgal,  Mars 1992 
'O At the  end  of  my  fieldwork in spring 1995 I witnessed  how  one (indeed very  well organized) family 
was  able  successfully to carry  out  the  transfer and  commercialisation of several hundred rams in Dakar during  an 
interval of only two days  before  the  Tabaski feast. 
Source: D E L ,  Dakar (unpublished).  Unfortunately  movements withiithe dlpuffemenr of Matam are. 
difficult to measure, as the dPparremenr comprises  both  the  area of departure  and  the  area of reception. 
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North development  has  been  directly  negative,  from  20.2  heads  pr. k m 2  to 12,7 in 1988. 
As a  result of this development,  herd  composition  has  altered  significantly after the drought. 
According to Santoir  (1994:234)  cattle  exceeded  smallstock  in  numbers in the northern half of 
Senegal until 1968  (in  the  Department of  Linguere until 1968). In 1994, one finds 35 heads of 
cattle to 100 heads of smallstock  in  Senegal  north of the  Gambia”. Preference is given to sheep 
rather  than goats, the relation between the two species being approximately 1 to 2.3 (Tyc, 
19943). 
According to mainstream  range  management  orthodoxies  such  rapid increase in the number  of 
animals grazing inevitably  leads to overgrazing,  range degadation and ultimately to desertification, 
not the least  in an area, as the Ferlo  (and further to the South, the Saluum), where rangelands have 
been  severely  diminished  through  the  perpetual  process of agricultural  encroachment. 
Contrary to these  widely  shared  orthodoxies,  the  increased  number of animals browsing on  the 
range  does  not  seem  to limit the amount  of pasture  available. In fact, migrants and  sedentary  her- 
ders alike  recognize the positive  impact  of  migrant  herds  contributing not only to open  up new 
lands for pasture but  also to improve  the  quality of the  range. 
The logic of this statement is the  following: In order to  find pastures which  have not been 
trampled, the  egge-egge  herders usually settle  far  away  from other herders and  in  considerable 
distance  from  the  borehole.  Consequently,  they often penetrate  into areas formerly  dominated by 
dense  bush  vegetations3.  According to the herders,  browsing sheep in such areas tends to clear the 
bush so that high quality pastures  can  come  up  with  the  next  rains: 
“The egge-egge who  came in 1983/84 contributed to the formation of large 
st& of Zomia in  the  bush areas of Velingara. The areas  where they settled 
in great numbers is where you now find zomia in large quantities. These 
species are highly  appreciated  by  smallstock”. (Agro-pastoralist, Velingara febr. 
1993) 
82 Measures at local  level  confirm this tendency.  In  1982 Sutter measures a ratio of 1 head  of cattle to 1,l head 
of small stock in  Gueye Kadar in  the  eastern  Ferlo.  Recent figures from a  census  made  in Bouteyni (Northwestern 
Ferlo)  show  a  herd  distribution  significantly i  favor of sheep  with  a cattldsmallstock ratio of  1 to 3,7 (i.e. 2,s sheep 
and 0.9 goat)  Thebaud  1994 p.16.)  Data from the systemtic reconnaissance flights of 1992 on the Linguere 
department  display  a ratio 1 head of cattle to 2,8 small ruminants in 1992 (215.022 heads of cattle to 602.297  heads 
of smallstock (CSE 1992). 
83 These  movements  into  dense  bush  areas  is  likely to have a  negative  impact  on  the  habitat of wild  animals. 
This  problem is  however  not  the scope of the  present  article. 
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The results of a  study  carried  out by Carl Bro Int. in Koungheul in 1988 point in the same 
direction.  Here the most  frequent  answer  given  by  the  local (sedentary) population when  asked 
to compare  conditions  of  pasture  before  and  after  the  drought, was that pastures were much better 
now. This was  attributed  to  the  reduced  number of trees leaving more space for pasture%  (Carl 
Bro  Inc.,  1988:  10.6). 
Research  during  9  years in  the GTZ project  of  Widou Thiengoly  in  the  northern  Ferlo  confirms 
these  statements.  Contrary  to  the  expected  impact,  regeneration of pastures turned out to be lower 
in those  fenced  areas  where  grazing  pressure  was  controlled  and  reduced  than it was in the areas 
subject to " n o d  grazing. In years  of  consecutive  good rainfalls  (such as 1988, 1989 and  1990) 
controlled  low  grazing  proved  directly  harmful  for  pastures. The explanation  seems to be  the 
following:  When the range  is  not  grazed  sufficiently,  the  grass left over from last year will  bend 
when  the  rain  starts.  When  such 5 a s s  covers  the ground  proper germination of  graminaceous  and 
leguminous species is hampered  (Tluczykont,  1991:41).  Quality  and  stability of pastures in the 
controlled and  enclosed  plots  thus  proved to diminish  significantly  during  3  successive  years  of 
good rainfab. Some of the  most  drought  resistent  and  nourishing  graminaceous  and  leguminous 
plants  tended  to  disappear  to  give way to  other  graminaceous pecies browsed only  in the rainy 
season and with  little or no nutritious value as  fodder  reserve for the dry season (for  example 
Schoenefeldiu gracilis). This was  apparently an effect  of  hardening soils due to limited  tramplings5. 
At  present  nothing seems to  indicate  that  the  increased  number of animals grazing in  the  southern 
part  of  the  Ferlo is leading to  range  deterioration. On the contrary, the new water transportation 
tecniques  enable  herders to disperse  their  camps in the  bush,  spread  their animals over  a  larger  area 
and  exploit  formerly  under-used  pastures.  Range  deterioration is therefore  likely to  be insignificant 
m comparison  with  agro-pastoral  and  more  sedentarized production systems  where  animals  are 
concentrated  around  the  village. 
Competition  for  natural  resources and conflicts  over  access. 
As  mentionned  the  introduction of cart and  inner tube  has provided a  substantial boost to  the 
pastoral production  systems of the  Ferlo.Nonetheless,  the increased mobility it engendered has 
also  given  rise to increased  competition  and  conflicts  over water and grazing resources,  both  in 
84 In the report, this answer was  however  ascribed to a lack of consciousness of the scarce fodder resources. 
=A reduction of the  reserve of seeds from drought  resistent  species  led to an almost  total oss of primary 
production  the fmt dry year after a  cycle of years  with  good  precipitation  (ex. 1990). It is not  known  how long the 
Widou  Thiengoly 1988-90). 
recolonization of pioneer  species  takes. ( S .  Miehe:  Inventaire et suivi de la vegetation dans les parcelles  pastorales  a 
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the  area of "settlement" and in the areas targeted  during  the  transhumance  trips in the  area. 
Many villages experience genuine invasions of foreign herders in the dry season. This is 
particularly  the case of those located in the  narrow  tract of land  through  which all transhumants 
going to  the  SaluumS6  have to pass; between on the one  side  the  Ferlo  Boundou,  where  wells  are 
too  distant to one  another to provide  a  transhumance  route,  and on the  other  side the fenced  area 
of the huge state owned fattening ranch, the Ranch of Doli  (see  map 5). 
Conflicts can be ascribed to differences in range management practices. As part of a risk 
management strategy farmers and  agro-pastoralists in the  Southern  Ferlo  have  tended to put  more 
emphasis on livestock during the last two decades.  Consequently,  the  number of cattle  found  in 
the southern half of Senegal now exceeds that of the traditional cattle breeding  areas in the  north 
(Santoir, 1994232)87. Where herders on transhumance from the North formerly  represented  an 
opportunity for  these  farmers to get  their fields manured,  most  farmers now possess at least  some 
animals themselves. As former ethnic  specializations  disappear,  reciprocal  arrangements  such  as 
manure contracts  lose  importance  and  the  general  environment  becomes  more  hostile  to  receiving 
transhumant  herders. 
The  following  statements  by  herders in the area confirm  these  changes: 
"Before trmhuming herders were well received. You were even  given part of 
the groundnut harvest if you would let the animals manure their fields" 
(FuutankoBe herder Fourdou 1993). 
'Transhumance  is more difjicult now. There is more jealousy and competition 
than in 83/84. At that time, people in the south were agriculturalists and 
hunters rather than herders. It's now, that  they  have started copying on  the 
newcomers and have large herds of smallstock  themselves , that  the problems 
arise".(Transhumant herder from Mbiddi  interviewed in Loumbi  Aly Tedy 
1993). 
Tambacounda road (Ribo,  Payar,  Loumbi,  Koungheul  and  Tambacounda  Nord). 
" h e  area  described as the  "Saluum"  by  the  herders i the  area  from  Velingara  and  Thiel to the Kaolack- 
area,  in  central  Senegal, the so-called  Peanut  Basin  (departments  of  Diourbel,  M'Backe,  Mbour  and  Kaolack 
(respectively 27,29,30 and  26 head of cattle per square km.)). For smallstock  the  Peanut  Basin also provided  the 
highest  densities in the dry season of 1989/90. The highest  densities were found  in  Bambey  Diourbel  and "Backe 
(respectively 34,33 and 29 heads per square km.)(CSE doc. NT 91-02  1991) A large  part of these animals are 
owned  by  sedentary fanners. 
In general  cattle  densities  per square kilometer in the dry season are highest  in  the  most  densely  populated 
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The  changing  herd composition has  further  added to the  problem as FuutankoBe  herders  today 
rarely accept-attaching their animals on the fields  and  grazing  the  stubble.  Contrary  to the past, 
when cattle dominated the transhumant  herds,  today's  herds of  predominantly  smallstock  need 
other types of  fodder than what is likely to  be  found  in  the  vicinities  of  the  fields.  As  the  range  of 
daily  movements for smallstock is shorter than it is for  cattle,  the  disadvantages  of  settling  on field, 
usually  located  in  proximity to  the well or borehole,  are  considerable.  Herders  are  now  more 
attracted  to living in the bush rather than close to areas of agricultural  production. 
The  FuutankoBe strategy  of  dispersing  their  camps  in  the  bush  impacts on the  range  management 
strategies  employed  by  indigenous  households. As mentioned  above  indigenous  herds  are  usually 
grazed in a  "centrifugal"  motion from a fixed dry-season  camp  located  close  to  the  borehole 
(Sutter,  1987:197). As the dry  season  progresses animals fiequent  still  more  distant  pastures.  With 
the  installation  of  FuutankoBe  camps  in  the  bush  these  animals  are  likely to reach  pastures  already 
grazed  and trampled by  the FuutankoBe herds.  The  obvious  result is that  the  FuutankoBe  herds 
tend to be  in  much better shape then  the  "local" animals. To the  more  sedentarized  indigenous 
populations the FuutankoBe micro-nomadisations is unfair competition.  It  has  therefore 
contributed  to hostility and jealousy towards  the  newcomers. 
At some boreholes indigenous herders have tried to control access to pastures by forcing 
newcomers to  install  their  dry  season  camps at the  same  distance from the  deep  well  as  their  own 
camps  and  preferably on their  fields  in  order to take  advantage of the  manure.  But  such  settlement 
is  incompatible  with their herding strategies and  FuutankoBe  herders  have  generally  refused, 
pleading  the free use rights to the range affmed in  the  1964  law  code. 
Where  well  committees  have  managed to enforce this  "controlled  settlement" it has  in  fact  turned 
out to be  a  double-edged sword as it implies  a  considerable  limitation of the  radius of pastures 
grazed.  Once the accessible radius of  grazing  is  devoured  the  FuutankoBe  herders  move  on, 
leaving  the sedentarked population to cross large areas  denuded of herbaceous  vegetation  before 
reaching adequate pastures. In such cases,  otherwise  settled  agro-pastoralists may be forced  to 
nomadize  once the  fodder  reserves  in  the  area of residence  are  exhausted.  Such  forced  migrations 
often involve  considerable constraints as many agro-pastoralists do not  dispose of sufficient 
manpower  nor  of the necessary  equipment  in t e r n  of  donkey  carts  and  inner  tubes.  They  also  risk 
facing  considerable losses in revenue as  they  are  unable to pursue  their  usual  supplementary 
income  generating  activities. 
As can  be  seen from the following  quotation,  disconcertion  among  the  local  population  with 
regards  to the possibilities of regulating access is great: 
"It ought to be a task for the  Rural  Council to monitor  the  installation of 
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foreign herders. It would  be  good to install  them at the  same level as the 
firstcomers instead of letting  them  settle  scattered  in  the  bush. This has been 
tried for  instance  in  the  village of  MalemBa in  the  Saluum.  However, even 
there  it  ended  being an expensive  experience for the firstcomers. For once the 
pastures was devoured, the newcomers went elsewhere leaving the local 
animals in  very poor conditions.  The  best  solution  would  be to have more 
rains. But as it is, the  best is maybe  the  way it works  now,  where newcomers 
settle where they want. In that way the most densely populated areas are 
spared and they leave once the pastures are exterminated. (Ago-pastoralist, 
Velingara febr. 1993) 
Such  forced  transhumances may also be prompted  by the breakdown of the borehole motor pump. 
Due  to  the old age  of the majority of the  motor  pumps,  the  constant  pumping to supply sufficient 
water  for the large number of animals results in overheating of the motor and to frequent 
breakdowns. In such  situations  allherders  are  forced  to  migrate to neighboring pumps for shorter 
or longer  periods.  Such  forced  migration  can  be  very  strenuous  especially for small herd owners, 
who  may easily lose  a large part of the  lambs  under  such  a  trip8*. 
The  large  number of foreign  herders  scattered  over  the  bush also represents  an inconvenience with 
regards to the supplementary  activities  of  the  sedentary  population,  such as the collection of gum 
arabic. This contributes  to  create  a  climate of distrust: 
'Transhumants do notfit well  with  the  collection of gum arabic.  They will not 
refrain from settling  in  those  areas where the gum producing acacias are 
located.  This  year I hardly  harvested  any gum. Production  was  generally low, 
but on top of that a  large part was  eaten  by foreign goats  transhuming in the 
area,  while  another part was collected  by  the  owners  of  the  goats. Everybody 
knows that the  transhumant  herders  sell gum, we just haven't caught anyone 
selling it, yet. They are  in  conspiracy  with  the  gum  traders." (Sedentary ago- 
pastoralist, Ranerou,  January 1992). 
Finally the population  increase  created by the influx of  foreign  herds  inevitably contributes to 
inflate the number of cases of animals straying  in  the  cultivated  fields: 
"When the  egge-egge  arrive  during the  cultivation  season,  there are  many 
cases offield damages.  Herders do not  respect  the  cultivation zones, but  it's 
also  because  people make theirfields all over  the  pastures.  There is no system 
As an  example:  one  respondent  claimed to have lost 20 lambs  and kid during one  month  were  he  had to move 
to another well. (Loumbi Sanrabe , May  1990)  Other interviews revealed similar losses. 
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of regulation and no text on the basis of which a regulation  could  be  made. I 
think it would  be a good idea ifforeign herders  could  be  chased  away  during 
the cultivation  season. At that time  neither  watering or pastures pose any 
problem. But it is not good to chase away everyone. That would be to 
transgress  the traditional solidarity  among  Fulanis“ (Ago-pastoralist, Thiargny, 
Febr. 1993). 
The  question  of  field amages is a very  serious issue during  the  rainy  season. In the  areas of  pre- 
dominantly  pastoral  production,  field  damages are usually  negotiated  directly  between  the  offender 
and  the  field  owner. In many cases, especially if the  plants  were  still  small,  the  field  owner  is  likely 
“to forgive”.  Otherwise a  compensation is paid based on an  estimation of the  value of the  harvest 
lost. Only in those  cases  where the two parties  are  unable  to  reach  a  mutual  understanding  are  the 
authorities, i.e. the  village  chief or ultimately  the  sous-prefet  and  the  extension  officers,  involved 
in the  conflict  settlement. Nonetheless, the problems  increase  the  further  one  moves  south  and 
agriculture  gains  momentum. 
This, indeed  very  interesting, issue of  field  damages  and  their  settlement  is,  however,beyond  the 
scope  of this dissertation,  which is concerned  primarily  with  herder-herder  issues. As is underline 
in  the  quotation  below, straying relates to (a  slightly)  different  problematique. 
There  is no regulation  of  the  location of transhumant  camps.  Everybody  settles 
where he wants.  Once the  pastures  are  devoured,  the  herders  are  forced to buy 
animal fodder. Here 20% of  the population are  Wolof  cultivators.  There  are 
problems of animals  destroying  the fields, but  at  least  the fanners get a 
compensation for what has been destroyed.  The  inconveniences  related to the 
arrival of FuutankoBe  herders are felt more by  the  [local]  Fulani  population 
who  get  no  compensation for the  increased  competition on pastures.  However, 
it’s also  the  Fulanis  who  have  harvested  the  advantages  of  copying on the  new 
system“ (Resident  of  the well committee,  Rib0  1993). 
Adaptation to new opportunities. 
‘Certain local people make a profit on the transhumants.  They  serve as their 
host (diategui) help them  to water  the  animals  and  take  care of part of their 
herds. Some people  are  favorable  towards  the  newcomers,  others  are  against. 
The shopkeepers  are  always  in favour“ (veterinary assistant, velingara, february 1993.) 
As underscored  in the two quotations above, the arrival  of  the  Egge-egge  has  not  only  brought 
conflict,  but also new  prosperity to at  least some of the  local  inhabitants.  First of all many  agro- 
pastoralists  involved  in  trading  livestock or consumer  goods  have been able  to  extract  considerable 
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benefits from their  enlarged  clientele.  Agro-pastoralist  are  able to barter their surplus grains with 
FuutankoBe  herders  for  either milk or animals on  favourable  conditions.  Finally the  arrival of large 
groups of rich  transhumant  herders  provides  a  considerable  boost t  the  weekly markets in the 
areas of reception. 
The new herding strategies developed by the FuutankoBe herders have also given rise to 
innovations  within  the  indigenous  herding  systems.  The  raising  of  smallstock is gaining momentum 
among the indigenous  populations and  more  labour is invested  in  surveillance of the flocks. (As 
could  be  seen  in  table 3,25% of  indigenous  herders  now  possess  flocks of smallstock  of more than 
50 head  while  a  large group possesses  even  more). In order to make better use of the available 
pastures many of  these  herders  have also started  to move  their camps  further  out in the bush in the 
dry season. Finally,  the  practice  of  micro-nomadisation  during  the dry season is being taken up, 
even by agro-pastoralists in the south. 
"The habits of the  local  population  have  changed  a  lot  since  the people from 
the Fuuta  am'ved.  Before  they had little  livestock,  maybe 2 cows  and 2 sheep, 
which  were  not  guarded.  After  they  saw  the  well  kept  herds  of  the  newcomers, 
they bought a cart  and  installed themelves in  the  bush.  Some  are ven  starting 
to  move southwards  during  the  dry  season." (FuutankoBe  herder,  Fourdou,  february 
93). 
The innovations brought about by the  FuutankoBe  herders in terms  of  increased  productivity, 
easier access to otherwise  unexploited  pastures  though  improved  conditions f r water transport 
and mobility has brought  about  new opportunities as well as new constraints for the producers of 
the Ferlo region. 
The change  of  emphasis towards smallstock  has  turned out to be more  difficult to combine with 
agricultural production  than cattle raising. In april 1993. members of the well committee of 
Loumbi Aly Tedy explained 
"It is the  smallstock  that  provokes  problems.  Before w  had mainly  cows and 
maybe 5 heads of smallstock  besides.  But  since  the  droughts  of 72/73 and 
83/84 we  started  having both small and  large  stock.  Now e are forced to do 
as the FuutankoBe. We are forced to live  in  the  bush  and  to  transport  water. 
Now we  have  more  beasts  but they are mot in good  shape  and  give  less milk. In 
general  the  sedentary  Fulanis  have 5 time  as many animals  as  before. Add to 
this the animals belonging to transhumants. No wonder the pump has 
difjiculties". 
Their colleagues from Rib0 added 
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' 2  is mainly the ways  in  which the herds  are  managed  which has changed. Now 
people  live  out in the  bush and  have  increased  surveillance of the  animals. It 
is dzficult to combine  this form of herding  with  manuring offields.  Animals  get 
thin ifthey are  attached  when  competition on pastures is high as now. It is no 
longer  possible to convince  migrating  herders of making  manuring  contracts. 
They want to ensure  the  well-being of their  animals." 
The shift in  herd  composition  and  intensification  of  herding  practices  poses a  number of problems 
for ago-pastoral producers.  Previously, animals were  herded  during  the  rainy season, or were kept 
together in  a  village  herd  which  was  moved  to  another  area to avoid  trespassing into the  fields. 
Now  the  individual  agro-pastoralist  has  too  many  animals  to  be  leave  supervision  of the fl ck to 
a village herder.  Instead  he  is  forced  to  find  labour  for this task  within  his own household. As 
described with the agro-pastoral systems in the waalo t h i s  may create bottlenecks in peak 
productive periods.  Instead of creating  closer  linkages  between  the  agricultural and pastoral 
activities, by increasing  yields  though  manuring  and  fattening  of animals on fann by-products, 
some households  appear to be 'delinking'  these  activities. Animals are  fed  almost entirely on fodder 
from the bush  and are kept  at  considerable  distances from the  fields.  Hence, it is the opposite 
process of  the  much  praised  intensification  through  livestock-crop  integration '~ -farm'*~ which 
is at  stake.  It  should  however  be  kept  in  mind  that  use  of  manure  has  never be n very developed 
in these areas,  where  population  densities  are low  and  land stiU readily  available. In many  cases 
manuring has  mainly  been  applied to the  fields of the  village  chief  who  was  responsible for the 
village. 
The different  distribution of workloads  between  the  sexes  among  southern  Fulani clans also 
complicates  adaptation  to  the  new  system.  Among  the  nomadic  clans from the north such as  the 
FuutankoBe, fetching of water  and building of new huts (a  considerable task during longer 
transhumance journeys) is the  task of  women.  Among  the  southern  clans more devoted agro- 
pastoral activities, these tasks, which increase considerably in the new herding system, are 
supposed  to be canied  out by  men.  Such a re-organisation of the  labour  division between sexes, 
may  not  neccesarily  be an advantage for the women. 
"It's only the last 3 years that the local HaaboBe herders have started 
nomadising to get closer to the  pastures.  But it's very  hard.  Among us, the 
HaaboBe, all work related to the herd is the mens' job, Fetching water, 
milking,  and  even  making  huts. With the  FuutankoBe  much of this is the task 
89McIntyre et al., 1992; McCrown et al., 1979 quoted from Scoones ,1994:12). 
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of the  women. I think  that with the new system, even our women  will  have to 
change“. (HaaboBe ago-pastoralist, Loumbi Aly Thedy,  Senegal  Oriental.  febr. 1993. 
Conclusion: 
The  drought as a watershed  effect: 
The  profound  changes, in relation to  the  great droughts of 1972/73 and  1983/84,  which  migration 
had on the  production system in the  area  of reception justifies treating this period as a  watershed 
event. Through the movement  southward  and the transformation of their  herding  systems, the 
‘drought  victims’  managed to  improve  their  livelihood  significantly  and  to  limit  their  vulnerability 
against  future  calamities. 
The  arrival  of  the  large  number  of drought refugees from the Fuuta area,  profoundly  altered  the 
social relations in the area of reception. The newcomers quickly installed themselves as an 
economically  more  consolidated group  than the firstcomers. They managed to take  advantage of 
the  new  opportunities  offered  by the  drought. As expressed in the quotation by  Yerim  Sow:  “the 
drought enabled herders to get acquainted to new pastures”. By means of technological 
innovation,  the  herders  who  were  evicted from the Senegal River  Valley  by the effects of drought 
and  proliferation of irrigated  agriculture, proved not to be passive  ‘victims’  of  the drought but 
rather  active  agents  engaged  in  examining and taking advantage of the new possibilities  offered. 
Although  conflictive  in  many ways, the  reception of a large group of  foreign  herders also proved 
to be advantageous  to  the  local  population, who were  able to copy  on  the  improved  herding 
systems put into  effect by the  newcomers. So to return to the views  of  Solway, there can  be no 
doubt that changes in practices  and  in  meanings  have arrived to  a  point  where it is unlikely  that 
a  return  to  a  situation  ‘before  drought’ is  on the agenda for any  of the two parties. 
Characterizing  the  post-drought  situation  in Senegal as a  watershed  event, does not imply  any 
inclination  towards  interpreting  the  changes  in terms of an epochal  change  (as  described by 
Morton in  chapter 2). Rather  than  establishing the drought as  a sort of fictive  reference-point, 
which  relates  traditional nd harmonious pre-drought societies with current post-drought turmoil, 
the  notion  of  watershed  event implies  the  recognition  of  a  turbulent  past. A  could  be seen in  the 
brief  historical  introduction  of  the  Ferlo, also the past is characterized by  many  turbulent  events, 
such as the introduction of boreholes  or  agricultural encroachment. All of these have contributed 
to alter  the  production  systems  and  the  prevailing social relations.  Similarly,  the  shifting  climatic 
conditions (m terms of increasing or decreasing aridity) have  been  followed  by  adjustments or 
modifications of the  production  patterns. 
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But  as  shown  above,  development  in the region  has  often  taken  courses  that  where  different  to 
what  was  anticipated.  The  expansion of groundnut production  did  not  entirely  squeeze out the 
herders  from the southem  Ferlo, for some it even provided  an  opening  towards  new  production 
opprtunih.  The herders  did  not become entirely  sedentarized  once  the  boreholes  enabled  them 
to stay year  round  in  their  wet season camps. As was  the case with  the  boreholes,  originally 
devised as ‘cafeteria  stands’  along the cattle marketing routes,  or  the  industrial  fodder  packages 
geared  towards  fattening  selected  animals,  herders  have  been  swift  to  adopt  these  innovations  as 
part of a general risk-reducing strategy. Nonetheless, this adoption has bnot taken place 
uncritically as herders  have  been quick to ‘unwrap’ the technology  or  opportunities  provided  to 
select those parts of the ‘package’ which fitted into their general aims of enhancing the 
productivity  of  their  herds. This process  of  unwrapping  could  also be observed  in  the  recycling of 
tubes  and  tarpaulin  cloths. 
By  the same token,  producers  have proved to be able to adapt  quickly  both  to  shifting  ecological 
regimes  and  to  the  changing  demands  of the market. This flexibility  and adaptation  of course 
strongly  repudiates  any  reference  to pastoral production  systems as  being  timeless,  conservative 
and  autarchic as conveyed  in  the narrative of  the cattle complex. 
The way in which the herders  have adapted their herd  management  system to the changing 
ecological  conditions  also  gives  a somewhat more dynamic  picture  of the relation  between  the 
herder  and his environment  than  the image of pastoralists as holders  of the one  and  only  form of 
resource  exploitation  in  balance  with t e ‘harsh  and  fragile’  ecological  environment of semi-arid 
lands, as presented by many ‘enviroxmmmlists’. Rather than deducting  the  systems of production 
&om  the  nature  of  the  environment, it s eem more fmitful to  look  at  the  many  different  kinds of 
adaptation  which  are  put  into  work  by the resource users.  For  as  stated  in  the  introduction,  many 
interdependent influences determine the particular outcome of a  process of adaptation.  It is 
therefore necessary to stress multi-causality  and the interaction of  many different  factors  in  order 
to  understand  the  processes  generating  human  action. 
As emphasized  by the  ‘new  ecology’  and chaos theories,  non-equilibrium systems are  profoundly 
affected by changes external to them (such as drought) and continually controlled by the 
unexpected.  Therefore  constancy  of behaviour becomes  less  important  than  the  persistence  of 
relationships.  Instead of focusing on drought as  a rupture of  old  practices it becomes  important 
to look at  the  ability of the  system to adapt.  And as could be seen  above, the potential for 
resilience  and adaptation of both ecosystems and  production  systems in the Sahel  have  shown  to 
be  significant,  making  any  reference to the fragility of the eco-system  utterly  misleading. 
The  success  story  of the  FuutankoBe  herders  was  largely  unpredictable. An analysis  of  the  process 
through  a  crisis  scenario in which ends are given  beforehand  therefore  makes  little  sense. As has 
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been shown above, the situation  of  pastoralism in  Northern  Senegal  cannot  be  analysed  only as 
a function of the pelpetual encroachment of the  area  through  agricultural  expansion.  Due to 
technological innovations, mainly in terms  of  improved  water  transportation,  more  animals are 
now  able to survive on a smaller  area. In most  years,  they  even  become  fat  enough  to ensure high 
reproduction rates. Although  important  pastoral key  resources  were  lost  as  irrigation  expanded 
in the waalo, herders  have  shown  a  remarkable abiity to adapt to  the new conditions. The pastoral 
area has so to say  been  "enlarged from  within" as new  production  opportunities  have  been  seized 
by  a large number  of  herders. Greater mobility  as  well as increased  use of industrial fodder, 
mineral  supplements and veterinary  medicine  have  provided  at  least  partial  compensation  for the 
resources  lost and  have  rendered  herders less vulnerable  to  future  droughts. As a  result, the large 
majority  of FuutankoBe herders  indicate  they have  become  richer  than  they  were  before  the 
drought  forced them to migrate  southward,  a  trend which is also admitted by a number of 
sedentarised herders. In contrast to the developmnt in  a  number  of  other  Sahelian  countries,  herd 
ownership has not been  transferred to absentee  herd  owners  but  has  been  kept in the  hands of 
highly skilled and  specialized  producers  with  in-depth  knowledge of  their  environment. 
The arrival of  a  substantial  number  of  transhumant  herders as well as the  generally  increased 
mobility presents a  number of disadvantages  for  the  more  sedentarised  segment of the Fulani 
society. But  it has also created new opportunities  which  have  been  apprehended by the most 
dynamic layers of sedentary  farmer  communities.  While it remains  important to document the 
increased  pressure on resources  due  to loss of rangelands  to,  mainly  agricultural,  production  it is 
equally important not to underestimate the ability of pastoral societies to adapt through 
technological innovations. As stated by Leo  Strooschnijder: 
'The production level  that  can be reached  and  the  number of people that can 
be feed without  destroying  the  natural  resource  base is everywhere  more a 
function of production  technology  than  of  the  renewable resources."(Stroosch- 
nuder, 1994:6) 
In view of the important changes  taking place in post  drought  pastoral  society it appears  useless 
to continue discussions on basis of a  scenario  according to which  pastoral  societies  are  growing 
increasingly vulnerable to drought (ref. Moorehead, 1991; Lane, 1994; Thebaud, 1993 and 
others). This is not to underestimate  the  less  favourable  effects of the  present  development: for 
instance the exfoliation of those segments of pastoral society which have been unable to 
accumulate sufficient  livestock  to  participate  successfully  in  the  increased  competition, or the 
diffculties experienced by  producers  more  oriented  towards  agricultural  production, or the loss 
of  habitat  for wild mammals and  birds  when  bush  steppe  is  transformed into pastures etc. It is, 
however,  important to recognize the basically  healthy  state of the  pastoral  production system and 
herdsmen's  capacity to renew  and  adapt,  even  without  outside  interference. If this is omitted,  blind 
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spots affect our analyses. 
In view  of this, the increasing  number of conflicts  related  to  resource  management  should be 
treated as problems  inherent  in  a  highly  competitive  system  where  "modus  vivendi is gu ded not 
only by mutual interest but by the  balance  of forces". (Khazanov, 1983:35). In these highly 
individualistic  societies,  the  "symbiotic"  and  "reciprocal"  relations  between  herder  and  farmer 
communities as well  as the mutual  solidarity  between  herders  often  turns out  to  be a  simple 
correlation  of  forces  whereby  the  stronger is guided  exclusively  by  their  own interests  and needs 
without  any  considerations of the  weaker.  This is to  some  extent  what  is  happening  with the well 
committees  where  individual  economic  interests  rather ancollective  ecologic concerns determine 
the present policy. It  is this issue  that  will be treated  in  the  following  chapter. 
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Chapter 5. 
Strategies  and  manoeuvres to gain 
access to and  control  over  resources. 
Chapter 5: 
Strategies  and  Manoeuvres  to gain access to and  control  over  resources. 
The findings  of the  previous  chapters  clearly showed  that  the  actual state of pastoralism in 
Northern Senegal  is  not  usefully  addressed in  terms  of a  crisis  scenario.  Obviously, the 
influx of  a  large  contingent  of  mobile  and  very  specialized  herders  has not been taking place 
without  conflicts, as wiu be discussed  in  further  detail  below.  This does not, however, alter 
the  fact that in the  case  of  Senegal,  drought  acting  as  a  catalyst  for  technological innovation 
has provided for a  substantial  boost  to  the  pastoral  production  of the Ferlo. The increased 
competition  for  resources  provoked  by  the  growth  in animal and  human population was to 
a  wide extent compensated for by the new  and  highly  mobile  herd management strategies 
which  allowed for rising  prosperity  and  improved  risk  and  resource management not  only 
among the migrating  herders  but  also  among  the  original ago-pastoral population. But by 
giving rise to a  new  class  of  very  rich  pastoralists  of  which the majority are to be  found 
among the FuutankoBe  population,  the  technological  innovation also contributed to alter 
the  existing  social  relations. 
Hence, the adaptation  of the new pastoral  production  system also brought about new 
exigencies in  terms of  realignment  of  political  authority  and  of rights and control over 
resources.  This wil be the them for  the  present  chapter.  For although successful individual 
economic performance may be a great help, it is seldom enough to secure access to 
resources. Herders also need to improve  the  level  of  control over resources in the long 
term. This depends on investments in social relations understood as the ability of the 
individual to gain influence over decisions regarding resource allocation and resource 
distribution.  Opportunities for such  political  and  social  adjustment  have to a wide extent 
been provided byless  spectacular  events in the  aftermaths  of the drought, such as for 
example  the  more  localized  drought of 1991-93. 
As wil be illustrated  below,  an  immediate  effect  of this proces  of adjustment has been that 
conflicts  between  first-comers and  newcomers  have  intensified  in recent years. Since the 
beginning  of the 199Os, it appears  that  the  normative  codes  of  Fulani solidarity, according 
to which  water  and  pastures  are  open  to  anyone  and  denial  of  access is considered shame- 
ful, have come under  particular  hard  pressure. On the other hand  'foreign' herders are 
increasingly trying to convert their  newly  acquired  wealth into social capital in order to 
increase their political  influence  and  the  control  exercised  over the productive resources. 
Only a  few  of  these  struggles of political  alignment  erupt into open fights. Many of them 
tend to pass  unnoticed as few of  them  involve  the  participation  of local representatives of 
the state apparatus.  Instead  they  are  fought  as  struggles over meanings attributed to key 
statuses,  principles,  codes and customs, as part  of a  social  and  political manoeuvering. Such 
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social manoeuvering is, however, often hampered by local conceptions of rights and 
obligations as denial of for example  accces to  well  or  pastures  may require rationalizations 
that are not shared by the population as a whole. In such situations, events such as 
droughts may, as will be shown  below,  act as pretexts  for  transgressing or altering previous 
codes of social  behavior. 
In order to introduce  the  reader to the ways  in  which  the  proces  of political realignment is 
taking place,  the chapter starts by narrating  the  case  story  of the  well-comittee of Naori. 
This conflict is in  many  ways  typical  for  the  manner in which struggles over access and 
control over political  and  productive  resources is taking  place. It gives  a good picture of 
the ways in which  political  alliances are  generated  across  and  between the different catego- 
ries of users just as it illustrates  how  the  locus  of  political  conflict  has shifted  since the 
anival of the 'foreign'  herders.  The  Naor6  case  is in no  way  unique. Rather it is similar to 
many other conflicts or events encountered during my fieldwork. Nonetheless, it has 
'unfolded itself  more  thoroughly  than  the  other  cases. So in order to avoid too much 
confusion I have  therefore  chosen to use this case as the  prime  reference  in the analysis, 
making reference to other  similar  cases  primarily when specific  events or detail  need to  be 
highlighted. 
As shown in chapter 3, it is standard within  the  Common  Property  school  of thought to 
attribute local  communities  the  ability  to  generate  institutional  arrangements that ensure 
sustainable  and  optimal  resource  use.  This  stems  from  a  vision of the  communities as sites 
of consensus and  sustainability.  Where  local  resource  management  arrangements are less 
successfull, this is often  attributed  to  the  obtrusive  effects of state interventions which are 
liable to undermine the authority of otherwise well-functionning traditional resource 
management  institutions.  Departing  from  the  case  of Naori, the  validity of this conviction 
is examined in order  to  understand  the  'institutional  climate'  into  which t e migrant  herders 
were to be inserted.  First  of all, the  institutional  framework  governing the crucial resources 
in pastoral societies i.e. water  and  land, will be  discussed, as will the social  affiliations 
affecting land  use  and  control.  Secondly,  the  extent of state powers  in the Ferlo will be 
addressed. 
After this excursion,  the  discussion  on  the  political and institutional  repercussions  of  post- 
-drought  migration  will be resumed.  With  emphasis  on  the  rising  level  of  conflict observed 
during the third wave of migration, the dry years of 1991 to 1993, the tactics of the 
firstcomer population vis 6 vis the  migrants will be  discussed  as will the reactions of the 
newcomrs. On basis  of these  discussions  the  nature of the  proces of political realignment 
will be analysed. 
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An example from real life: The borehole of Naor6. 
During the dry seasons of 1994  the  borehole  of  Naor6,  located in the arrondissement of  Og0 in 
the  Matam  departement  was the scene of fierce  hostilities  between  rival  groups  of  herders.  At 
the height  of  tensions  young  Fulank  could be seen  patrolling  around  the  borehole  with drawn 
machetes. At several  occasions  the  police forces  from  Matam  were called out in order to avoid 
bloodshed. 
The contlict arose when me&n of the local  community  sent  a  letter to the  sous-prefet of Og0 
to protest  over  the  seizure of the local  well-committee  by  herders  who  were  foreigners  to  the 
zone. This seizure had happened  in  conspiracy  with the  President  of the well-committee  who 
during his ten  years  in  office  had  held  no  general  assembly or election to the  board  of  the  well- 
committee. In the  course  of the  years  members  of the original  board  who had withdrawn  or 
died, had simply been replaced  by the president  by members of his own choice. The  result was, 
according  to  the  critics, an  over-representation of FuutankoBe  herders  and  of  Mauritanian 
refugees. 
According  to the legal *work relating to the local  management  of  wells,  the  mandate  of  the 
well  committee is ody for 2 years  after  which  new  elections  should be held. In consequence  of 
the  protest  from  the  population,  the  sous-prefet  therefore  felt  obliged  to  dissoive  the  old 
committee  and p i n t  a  new  one. This was carried  out  at  a  meeting m February  1994,  with  the 
presence  of 5 vdlage  chiefs  (including  the old  president  of  the  well-committee in his function  of 
chef de village of  Naor6 central), a  representative  of the FuutankoBe  population  and  a  represen- 
tative  of  the  refugee  population.  According to the official  record (Proces verbal) the aim of  the 
meeting  was:  to  settle  the  "legitimate  claims  of  the  Senegalese  users  to  hold  leadership  of  the 
deep-well"  together  with  the  equally "legitimate claims  of the transhumant  and  refugee user 
group  to  participate  in  concordance  with  their s are of the  watering  taxes"'. 
In the meeting, the sous-prc!fet took  the  opportunity to lament,  that  elections had not been held 
to the board  of  committee  for 10 years  and  that  "posts  were  now held  by  elements  with  no 
relation  to the former  elected  board  Le.  refugee  and  transhumant  herders".  He also regretted the 
effects of the internal fighting between the local factions of the ruling party, PS (Partie 
Socialiste). F d y  he  complained of the  fact  that no proper  accounts existed for  the  spendings 
and  earnings  of the wellcommittee  and  that  only  one  tax-collector,  the  representative  of  the 
'refugee'  population,  kept  any sort of accounts  of the watering  fees  collected. 
' As the share of the  FuutankoBe  herders  officially was estimated to 80% of the total revenues  these two 
claims were not  easily harmonised . 
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Seehg  a  comprorrdse,  the sous-pr$& appointed  a  new  board  whose  members  represented  a 
broad mixture of the two opposing local political tendencies  and  of  the  'settled'  and  'transhumant' 
population:  The  leader  of  the  protesters  was  appointed  president  while the son of  the  former 
president  was  designated as his deputy.  The  post  of  treasurer  was  given to a  sedentary  while  a 
refugee  was appmted vice-treasurer.  Finally the  tax-collectors  were  chosen  in  such  a way s to 
ensure full representation  of all ethnic  groups  and subgroups of  the area'. 
It is of  interest to  the  case to mention  that  the  leader  of  the  protesters was also the  local 
representative of  tendency B of the ruling Socialist  Party,  while  the  old  president  represented 
tendency A3 of the same party.  Noteworthy is also that  Naor6 is one  of  the  boreholes m the 
Ferlo  around  which the  largest  contingent  of  herders  originating  from  the  Senegal  River  Valley 
(the  Fuuta) have  settled  in  the  aftermaths  of  the  drought.  These  have been joined  by  a  large 
number of very  rich  herders  originating from  Mauritania  who  have mived either  in  connection 
with the droughts of 1972/73  and  1983/84 or m relation to the Senegal-Mauritanian  confiict of 
1989. According to  population  survey  carried  out  in  1994, the population of 'newcomers' 
amounts to around 70% of those  households  using  the  well on a  regular bask. 
So when  the  sous-prefet  selected the official  village  chiefs as representatives of the  population, 
he  actually  favoured  only  a small faction of the  actual  users of  the  deep-well,  whereas  the 
majority of the  users  including the  ones  providing  the  heaviest hancial contributions  were 
represented by  only 2 persons  who,  even  more  importantly,  were  grouped  under  the  categories 
of  "strangers"  or  "newcomers"  and  not as part  of  the  regular  user  group. 
The solution  proposed  by  the  sous-prefet  was  therefore  perceived  by  the  FuutankoBe as a  way 
of excluding than, the  interest  of  the sedentaries in controling  the  well-committee b e i g  the 
large sums of money  collected  every  month4. 
Far from the  peaceful  solution  anticipated  by  the  sous-prefet,  the  result  of this meeting  was  a 
totaluproar  among  the  'foreign'  population  and  the  mobilization  of allavailable  resources.  First 
of all a  parallel  committee  was  established  (identical  with e old  one). As all large  taxpayers 
*Wolof, Black  Maures  (Haratins), UnuBe, FafaBe,  FerlankoBe,  DiawBe tc 
The  system of political tendencies is described by Schmitz (1993) as a  binary  system,  referring to the 
opposition  between  the  leading  faction  (A) and it's inevitable opponent,  tendency B. This characteristic  feature of 
Senegalse  politics  will be treated  more  thoroughly  below. 
only 15.000 CFA  Francs 
Estimated by the  FuutankoBe to be around 265.000 CFA of which  the  sedentary  herders  contribute 
148 
withheld their watering  taxes  from  the  official  committee  and  instead  contributed  to  the  parallel 
committee;  the  official  committee  soon  went  broke  unable s they  were  to  deliver the  services 
expected.  Provision  of  water  was  therefore  soon  taken  over  by  the " rich parallel  committee, 
leaving  the  "new"  committee  with no real  functions. (It was  in  the  course  of this operation 
which  was  'guarded'  by  youngsters anned with  machetes,  that  the  police  forces  of  Matam  were 
forced to intervene). 
Secondly,  a  letter  of  protest, signed by 95 users of the well,  was  sent o the  sous-prkfect  of  Ogo. 
The protest was threefold, 
a). A protest against the under-repmedon of  the  majority  of  the  population  who  financed th  
bulk  of the running  costs  of  the well. 
b). An accusation of embezzkmnt by the new  well-committee as well as 
c).  a  protest  over themwsures taken by the new  well-committee to raise  the  waterjng  fees. Such 
measures taken by  a  minority  board,  it  was stressed, would  not be tolerated  by the majority 
population. 
To give further weight to the  claims,  important  funds  were  raised  among  FuutankoBe  herders, 
not only from Naor6  but also from the  neighbouring villages. This  was used to finance the 
equipment and  dispatchment  of  delegations  who  could  visit  various  influential  persons  on  the 
Senegalese political scene in  Dakar as for  example  the  leading marabouts (saints)  of the m u s h  
Tijanya  brotherhood. 
The efFectiveness  of these measures  could  soon  be  observed.  Shortly  after  the dissohtion  of  the 
old well-committee,  a  letter  from  the  Minister  of  Waterworks  refening  to  the  case  of  Naork 
appeared on the  desk  of  the  Governor  of Matam Stating  that  a  majoriq of  the  population  of 
Naor6 considered  the newly  elected  committee as illegitimate, as not all membrs of  the  user 
group had been present  at  the  founding  meeting  and  the  non-sedentarised  population  were 
excluded from the  election of  a  new  board,  the  Minister  pressed for  a  solution  to  be  found  as 
quickly as possible. 
Evident@, this letter was the result  of  contacts  taken  by  the  FuutankoBe  herders,  to marabouts 
from the influential  Tall  family to whom  most  of  the  herders  from  the  Fuuta  claim  spiritual 
allegiance  and to the jduential director  of  the Dakar cattle  market.  Through these channels 
contacts  were  established  to Djlb JSa, at  that time Minister  of  Interior  and  a Fulani from  the 
region. He m turn had contacted  the  Minister  for  Waterworks. 
The Governor,  kickhg the hot potato further  down m the  system,  ordered  the Prefect of Mafam 
to solve tke problem, atask he assigned back to the  sous-prefect  of  Ogo,  i.e. to the same person 
who had onginally  been  compelled to intervene m the  conflict. 
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A meeting was held  with the participation  of the sous-prefet  of  Ogo,  the UNHCR 
representative,  the  commander of the police forces of Matam, the departmental chiefs of 
Waterworks  and of  the  Livestock  services, the local  veterinary  assistants,  the  President  of the 
rural council  and  the  village  chief%.  At this occasion  the  FuutankoBe  herders  complained  that e 
“genuine”  herders  were  not  represented in the new  board.  They  were  not,  they  declared  “ready 
to hand  over their money to people  just  waiting  for  an  opportunity to embezzle it”; 
In spite  of the m i v e  representation  of  the  Senegalese  administrative  system,  the  meeting  was, 
characterized  by its lack  of  clear  decisions.  The  only  decision  taken  was  a  passive  approval  of 
the de facto dissolution  of  the  committee  installed by  the  sous-prefet. An intention to form a 
provisional  committee  consisting of representatives of technical  services  was  never  carried out, 
neither  were  the  proposed  new  elections to the  board.  The  immediate  effect  of  the  meeting  was 
therefore  primarily that sfaius quo was  restored. 
But in spite  of  its  apparent iner& the  incident is sigdicant on  a  number  of  levels: 
First of all, it illustrates  how  the influx of  herders  from  the Fuuta region  has  altered  the  social 
relations  between  newcomers  and  sedentaries.Obviously,  the  growing m u n t  of animals and 
the herd  management  strategies  practiced  by  the newcomrs represent  a  number  of  obstacles to 
the local  and m r e  sedentarjsed Fulani agro-pastoralists. But the  Naor.6  case  shows  that  it is less 
questions of  access  to  the  grazing  resources, than efforts  to  gain  control  over  key  institutions 
such as the  well-committee  and,  not  the  least,  the  financial  resources  it  accumulates,  that are   
the heart of struggles. 
Secondly, the case pomts to some  of  the problem related to  the handing  over  of  responsibjlities 
over the deepwells hmthe  state  to  the  local  communities  which  took  place in 1984. Contrary 
to the assumptions  of  the  Common  Property  view,  the  transfer  of  responsibility  of this vital 
function  has  resulted in poor management,  frequent  breakdown  of the pumps  and  generalized 
misappropriation  of  collected funds’. Popular  participation  based  on  equitable  representation as 
envisioned  by  for  example  Runge, is not  a  sticking  feature  at  any  of  the  boreholes  visited6. 
running costs of the  borehole if fees were  collected for all animals  using  the  watering  facilities.  Explanation for the 
’According to a  rough  estimation made  in 1989 (Juul et al) taxes  should  largely suffice to pay for the 
constant deficit characterizing  the  vast  majority of boreholes,  must  be  found in the  (clientelistic)  exemption  of  a 
large part of  the  herd  from  taxing, and in  misappropriation of collected funds. This results in serious obstacles for 
the individual herder in  terms of frequent  stand  stills of the  pump as no funds  are  available  to  purchase diesel oil. 
management institutions will be discussed further on. 
The democratic  elements of the  clientelistic  and  patrimonial  structures  characterizing  most 
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This situation is, among  other  things, the  result  of  an  ambiguous,  ftagmentary  and  contradictory 
legal hmework which  together  with  a  limited (or hardly  existing)  control on the  part of the 
state  agencies,  more  or  less  invites o mismanagement  and  embezzlement. To this adds  that  the 
well-committees  serve  several  functions  at  a time. They are not, as perceived  by  the NRM 
framework,  institutions  concerned  exclusively  with  the  management  of  boreholes  and  pumps. 
Rather  than  single-purpose  institutions,  these  institutions  play an hnportant  role  in  the  political 
and  social  life  of  the  village s control  over  watering  facilities  in  these dry areas has turned  out 
to be the most important means to  control  access to the  grazing lands. With this in mind it is no 
wonder  that  the  well  committees are turning  into  prime  arenas  for  local  political  struggles. 
Thirdly, the Naork  case  exposes  part  of  the  vast  potential  of  resources  and  strategies  that 
newcomers  and  locals  respectively  are  able to mobilize  in order  to  control  access to water and 
grazing lands. For m spite of the osten&le  remoteness of Naor6, herders are both well-informed 
and  have  strong  networks  that enables them  quickly to acceed  to  the  central  political  stage of 
Dakar  and,  no  less inportant, to get  their  message  through. 
In this context it is interesting to  note,  how  the  sedentarized  herders  have  shown  themselves 
adept in  taking on the  mode  of  discourse  of  the  administration. In their  appeal  to  the  local 
administration of  the  Matarn  department  they  advocated  for  the  legitimacy  of  their  claims 
through a discaurse of  decentralization,  stressing the distinction  between the settled  population7 
and  ‘the  foreigners’.  From  their  side, th FuutankoEe  herders,  of  whom  a  large  part  have  been 
present m the  area  for  almost 20 years  stressed  their  rights as the “genuine”  herders  and as (the 
largest)  taxpayers - a  tactic  which  made  the  sous-prefet  conceive  of  their  protestations as an 
attempt to install “la Zoi du plus fort” i.e. to turn the principle  of one man one  vote  into 
representation  according  to  ownership in animals’. Furthermore  the  ‘newcomers’  relate  to  the 
parallel  discourse  of  the  f?ee  grazing  rights  granted to any  Senegalese  according to the  Rural 
Code (La Loi SUI le Domaine National). It is this legitimation,  together  with the mobiiation of 
inilwntid patrons, which has enabled the  ‘foreigners’ to mobilize the  support of the  Minister  of 
Interior,  against  the  immediate  interests of his own kin. 
Fourth, it illuminates  the  ways  in  which onflicts tend to become  politicised as local  strives  to 
gain control  over  resources  are mixed  with  struggles for  larger  political  goals. This could be 
seen by grapples Ween the competing  factions  of the  ruling  party  (the  struggle  of  tendency A 
for the  borehole  for  more  than 30 years. 
’ This is justified by  the  sousprefet  because  the  fmt-comer  population  (presumably)  have  been  paying 
the regular  users of the  borehole. 
The  Sous-prefet is apparently  unaware  that  the ‘foreign’  population  comprise  approximately 70 % of 
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vs.  tendency  B?.  This  perspective  might  add  another  dimension to the  understanding  of  Djibo 
Ka's surprjsing  intervention.  For maybe it was  not  only  the  rights of the  FuutankoBe  herders  that 
was at stake, but also the maintenance  of  political  support  from  the  leader  of  Tendency  A m
Naori, the president  of  the  outgoing  well-committee". 
The partial non-application of the legal framework and the ambiguous role of the state 
furthermore illustrates how decisions taken at the decentralized level at any time may be 
overruled  by  decisions  taken further up  in the  system This ambiguity is further  elucidated  by  the 
absence of  clear  decision  making  and the relatively  peaceful  return  to  status quo. This issue  will 
be discussed  in  further  detail  below. 
Finally is shows how  access  in  spite  of  state  ownership to both  water  resources  and  grazing 
remains subject to political manoeuvermg.  The  case  clearly  illuminates how part  of  the  struggles 
over  access  and  control  are  fought as struggles  over  meanings  attributed to crucial  terms  such 
as the dehitions of  "strangers"  and  "locals". 
The issues  presented  above all represent  crucial  aspects  in  tenure  disputes m ago-pastoral 
Senegal. In the following  section I wiu therefore try to elaborate  more  on  a  number  of  these 
questions. 
Fluidity,  flexibility, ambiguity and negotiability: 
Aspects of properly dations to grazing  land in the Ferlo. 
As mentionned  above, Common Property theorists  such as Ostrom  and  Bromley  argue  that 
"problems  in rural managed capacities  stem  from  unclear  institutional  arrangements  and  from 
the absence  of  an  authority  system to give  meanings to such  rights"  (Bromley  and  &mea 
198955) According  to them, problems arise from free and  unregulated  access  resultjng  from 
been  written about the competition  between  poliitcal  tendencies  at  the  local  level  (exceptions  are  Blundo,  1995b; 
Jacob and Blundo, 1997; Schmitz, 1993 and Cruise  O'Brien,  1975).  My  impression  is  that  the  labels A and  B  refer 
only to their status as respectively  majority  or  minority  faction.  Hence  tendency A in  various  localities  may  be 
mutually  opposed. It is,  however,  important to note  that  each  faction  have  representatives  at  all  levels of the party 
hierarchy,  making it very  difficult o  seperate  local  politics  from  politics  at  the  central  level.  (Schmitz, 1988600). 
Nonetheless,  given  the  fluidity of factional  affiliation  within PS, adherence  to  one  tendency  or  the  other  does  not 
provide a clear (or static) affiliation at the cenml level  (See also Cruise  O'Brien,  1975174-177). 
Although much has been writkn on  factionalism as a  dominant  feature  of  Senegalese  politics,  little  has 
10 Unfortunately  this  obvious  connection  did not  occur  to me during  fieldwork,  reason for which I did  have 
not the opportunity to check  these  relationships  with  local  connoisseurs of PS party  politics. 
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the  perpetual  undermining  of  local  systems  of  authority  and  regulation  by  obtrusive  state 
policies. Efforts to improve local management systems should therefore be directed at 
establishing  more firm property  rights  to  the  group,  including  the  rights to exclude  others from 
use and  decision  making  (ibid.:  15). 
This diagnosis indisputably fits many  of  the  problems  revealed by  the  Naor6  case,  at  least  at  a 
first sight.  Obviously  the  local  population  struggle  with  the  absence  of  clear  rules  and are 
constrained by the  limited  means  they dispose of to regulate  access to the  well  and  the  adjacent 
pastures. The question is however  whether  improved  management  may be reduced to a  question 
of reviving traditional and, it is claimed, hitherto efficient management institutions. Will 
increasing the  authority  and  means  to  sanction  local  rights of exclusivity as proposed  by  the 
Common Paperty b w o r k  alone do the job?. For how  extensive  were  in  fact  capacities  of the 
‘traditional‘  institutions  involved m managing  local  natural  resources  in  the  Ferlo? To what 
extent is it  possible to distinguish  a  clear  user  group  and  discern  a  distinct resource  territory to 
defend against the intruding  “foreigners”? And can struggles  over  access to resources jn the 
Ferlo be r e d u d  to  a  question  of  improving  the  legal  framework  and  establishing  a fumset  of 
rules, as proposed  by  Ostrom, North and  Bromley? 
As mentioned  above,  traditional  insftutions  or  customary  rights are seldom as unchanged or 
origmal as they  appear.  Rather  redefinition  of  custom  and  invention  of  tradition are part of the 
local  power  struggles  and  are as such  crucial  aspects  in  the  transformation  of  social and cultural 
systems. As could be seen in the Naori case,  redefinition of customs has been one of  the means 
used by the local, mainly Ferlanke, population to legitimize exclusion of the Fuutanke 
population kom the  well  committee.  By  suggesting  a  strong  dichotomy between locals’ and 
‘strangers’  the  Ferlanke  population has managed to establish  a  ‘discourse’  linking up  to a  central 
assumption in the  discussion  of  local-level  resource  management:  that  resource  degradation 
originates m the  dissolution of customary  common  property  arrangements  whose  very  purpose 
was to give  rise to resource use patterns  that  were  sustainable  (Bromley  and  Cernea  1989). 
Rather than establishing tta: basis for  understanding  ongoing  struggles  concerning access to and 
control  over local resources,  it seems that  the  focus on state  intervention as the  prime  agent  for 
the undermining  local  authority  structures  further contriiutes to the  creation of ‘blind spots’ 
with regards to  the  intricate  power  struggles  at  play  at he local  level. In the  next  section  a 
number  of  the  myths  relating  to  ‘traditional‘  resource  management  in  the  Ferlo  region wil be 
examined.These  are: 
a)  the myth of the  strong  customaq  tenure  arrangements 
b)  the  myth  of  the  distinct  user commnity 
c)the myth of the  stable  resource  environment 
d) the myth of the  obtrusive  state. 
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a) Customary regulation of access to pastures. 
In conformity  with  mainstream  views  on  environmental  degradation,  range  degradation  in  the 
Ferlo is often  attributed  to  the  absence  of  rights  of  exclusivity. This, it is held,  hampers any 
attempt by local managemnt institutions to control  the  access of kee riders and hinders 
motivation to limit the number  of animals grazing on the  range. 
As elsewhere, discussions in  Senegal  over  herders’  responsibfities for the  destruction of  their 
environment  in  Senegal  have  taken  form  of  a  juxtaposition  betwen the transformation  and  the 
preservations  views (see chapter  3).  Many  projects  and  official developmnt policies  take  their 
point  of  departure  in  the  narratives  of  the  Tragedy  of the Commons and  the  Cattle  Complex 
blaming  destruction  on the contradictions  between individual interest  and  social  obligation  and 
the  irrationality of  the  traditional  extensive  herding  systems”. In contrast  to this, a  number  of 
scholars  and  projects  have  defended the preservation  stance  and  have  argued  for  the  existence 
of  customary  rules  and  traditional  authority  structures  in  charge of regulating  access  to  the 
water  and  grazing  resources  of  the  Ferlo  region.  It seem however  that  in  the  attempt to 
confirm herders as rational  and  conscious  managers  of  their te ritory  another  narrative is created 
that contriiutes to oversee the subtleties m local decision making and to exaggerate the 
extentheach of existing  regulahons. 
With  regards  to  the  rights  over  lands, it i  dif3icult to trace any customaq regulation  of  access 
to the grazing lands in the Ferlo. Indeed, the empirical foundation used to validate the 
assumption of  regulation  appears  problematic.  For  when  looking closer at the works of those 
scholars  professing the existence  of  strong  resource  regulating ~~~titutions, it turns  out  that all of 
them  refer to the  work o f B d f r o m  1982 (See Tour6 et al., 1986:17-19  and Tour6 19904, 
Diawara,  1984:72 and Malick  Faye  in UNSO/UNDP 1993:17  and  Richter,  1991). In this study 
Barral shows how use of  the  pastoral  space in the  Ferlo was regulated  through  respect  of  the 
hurum (from  arab haram: interdiction). This interdiction  was  divided  between h u m  ngesse, 
“interdictions  of the fields”, which  prohibited animals to graze in  the vicinities of the  fields  during 
the cultivation  season  and hum dumgol,  “interdiction  of the pastures”, alluding to the  spatial 
entity grazed by  the  individual  herd  within  which other  herders  should  avoid  camping. 
I’ See for example the documents of ‘Trojet d’Appui  a  1’Elevage” (F‘APEL) for example Algor  Thiam 
1995,  and SODESP (1995). Also Grenier 196038-40 decribes what he calls ’la boomanie des peuls’,  the 
desire to have  a  large personal herd,  which inclines  the  herders to live seperated from one another and 
religious  attributes.  Rather  the ”cow is regarded as a  member of the family”. The herder makes use of his 
incessantly to be on the  move  according  the  the  seasons. Grenier underscores that this is a  passion  with  no 
livestock, he does not exploit it. In his  work  from  1987  however Grenier states that the new  lifestyles of the 
boreholes  imply  that  herders  are  commercialising  a  larger p t of their herd than before. 
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Bmal stresses, that rather than a customary  pastoral  code, the system  of h u m  ngesse was  a 
regulahon to defend the cultivated  fields  while h u m  durzmgol was  a  way  of  maintaining  herd 
sepgation. Nonetheless,  the  notion  of hum durzmgol has been  picked up by  several  authors 
who  have  used Bmak hdings as an indication  of the existence  of  territorial  units  over  which 
the encampment  exercised  controL  Such  bounded  territorial units, it is argued,  have  tended to 
be disoived  with the ernergene of the boreholes  and  replaced  by  the  prevailing  situation  of de
faao open access. For being state owned,  these  boreholes  confered ffee and  unlimited  access to 
anyone,  thereby  undermining  traditional means to limit the number  of users to  the  adjacent 
pastures'2. 
Little  evidence  seems to support this somewhat  biased readmg of Bmal and  its  construction  of 
a regularized past  governed  by  rigid  customary  restrictions  to  pastures.  Although  the eqmcal  
sources to the preborehole tenure  systems, as mentionned m the  introduction,  are  quite  limited, 
they  do  not  (to my knowledge) nmke reference  to  direct  rights  of  exclusivity  on specifc  parts of 
the mg. The exjstence of clear  temtorial  rights i indeed  questionable.  For  even if the Merent 
subclans (as shown in the maps  over  transhumance  movements  made  by  Bonnet  Dupeyron in 
1951 see map 6 )  tended  to  direct  their transhumance  routes to roughly the same areas  every 
year,  settlement of camps  was  more  a  function  of  opportunistic  calculations  over  water  and 
pasture  availability than regular  movements to a &xed and  bounded  territory. 
This non-existence of rights over pastures among the Fulani of the Ferlo was conkned 
unambiguouAy both in the survey carried out  by  Grenier  in  1957  and i  my own  interviews fiom 
the period  between  1988  and  1995. h r d m g  to Grenier,  pastures are the  property  of  everyone 
(Grenier 1957 quoted from P~uiUon'~ 19W190). In my own interviews, surprisingly few 
herders recollected to have  ever heard of the notions of h u m .  In contrast, the fieedom to  settle 
wherever  one  chooses med out (as can be read out  of the stories  of  Yerim  &d  Bathil  in 
chapter 4) to be a prominent  feature in herders  own  self-knowledge. 
With regards to the present  state  oftenure  rights,  interviews carried out  between  1988  and  1995 
wholly confirmed the lack  of property rights  at  present  and  the  rights  of  any  herder  to  camp  and 
exploit  pastures  where  and  whenever  he  wants  without  asking  anyone for p rmission to  settle 
'* For examples  elsewhere in the Sahel see notably  Thebaud, 198868  wiger), and Benoit 1984 
(Burkina  Faso). 
l3 See also Grenier, 196057. Unfortunately I have  not  been  able  to  get  hold of the  1957  document  by 
clearly  expressed. 
Grenier.  In  the  later works of Grenier (1960 and 1987). the  statements  regarding  free  and  open  acces  are  not s  
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(see the story of  Yerim  Sow). This is also what  can be read  out  of  the  many  unsuccesful 
attempts to regulate  the  distance  of  transhumant  settlements vis 2 vis the  borehole,  discussed 
briefly  in chapter 4. 
This moderation  of  the  presumed  importance  of  regulation  generally  confers  with  the  views  of 
for example  Jeremy  Swift (1988) or Lawry (see chapter 3) who  underline that in  areas  where 
resource availability is characterized  by  spatial  heterogeneity  and  temporal v-ility, 
independent  and  opportunistic  decision  making  appears  to be the  most  efficient  response to  a 
heterogeneous environment. Such resource management systems are more likely to be 
characterized  by  flexible  arrangements,  which  allows  transhumant  herders to gain  access to the 
crucial  resources,  water  and  pastures,  over  a  vast  area. 
Regulation of awes to pastures through the control over  water? 
But  if  pastures  were  unregulated,  what  about  acccess  to  water? As water pnmady is a  means 
to  get  access  to the prosperities made up by the  pastures,  it  has been common to regard  water 
sources such as wells as the  key  customary  resource  management  institutions  of  the  clans (see 
TM”oucl, 198851). Many  scholars  have  therefore  blamed  the  drilling of state  owned  boreholes, 
where access was open to anyone, for undermining hitherto well-functionning resource 
management  institutions,  bounded as they  were  in  the  ability to restrict  the  number  of  users  of 
private  wells. 
But as was the case of the  pastures it turns out to be difficult to  trace any  customary  regulation 
of access to water  in  the  case  of  the  Ferlo.  Nothing seems to  indicate that either the natural 
ponds or the shallow  wells  dug  into  the dry river bed of  the  Ferlo  Valley  were  subject- to 
restrictions  of access before the boreholes  were Med. In fact, both islanic law (Bonte, 
199358) and Fulanis  concepts  of  proper  ‘conduite’  repudiate  private  appropriation  of  water 
sources,  even in those  case  where  they  are  dug  by an individual or a goup. 
Hence,  when  the  colonial  administration in the  late 1950’s started  setting  up  a  network  of 
publicly owned deepwells throughout the Ferlo, they did not break up any primordial 
customary organization.  Quite on the  contrary, it was  the  boreholes  and  the  new  opportunities 
that they  created,  in  terms of  year-round  settlement,  which  started off new,  but  initially  rather 
vague,  claims  of temtorial ownershrp to the  areas  around  the  well.  Such  tendencies  of triial 
appropriation were  observed as early as 1956 by the  French  anthropologist  Marguerite D~~pire’~. 
Fulani lifestyle, as part of Gromaires  team. 
14 Marguerite  Dupire was appointed  by  the colonial administration to study  how  the  boreholes affected 
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Accordmg to  her,  a  certain ‘nationaJism’  was  developing  around the wells as rivaling subclans 
would  request  to have  their  own  deep-well  because: “the  government has given a well to the 
UmrBe, but they have  done  nothing for [us] the BarkanaBe” @pire, 1957:23). 
At  present  all  water  resources  officially  belong  to  the  state  and  are  considered  an  integral  part 
of the public domain. According to the Water  Code’’ “such  resources are a  collective  asset  and 
their use on the national temtory is subject to prior  authorization  and  supervision”. Indeed, user 
permits  are  issued by the  Minister of Water  Resources  and  Land  Reclamation  (Ministre de 
1’Hydraulique et de I’AssainiSsemnt) their purpose  being “to reconcile the interests of various 
categories  ofusers,  to  taking  into  account  previously  established  rights  and customs and  finally, 
to conserve  national  water  assets”  (Minjstsre  de  I’Hydraulique  et de l’Assainissement, from 
Allisoutin, 19963). Needless to say,  very  few  of  the  users, at  least in the rural areas,  have  ever 
heard of the  existence of legal  provisions  requjring  them to  to obtain permit to use  water 
resources. As noted  by Allisoutin, ponds  do  not in the  mind of the  rural  population belong to 
anyone  and  anybody  may  make us  of  them  (ibid.:4). 
With  regards to the ordinary wells,  which  for  a  large  part are  state b n c e d ,  access is not 
restricted.  Nonetheless,  more i n f o d  types  of  regulation  may be enforced.  According  to  my 
informants,  foreign  herders  may,  for  example, be asked to refrain  f?om  watering their livestock 
until  the animals of  the  regular  users  have drunk. At this moment  the  water  level has sunk and 
water is more  diflicult to access. 
S i  rules  apply for privately  owned  wells,  bearing  in  mind  that  according to the legislation 
access to and use of  publicly  owned  ground  water is open to anyone.The  fact of being man- 
made  (i.e.  privately  sponsored)  does,  however, attach rights  of  a  more  private  character o the 
well.  Hence, also the  shallow  wells  dug  into the dry river beds have certain rights  attached to 
them,  obliging  a  possible  lender  to  provide a g& for  the  owner,  while  the  annual  enforcement 
and  maintenance is left in the charge of the  user.  But as shown in the quotation  below  the  actual 
extent of these  rights  remain  somewhat  blurred: 
“A great number of transhumants  have  settled  here.  We  don’t  lolow  where 
they comfrorn They haven’t talked  with us. They water  their  animals at the 
well  and at the  hand-dug  shallow  wells [cianes]. They don‘t  even ask for 
permission  to use  the  well,  in  spite of it  being  the villagers  themselves  who 
Is Law 81.13 of March 1981, Journal offciel de la  Ripublique  du Sinigal no. 4829 of April  1981 
pp.411418, (here  quoted from Allisoutin, 19963) 
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have dug it and paid all expenses. With regards to the shallow wells 
everyone is free to dig  one,  where  it  is  possible.  But if you  make  use of one 
which  has  been  dug  before, you ought to get  the  permission of the one who 
initially dug  it. lf you dig  one yourselj  you  are free to prohibit othersfrom 
using it. (Village chief, Sessoum, Vehgara Febr. 1993.) 
But as can be traced in  the  quotation,  presumed  rights  and  enacted  realities are  not always  con- 
gruent,  but  rather  the  source of  constant  strives  and  redefinition. This is part  of  the  constant 
realignment of  power  relations: In the  interpretation  given  by the village  chief,  it is the  local 
population who are  holders of certain (unspecikd) rights  over  the  well,  rights  which  are 
tresspassed  by  the  foreigners  in  their  impolite  behavior (theyhaven 't talked to us, they haven 't 
asked forpemission). The  response of the villagers,  in this representation, is one  of  tolerance 
and  indulgence  towards  the  aggressor.  Tolerance  and  indulgence  have  positive  connotations. 
They are features  often  accentuated  by  herders  and  centrally  placed  in the Fulani code  of 
conduct. To be tolerant  is  no  sign of weakness,  rather  it is the  position  of  the  strong  one,  who 
has force  to  respect  the  codes of  proper  conduct  and be generous  (see Riesmann, 1990). 
As argued  above,  access  to  land is kee and  unrestricted. This does  not,  however,  imply  that 
settlement is is completely  random  or  chaotic.  For  while  the  individual  herder is free to use 
whatever  pastures he wants, settkmnt into  new areas will take  place  with  due  regard  to  a  series 
o f in fod  conventions  on  proper  conducts.  According to Niamir (199032) this  'choreography 
of  movements' or 'passive  coordination'  derives from a  mutual  wish to  avoid  mixing  of  herds 
which  could be the  consequence  of  settling too close to  other  herders.  Likewise,  a  desire  to 
avoid  confrontations  usually  inspire  transhumants to refkin from  settlement  in  zones already 
occupied  by  large  numbers of herders.  The  following  quotation  may  illustrate thismentality 
'Tmore wells  are  drilled  it would destroy the  bush. It's good for the 
animals  to  be  able  to  move  the whole day without  meeting other 
herds. At present I'm taking advantage of the  breakdown of the 
borehole-pump.  Once  the  pump is repaired and herders  come  back, 
I will  move  another 10 h k  away. (Herder h m  Mbiddi, on imshumance 
nearLoumbiAlyThedyfebr. 1993). 
In contrast to  the  interpretation  stressing  the  existence  of  a  customary  regulation of access  to 
pastures, the  view  expressed  above  underscores  the  individual  interest  in  avoiding too  close 
contact  with  other  herders. It is the  right  of  the  indivual to move  away kom others and to have 
unrestricted  access to a  large  number  of Merent resource  regimes  and  not  the  rights  of  a 
restrkted group of users to  exclude  others  which is at  stake. The relatively  low  priority  given  to 
creation of  rights  of  exclusivity  to  a  distinct  resource  re+ also explains  why the majority  of 
158 
herders are extremly favorable  to the drilling  of  more  wells  (in  contrast to the  herder  quoted 
above).  For  although  creation  of  new  wells  increases  competition  (the  concern  expressed  by  the 
Mbiddi herder), it still opens up new resource spaces  for  grazing. As will  be shown below  claims 
of  exclusivity  therefore  often ~ m s  out to be as much  a  question  of  gainjng  and  securing  political 
control as of  limiting the pressure on the grazing  lands. 
The  system  of  ‘passive  coordination’  which n principle  gives  everyone  equal  rights  of  access, 
does  not  exclude  that  herders  generally  recognize  the  needs  of  being  on  fiiendly  terms  with  their 
neighbours. In many cases,  settlement  into  a  new  area will therefore involve some sort of 
compensation  to  the  neighbours  in  the  area of  settlement.  Thsi  may  be  done  either  through 
manm contracts (shorter  or  longer periods), through  temporary  employment of m e d r s  of the 
host  household  to  draw  water or through  other types of  relations  which may constitute an 
advantage to the host  population.  Although  no  formalized  practices  exist,  and  herders  generally 
are  reluctant  to  mention  such  transactions,  transhumant  herders may  in  certain  occasions also 
give  away animals as gift to neighbours,  village  chiefs  and  local  authorities in order  to  ensure 
good  relations. 
Ultimate dichotomies? Sedentary vs. mobddidigenous vs. foreigner. 
If flexibility  and lack of  clear  regulation  with  regards  to  the  productive  resources as described 
above, turns out  to be, not the result  of  undermining  of  well-functionning  customary  institutions, 
but  rather the corollary  of  a society characterized  by  a  broad  and flexile resource  base,  then  the 
distinct  user group with shared interest m a  long  term  maintenance of a  sustainable  resource 
environment  may also turn out to be  diflicult to identlfy. 
As argued in  the  previous  chapters,  the  productive  strategies of the  Ferlo  population  are  not 
homogeneous  and  may  vary  considerably  over time. In the Ferlo, as elsewhere m the Sahel, 
most producers turn out to combine  a  large  variety  of  very Merent economic  activities  such as 
collection of gum arabic  and  other  forest  products,  commercialisation  of  livestock or salaried 
work  in order  to  pursue  a  living. Such activities  are  not  necessarily  linked to either  agricultural 
or livestock  production. In recent  years  a  growing  number  of  the  herders  have,  for  example, 
established  themselves as shopkeepers  in  the  borehole  villages. 
Often  these  productive  activities  are  not  either  very  closely  linked  to  a  specisc  and  bounded 
gwsrafical setting. In fact  extensive  travelling, as part  of  a  productive  strategy, is not  practiced 
onlybytmshmam herders. Also apparently  ‘sedentarised‘  inhabitants  of  the  Ferlo  ?kquently 
turn out  to  make use of murces  in other,  even  fairly  distant,  resource  regimes.  Some  continue 
to  cultivate  seasonally  in the wmlo, other  travel  extensively  during the dry season oEering 
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treatments on basis  of  their  magical  powers (maraboutage'6), still  others  supplement  their 
incomes  by  travelling to  town  or  abroad as migrant  workers on shorter or longer  terms'7. 
It is jmpoaant to stress that such  supplementary  income-generatjng  activities  are not  carried out 
solely  by  the rewure-por rural dwellers. Also large  herd  owners may turn out to supplement 
their inmm as travelling marabouts, livestock traders or  the  like. This variation  in  productive 
strategies underscores the need to substantiate  claims  made  by  the  preservationists of rural 
producers as having  common  goals  and  interests.  Obviously,  those  herders  who are active  in 
commercialisation of livestock or are involved in retail trading may be only moderately 
interested m setting  up firm rules to  reduce  the  number  of  foreign  herders  settling  the area. 
Consequently, sedentarity and  mobility  can  neither  be  considered as hed entities  nor as the two 
opposed poles m the evalutionary  proms.  Such  dichotomies  do  not  hold  in the casc of Senegal, 
where  producers  constantly shift between  different  types  of  production  and between various 
degrees  of  sedentarity  and  mobility,  according to their  immidiate  constraints  and  abilities  in 
constant  adjustment  to  where it is most  profitable  for  the  moment 
Those  who left in 1973, used to be agro-pastoralist. Some had 300 sheep and 
maybe 100 heads of cattle. But many lost many animals  during  the trip as the 
animals had to  get  used  to  the  new system Some  managed to  reconstitute  their 
herds  after  that. Others  lost  everything and had to come  back and cultivate. 
Among  those who failed m the3n-t m some  managed to  build-up  a flock after 
some time. And among  these, some have  now left to go on transhumance  in  the 
more  extensivelly than others,  being  away f o m  their household  for  many  months  during  the  lean season. Also the 
success of  certain  herd-owners  who  have  been  able to build  up a  particularly  large  herd is currently  attributed to 
special  magical  powers.  Several  times  during  visits to particularly  rich  herd  owners  people  have come to seek their 
mystic  services.  Such  mystical powers  play an important  role in the  self-knowledge  regarding  herding skills. 
According to the  richest  herder  in  the  area,  the  reason why  he  managed  to get his,  indeed  extremely, large herd 
across  the  Senegal  River  form Mauritania  in  the  midst  of  the  fierce  hostilities  between  Mauritania  and Senegal  in 
1989, was that he  was able to  make  them  invisible.  Invisibility  was  also  used  to  explain  the  relative succ ss of those 
herders  who  where  able to cross the  river to 'raid back'  part  of  the  Fulani  herds  during  the hostilities. 
l6 Notably  SanraBe  herders  are  considered  to  possess  magical  powers,  reason for which this group travel 
"A survey  carried  out for the CSE (Juul, 1990) in  1988/89  showed  that 17 9% of a sample of 93 
households were involved  in gum collection, 20% in  commercialisation of livestock  (but at a  very variable scale) 
Barkedji have at least 20 different  shops. Often the  shops  function  as  a  meeting  place for different groups of  a 
while 4% were  involved  in  retail  sale.  In  the  course of the years retail  trading  has  merely  exploded and villages as 
more or less clientelistic stamp and as a meeting  point for trading smalktock etc. 
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south. Others, however,  can’t make it. (Ardo’* Ururbe DjougonaBe,  Madina 
Ndiatabe (waalo) 1995). 
As illustrated in the quotation, the post-drought migration process is in  itself  an  indicator  of  how 
rural dwellers may shifi between  preferred  resources as a  reaction  to  internal  and  extemal 
changes,  adopting  a  more  or  less  mobile  lifestyle  accordingly. And clearly,  such  patterns  of 
resource use are likely  to  give  way  to  more flexile resource  management amngemnts, than 
those  adduced  by  the  Common  Property  approach. 
Indeed, the  whole  history  of  post-borehole  settlement aftinns the picture of African 
communities as porous  and  fluid  social  entities.  Hence,  they are comprised  of  individuals  who 
have  shown themelves apt to respond  to new opportunitks and constraints in a fluctuating 
physical  and  social  environment, as discussed in chapter 3. This adaptability  is  reflected as the 
histories  of  the Merent agglomerations  in  the  Ferlo  which are  characterized  by  constant shifts 
in  relation  to  changing  population. Indeed they  resemble  the Zambian situation,  recollected  by 
Berry, according to which “ the village is not a permanent social entity, but rather an 
institution  through  which a large and vaned company of people pass  at direrent speece’ (Kay, 
1967 quotedfiomBeny, 1993:162). 
Accordingly,  the  distinction  between the rightful  user  and  the  foreigners  against  whom  the 
resources should be protected, becomes less obvious than it would appear at lint sight. 
Distinguished as it is by  fluid  ethnic  boundaxies,  high  levels of m o b w  and  little  permanent 
attachment o a particular geographical space, the Ferlo fits well into what Kopytoff 
characterised as a  ‘Yiontier  region’  (see  chapter 3). In conformity  with  the eontier ideology’ 
described, a  continuing  reorganisaton  of  ethnic  identities s taking  place, making the  distinctions 
between who is currentiy labelled ‘foreigner’  or ‘newcomr’ and  who falls under  the  heading  of 
‘ht-comers’, ‘local‘  or  ‘indigenous’ less clear-cut  than  orginaUy  anticipated. In the  case of the 
Ferlo,  a  closer look into  the  ‘age’  of  settlement  of  various  groups  around a borehole  shows, 
that  white  many  of  the  so-called  ‘foreigners’  have  stayed m the area  for  more than 25 years  and 
have invested considerable sums in the maintenance of the boreholes and other crucial 
equipment in the  area,  many  of  those  labelled ‘iirstcomrs’ turn out  to have been settled in the 
area only  a  few years before or maybe  even after the arrival  of  the h t  FuutankoBes. This was 
for  example  the  case  of  a  group of FafaBe’s  in  Velingara  who  were  considered as ht-comers, 
although  they  had  only  moved  in  by  the  late 1960’~’~. In those  cases the labels of  ‘local‘  and 
Ardo is the  titie of the subclan leader,  and equivalates the status of the village  chief. 
This was revealed  during the mapping exercise in Velingara in 1991 (see chapter 4). 
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‘foreigner’ tended to k m r e  related to differences  in  herd  management, to productive  strategy 
and  to  political  &ation than to  the  actual  age of settlement. In the same vein the  constituion 
of the  FuutankoBe  herders as a  distinct  group is a  recent  phenomenon, m vigour  only as a 
product  of  post-drought  migration  situation. 
The recent  tendency among a  number  of  those  FuutankoBe  herders  who had stayed  a  long time 
m the Southern Ferlo of discretely  backing  attempts  aiming  at  excluding  their  newly  arrived kin 
may also reflect such ‘identitq volatility’. With tbis in mina it turns out to be largely 
impossible to distinguish  a  group  through  some  common  objective as was  proposed by North, 
Ostrom and  others.  For as identities are changed  new groups  are  composed,  underscoring  the 
need to explain  change  historically  and  not  just  fkom  what  can  be  seen  here  and  now.. 
F i i ,  it is questionnable  whether  post-drought  migration can be perceived  solely as a  one-way 
proces of newcomers  invading  a  previously  stable  and static  resource  space. As is shown in the 
case  of the Loumbi UrurBe  sub-village  (south  of  Barkedji), the influx of FuutaukoBe  settlers  in 
some cases contriiuted to  increase  the  productive  potentials  of  a  certain  area,  thereby  making 
it more  attractive  to  the  so-called  local  population. In this case  the  labels of ‘newcomers’  and 
‘locals’  are  turned  more  or  less  up-side  down. 
We  all  come  from  Namarel [in northern Ferlo]. We came  in 1973. When we 
settled  there W no one here,  only  jackals,  hyenas nd even  lions. We camped 
in  one  single,  but  very  large  camp. This was  to  protect  our  herds  against  the 
WiId animals.  But  after a while  the  predators left [to find a more  undisturbed 
environement].  And  then  the  SanraBe  agro-pastoralists  started  moving  in. 
They started  cultivating and that‘s  when  the  trouble  of  crop  dmnages  started. 
We spend fortunes  paying  compensations for crop  damages  now.  Some  have 
even chosen to move away into the gazetted forest where there is no 
cultidon. The SanraBe’s  who  have  moved  in,  are p ople with very  little  live- 
stock. They are  amacted by the  improved  conditions for cultivation,  now  the 
predators  are  gone.  At  present  there  are 5 camps  of  SanraBe  cultivators.  But 
we fear that  more will come. l’ (FuutankoBe herder from the subvillage ofLombi UrurBe, 
Barkedji). 
The  case of Loumbi  UrurBe  illustrates,  how  djf3icult  it is to speak of the borehole  and the 
adjacent pastures as a  distinct  resource  management  space. Most  resource users operate  across 
several resource management  spaces or make use of different  resource  spaces in the  course of 
their productive  ‘career’.  Consequently, also the  distinction  between  the  rightfull  ‘owner’  of  the 
resources and  the  deleterious  ‘foreigner’  or ‘free-rider' (in the  terminology of the Common 
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Propeay framework)  will turn out to be  more  politically than objectively dehed labels, aiming 
at j u s m g  the  rights of certain  groups at the de-nt  of others. 
When  the  Ferlanke  population  of  Naor6  suggest  a  strong  dichotomy  between  themselves:  'the 
local,  sedentarised  population'and  the  others:  the  'vagrant'  foreigners  (or  even  'refugees' from 
another  country),  it s yet  an  example  of  how  identities are redehed and  traditions  reinvented. 
For as shown a b v e  restriction  of  access of  so-called  foreigners to  the  pastures  or  to  key 
resource  institutions is not tied to some mtually recogulzed primordial or ancestral right 
legitjmizing  a merentiation in  status.  Rather, it is a political  manoeuvre,  a  way  of estabhhing 
a 'discourse' linking up to the poky -work  of  decentralisation  and  self-govemance.  Framing 
the  conflict as a  problem of local vs.  stranger  groups  may  therefore  be  perceived as a  tactical 
move  by  certain  layers  of  the local  population through which  they  have  managed to legitimize 
the  intervention of the sous-pr@eet aiming to defend  their  postulated  rights of exclusivity. On 
their  side  the  newcomers may, as is the  case in  Loumbi  UrurBe,  claim  equal  rights as fust- 
comers  by  stressing  their own role as 'domesticators'  of an otherwise  uninhabitable area 
Evidently such  'politisations' or struggles  over  meanings do not  preclude  that  the  arrival  of  the 
large and highly  expansionist group of FuutakoBe households  carried  with  it  many  problems in 
terms of i n d  competition  and  partial margdisation of  those  occupying  the  area  prior to 
the FuutankoBe  mv&on.  But to  get a  proper  understanding  of  the  unfolding  of  conflicts, as the 
one  in  Naor6, it remains  critical to recognize that  the  call  for  exclusivity  was  not shed by the 
entire  (local)  population.  Other  interests  than  the  pure  defense  of  the  local  resouce  base  may  be 
just as important  elements on the  local  political agendamerefore the meanings attriiuted to 
notions  such as 'strangers'  and  locals'  and  the  definition  of  who is a  legitimate  user  and  who  an 
outsider  often turn out  to be highly  political  issues  crucial for  present  and  future  aligMlent of 
political powers. This political  dimension is however  largely  neglected  in  the  Common  Property 
approach. This omission  of the political  dinension is, as wiu be shown below,  even  more 
apparent in the analysis of  the  relations  between  local  institutions  and  the  state. 
The local institutional landscape and the myth of the obtrusive state. 
The negative  effects  of  excessive state interference  and  the  unclear  institutional  arrangements 
hold considerable weight in the arguments for (re)instawing c o m n  property resource 
management  arrangements.  According to conventional  analysis  of  local  institutional  capacities 
it is the overcentralization  of  insftutional  arrangements  which  constitute  the  prime  obstacle  for 
local  paaicipation  and self-government.  Through  stitling  of  local  initiatives,  excessive  state 
tutelage is considered a major  obstacle  to  development  of  viable  institutions  of  local  resource 
management  (Guellar, 1990130). Such  arguments are, as wiIl  be  shown  below,  pervasive,  but 
nonetheless  incomplete. 
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There can be  no  doubt  of the overly  centralized  character of the  Senegalese  state  apparatus. As
noted  by  Rondinelli  and Minis (19W451) much of the  authority  system  to  take  action,  on  both 
major  issues  and  seemingly  routine  personnel  actions, is centralized  in  the  Presidenq? To this 
adds, that governenmt StNCtures are highly  compartmentalized, composed by  many  ministries, 
agencies,  commisions  and  institutions  that  operate  with  little  co-ordination  and  co-operation. 
F i  a hiemchic system  of  controls,  inherited fiom French  tradition of public  administratioq 
hinders  the  ability  of  ministries  and  agencies  to  take  action. All of  this  contributes to  create  a 
situation  where it may be very  dif6cult  to cany out govemmnt functions  and  make  decisions 
unless the highest  executive  officer  takes  a  personal  interest  in  expedient  action. (Ths could be 
observed  very  clearly m the  case  of Naork). 
Wfi the -e reform  of  1972, a proces  of decentrakation was  launched.  It c o q k e d  
both deconcentration of power  from  central  govemement  to  local  administrative  offices  and 
handing over of specific responsibilities to locally  elected  bodies,  namely  the  rural  councils  and 
the  well-comittees.  Administratively  the  country  is  now  divided  into  regions,  departments  and 
arrondissements,  headed by governors, prifets and sous-prifets respectively. At the  lower 
administrative  levels,  the rural communities,  state  administration is handed  over  to  a  locally 
elected  body,  the mal council,  formally  endowed  with  legal  status  and  financial  autonomy. 
For the present dissertation, the administrative levels of prima^^ interest are those of the 
anondissement  and of the rural community  (communautk male). At arrondissement  level,  the 
state  administration is physically  represented  by  a  sous-prefet,  a  secretary  and  a brigade de 
gendarmerie, all of  whom  act on the behalf of the Ministry of  Interior  (Vengroff  and  Johnston, 
1987:  274). To this adds the CER (Centres  d‘Expansion Rural) a  multi-disciplinary  team  of 
extension  officers” in charge of providing  technical  expertise  for  the  implementation  of rural 
community  development  efforts  (Vengroff  and  Johnston,  1985:4). 
At the level  of the Communauti Rural, the representation of civil  servants is often  restricted  to 
a single extension  officer,  eventually in company  of  a  representative  of  the  police  forces.  At 
for a myriad of administrative  details  such as the  approval,  appointment,  promotions,  retirement etc of all admini- 
strative  personnel down to the  level of the  deparrment  director.  The  president  can  also  ammend and iscard  any 
regulation or procedure, reason for which many  conflicts over or  recommendations for change  can be resolved  only 
by actions in the  Office of the Presidency  (Rondinelli et al. 1990451) 
In fact, the President o f  the  Republic, is responsible not  only for political  guidance  and  direction  but  also 
21 In the pastoral areas the CER is comprised of extension  agents in charge of agriculture,  livestock  and 
forestry. The” chef de C E R  bas an  administrative  background  and is tied to the  Ministry  of  the  Interior. 
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ViUage level  the  state is represented  by  one  or  several  village  chiefs? The village chief is in 
charge of resolving  minor  local  conflicts, of  collecting taxes and  of  assisting the government 
technical  officers  in  their  activities.  Nonetheless  he  holds  no  formal  authority  and h s no mans 
to  sanction  tresspassing of local or national rules  or  regulations. 
Localisation of local authorities: 
(persons  in  brackets may be, but  are  not  neccesarily,  represented) . 
Chief town  of 
officers m n t  
council/ CERlExtension the ~ o n d i s s e -  
Village  Chiefs  Well-committee h o n h s e m n t  Sousprefet 
councillors 
Police  Force 
Chief town of Village Chiefs Well-committee  President of the (Extension 
the ~~- 
naut6  Rurale 
Rural  Council/ officers) 
Police  Officer 
Borehole (Councillor) Well-committee 
village 
V%e  chiefs 
V i d s e c t o r  (Councillor) Village  chief 
Councillors 
In spite  of  the  considerable  efforts  to  deconcentrate  state  agencies,  implementation is far from 
complete. As stressed by Rondielli and Minis (1990455) decision-making  respons%li@ remaim 
highly  centralized and field offices lack  the  resources to cany out their functions effectively. 
Strong  vertical  lines  of  authority  prevail  among  the  field-staff  of  technical  &tries  at th  local 
level. This counteracts  their  official  intention  of  providing  technical  support th ough the CER. 
Technical agents often prefer to follow  the  directives of their own ministries (m c h g e  of salary 
and  future  career  advancement)  instead  of  respecting  the  priorities  and  directives  of  the  local 
councils. This obviously h i t s  the ability of the CER chiefs technically in charge of the 
horkontalcoordinafion  of  activities,  to  exercise  real  authority  over  the  agents. This situation is 
further  hampered  by  a  general  condition  of  poor  equipment,  insu&ient  stafling and hancial 
constraints  which  effectively  limits thefkquence of  trips to  the  field. 
them represent their own 'sector'  (ethnic  group or  subclan) 
=Within a larger  village, for example  a  borehole-village, there may be several village chiefs as each of 
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Close collaboration  between the administrative  and  technical  officers  and the  local  government 
is also fitstrated by the  policy  of  the  central  govemement  of  keeping  administrators  responsive 
to central  policies. In order  to  make  it  more  diiiicult to develop  schemes to abuse their  powers, 
subordinate  administrative  officers are always  posted  outside  their  home  districts  and  ethnic 
groups. This, together  with  the  rapid  circulation  of  administrative  personnel,  makes  it  liable that 
anytime  the  administrator  gets to understand  a  comer  of  what is at  stake in local  politics,  he is
transfered to another  jurisdiction.  (Thomson,  1991:6). 
The Rural Councils. 
Also the devolution  of  power from the  state  to  the locally elected  and  participative  structures, 
the rural councils, is hampered  by  the  pervasiveness  of state  centralisation  and  controL 
According to the  design  of  the  Administrative  Reform  of  1972, the most  important  local 
institution in charge  of  management of local  resources is the rural councjL It  was,  however,  not 
until 198423 that these locally elected bodies had been established in every municipality 
( C o m a u t 6  Rudea) of  the  Senegalese  territory. 
Rural Councils are elected  by  universal  suf&agez  on 5 year  terms.  According to the original text 
(Loi 64-46 du  17juin  1962  relative  au  Domaine  National) all adults actually residing  in  the  area 
set up  in  the  course of 1970’s. In those parts of the  Ferlo  comprised  by  Region  du Fleuve,  the  councils  were 
established  in  1980  and  in 1982 in  Senegal  Oriental. (As the last area Dakar  elected their fust municipal  council  in 
1984 (vengroff and  Johnston, 1987276)). 
23 In those  parts of the Ferlo  region  comprised within Departement of Diourbel  (Louga)  the  councils  were 
villages  and  a  total of 5000 to 10.000  inhabitants.  (Le  Roy, 1980562) 
A Communautk  Rurale  consists of a number of villages  within  an  ‘‘Arrondissement’’ i.e. 20 to 80 
the  Ferlo, 16 members are elected through direct  voting. originally 2 3  of the members were elected by universal 
suffrage  while  one-third are appointed by the  local  cooperatives. Since 1996, all members have been  elected. 
The number of elected  members  varies  according to the  population density of the mal community. In 
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and  occupied  with  ‘rural  activities’  may  be  elected  into  the  councilz6. In reality  lnembers  are 
almost exclusively selected among the local  sedentarked  elites  and mobilized through  the 
factions  of  the  ruling  Socialist Party. 
The Rural Councils are intended to act as a sort of interphase between the temtorial 
adminktrative hierarchy  and  the rural  users. In principle,  they  enjoy  considerable  authority  over 
local resources: being responsible, first  and  foremost,  for the allocation  of  use  rights o land  and 
resources as well as for land use planning  i.e. the ability to reserve  certain  areas  of  the  municipal 
land for speci6c  purposes. To this adds  the  powers to regulate  local  markets,  cattle  walks  and 
residential zoning patterns  and of financing  local  community  projects  through  the  rural  councils 
budgets. 
In spite of the  broad  powers  attributed to the  rural  councils  with  the  reform,  a  number  of 
constraints exist  which limit the efEective control  of the councils  over  local  resource use. First of 
all, the state  maintains  considerable powers  over  the nual council.  For  being  an  agent  of  the 
state,  the  president  of  the rural council  comes directly under  the  authority of the so~s-prkfe?~. 
Until the 1990 revision  of the law, the sous-prefet  could  suspend  any decision taken  by  the 
president if it  was  considered  untimely,  iuegal or not in  conformity to the  spirit  of  the  rural 
council  debate to which it applies (Minist6re de YInterieur, 1984 14 here  quoted ftom Vengroff 
et al., 1984.12). This also applied for  the  resolution  of  local  conflicts which  formally  lay  in  the 
hands of the rural council. Here, the autonomy  of  decision is hampered by  a  clause  according to 
which  solutions  are to be presented to the sow-prt‘fet before  application (Le Roy  ,1980: 563). 
Since 1990 a  majority  of the prerogatives  regarding  local  resource  management  were  transfered 
to the  rural  council  leaving  the sow-prt‘fet a  clearer  role as the  controling  party  (Blundo, 
1995b14). 
domicilis  dans le terroir , y dsident effectivement s’y livrant A des activit6s d e s  a titre principal  et  jouissant  des 
droits  electoraux” 
Art. 10 :” Le Conseil rural] peut  comprendre [..l des membres Blus parmi et par des personnes 
The text  concerning  the degree of state supervision of the councils has been  subject to frequent 
revisions.  Initially  land  attribution was a prerogative of  the  president of the  rural  council  upon  consultation 
with the  other  councilors.  This was modified in 1980, where the sous-prefer was  given  the  authority  of fmal 
approbation.  In 1986 further centralization was  made as a decree transferred this approbation to the Prqet. 
Finally in 1990, the autonomy of the rural council was reinforced, as the control over local budgets and tax 
collection  was  transferred  from  the sous-prefer to the President of the ma1 council. 
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Futkmre vast tracts of  land  in the areas in  question  are  gazetted (as pastoral,  forest or game 
reserves). and  therefore  remain  under  the  direct  authority  of  the  state through the Forestry 
Service?.  And M y ,  the  councils  dispose  of  few hancial and  logistical means to control  the 
implementation  of  their  decisions  notwithstanding  the  implementation  of  local  development 
projects as propsed by  the  law.  According  to  the  intentions  of  the Refom the activities  of  the 
rural councils are to be fjnanced pnmarity through  a  rural tax which is managed  and  budgeted  by 
the rural communities  themselves. The rural  council,  however, has no control  over the rate of 
taxation  which is fixed  by  the  state.  According  to  planners thi ‘investment budget’ was to be 
the motor  of the communi@ budget as local  leaders  were  intended to commit the greatest  share 
of the  budget  to  economic  investments  such as tube-wells  and  larger  boreholes,  livestock 
vaccination pens, markets,  irrigation  schemes  etc.  promoting  the  development of the  rural 
community  (Vengroff  and  Johnston, 1987276 ). These intentions  have,  however, had little 
impact on reality.  Budgets  are  very  limited  and m most  cases no development  projects are 
actually carried ouf9. In the pastoral area, the large of logistical and hmcial support is 
particuIarly  problematic as each  council is in  charge  of  vast areas3’  over  which the councilon are 
spread. 
So although the rural councils are designated to play a central role in local resource 
managem& few mans are provided  for  regulating  and  securing pastoral  land fiom agricultural 
encroachment. As will be shown below, the legal ftamework is both contradictory and 
ambiguous, making it very difficult for the councillors to  cany out  any e a i e n t  land use 
planning. 
A maiu problem is the  agricultural bias of  the  legal  kamework.  According to the Land  Law  of 
1964 (Loi 64-46 du 17juin 1964 relative  au  Domaine  National)  land is intransferable.  Plots may 
Faune du Ferlo Nord covering  332.000 ha and the  Reserve de Faune  du  Ferlo  Sud  covering  663.700 ha Source: 
This is particularly  relevant  for  the Eastem part  of  the  field area which is located  entirely within the Reserve de 
Grenier, 1987p 156-157. 
CFA i.e. 270042.000 US$. The  budget of the  Communauti Rurale of Sald6  amounted 22 million CFA in 1991 of 
which 1 million were given as subsidies to the  running  costs of boreholes  in the area, 2 million were used to repair 
wells and boreholes,  while 3.7 millon  were used for the  drilling of a  well. 
29 According to  Vengroff  and  Johnston  in  1983-84  total  annual  budgets  ranged between 1 -17 million 
30 The cornmunaut6 nuale of Barkedji  comprises  2072 sq.km, whereas  the  Communaut6 Rurale of Ogo, 
the  country’s largest is approximately  18.000 sq. km. 
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be allocated individually only in the form of leasehold to producers who will ensure its 
productive  use either by physical or financial  investment  in  the  land,  the  principle  of mise en 
valeur (land  development). As long as the peasant  uses  the  land  productively  and  hence  respects 
the mise en vuleur he wil not  be  deprived of his means of  production  (Decret 86-445). For 
herders,  however, this situation is quite  problematic.  Due  to  the  extensive  character  of  the 
Salaelian grazing  systems, gazing as such is not  considered  a  productive  investment  in  the  land, 
and  can  therefore  not  serve as a  justification for obtaining  private  leaseholds. So even if the 
right of access is left  almost  untouched  by the  law,  herders  have few means to  protect  their 
grazing lands once  claims  have  been  made  by  agriculturalists. 
In the come of the years, attempts  have been made  to  improve  tenure  security  on  grazing  lands. 
According  to  a decree from  the Ministry of  Agriculture  from  1980  it isprohibited to clear  land 
for agndhml purposes  within  the  boundaries  of  natural  pastures.  According to the decree 72- 
1288, land  which is designated as grazing  lands  may be used  by  any  citizen (rLssortissant du 
terroir". Here,  one  finds  an  attempt to bind the local  resources to the local settled  population. 
But as shown by Ji Roy  (1980560)  impleementation  of  the  regulation is seriously  hampered  by 
the  fact  that  the  concept of "terroir" remajns undefined. 
In the s a m  way, the  decree  stipulates  that i is the  responsibiity  of  the  cultivator t  fence  and 
protect his fields from straying animals. But  again,  the  legal  value  of  these decrees is severely 
restricted, as none  of  the  pastoral  zones,  except  for  the  gazetted areas, can  boast  of  clearly 
demarcated boun&es. The legality of a cleared field will therefore remain subject to 
negotiations  and  interpretations. 
One  the  whole,  restriction  on the room of manoeuvre of cultivators  in  search  of  new  lands  to 
clear is limited  to  singular  regulations  such as the  prohibition  to  cultivate within a limit of 1 km 
h m  a pond and on cattle trek% But  even such regulanons may be diEcult to put  into  effect  due 
to  the limited  capacity  of  the  institutions  in  charge  of  their  control. 
Finally,  the  central  concept  of mise en vdeur is difficult for  the  councillors  to handk a  fact 
which  is  reflected  in  the  minutes fiom council  lneetjngs  by  recurrent  reference to almost all 
applicants as 'great  workers'.  EspeciaUy  estimations  of the capacities  of  modem  farming units 
such as the Mouride daaras becomes pure guesswork. Indeed the lack of examples of 
'desaffectation" (fields taken away from leaseholders because of non-cultivation) and the 
enormous areas attriiuted to  single families is telllng  for the difficulties (or lack  of  motivation) 
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related to the evaluation  of  the  productive  capacities  of  the  individual  household3’.  The  effect  of 
such  ‘incapacities’is  likely to be that  priorities  other than the  plain  productive  capacities  are 
decisive  for  how  much  and to whom  land is attributed. 
This is  well  illustrated  by  the  sweeping  practices  of  the Mourides of making  claims  of  several 
hundred quare krns of  land often  located  within  the h i t s  of  the  gazetted  forests,  and  the  many 
cases where  fanners,  including  the  mourides  have stated cultivating  much  larger tracts  of  land 
that ongmlly atributed? But it is also embodied  in the new  ‘counter-strategy’put  into  effect  by 
thebig herd owners  of  Velingara  in 1990 and  1991  who  started  soliciting  large  parcels  of  lands 
as private  grazing  grounds. This attribution of  parcels  covering 10, 15 or 20 k m z  of pastures 
(mainly to council members) aimed primarily at creating a buffer against the expansionist 
practices  of the Mourides. As herders  seldom posess @cultural  tools or manpower to cultivate 
more  than  a  single  hectare or two, the  practice  was  clearly  not  in  conformity  with  the  law. 
Nonetheless  it was approved,  at  least  passively,  by  the sous-prcjFet and  the pr&@, thereby 
providing  yet  an  example  of  the  p&  non-application  of  the  law. 
In spite  of  these  obvious  deficiencies, it remains  questionnable  whether  the  apparently  meagre 
results of the decentralization proces can be attriiuted solely to  the  insufiicient  devolution f real 
power from central  government or to the deficiencies  and  contradictions  of  the  legal  flamework, 
as assuITEd by Rondinelli and Minis, Guellar  and Thomson. For  while,  it s true, as shown  above, 
that decentralization remains imperfect and the fundamntally centralistic structure of the 
Senegalese state  apparatus  in  many  ways  serves to undermine  the  autority  and  efficiency  of  the 
locally elected bodies, it remains doubtfun whether clear stmctures of authority or the 
establishment  of  a  lucid  and  unequivocal  legal  framework is likely  in  itself to improve  local 
management  si@cantly. Looking into the  actual  practices of the decentralized  institutions  in 
charge  of  local  resource  management  a  number of equally  important  issues  are  revealed,  more 
related to the  local  practicing of politics. 
See also Le Roy 1980565, Caverivi2re 1991:22  and Juul 1991c. 
the  extension  officers  and  councillors in charge of field  delimitations. 
”Such  ‘overflowing’ of field  limits may even, is it said,  entail  movement of the  boundary  stones et up by 
33 For a  more  thorough discussion of these practices see Juul, 1993. 
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Contraq to the somewhat  amputated  version  of  local  resource management accorded to the 
rural councils, the well  comittees  enjoy  considerable  autonomy  both  financially  and  legally. 
Indeed the  measures  taken  by  the  state in 1984  to hand  over  the  responsibilities for operation 
and  maintenance  of  boreholes  and  pumps to locally  elected  well  committees  have in m a y  ways 
therefore proven  far  more sipiicant with  regard to pastoral  land  use than the creation of the 
rural councils. Before  passing on to the  general  discussion  of  decentralisation  and the extents of 
state powers in the  Senegalese  countryside,  these  committees  and  their  abilities in terms  of 
efficient  local  management  will  therefore be presented  and  discussed. 
The well committees. 
In contrast  to the restricted  powers  of the rural council,  the  handing  over  of  responsibility  for the 
boreholes to locally  elected  committees i  largely  in  line  with  the  recommendations  of the  afore 
mentioned Common Propeay school.  Although  the  state  remains  the  formal  owner  of both 
water resourcesu and of the technical equipment, the well-committee enjoys extensive 
autonomy  receiving  almost no organisational  support fiomthe state. 
The different degrees of autonomy result pnmanly  om differences m the objectives of 
decentralisaton.  Obviously  the driving force behind  the  establishment  of  the  well-committees  in 
1984 was an attempt by the state to reduce public expenditure as part of the structural 
adjustment programme,  an  intent  deckmd  overtly in the  legal  -work  of the transfe?’. 
Although  public  parlance  highlights the participatory  elements  of  the  transfer  of  responsibility, 
herders have  tended  to  regard  it mainly as a  transfer  of  costs of operation  and  maintenance. 
Contrary to the  implicit assumption, that  transfer  of  power is always  wellcomed  by the local 
population,  herders feel that maintenance should remain the responsibility of the state, an 
opinion which  helps to explain  the  widespread  reluctance  to  pay  for  even  minor  repairs. Ths 
are  a collective asset and ther use of the nahonal terntog LS sub ect to nor authonzahon and supervls1on. (Artcle 2 
According to &e Water  Code  Water  resources  are an i n t e d  part of @e  public  domain.,  Such  resources 
Law 81.13 of March 1981 Journal Wiciel de  la  Repubhque  du Senegdlno.  4829 Here  quoted from Allisouun, 
1997:3). 
gestion de forages  en  milieu rural,  and  Circulaire  Interministerielle  du  9  janvier 1984,  Annexe 5 sur les  Comites  de 
35 Circulajre Interministerielle  du  9  janvier  1984  visant a la dation et a la gidralisation de comites  de 
Gestion des Forages. 
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results in  surprisingly  fkequent  cases  where  the  vital  source  of  water is blocked  for  months 
despite  considerable  inconveniences  for  the  users36. 
The (rudimentq) legal fkanework affecting the well committees is interesting on several 
counts. Erst of all, it is stated  that  the  committee is a  public  non-profit  making  organization, 
organized  in  accordance  with  the  President  of  the  Rural  Council  of  the  locality.  Secondly,  the 
recommended 12 members  of the well-committee  are  elected by the  local  population  for  a 
period of 2 years. With  regards  to membership, this is open  for  any  user  paying correctly  their 
waterhg fees. Tlvrdly, the objectives  are  restricted to ensure  supplies  of  diesel  and  lubricants as 
well as proper  maintenance  of  the  pump  and  engine. 
Nothing in the law confirms that 'indigenous' occupants of a certain area, should have 
preferential rights with regards to representation in the  boards  of  the  well-comittee, as it is often 
argued  by  local'  residents  and  even by the  personel  of  the Ministry'. 
In spite, however,  of  the  requirements of the  text,  none of the  well-committees  visisted 
during my  fieldtrips  could boast of  having  held  any  elections,  since the  initial  election of 
1984. In many cases,  single  members  had  been  replaced  with  others  of the Presidents 
choice, as in  Naore. In other cases  the  boards had  been  dissolved  numerous  times  by the 
sous-prefet or the  President  of the Rural Council,  who  had  used  the  opportunity to appoint 
a  new  committee, in some  cases  made  up by adolescents  or  people  without  much cattle3 
acting  more or less as stooges  for  more  influential  people. 
The present well  commitee has been in ofice 4 months. I don't know  what 
happened to the old one, but the President of the Rural Council called  upon 
one of his relatives and askd him to become President of a new well 
dipartemenr have been paralyzed  for  more than 2 yeas, due to  breakdown ofthe motor. 
j6 According to the Services de 1Hydraulrqw's regional office in hgnere 4 of  the  boreholes  of the 
1'Hydraulique) that only  those  paying  their (poll) taxes in  the area can be appointed  members  of the  board. (those who pay 
their tares down there can de p a n  of the board, those who are outside cannot. The tramhumants are  outside) This view 
is also  the one forwarded  by  the  local  'first-comer'  population. 
j' It is a iirm belief  among  the  technicians of the  regional oftice of the Ministry of Waterworks (Service de 
Members of the  board  are officially compensated  by  a  10%  refund  of  the fe s collected. 
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committee.  It’s  very d&licdt to find anyone  who is ready to volonteer for the 
job. We  have  all  been  appointed by the  President  of  the  Rural Council. Except 
for two representatives  of  the  Wolof population , we are  all his relatives. We 
are  all young people” Wember ofthe well-committeee,  Barkedji  febr. 1993.) 
Alternatively,  the  composition  of the board is a  matter of eternal  strive  between  various  rival 
sub-clans  and  factions  present  around the  borehole as in the case  of  Gueye Kadar, where 
standstill of the well has been  a  repeating  feature  ever  since the handing over  of  resposibility  due 
to internal  competition  between IrlaaBe,  UrurBe and DialluBe Fulani sutclans. . 
Often  these conDicts  go  on  for  many  years. For  contrary to the  situation  of  exessive  state 
tutelage  of the R d  councils, the well-committees  cannot  rely on much  institutional  support  or 
organisatod backing komthe state ser~ices?~ The Ministry of  Waterworks f o d y  in charge 
of the wells,  restrict their services to technical  maintenance.  Organisational  support is, as can  be 
seen  in  the  text,  restricted  to  the  surveillance of the  President of  the rural c0uncil.4~ The sous- 
prefet is often  quite  reluctant o intervene in the  fiequent  and  uncompromising  strives  between 
ditferent factions  of the popukon over  the  wells. In several  instances  the  situation has however 
becorn so chaotic that the sous-pr.6fet has taken to dissolving  the  existing  borehole  committees 
replacing them with CO- composed by the available  extension  officers (This was also the 
proposition made  by  the sous-pr.6fet in the  case of Naor6). But in 1989 this praxis  of  ‘re- 
engagement’  of the state  was explidy condemned in a note &om the government  (Cjrculaire  de 
Jean Collin 30 juni 1989) enjoying the sous-pr.6fets to leave the management  of the  boreholes 
to  the  local  population. 
The composition  and  functionning  of the  board is also a matter of serious divide  between  those 
with  only  few animals and  those  with many 
In the  original  conception of  the  handing over  a  special  unit for ‘sensibilisation’ or awareness-  raising,  was  intented. 
39 The  Services  de  l’Hydraulique  do  not  intervene  in  organisational  matte-s  (questions  de  sensibilisation). 
Due to budgetary  limits it was  never  implemented. 
ofthe budgets and accounts of the well-commitee: There are lots offinancial problems, but no one is in charge of 
taking care of that problem. It up to the sous-prefet currently in office whether he will designate someone to 
supervise the accounts”. Chef  de CER, Barkedji  febr. 1993. 
a Also the  Chef  de CER laments  the  lack  of  clear  rules  and  control: “There is nobody  to make revisions 
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To become  a  member of the well-commitee  you must live  in the village and 
have a few heads ofg livestock. No, I don’t know whether that winen down 
anywhere. If the  boreholes  were  handed  over to those  with m y  heads of 
livestock,  there would be  no  more  problems. At present  it‘s  the poor, who are 
in charge. They need  the  money  they can  earn and what surplus they  might 
ernbe.de for the  suntiVal of their  families. In Ranirou, they  get 20 % of the 
turn-over [against  normally lo%] Veterinary  assitent,  Ranirou). 
But on  the  other  hand,  the  large  herd  owners,  first-comers  and  newcomers  alike,  have  until 
recently tended to  give the wellarnmitte little  attention,  claiming  that  they  are  herders  and  have 
other  more  important  thing  to  do  than o hang  around  at  the  well. 
The high  level  of emkedemnt is condemned  vigourously  by all parties.  Nonetheless is remains 
characteristic  for the vast majority of boreholes  legitimated as it is by  a  general  dislike  among 
herders  to  count  their animals, leaving  taxes  to be evaluated as a  rough  estimate  of  the size of 
the  herd4’.  Lack  of  transparency  in  accounts further  facilitates informal agreements in favor  of 
influential  indigenous  herders  who  by  way  of  clientelistic  relations  and informal negotiations 
have managed to keep their contribufions to a minimum4’. Many web are now  financed  almost 
exclusively  by taxes applied  to  FuutankoBe  herds  -a  practice  which  seriously questions the  non- 
profit  character  of  the  well-comnitees. 
In spite of the profits  made,  cases  are  fiequent  where the pump is shut  down  several  days or 
weeks  because  of  lack  of  fuel  and  lubricants,  of  spare-parts  or  of  other  repair.  Such  perpetual 
embezzlement of funds evidently  generates  a  climate  of  general  mistrust. As noted  by  the 
regional  livestock  officer  in Linguitre: 
“There are many problems with the boreholes. Even if the transhumants 
weren’t there,  there would be problems.  There  are  simply  too m y  animals at 
encampment  with  the  tubes. 
‘I Such  estimations  were  not  made easier by  the fact that a considerable  part of the  herd  was  watered  at  the 
corresponding to notoriously false herd size estimations. 
‘*According  to  Grenier  (1987:138) the fees payed  in 1987 had  been  unchanged for 10 years,  hence 
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the wells. At Warhock [a borehole  with little or no FuutakoBe  representation], 
they have anived to a situation where they pay for watering on a daily basis. 
With  regards to the  process of  decentralization, it is impoartnat to  stress  that the borehole 
committees  were not intended to play  any  significant  role.  The  boreholes  remain  under state 
ownershq, guaranteeing everyone  who  will  pay  the  fees  agreed  a  right  to  use the facilities.  With 
regard to regulation  of  access  to  the  watering  facilities  notwithstanding  the  adjacent  grazing 
lands, they do not officially  hold  any  authority.  Nonetheless, the well-comnittees  have  found 
themselves to be holders of no less than the  key  institution to  control management  of  local 
ESOLIKZS, the atnlay to linm access  to  pastures  through  regulation  of  the  number  of  users  of  the 
well. This, unintended consequence of state withdrawal, becomes all the more  paradoxical  when 
one recalls that m contrast  to the rural councils  who  are  under  tutelage  of  the  Bureau  in  Charge 
of the Decentralization located in the Ministry of Internal A f f a i r s ,  boreholes and well- 
committees remain seperated kom the  decentralisation  process,  under the supervision  of  the 
Ministry of  Waterworks. 
The impoaance ofthe role  of  the  well  comittees ba become  apparent  particularly in relation  to 
postdrought migration  Obviously  the  growing  number  of  "foreign"  herders  transhuming  in  the 
area, especially in  years  of  rain  deficit,  increases  competition on the  pastoral  resources,  just a  it 
wears the pump machinery which in most cases is old and Hence, excessive use in 
order to satisfy  the  large  number  of animals contributes to kequent  breakdowns  which  force 
otherwise sedentary agro-pastoralists to move  over to the neighboring  well  for  longer  or  shorter 
periods of time. In order  to l i t  pressure on the  borehole  pump  and  not  the  least  the  pressure 
on the adjacent  pastures,  some  first-comers  holding office in  the  well-committees  have  used  the 
tool,  out of direct reach  of  the Rural Counc&  of  limiting  the number of users of the well. This 
may be  done either by direct exclusion  (which is illegal  accoraing to the  law)  or  through  the 
exorbitant  taxing  of  herds belonging to  the  migrant  population. 
But although emergence of more  exclusive  practices  would  appear to be a natural consequence 
of  increased  competition on resources,  this  trend is accompanied  by  its  apparent  opposition - a 
similarly strong inclination towards inclusive practices, generated primarily by economic 
concerns.  For with the  arrival of  the  FuutankoBe  herders,  the  turnovers  of  the  well-committees 
function 24 hours a day in  the  deliberate  intention f making them break down, so that transhumants will  leave. 
The  level of suspicion is so that certain herders even suspect the  wells committees of letting  the pumps 
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have  increased  dramatically,  and  have  turned  into  important mans for  extraction  of  economic 
revenue. The result  of  these  contradictory  interests has been that  the  policy  of  most  well- 
committees has been  a  constant  oscillation  between  exclusive  and  inclusive  strategies  with 
regard to foreigners’  access  to  water;  between  the  desire to limit competition on pastures 
through restrictions on the number  of  users  and the  temptation to increase  revenues of the  well- 
committee  by  expanding  the  number  of  “foreigners” to  finance the bulk  of runningcosts of the 
deep-well  (the  advantage of the last strategy  being  that  it is likely to create  a  surplus  apt  for 
embezzlement). 
Contrary  to  the improved  management  anticipated by the Common Property framework  the 
handing-over  of  boreholes to locally  elected  bodies has resulted in  generally poor management 
of  the  welts.  Breakdowns  of the equipment  of  the  wells are frequent,  and  local  herders  generally 
reluctant  to  pay  for  something  which  they  regard  essentially as a  state  responsibility. 
It is, however, important to notice that in spite  of  the  newly  aquired  ability  of  borehole  members 
to  regulate  the  number  of  herders gazing in  the  adjacent  pastures,  contlicts  center  increasingly 
on  problem related to the financial  management  of  the  borehole,  rather than on management of 
the  pastures.  For  apart  from  turning  into  a  key  institution in resource  management,  the  deep- 
wells  have also proven  to be important means for  extraction of economic  resources in  a  region 
otherwise  largely  deprived  of  other  objects or resource  flows  prone  for  misappropriation. 
In the  controversy  between  protection  of  local  resources  and  the  economic  advantages  related 
to increased mobility, many well-committees are incited to a constant oscillation between 
inclusive  (and  financially  attractive)  strategies  and  exclusive  practices  where th   access  to  wells 
is used as a means to limit ‘free-ridjng’ by ‘foreign’ herds. And contrary that what was 
envkionedby  Runge,  the  chosen policy turn  out to be  motivated  more  by  short-term  economic 
(and  political)  gain  than  by  longterm  ecological  concerns. 
Excessive state centralisation or politisation of institutions? 
The process  of  decentralization  in  Senegal  comprises  both  a  devolution  of  power  from the 
central  government  to  the  local  administration  (decontration)  and  a  handing over of s p 5 c  
r e s p o n s i i  fiomthe state to m r e  or less autonomous  and  locally  elected  bodies; n w l y  the 
rural councils and the wen committees. Where  the  rural  councils  and the  local  administration  are 
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closely  knit  together in a  web  of  obligations  and  control,  the  well  committees  enjoy,  for  better 
or  for  worse,  a  high degree of autonomy. 
As illustrated  by the case  of Naod, the direct  effect  of this handing  over of control  over  the 
natural resources  was  not n e c e s d y  more efficient managemnt. Rather the effect  was m the 
first  place  that  new arenas of struggle  were  being  created  with  regards  both  to  structures  of 
authority  and to the  rights  of  access per se. For as stated  by  Goheen (1992403): .”as access to 
land  and  authority  over natural resources are being  redeiined  by  the  state  through  the  process  of 
decentralizafion,  contradictions,  paradoxes  and  unintended  consequences  increase,  and  struggles 
over meaning and power  intensfies”. 
Wfiregards to problems  related to decentralisation,  one  could, as Sheldon  Guellar,  choose to 
perceive of the  role of the  state  administrators as the prim obstacle  for  self  governance,  the 
rural  councils as being  deprived  of their capacities  for  local  initiative  by  flagrant  state  tutelage 
(Guellar,  1995:140).  According to this  inteqretation,  the well-committees  would  stand  out as 
the example of genuine local associations characterized by institutional independence and 
iinancial  autonomy. 
Seen in the light of the conflicts of for example Naor.5, it is reasonable to ask whether  the 
unfolding of  local  jnitiative is in fact hindered  by  state  interventions  and  whether  the  remedy 
likely to bring about the administrative efficiency advertised for is transfer of increased 
responsibilities  to the local  population. Is it at all possible to analyze the  interrelation  between 
the rural population  and the state  solely from the  point  of  view  of  administrative  efficiency, - as
a  relation  between  simple  order  and  an  obedient  rural  dweller? 
As discussed m chapter 3, rules do not automatically determine peoples behavior. Many 
situations may force  people to countervene rules, just as they  may  chose to  do so in order  to 
fdHl some political or economic  objective.  Whetheror  not  local  initiatives  are stifiled remains 
an open question. InW it  seems more reasonable to analyze  the  ‘management’  of both well- 
commitees  and  rural  councils as a  both  creative  and,  and  at  least  to s me extent,  functionnal 
adaptation  of local institutions to the  new  management  requirements.  Such  adaptation  may  take 
place m m a y  unintended  ways, as could be seen with the powerful  key  role  suddenly a m i i d  
to  the  apparently  insigniscant well-commine. 
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In the same vein,  the  considerable  formal  power  attributed  to  the  agents  of  the  territorial 
administration  as  compared  to  that  of  the  popular  institutions,  does  not  necessarily  reflect  the 
‘real‘  relations  of  power  between  these two parties. As could be observed  in  the  checkmate 
situation  of the  sous-prefet m the Naori case,  formal  authority  does  not  necessarily  go  hand  in 
hand  with  actual  control. In many cases the  area of state  control tums out  to  be  surprisingly 
limited. 
Hence,  a  first  problem  when  evaluating  the  extent  of  state  control  at  local  level  relates to  s ate 
representation. In areas as sparsely  populated as the  Ferlo  region,  each cornmumuti luraZe 
covers  a  vast area. Herders’  relations  to  the state admjnistration  may  therfore be very  distant,  a 
situation  which is e r  aggravated  by  a  permanent lack of  vehicles,  fuel  etc.  The  rural  council 
tends  to be far better represented  in the chef lieu de Z’arrondissement, the  central  village,  where 
also the sous-pr&?& o&e and the gendarmerie are  located,  than  in  the small vdlages scattered 
over  a  vast  territory. 
Due,  among  other  things, to the  extensive  distances,  the lack of  information  about  the  actual 
situation  in  the  more  remote areas and  a  generalized  practice  of  informal  arrangements,  few of 
the  conflicts  played  out  in  the  field  follow  the  official  routines  and  formalised  structures  of 
decision  making. In fact,  many  of  the  decisions  concerning  land atmiution which  formally  are 
under  the  authority of the rural council, are taken  locally  without  consent or approval  of  those 
formally  elected.  Both  my own data material  and  the  literature  on  tenure  problems  in  Senegal 
abounds  with  examples  of  how  land is attributed by the  president  of  the rural council  and 
‘officializpd though his stamp on  a typed petition’  without  any  control r measuremenp by the 
CER or sous-pr$et or  even  consent  from the  other members  of  the Conseil Rural. (see Blundo, 
1995b:13; LeRoy,  1980;  Mathieu,  1996  and Juul, 1991~). In other  cases  land is distriiuted by 
the  village  chief  or  simply  taken  by the user  without  any  form  of  formal  approvaL 
In short,  the  situation  surrounding  land  attributions  in  large  parts  of  Senegal  may  at  best  be 
characterized as imperfect. Attriiuhg the  responsability  for this chaotic  situation  solely  on  the 
excessive  state  interventions,  therefore  seems  unjustified. 
M The  prospections  (missions de prospection) prescribed by the law before  any  attribution of land is 
carried out, are  highly  infrequent  (communication of the President de  Conseil  Rural of Barkedji  1993, see also 
Blundo,  1995b:13).  Only  a small part of the plots attributed are registered in  the  books  (cahiers de dbliberation) of 
the rural council  (see  Juul ,1991~). And  in  those cases where  registration is carried  out  the  actual  size of the plot 
only in  few  cases  corresponds to the extent registered,  while its geographical  location in most  cases is omitted. 
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In reality  the  control  and  influence  of  the  state i  severely  restricted  by the ambiguous position 
of the  sous-prefet  and  the CER vis-&vis the  local  population.  For  contrary to the vision of the 
Common Property progagators of the state administration giving orders to an obedient 
populafion, it turns out  that the local population to a wide  extent  evades,  obstructs or transforms 
the orders of the  authorities as part  of  a  defensive  strategy  (Spittler,  197930). As shown  by 
Spittler,  such  defensive strategies may take many  forms  ranging from hiding or direct  movement 
of villages into the bush  to  escape  tax  collection,  labour  demands  or  other  forms  of  bureaucratic 
pressure, to ignoring  or  deformation  of  the  commands  and  probihitions  of  the  state. Also 
simulation of agreement is a mans by  which  herders or farmers  hope to bargain  with the 
minimum of  annoyance  and  bring thesubject to an end as quickly as possible  (ibid.:32). 
As experienced several tjmes during fieldwork, the effect of such strategies of defensive 
communidon is obviously  a  low  level  of  information on the  part  of  the  administration at local 
as well as at  the  central leveL  According  to  Spittler (ibid35) this lack  of howledge may be 
partly  compensated  for  by  force.  For  contrary  to  other  forms of  influence  which implies some 
consideration  of  the  situation as a  whole,  this is less a requirement with threat of  force. This 
mkes it  easier to handle for the administrative  authority.  Alternatively,  the  administration  may 
chose to give  up  the arm in  which it is hardest to achieve  success. The reaction ofthe state 
therefore becomes a paradoxical  mixture  of  laissez-faire  and  force,  a  situation  which also 
characterised the role  of  the  state  administrators m the  case  of  Naor6. 
W e  the analysis proposed  by  Spittler  of  the  interrelation between peasants  and the  state fit 
well with the situation of  the  Ferlo, his focus on the  defensive  aspects  of  the  peasants’  reactions 
tends to overlook the political  power struggles going on between merent groups  of  herders 
and peasants and the role  of  the  administration  herein.  For  where  according to  Spittler peasants 
attempt as m c h  as possible to avoid  situations  which  could  bring  them  into  contact  with the 
holders of office in the  government,  herders in for example Naori played  a  very  active part in 
innuencing or discrediting  the  agents  of  the  administraton as part  of  the  struggle for  political 
power45. 
autonomy from the state I prefer  the view expressed by Beny (1993: 62) according to which people  in general 
seek to activate ties to the state when  gains can be  made from  it,  and  escape when state resources dwindle or 
political opponents gain  the  upper hand. 
45 Where Spittler here seemingly  approaches  Hydens  ‘uncaptured peasant’in his focusing on peasant’s 
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Furthermore the Naor6  case  shows,  how  the sous-pr@? acts  within  a highly politicized  local 
environment  where  the  administration is under  strict  control  by  the  (ruling)  Socialist Party4‘. 
Any faux pas, stemming  from  jnsufiicient  understanding of the  intricacies  of  local  politics, is 
likely to  cost  the  local  administrative  officer his career  or  at  least  put  a  halt  on  any  aspiration of 
moving  closer to civjlizafion  and  away fiom the  dust storm and the heat  of  the  Ferlo  by  way of 
a promtion, This situation is well  recognized  by  the.  representatives of the  local  administration 
and  was  obviously a source of  great  frustration  to  the so.s-pr& of Og0 in the  Naore  case. 
As a  result, the som-prefk? and his officers,  who  are  paralyzed  by the joint  pressure fiom the 
Ministry, the political  party  structure  and  not  the  least  the  local  politicians,  tend as long as 
possible to adopt  a laissez-faire attitude  and to limit  interventions  and  hence  active  responsibility 
to aminimum 
According  to  Spittler (1979:35), such  circumstances  forces  the sous-pr$&, who is under  the 
obligation of reporting  regularly  and  extensively to his hierarchic  superiors to  resort to the 
creation of a  fictive  reality in his monthly  reports. This tendency  by the  local  administrators of 
trying to keep out  local  disorder is labelled instihuioml autism by  Geshiere (198422, see also 
Spittler, 1984.364’ and  Blundo, 199%) and  stems from a  mixture of deficient  knowledge of the 
realities of the  vast  area  under his command,  and  out of fear  of  presenting  local  conflicts to the 
higher  levels  of  an  administrative  hierarchy  who  will  conceive of such  local  disorders  primarily 
as disturbances,  issue of the  insufficient  capabilities of the  administrative  o&er. 
Institutional  autism  and  attempts  to  avoid  getting  to know about  local  conflicts  may be traced 
in the many  cases of local dispute  where  the  pragmatic  intervention of the  local sous-pr?fet or 
Parties. The large majority of administcatie cadres are party  members, just as all  councillors, at least until the latest 
elections were  members of the  ruling party. 
*The state adminisuation is to a  considerable  degree  interwoven  with  the  structures of the  ruling Socialist 
in Niger when the district commissioners  in  spite of severe  famine  continuously  reported of high input pr. hectare 
and an adequate provision for the population.  Hence  the  blame for a bad  harvest  was  attributed to the natives and 
their laziness. As the  famine  was  finally  recognized in 1932, the  bureaucratic  machinery  was  able  “with ts usual 
seeming precision to evaluate the victims to 26,167 dead  and 29,311 emigrated to Nigeria”. 
47 Spittler (1984:37) refers to the  disastrous  situation of 1930-31 created by the colonial adminishators 
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chef& CER has been to urge the local  population of “trouver un In this way, 
the administrators signals that even diversions of the law will be tolerated if ody the 
administration is not  concerned  and  peace  reinstalled. In the same vein the frequent  cases of 
rrrrmmalistic‘  or  overtly  deficient  minutes from council  meetings  engaged  in  conflict  resolution 
reflect  such  generalized  reluctance  towards  ‘officializing  decisions’  by  hem  writing  down,  and 
hence run the risk of giving cause  for preceden~e~~. Finally it can be traced in the often 
supkingly low  level  of  information on the  part of the administration  for  example  regarding  the 
amplitude and implications of postdrought  migration.  Obviously  such lack of interest also goes 
hand  in  hand  with  a  tendency  among  administrators  and  extension ofkers of  misregarding the 
mobile  population.  Having  been  educated  in  a  system  which  regards  nomadic  herders as a 
residual category and an obstacle for any ‘real‘ development of the rural areas, these 
administrators  tend to favor the local,  and  settled  population  with  which  it is easier to establish 
stable  relations  and  who  fit  better  into  the  general  picture  of  an “administre”’. 
1 . .  
As a  result  of  the  above,  a  highly  fluid  situation  prevails  with  regards to  the arbitration  of  local 
conflicts, a situation in which, as we will see, decisions are fcequently contested and 
renegotiated. As in  the  example of Naor6,  local  decisions  are  often  overruled  while  decisions 
taken  by  the  state  very  often  are op n ended. This leaving open space  for  renegotiations  while 
the local  administration is left in  a sort of  power  vacuum.  For the individual  administrator this is 
often  asource of  liustrations  leading to  attempts to ‘professionalise’  the tasks asigned to the 
locally  elected  bodies: 
”We  ought to make a  committee  in  charge of installing  the  newcomers.  It 
should be formed by the extension ojlicers in charge of agriculture .and 
livestock  production. The well  comittee is not  able  to  evaluate  the  carrying 
capacity of the  pastures.  %@ore  they  would  install people in a completely 
arbitrary  manner.  It  should  be a  task for the  local  administratioa (..)It’s not 
Mathieu, 1996:67-68). But also  the  example of the adminiseations passive accept of pastoralist  councillors 
48 “Find a  mutual  arrangement” An example of such state ‘disengagement’ is given  by  Niasse(in 
attribution  of  large  tracts of grazing  lands to themselves (Velingara in 1990) is an example of such deliberate 
overlooking of tresspassings of the  law. 
representation  from  all  the  parties  involved,  including the tecnical services, the UNHCR representative etc. was 
criticised by some of the  attendants for being an un-africun form of problem-solving.The idea was that with so 
many witnesses  present  possibilities for individual negotiations were hampered just as the  solution  which was 
written  down  in  the  minutes  could  make  room f r precedence. 
49 It was  inteleting to  note, that in the case of Naod the decison of making a large meating  with 
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the  Rural  Council which is in charge of pastures. They can make cattle rracks 
etc. but that's it. In  each  arrondissement  the  sousprefet  is  the  representative of 
all the M e s ,  so he is in charge of coordinating the activities  at  local  level". 
(Chefde CER, Barkedji,  febr. 1993). 
But  such attempts to deed the 'adminstrative  territorium' do not  receive  backing  from  aboveso. 
Decisions taken by  the  government  tend to be vague  and  characterized  by  partial  application  of 
laws  and  decree, as m the  example  of  Naor6. 
This situation  is,  of  course  ,further  aggravated  by the ambiguities  and  overlaps  of the different 
legal texts jlvaaposing  the f?ee and  open  access  determined  in  the  Law  on  the  National Domain 
and  the  decentralization  proces  according to which som authority  of  exclusivity is granted  to 
the local resource managemmt institutions.  But also in  relation to the  presumed  need  for  a  clear 
and uneq~ocal framework  the  position of the  Common  Property  School is questionable.  For 
according  to  Mathieu  and  Hesseling (1986309-325), this partial  non-application of rules is 
neither  accidental  nor  an  exarnple  of the  impotence  of  the  state  apparatus.  Rather  the  gap 
between  on the one side rules  and  principles  and, on the  other  side,  its  effects  in  reality, m t  be 
seen  as  a sort of  'functional  ambiguity' - a  situation  of  fluidity  in  which  and through which 
arrangements  can be made  on  the  marge  of  legality m its  strict  sense. In this way  a  non- 
expressed consensus can be obtained  between  state  and  the  different  parties  at  local level which 
is crucial  for  the  proces  of  transformation. 
Inherent  in this proces is of  course  a  constant  strive  for  adjustment  and  accommodation  where 
the different  social  actors seek to  manoeuvre  themselves  into  those  positions  which are most 
beneficial  to his or  her  objectives  and  take  most  advantage  of  the  opportunities  offered  by  the 
moment.  Here  the  dispute  related to  who is to  be  considered  a  'regular'  user  eligible  to  the 
board  of  the  committee is of  course  central. 
Seen in this perspective is kcornes clear  that  penetration  of  state  structures  into  the  countryside 
is far more  restricted than anticipated  by the  critics of the  obtrusive  state.  Farmers  and  herders 
often choose to ignore or countervene. state  policies  which do not fit into their particular 
interests, while  bureaucrats  to  a  wide extent limit  their  sphere  of  intervention  into  those areas 
committees  above,  which was dismissed by the goverment 
so See  also the  fate of the  attempted  re-engagement of the local state administrators  into the well- 
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where  they do not get into conflicts with the ruling  elites.  The  relation  between  state  bureaucrats 
and the representatives  of  the  local  population ca therefore  not be described  just as a  one-way 
power relation between  the  'administrator'  and the 'adminishe", Rather  it is characterized  by  a 
constant  struggle for power  and  authority  between  different  parties  each  disposing of different 
political means. Although  critics are right  when  they  claim  that  the  decentralisation  proces in 
Senegal, particularly  until  1990,  was  stifned  by  the  excessive  controlling  powers  attributed  to 
the sous-pr6fef and the ministries of tutelage,  the  critique  tends  to  underestimate  both the 
political abilities of the local d elites and the compkxity of the task assigned to the 
administative  authority.  Squeezed as they  are  between claims and  diverging  interests  of the 
marabouts, the rural councils and the political party, the  sphere  of influence of the sous-prifet 
and his officers wjll  often turn out  to  be  extremely  restricted. 
As a  result cases are many  where  strategies  of  peacekeeping  and  accomodation  has  dominated 
state intervention  rather than attempts  of  keeping  strictly  to  the  letter of the  law.  Blundo  even 
speaks of the process of 'socialisation de l'administration de tutelle', refering  to  the  ways in 
which  any  newly  appointed  sousprefet will tend to cling  to the political  faction  or  tendency  in 
majority and otherwise keep a minimum level of govemmentality, in order to avoid 
administrative  trouble  (Blundo, 19954x14).  Hence,  contrary to what is anticipated,  there is not 
necessarily any conflict between the locally elected representatives and the administrative 
personnel. 
Excessive state intervention  is  therefore  seldom a proper diagnosis to the limited  efficiency  of 
local resource managant  institutions  and  transfer  of  power  to  local  institutions no panacea to 
@rove  local  management  practices. As highlighted by the  quotation  below,  rules do not 
neccesarily determine  peoples  behavior,  just a many  &rent institutions may compete  for  the 
control over  the same resources. 
"It's  dzficult to  talk of d e s  in relation to the Rural Council, for among 
Fulani's, people do not follow what is w'tten down.  Fonnally it's the  Rural 
council who should decide everything in relation to the  management of the 
territory  here. But that's  not  possible  because of Fulani solidarity [Puhah]. 
People should make a request  bejiore  settling  in  the area. But people just settle 
where they feel like. The Rural Council  isn't informed of anything.  People  only 
negotiate with the  Borehole Committee".(Agro-pastorakt, former  president  of 
the Rural Council,  Thiargny,  February  1993.) 
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5.2. Political  and  social  realignment  in a post-drought  context. 
But how does the question of decentralisation, and the politicisation of the natural resouce 
management  institutions  relate  to  the  issue of post-drought migration? 
In the  introduction  to  the  dissertation,  the  importance  of getting the  political  diemsion  back  into 
the  study  of  natural resource management’  was  emphasized together with  the  need for uncovering 
the often unexpected  and  innovative  ways  in  which drought victims  have  adapted to and  taken 
advantage of the  post-drought  situation.  As  revealed  in  the cases and  events  recounted  above 
‘getting  politics  back in’ tums out to be an essential requirement  if one is to  explain  the  successfull 
and  dynamic  adaptation  of  the  FuutankoBe  herders. For, as will be argued  below,  the success of 
the  FuutankoBe  herders also has to  do  with  their  ability  to  manouevre  adeptly  within  the  existing 
power  elations  and to take  advantage of the current political  opportunities. Here the 
decentralisation  policy  is  but  one of several  occasions. 
The  second  part  of  this  chapter is an  attempt  to  disentangle this process of adjusting  the  political 
and social institutions  to  a  new  emerging  order. Here the political dimensions of the inception of 
the FuutankoBe herders and the impact on the post-drought migration movement on the 
institutions  controlling  water and  pastures  will  be  discussed. 
In areas as the Ferlo,  where  most  resources  formally are  state-owned but governed as open  access, 
normative  codes  play a crucial  role m the  regulation  of  accces  to  resources.  When  socio-economic 
conditions change  in  this  case as a  result of improved  herd  management  contradictions  in  the 
existing  order,  between  for  example  individualized  and communal  property  claims  may  be  become 
more  apparent. New  attempts  to  safeguard  local resources and enforce exclusive  rights are also 
likely to emerge.  Where  the  open  pursuit of material  gain  and  political power is acquiring  new 
legitimacy a mral  pretext may be needed for  rendering  legitimate claims and  social  practices  that 
have hitherto been considered  socially  unacceptable. In these situations, specific  events  such as 
droughts may, as mentionned  above,  play  a  vital role in  providing  such  justifications.  For  under 
the guise of  caring for the well-being  of the  local community a process of  innovation  of  the 
normative  codes  regulating  access  to  crucial  resources  such as water and pastures is set in motion. 
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, opportunities for such  social  and  political 
adjustment have  been  provided  through  the shorter and more localised  droughts  which  have 
occurred on several  occasions  during  the  1990s,  notably the drought of  1990-1993.  For the old 
sedentarised elites  these  events  have  provided the opportunity for re-inforcing  their  position in 
relation  to  local  power  relations  and  for  positioning  themselves  more  favourably in the  competition 
over local  resources.  For  the  emerging  elites  of  rich newcomer pastoralists  they  provided an 
opening  for  driving a  wedge  into  the  existing  institutions  involved  in  local  resource  management 
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and  in getting part in the control over key  institutions  in  local  resource  management. 
Increased mobility and exclusive  management  practices 
The new attempts to restrict access to local resources and enforce exclusive rights became 
particularly pronounced between  1991  and  1993  when  failing  rains  in  the  Northern  Ferlo  during 
two  successive  years propelled a new  wave  of  migration &om the  Senegal  River  Valley  southward 
to the less afFected areas south of  the  Lingu6re-Matam axis. Already in the  beginning  of the  rainy 
season of 1991  when  it became clear  that  rains  would  be  deficient,  the  most  livestock-rich  herders 
from the Senegal River Valley started moving  southward to join their kin in  the  southern  Ferlo. 
The  movement of these animals took place at a  steady  pace,  giving  the  animals  the  opportunity 
to graze and recover at the various boreholes or wells  traversed. 
At  certain  wells this resulted in a  tripling of the  number of animals  presumed  to  share  the  meagre 
pastures  available.  Obviously, this created  anxiety  among  the  local  population  who  foresaw  that 
they  would  be forced to migrate  themselves,  once  the  large  foreign  herds  had  stripped  the  area of 
fodder.  Transhumance  for  these, in some  cases  relatively  poor  agro-pastoralists,  implies  numerous 
constraints, as it is demanding in terms of labour  and  logistics just as it is  likely to  hamper  the 
accomplishment other supplementary  income-generating  activities. In an  attempt to reserve  the 
meagre  resources for themselves,  new  and  bitherto untried methods  were  therefore  put  into  service 
to  limit  access to the pastures. As can be read out of the  statements  below,  this  resulted in a rising 
level  of conflict throughout the Ferlo: 
In the entire Ferlo people are  doing  things  to  limit  the  access of foreigners. As far north  as 
Tessebe, the well committees  have  closed  the  borehole a few days to avoid  that herdersfrom the 
waalo  settle. It's mainly  to  avoid  illnesses. But in  some  areas  people  have  even  taken  to  burning 
their own pastures to avoid the arrival of foreigners. (FuutankoBe  herder on transhumance  near 
Loumbi  Aly Thedy febr.  1993) 
The local population will do anything to get  rid of the foreign herds. In some  cases  they do not 
fill up  the  reservoirs  properly, so the animals  are  hindered from drinking  properly. In other  cases 
they force you to continue your voyage  after  having made you pay a fortune for a  single 
watering. At the boreholes of Linde and Thiel they closed off the pump for a  whole  week,  and  told 
people  that it was broken, just to get the foreigners to move  away.  Many  herders from the  north 
are  beginning to  be afraid of  moving  south  after  these  latest  experiences." (Transhumant herder, 
Thiargny febr. 1993) 
"The transhumant herds have completelyfinished the  pastures  here, and  we'll  all be  forced to 
leave. I have stayed put around  the  borehole of Djagueli for the last many years,  moving  only 
between  my  dry season and my wet  season cmp. But with  all  the  newcomers,  my  animals  cannot 
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any longerfind pastures on  the  day  where  they  go for watering.  Herders  here  wanted  the  well 
committee  to limit the number of newcomers, but they  want to  earn  money.  Personally I don't 
want to prohibit installment of newcomers,  but it would  be  good  to  limit  the  numbers  coming at 
each  well. In that way  the  motorpump  could be  spared  without  increasing  the  taxes". (Ancient 
FuutankoBe herder, Djagueli Febr. 1993). 
"Last year we  were forced to limit  the  number of transhumants.  They  say  that  all  Senegalese have 
the same rights. All the  village  chiefs  around  Djagueli  got  together and held a  meeting. It was 
decided that transhumants could  come  and let the  animals  drink; and  then  continue  elsewhere. 
We're  saturated  here. We contacted  the  sousprefet  and  the  rural  council.  After  that  people  have 
respected  the  decision." (Chef de village Djagueli, Oct. 1994). 
"There is much more jealousy now than  was  the  case  in 1983/84. It's now,  where they  have 
started  copying on the  newcomers  and  have  large  herds  themselves,  that  the  problems of rivalry 
arise".(Herder from Mbiddi, on transhumance near Loumbi Aly Thedy febr. 1993). 
Comparing the level  of  conflicts  and  competition (or as  phrased  by the Fulani's  "the degree of 
jealousy") over resources from the  great  drought  periods of the 1970s and 1980s till  now  is  of 
course  a  hazardous  endeavour.  For  obvious  reasons, it is  problematic,  in  retrospect,  to  assess  the 
degree of conflict which resulted  from  the  insertion f the first  contingent of "drought  refugees" 
in the beginning of the seventies and eighties. Sufficiently reliable sources concerning the 
acceptance  and  tolerance of the  local  population vis-&-vis refugees of the  droughts  in  the  seventies 
and  eighties are not  available. In addition,  reference  to  a  traditionally  high  degree of solidarity  in 
an undefined past would be tantamount to undemining my previous arguments. In these 
arguments, I have  stressed  how,  due to the highly  variable c h t i c  conditions  under  which  pastoral 
production is undertaken,  pastoral  production  strategies  tend  to be based  mainly  on  individualistic 
decisions,  while rules and  restrictions in general  are  kept  to  a  minimum. 
The  impression is, nonetheless,  that  although  conflicts  and  contradictions are. recurrent  phenomena 
in both intra-herder and  nomadlsedentary  relations  (Hussein  1998),  the  general  porousness  and 
latent  mobility  inherent in these  communities ensured  a  relatively  peaceful  reception f foreigners 
in what might be characterized as the  first  wave of drought  related  migration.This  peaceful 
inserfion was also assured by the  FuutankoBe  herders,  who on their  side  also  kept  a  relatively low 
profile vis-&--vis the  settled  population.  They  camped  mainly in remote  areas  and  endured,  at  least 
to some extent, the malice inflicted upon them by the "firstcomer' population. The general 
impression is that herders in accordance  with  the  strategy  described by Niamir (1900:32) as 
passive coordination', in  general  have  sought to avoid  conflicts  and  confrontations  and  have 
'See also chapter 4. 
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accepted  their  status as ‘strangers’  with all it’s  connotations of marginal representation in the local 
resource  management  institutions. 
In the  course  of  the  late  1980s and early  1990s the large  majority  of foreign’ herders had  managed 
succesfully to rebuild their herds and could no longer be considered as drought ridden  and 
destitute kin, victims of climatic hazards and calamities. Concurrently with the economic 
consolidation  of the foreign  herders,  it  became  clear that what  distinguishes the settled first- 
comer  population  from  the  so-called  strangers  was  not so much  the date of installation but rather 
the very  mobile  lifestyle  and the new  herd  management strategies which they had adopted.  It  was 
these  differences in strategies which created  what  some fust-comers perceived as a situation of 
unequal  competition. 
So when a  new  wave of southward  movement  began to take shape in connnection with the 
drought  period  of  1991/93  the  indigenous  population  began  to fear that these herders too would 
settle in the  area on a  more  permanent  basis.  This,  was feared,  would further increase the ratio 
of  foreigners to locals. As a  result,  the  claims  for  exclusive  rights,  which  had  been addressed ever 
more  fiercely  during  this  period,  erupted  during the  drought of 1991/93 into genuine struggles to 
secure  control  over  key  institutions f  resource managemnt  such  as the well committees. Without 
stretching  the  argument  too  far,  it  seems  liable  that t is pressure was stronger than had been  the 
case during the drought  years of the  seventies  and  eighties. 
In this sense the drought of 1991/92  which  affected  only the northern half of the Ferlo (mainly 
north of Tessekre) fits very  well  into  the  label of revelatory  crises or event of articulation, where 
a shorter and  evanescent  event  was  used as a  pretext  for  rendering  formerly  illigitimate  claims 
acceptable.  As  will be shown  below,  the  drought  contributed  not only to an upsurge of distinctions 
between  (more)  settled  fEst-comers  and  mobile  newcomers  but also opened up  for a process of 
privatisation of former  common  property  resources  and  of commodification  of  formerly  reciprocal 
arrangements. 
Limiting access  to  water:  the  technical’  solutions 
As described above  the  migration wave  prompted  by the  failing rains in the drought involved 
considerable  inconvenience  for  the  local  population. As a  means  of self-defense a variety of  new 
measures were  taken by the  local  well  commiteee  to  limit  the  access  of strangers to the wells. 
Although methods  varied,  they  aimed  above all at making watering of large (foreign) herds as 
difficult as possible. 
At some so-called puits-forages, where  a  motor  pump  facilitates the drawing of water from a 
relatively  shallow  well,  the  pump  was  blocked so that  water  had to  be drawn by  hand. 
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"Many of  the small boreholes  (puits-forages)  do  notfunction atpresent. They aren't even  broken. 
People just don't want to make  themfw2ction.  They wan't to avoid  having the transhumants to 
come.  Therefore  people  have  been  getting  together  and  have  decided not to start the  pump.  They 
will turn  it on once  all  the  transhumants  have  passed. It's the first time that we hear of such 
measures  being  brought  to  use "(Ago-pastoralist Loumbi Sanrabe jan.1992) 
The pumps of Lour and  Lombi  Balai'  have been  closed  to  avoid that transhumants settle  there. 
Its the first time that  this  method  is  employed. r f  you are  ready to haul  water by hand  they let you 
stay,  but  those  who  have many animals  are  forced to continue. I think  that it's evil.  The  wells  were 
drilled  by  the  state,  they  are  meant for watering  of  animals. Its not because there are  too many 
animals that  they do this.  It's  because  they  wan7 to stick to themselves." (Mauritanian refugee, Loumbi 
Sanrabe jan 1992). 
Discouraging  large  herd-owners  by  forcing  them  to  haul  water manually is however  only  possible 
at  the  puits-forages. This well type, where  water  may be drawn either by  hand or by  pump  can be 
installed  only  in  those  areas  where g ound water  tables are relatively  high-lying, as in certain  parts 
of  the  eastern  Ferlo.  At  the  deep  artesian  boreholes f und over the rest of the Ferlo, hand  drawing 
is impossible.  Therefore  certain  well  committees  have obstructed the  connection  between the 
reservoir  and  the drinking troughs  of  the  animals o that  the individual herders had  to  draw  water 
by  means  of  a  hose sunk into  the  reservoir.  Water  was  then filled into a container made  from an 
oil drum cut in half from  which  the  animals  can drink. In this way the time  and effort spent on 
watering  the animals increased  sigmfkantly. 
The  event  depicted in the following  box, decrihs some of the controversies which  arose as the 
flow  of  water fromthe reservoir  to  the  troughs  was  constrained as part of the politics  of  keeping 
away  foreign  herders: 
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As can be seen, considerable  ambiguity  reigns in relation  both  to  the  legality of these  actions and 
in determining  which  state  institutions to hold responsible for stopping  such  acts. On the one hand 
everyone seems well  aware  that  both  wells  and  boreholes  are  public  and  access  therefore is open. 
On the other hand  the  intervention  of the Ministry of Waterworks  was  strictly  limited to the 
eventual  damage to public inftastructure (the undermining  of  the  foundation  of  the  reservoir) and 
did  not go further into the question of restriction  of  use  rights. On the  contrary;they  refrained 
from  reacting  when  the  malpractice  persevered.  And as access to  water is not  denied  (which  would 
be against  the  law)  but  hauling  only made  more  difficult,  the  motivation for the sous-prdfet or the 
police-forces to intervene  was  likely to  be low. For as  discussed  above,  local  administrators in 
charge of securing  law  and order are generally  favorable to local  solutions  aiming at restricting 
uncontrolled  migration  and free-riding on the local resource  base.  Besides  they  tend in general  to 
be unwilling to  mingle  in  local disputes, not the least if  spheres of competence  are as unclear as 
is the  case  here. It was  therefore  only  when the hostilities  developed into open  violence  that  an 
intervention on behalf of the state administration  was  carried  out. 
Finally,  the  case is interesting  in the sense that it shows how certain  individual  herders or well 
committees  have taken  advantage of the migration wave to try and  discourage  some  of the old’ 
FuutankoBe households,  such as Bathil’s, from resettling  in  the  area,  when  retuming from their 
periodic  transhumance. 
Scarcity  and  other  justifications 
Justifications for keeping out the migrants are various but often centre on  the  prospects of a 
situation of scarcity  and  on  the fear of infestation from diseases  presumably  carried around by 
transhumant  herds: 
“The transhumaplts  have  destroyed  the pastures.  They  come from the Waalo or they  are  refugees 
from Mauritania. If they hadn’t come, pastures would  have  been suficient for us  and  there 
wouldn’t  have  been any problems with the sheep. But  they  have  brought with them diseases that 
affect  both  sheep  and cattle ” (Rural Councillor,  Jaen Fuuta jan 1992). 
Also concern  over the state of the mecanical equipment of the  borehole  or,  in  the  Eastern  Ferlo, 
the  question  of  protection  of the gum producing acacia senega1 stands  are  prominent causes for 
worry.  For as herders  are  spread around in the  bush it becomes  difficult  to  protect this important 
source of income from the  hungry  goats  of  transhumant  herders2. 
bubbles  exuded  from the trees, also the foreign herders are cause for worry among the  gum-tappers who frequently 
acuse  them of having  collected  (and  sold)  the gum exuded  from trees tapped by  others. 
While  both  transhumant  and  indigenous  goats are known to be liable of devouring  the  gum  arabic 
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"This  year we have  received  many  more  animals  than  usually.  The pump works from 7 in the 
morning to midnight  with  a 2 hour  break  in  the  afternoon.  There  are  at  least 700foreign heads 
of cattle and a  much  larger amount of smallstock for each  transhumant  bring with them between 
50, and 400 heads of smallstock'They  eat up all  the  pastures  and  bring  with them diseases. The 
well comittee  cannot do anything  to  control  the  situation.  There is no  way  we can regulate  it. We 
started out trying to force the foreigners to  camp away from the  acacia  groves, but it isn't 
possible.  The only place where you$nd some pastures is in between  the  acacia  trees. It isn't 
possible to prohibit people from coming.  The  problems is the  lack  of  rain,  not  the  arrival of the 
transhumants. But there are too many animals  now4. If more  arrive  we  won't  be  able to provide 
sujficient  water. " (Resident of the  well-committee,  Jaen Fuuta. jan 1992). 
As can be seen, herders  generally  express  considerable  ambiguity  towards  attempts  at excluding 
transhumant herds. In the present case this is  expressed  through  the  competing  explanations 
between  the  neutral  failing  rains  and  the  more  partial  excess of animals.  Justification for limiting 
the numbers is therefore  often  expressed m other  terms.  Very  often  common  'environmental flaws' 
such as bushfires or illegal cutting  of  trees,  are  attributed  to  the  uncivilized  behaviour  of fo eign 
herders, just as the growing  problems  of  theft of  animals is assigned to the foreigners,  either as 
deliberate robbery or in terms of local animals joining  foreign  herds. 
Finally the authorities have pointed to the fact that the early arrival of the transhumants 
contributed  to increased  cases  of crop damage. This is true not the  least for the  number of 
officially  recognized  cases.  For just as the increased  number of  animals  present in the  cultivation 
season increases the chances of trespass and crop damage,  the  more  distant  relations between 
foreign herders' and  local  farmers also put  a strain on tolerance  and  friendly  relationships5.  And 
as more  cases are brought for settlement by the  administrative  authorities, the number of cases 
known to a wider public  automatically  increases. 
An obvious  cause  for wony is the  limited  or  at  least  contradictory  authority  and  restricted means
can also be read out of  the  numbers of foreign  herds  present  in  Velingara in january 1992. According to the local 
The importance  number of transhumant  herds  arriving  at  certain deepwells during the 1991-93 drought 
veterinary asistant 18.000 heads of cattle  were  watered at the  well, of  which 5.000 were  'foreign'  to  this adds at least 
10.000 foreign heads of smallstock. 
households during the month of january. This relates to a  local  population  which  according to the national census 
of 1988 (repertoire des Villages,  region de St. Louis) is of appoximately 95 households or 500 persons. 
According to the accounts of the  well  comittee,  the  borehole of Jaen Fuuta hosted 23 'foreign' 
The intervention of the CER and  the  extension  officers  had,  according to the  agricultural  extension 
officer in Barkedji, been  requested in no  less  than 20 cases of crop damage  during 1990. In a  normal  year' this is 
restricted to only a few pamculary serious cases. 
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held  by the local institutions in charge of  managing  access to resources.  Views  expressed  by 
different interviewees clearly  verbalise this confusion: 
“The councillors  and  the  village  chiefs  have  discussed  what  to do. They have  considered  to get 
the  President  of the rural  council  to  mobilise  the  police forces, but they  haven’t yet made  use  of 
this  means. It’s much easier to convince  the  well  comittee  to  deny  access  to  water to those 
foreigners who do not want  to  install  themselves  where  it is proposed  by  the  councillors. Once 
a  herder refused to move to the allocated  spot  he  was  denied  access  to  water  and  within  a  week 
he  had moved out (Rural councillors, Jaen Fuuta jan 1992). 
Despite the apparent h m e s s  of  the  councillor, it is  clear  that  few  legal  means  for  restricting  the 
access of foreigners  are  available.  Considering  both  the  absence of restrictions  in  the  letter  of  the 
law and the distance (over 50 km’s) to the  police  forces,  the call upon  the  police to expel1 
Senegalese citizens from a  public  well,  seems  a  hollow  threat. As expressed  below, the use of 
“technical”  and  hence  not  directly  illegal  dispositions  seems a  more  adequate  manner  to  deal  with 
the increased number of transhumants: 
”With  the law on  the  Nationul  Domain  it  is  very  difficult  to  prohibit  people  using  the  well  and  the 
pastures. There are no rules to apply.  The  wells  are  private  property  but  nonetheless,  it’s  very 
difficult  to limit access. The only way to  limit  the  number  of  newcomers  is  to  block  access to 
water. If the well contains little water,  the foreign herders  are  likely  to  abandon  the  area  within 
a short time,  but if the  well has plenty  of  water,  it is almost  impossible  to  persuade  people  to  go 
elsewhere“. (Rural Councillor,  notorious for having  chased  many  foreign  herders  away,  Bembem 
febr. 1993) 
The various attempts listed above  at  making  the  borehole  unattractive for foreign  herds  indicate 
the  increased  resource  competition  experienced  in  the  Ferlo  in  years of partial  or  total  rain  deficit. 
Evidently the arrival  of large numbers of transhumant  herders  often  possessing  very  large  herds 
constitutes a  considerable  constraint  for  local  agropastoralists. The migratoly  movements  from 
the North tends to trigger  a  “domino  effect”,  whereby  herders  in  the  less  affected  areas are forced 
to follow the migrants once the scarce local fodder resources have been devoured. Such 
movements are likely to further social  differentiation as small  herdowners  tend  not to have the 
same capacities for moving to more  abundant  pastures as have  the  more  livestock-rich.  Indeed 
it seems that the attempts directed  toward  discouraging  large  foreign  herd-owners  from  settling 
were  more  widespread in the  eastem  Ferlo,  where  the  indigenous  population  primarily  consists of 
relatively fxed agro-pastoralists  possessing  herds  and  flocks of more  moderate  sizes. As will  be 
shown below attempts to take economic  advantage of the  increased  mobility  have  been  adopted 
more frequently in central Ferlo. 
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Taking advantage of the drought situation: the economic solution 
The  most  frequent  strategy  set  forth  was  the  enforcement of exorbitant watering fees on foreign 
herds. This practice has, as mntioned above, teen frequent  throughout the Ferlo since the 1980s. 
Nonetheless,  the  increased  mobility  of  the  early 1990s encouraged the development  of still more 
excessive  taxation  policies. During the dry seasons of  1991192 and  1992/93migrating herders in 
the  arrondissements  of  Og0  and  Barkedji  could  unauimously  recount  how excessive taxes or direct 
denial of access had forced  them  to  zigzag  through  the  area in order to find  a  well where, as a 
ndolirmun, the livestock  could be watered  before  the  voyage  towards more friendly localities could 
be resumed. Many herders claimed to have used sigmficant sums to bribe the various well 
committees andor pay sums  equivalent  to  a  full  month of watering at their usual well just to  use 
the watering facilities of certain wells for a few days6. The considerable  variation in taxing 
practices is well  illustrated by  the  record  made  by  Bathil Ba of his tranhumance trip in  1992/93: 
"At  ourfirst stop  in  Fourdou I didn't pay anything.  People  there  are all our relatives. In Naore' 
where  we  stayed 2 weeks,  prices  were  reasonable. Ipayed 2.500 CFA for I4 days. The well of 
BemBem  was  the  most  expensive.  There we had to pay 6000 CFA just for one week After  that we 
stayed in Loumbi, where  the  price  was 14.000 CFA  per  month. At the well of Diamel, we  paid 
15.000per month in salary to those  who  were  hauling  water.  We  had to provide the equipment 
(bucket and tackle) ourselves.  Then Ipaid 10.850 at  the  borehole  of Loumbi Aly Tedy for one 
month of watering.  Finally in Malem Ba where we stayed I month  and 19 days, I had to spend 
36.000 CFA corruptingpeople ana' 20.000 in total on watering fees  at the borehole. This is to 
compare to the fees  Ipay back  home in Ranerou of 7.250 CFA per month",@athil Ba, Ranerou, 
1993). 
As mentioned,  extraction of  higher  taxes for  foreign  herds  normally  means lower taxes for what 
is considered  to be the  "indigenous"  population.  Whether  that is the case is obviously difficult to 
assess. The  herds  and  flocks  are  seldom  counted by  head and  taxation of "local" herds is to a  wide 
extent is based on  estimates  which  are  not  written  down.  Nonetheless the alleviation of watering 
taxes obviously contributes to make the arrival of large contingents of transhumants more 
acceptable to the  local  population.  At  some  boreholes  securing  of such external "funding" has 
become a  more  a less deliirate strategy,  where  taxes  are  deliberately set a little lower than at the 
neighbouring  well,  in  order to attract  the maximum number  of transhumants. In fact, a three layer 
taxation  system may be discerned  whereby  FuutankoBe  herders who have been residing in the 
area  for  several  years  are  overtaxed  according  to 'usual' rates , while  new transhumants are more 
mens are variable as  are the servive  involved.  One  herder for example  complained that the price of 3000 CFA 
Francs for donkey-carts in some  boreholes  covered  several  carts,  while at other one had to pay seperately for each 
Cart. 
Due to  the  lack of aansparency it is difficult to get an accurate picture of the prices payed. Arrange- 
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excessively  taxed. 
This graduation of taxing  could  be  read  out of the  common practice of using a diategui, a host,. 
in whose name you  can  water  your  animals  or  who  can negotiate  a more reasonable taxation rate 
with  the  well-committee. The practice  of  using a host, is yet an exampleof  the  many  ways  in  which 
the  presumed  'victims' of the  policies  of  exclusivity  manage to evade  attempts  at  discimination. 
Such services  are  of  course  reciprocal in the  sense  that  they  often release granting of certain 
favours to the  host, just as  they  contribute  to  increase  the ost's personal status: 
'' I arrived to Loumbi in I973 as part of  a larger  group  of  FuutankoBe  herders. But I was the 
only one to stay. I'm a  hunter and there was  a  lot of deer in this area. When the  drought of 
I983/84 pushed  a  new  wave  of  FuutankoBe  herders to the area, I helped them to get  installed, 
The  local population wasn't too friendly, so I undertook the negotiations concerning  access to 
the well.  There  are  always  some  of  the  locals  who wmt to chase away the newcomers, but I'm 
there to help settle  the  matters. Now there is a  better  understanding  between the two  parties" 
(Ancient  FuutankoBe,  Loumbi Aly Thedy , Koumpentoum  1993). 
But  not  only  legal means have be used in the  attempt to  make the best of the situation. For certain 
political  notabilities, the installation of foreigners has provideda  new possibility for extraction  of 
material  gain.  At a public  meeting  with  the  Governor  of  Louga in Barkedji in 1993, a  new  practice 
was  revealed  where certain  rural  councillors  abused  their authority to make transhumant  herders 
pay  for  the  right  to  install  themselves in the  pastures. This clearly  illegal  practice  was  vigourously 
condemned  at he meeting.  Whether  the  practice  was  widespread or not remained unclear  as no 
one would stand up and admit to have received or have been given anytbmg as part of a 
negotiation  regarding  provisional  settlement.  Nonetheless  noone seemed to doubt  the  existence 
of such  practices: 
People  negotiate  theirprovisional  settlement  with e village  chiefs'. It's not in conformity with 
the law, they  are  all  Senegalese  citizens.  Nobody  will  admit to have  received or given  anything 
to anyone as payment for their  installation.  But as rains  have failed again this year, it is most 
likely  the  illegal  conmaereidisation f rights  of  settlement  will  resume again" (Souspfifet,  Barkedji, 
Oct. 1994.). 
According to other  sources,  such  illicit  commodification  of the right of  settlement may  be  carried 
pointed to the  councillors.  Apart  from  the  possibility of it  being a  slip of the  tongue,  one  explanation  could be that the 
position of the sous-prifer is under far more  pressure  from  the  politically  elected  councillors than from  the  village 
chiefs. 
' It's  interesting  that the sous-prqet blames  village  chiefs for this illicit practice, as all other  sources 
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out under  different  guises.  Frequently,  the  councillor  will  claim  that  the  transhumant  has  settled 
on what is a  recognized cattle path (an issue under the  authority  of  the rural council).'Payment' 
then  takes  the form of  a  "fine"  payed to the councillor. In this way it represents  yet  another 
example  of  how  such  commodification  of  former  reciprocal  arrangements (the  free  movements  on 
the range) is given  a 'legal guise', thereby  making it socially  more  acceptable. 
Exclusive rights and the heterogeneity of interests. 
The  transgressions  of  Fulani  norms of hospitality  revealed  above are, however,  not  neccesarily 
acceptable for the population as such. In line  with  the  ambiguities  running  through  many of the 
statements  cited  above,  many  local  herders  have  expressed  their  concerns  over  the  ill-treatment 
of foreigners: 
"Closing off the wells is not correct behaviour. The calamities which  have forced these people 
to  move could @ect  ourselves next time - and besides where  there  are  many people there is also 
more  happiness" (President of the well-committee, Loumbi Sanrabe 1992) 
As expressed  by the well-committee  president  neither  the  denial  of  access  to the  watering  facilities, 
the  differential  and  excessive  taxing of the migrating  herds  nor the  (few)  attempts  at  commodifying 
the rights  of  camping on the open range are in accordance  with the customary  norms  and  regula- 
tions related to local resource management. They are also in disagreement with the legal 
framework covering watering and  grazing  facilities, which stresses  the  equal  and  open  access 
rights of all Senegalese  citizens. Putting forward claims of exclusivity to resources that have 
previously  been free for al, has therefore required considerable  efforts  in  terms  of  constructing 
a moral pretext for transgression of Fulani solidarity. The reaction of the local  population  is 
therefore also full of contradictions and  ambiguities: 
At the  smaller  puits-forages in the eastern Ferlo, which  are  normally  not  used by more  cattle-rich 
agro-pastoralists due to the labour constraints attached,  the gestures of  closing  the  pumps  must 
be interpreted as clear acts of  panic from a  population  with  few  alternative  means of survival. At 
the larger boreholes the situation is less clear. Here  the  cry for exclusive  rights  is  promoted 
primarily by the  politically strongest groups of  herders  and  agriculturalists. It is mainly  among 
these groups that the situation of scarcity is put forward as justification for restricting the use of 
commonly owned resources  such as water and  pastures. In this way  they  seek  to  adjust  the  system 
in their  favour. For while high degrees of  permeability  and free access  to  water  and  pastures  are 
preconditions  for  a  mobile  and extensive livestock  system,  the  indigenous  system of production 
has been  moving towards  increasing  sedentarization  ever  since  the  installation of boreholes  in  the 
1950s. Such a  system  evidently works in favour of  development  of  more  exclusive  rights.  For 
these  groups  mobility no longer contains the same predominance  as  a  risk  management  strategy 
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whereas  exclusive rights could turn out  to enhance possibilities for more pragmatic herding 
strategies  where pastures are preserved for a  limited  group of  users. 
It is therefore  among these groups that scarcity  has  been  used  most  frequently  to  legitimize  the 
tendency towards a  commodification  of  social  relations.  Such  legitimations  could  be  traced in 
relation to the attempts by influential  sedentary  herders to generate  revenues on. their  drought 
ridden kin, either  through exessive watering  fees  and by commodifying  the  rights of  camping  on 
the  range. 
Such  call  for  exclusivity is nonetheless  not  without  its  contradictions.  First  of  all,  the  arrival  of  the 
economically  potent  foreign  herders  increases  prosperity  not  only  through the  deep  wells,  but  also 
in the general economic life of the villages. Local trade in livestock, often an important 
supplementary  activity of the local  agro-pastoralists,  is  boosted  as  are  the  weekly  markets.  The 
same goes for sale of grain from the peasants and the  turn-overs of the  local  shops,  owned  to  a 
large  extent  by  the  settled  agro-pastoralists.  Furthermore,  the  foreigners  often  contract  local  youth 
as salaried  herders just as a  wealth  of  services and  gifts  are  exchanged to improve  the  relations 
between the two parties: 
"I  get along  very  well with the  transhumants. I do not wish  them to leave.  We  help  each  other 
hauling  and  transporting  water. When they  go  looking for hay,  they  always  provide us with  a 
cart-load, and they lend us their oil  drums and their  hose so that we can  draw waterfrom the 
reservoir. If they go to the  market in Galoya [in the  Fuuta]  you can always  get a lzft on their  cart. 
At present, where  we are in  the  dry  season,  the  transhumants  do  not  dispose of any  milk,  but 
othenvise  they  would be sure  to offer you some". (Sedentarised herder with few animals, Loumbi SanraBe 
1992) 
"The  only  one who has shown  some  hospitality  to us is the  shopkeeper.  He  also  defended UT at 
the  meeting"(Tmshumant  herder, Thiargny, febr. 1993). 
And  even at borehole level one finds examples of  well  committees  which  have  intervened  more 
directly  to  ensure more peaceful  relations : 
"Last  year  rains  were  good  and many transhumants  herds  stayed  in  the  area.  All  went  well.  The 
well  committee had engaged  a  griot  [traditional  praise  siagerl  to  travel  around  in  the  settlements 
to tell people that the transhumants have  the same  rights  as  the  rest of the  population". (A~IO- 
pastoralisr Thiargny febr. 1993) 
In reality the  opposition  between  'foreigners' and  'locals' is less  antagonistic,  than  what  could  be 
anticipated  from  the conflicts described  above.  Many  alliances  and  social  relations are created  and 
upheld  between the  two groups, alliances  which  may be brought  into  effect  for  example in the 
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struggle against the encroachment  of  peanut fanner upon  grazing  lands. Part of the explanation 
for the significant decrease in requests and attributions of land to mouride marabouts and 
peanutgrowers in the course of the  1990s  could be attributed to the  numerical and economic 
reinforcement  of  herders vis-?~-vk the  cultivators,whci  was  provided  by  the FuutankoBe 'invasion' 
in the area This situation  enforced  herders'  possibilities  of  presenting  their protest at higher state- 
administrative levels (see  Juul,  1991). 
Furthermore, it is important  to note that,  although  mobility for these  relatively sedentarized 
herders has decreased  in som ways,  it has not  disappeared  altogether. In a highly risk-prone area 
as the  Ferlo,  local or generalized  drought,  bush  fues,  ticks,  disease, or failure  of crops still requires 
the possibility of seeking  refuge  in  less  affected areas*. Also the  frequent breakdown of borehole 
equipmnt favours  a less hostile  relationship  with  neighboring  communities. In fact the tendency 
for  increased  sedentarization isparallelled  by a  tendency  towards  increased  mobility. As described 
in  chapter 4, the  technological  innovation  provided  by  the  tubes  has  largely  been taken up  by local 
agro-pastoralists who now attach  more  importance to raising  small stock. Together with this 
strategy  goes the adoption of  more  mobile  lifestyles,  although seldom  as  mobile as those followed 
by the FuutankoBe  herders. 
All this brings  about  a  paradoxical  situation  where  herders  stress  mobility  and the eed to move 
across the range  when descniing  their  herd  management,  but  emphasize  their fixed location when 
discussing rights to water and  pasturesg.  Consequently  motivation for coordinating resource use 
has seldombeen  sufficient  to  support  development of an extended  set of rules  and  of institutions 
capable  of  the  implementation  and  sanctioning of such  regulations.  Struggles to limit the number 
of users  should  therefore  not  be  confused  with  a  desire  to  improve  local resource management or 
an  urge  for  more  sustainable  methods  of  resource  extraction.  Conflicts  tend to  be related more to 
struggles to gain control over  key  institutions than to  competition  over  presumably scarce pastoral 
resources.What is at stake  therefore t u n s  out  to be  the  political  power that securing of control 
over  the  productive  resources is expected  to  generate  rather  than long terms ecological concerns. 
The reaction of the FuutankoBe herders. 
Before passing to a  general  discussion of the  struggles  over  resource control in post-drought 
herders from Widou  Thiengoly and  Tessekre.  Nontheless,  these  herders  have, at several  occasions,  been forced to 
move  southwaid  because of large  bush-fires  (1988)  and droughts  (1991  and 1993) and have  been forced to 
capitalise on a  solidarity to which  they  did  not  contribute  in  their  area of origin. 
Among the more sedentarised  herders  who  have  been  most  eager  to  exclude foreign herds are the 
A similar  situation i s  described by Peters  from  Bouwana (1994108) 
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Ferlo, it is interesting to have  a closer look at the  reactions  of  the  FuutankoBe  herders  to  these 
attempts to strengthen  local control with the resources  crucial for pastoral  production:  water  and 
pastures. 
As noted  above,  nomadic  societies are generally  characterized  by  a  lack of central  institutions  and 
systems  of political  representation. Reactions to  harassments  therefore  tend  to be individual and 
passive (the ‘passive coordination’ or the ‘choreography of movements’) in order to avoid 
conflicts. In those cases where  the  herder  disposes  of  suflicient  means  he  will  tend  to ry and  settle 
conflicts  through  individual  arrangements. Such informal  settlement  often  includes  some  elements 
of  bribing of neighbours,  local  politicians or eventually  local  administrative  authorities.  Compared 
to sedentarised  farmers  a  special feature of the mobile  herders  is  however, that herders  under 
pressure may chose to make use of their mobile  lifestyle  and  move  away  from  areas  of  conflict. 
This is one  explanation of why Fuutanke herders in the frst period of settlement  in  the  southern 
Ferlo  have  involved  themselves  very little in  local  affairs. 
In recent  years the increased  wealth and power of the FuutvakoBe  herders  have  contributed to
alter this situation. Confronted with the general mismanagement of the wells and with an 
increasing  number  of  attempts  by certain “local“  groups  to  use  the  well  committees as a means of 
exclusion or extraction of revenues, FuutankoBe herders have, as will be described below, 
embarked  on  a  set  of  new strategies. 
Improving the bargaining  position. 
Increasingly,  well  committees  have come under  pressure  from  Fuutanke  herders  who demand 
representation on the  board  in order to ensure proper  functioning  and  to  control  the  considerable 
financial  resources  collected  by the well committee. 
“Those  who  are in the  well committees hardlypossess any  animals  themselves.  Hence  they  show 
little  concern for the  well-being of the animals.  Until  recently,  it  has  been  almost  impossible  to 
react  against all  the abnonnities.But now, after  the  dry  years,  we  are  more  egge-egges,  and we 
are better  able to react against the  malpractice. We are  getting  organised  to  get  more  control 
over  the  well-committee and information  about  the  money,  the  turnovers  etc. We have  the  means 
to go  to  the  authorities. For us it is an advantage if many  FuutankoBe  herders  come  and  settle. 
That  could  make things change, but the inconvenience is that  it  would  increase  competition 
pastures” (FuutankoBe herder, Ranerou Febr.1993). 
“We  have hied  to make a w e l l  committee  comprise of only  herders with many  animals. We ensure 
that the  reservoir is alwaysfull of water,  and  that  all  transhumants  are  received on the  same 
conditions as those  settled  around  the  well.  Those  who  come  will  probably  have  a  relative  who 
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is member of the  well-committe, and this  relative will eqdain the  modalities  to  the newcomer. We 
receive a l o t  of transhumants every year. That's because we are more friendly. After the 
FuutankoBe  herders  are  represented  in  the  well  commitee,  they function much better. Now it's 
recognised that the  well is for everybody  and  everybody  pays.  The  local  population recognises 
the  rights  of  the  newcomers. In the  beginning  we had to  keep  quiet." (FuutankoBe Accountant,  well- 
committee,  Fourdou) 
The first-comers have in general  exhibited fierce resistance  to  any  division  of  power, an attitude 
which in most cases  has been backed by the local administration. As discussed above, such 
resistance is most  frequently  being  legitimized by suggesting  a  dichotomy  between "strangers" and 
"locals". In this  way  the  "local"  population seeks to  establish a discourse  linking  up  with  a central 
assumption in the decentraliiation framework,  i.e.  the  existence of a  homogeneous and fmed' 
group of local  users,  which  should  be  given  more firm property  rights. Such rights should, it is 
held, includ  the  rights  to  exclude  'foreigners' f om use  and  decision  making". But as mentioned, 
the existence of  such  clearly  defmed  groups of users  is  certainly  a  matter of redefinition  and 
reinvention  of  the  past  espacillay  in aeas such as the Ferlo  which,  due  to  variability n climate and 
resource  use, are characterized by high degrees of mobility and therefore a  very fluctuating 
population. 
One  of  the things that  contributed to open  up for a new situation  was  paradoxically enough, the 
perpetual  embezzlement  of  funds  which  characterizes  the  large  majority  of  well  committees in h  
area. If a pump breaks  down,  herders  are  forced  to m ve  their  herds  to  a  neighouring borehole, 
located  approximately 25 km away. This involves  considerable  risk for  herd-owners (notably those 
used to a  more  sedentary  lifestyle).  Purchase of expensive  spare-parts  has  therefore proved to be 
a comfortable platform for negotiating  a  partition of  power  where  wealthy FuutankoBe herders 
were able to trade financial  help in emergency  situations  for  representation i  the  well-committee". 
An example of such  bargaining is the  case of  Djagueli: 
"Later there  was  a problem with  the  borehole  pump. The  rural  council  told us to decide among 
the  village chiefs whether we would pay and have it repaired or  wait mtil the brigade of 
waterworks  cou2dfind  the  means to repair it. The  local  herders  had no possibilities of paying. 
We decided to take it in  charge  and  collected 700.000 CFA for the  repair". Village  chief of Fidjiti, 
lo See for example  Bromley  and  Cemea,1989:15) 
" This smtegy had been used successfully in at least 3 cases (in Djagueli,  in  Yonofere  and in Fourdou). 
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Djagueli. 
In return for this favour,  the UrurBe’s a FuutankoBe  subclan,  which  has  been present around 
Djagueli  in  large  numbers since the  beginning  of the 1970s were  granted  two key positions within 
the well commitee  (that of president  as  well as that of accountant). 
But as stressed in  chapter 3, such  decisions  are  always  open for renegotiation. In spite of the 
feeing of superiority expressed through the unhlining of the limited economic resources 
disposed  of  by the local  herders’  the  new ( and  evidently  more  adequate) representation proved 
short-lived.  Within  a  period  of  less than a year,  the  local  population  had  managed, in spite of their 
numerical  inferiority  and  restricted  economic  contributions,  to  overthrow this new board and re- 
conquer the  central  key-position of president.  Needless  to  say all these transactions have  been 
taking place without  any  preceding  elections. 
The attribution of  seats in the  well-committee  is  however  not  only  a  matter  of  making the well 
function  properly.  Along  with  the  growing  recognition f the  key status of the well  committee, 
these  committees  also  become  the  scene of local  power  struggles  between representatives from 
different factions (see  the  deploration by the  sousprefet of the battles  between  tendency A and 
tendency  B  in  Naore,  for  example).  Being vital institutions  in  local  economic  and  political life, the 
well-committees are used by the  local  political  elite  to gain (or trade) support for their own 
political career within the ruling and (until recently) all embracing Socialist Party”. This 
politization of the  well-committees is particularly  explicit  in  those  smaller  villages  where other 
state  connected  institutions  (such as the malcouncil or  the sous-prifet and CER) are not present. 
In several such  cases  FuutankoBe  herders have  managed to play  very  skillfully on the internal 
rivalry  between  opposing  political  candidates of the  local  community.  The  means for doing this 
has been the institution of local  purchase of party cards.  Purchase of local  party cards plays a 
crucial role in  the  internal  alignment  of  candidates a they are used to measure the support that 
opposing  tendencies  within  the  ruling  Socialist Party can  mobilize on the  local  level  (see Cruise 
O’Brien  1975:  174). In times of approaching  elections,  FuutankoBe  herders who constitute an 
important  economic  backing  for  some of the  local  candidates, took to refusing  any purchase of 
party cards before  the  posts of treasurer or president  were  granted to a representative of the 
FuutankoBe  population, a pressure  which  turned  oput  to  be  very  efficient. 
Bathily’s LD-MPT has also acquired  (sporadic)  representation  in  the  small  villages of the  Ferlo. 
Since  the  beginningof  the 1990s opposition pzuties  such as Abdoulaye  Wades PDS and Abdoulaye 
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Also in other  cases ( as in Naork), it seems that political support for a  certain  member  of  the  well 
committee, has been a  term of trade for the 'foreign' herders to gain access to the board of  the 
committee. 
Both  cases  point not  only to the  fluidity  of political representation but also  to the importance of 
personal  political  relations. As can  be  seen,  decisions  regarding  board  representation in the  key 
instititutions  are  always  open  for  renegotiation.  Rather  than  determined  by  the  existing  rules  and 
regulations  (concerning  transparency of accounts or democratic representation),  the  outcome is 
to a  wide extent determined by the  ability of the various actors to manoeuvre  sMlfully in the 
power  structures  reigning at the  moment. An important  weapon  in this struggle is the ability  take 
advantage  of  the  various  opportunities offered by  the moment (such as the  national elections or 
the mechanical  breakdowns). 
Investment in clientelistic  networks 
Evidently  many  of  these  victories  are t mporary and may be modified  once  the  power  relations at 
the local  level turn in favour of the  'locals'. In the words of  the  deputy of the  Prefet  of  Matam: 
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“Every  time  there is trouble  in the management of the  wells,  some  FuutankoBes  are  integrated 
into  the  well-committee in order to get hold of some money. Afterwards  they  try  to  get rid of them 
again  as  quickly as possible“. 
In order to strengthen  their positions, FuutankoBe herders  therefore  increasingly  participate in 
political  power  struggles  and  seek to position  themselves  to  gain  control  over  resources. In this 
process  investment of their  newly  acquired economic wealth  into  social  capital is also  used. 
Conscious of their  weak  political  position as foreigners, many FuutankoBe  herders  have  until 
recently  sought  to settle conflicts  through  individual  negotiations. Arrangements a l’amiable 
(arrangements  on  friendly  terms)  have  been the most  common way  of settling  for  example  cases 
of crop  damages. This ranges  from  “tolerating”  (i.e.  making o demand for compensation) to open 
negotiation  between  the  two  parties over the size of  the  compensation,  eventually in the  presence 
of  witnesses,  eventually  the  village  chief). The frequency  of  the latter type  tends  to  increase as 
harvesting  approaches. 
From  the  beginning  of  the  1990s the number  of complaint^'^ presented  before  the  local  officials 
seem to have increased dramatically. This was partly due to a general rise in the level of 
conflictivity  due to increased  mobility  when  rains  failed  in  1991-1992.  The  rising  number  of 
complaints  was,  however, also an indication of a  new  tendency  among  FuutankoBe  herders  to try 
to gain  support  further  up  the political-administrative  system  in  those cases where no satisfactory 
solution  could be found  locally. Compared to the previous, very  individualistic  and  dispersed 
attitudes  among  newcomers,  such attempts presupposed  a  higher degree of consensus  than  had 
been  prevailing until  then. 
One  way  of  generating  such  consensus  has  been  through  the  increasing  number  of  religious 
festivals,  such as the Maouloud (the  profets  anniversary)  celebrated  for  members of particular  sub- 
clans by marabouts in  the  area  of  origin14, 
“Maouloud is an  occasion for all  SowonaBe to meet at Mbiddi,  where  we  have  our  marabout. 
We  come topray and to celebrate the  aniversary  of  the  Profet.  Everybody  brings  something,  even 
locally  between  the  two  parties  but  negotiated  by  the extension  officers. 
?his is also  reflected  in  the  increasing  number of conflicts  over crop damages which are not  settled 
terms of pilgrimmage  and  songs,  characteristic of the  Mouride  muslim community.  According  to  Cruise  O’Brien 
This is of come a very  bleak  parallel to the  very  active  associative We sustained by periodic ritual in 
(1996459) associative  life  among  the  Mourides  constitutes  what  amounts to a religiously based civil  society,  more 
or less the  social  foundation of the  Senegalese  state. 
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those  who cannot come  themselves  will  send  a  contribution.  Women  may for example  give some 
butter while.men may send an oxen  or  a  sheep. I t  is a festival of religious  songs.  It’s not for  
making politics, but of  course  there  is  a lot of  debate  going on. 
At the boreholes  the S o w d e  talk with each  other. Theyfind someone to  whom  they  can present 
their grievmes. Either  they  pass by the  Sousprefet,  but if that  doesn’t satisf) them,  they  continue 
to  someone  higher up in the  system.  They  may  even  demand  to  be  received  in  audience  by Djibo 
Ka [the minister of Interior].  This can be  organised  through  his  servant  at  cost of appoximately 
25.000 CFA. Also Amadou Talla  [Director of the  Dakar  cattle  market,  see below] can help. 
Anybody  may help us.(Interview  with Yerim and his brother  in  GaninaJ994) 
Whereas herders vigourously  deny that these  religious  meetings  have  political  functions, the 
possibility  of  discussing  common  problems  with  people  of  one’s own lineage,  have  materialized 
in several coordinated actions  on  behalf of the  migrants.  The  ethnic  gathering  of  the SowonaBe 
undoubtedly had an impact  on  the  formation  during  the dTy season  of  1992193 of a  delegation  of 
SowonaBe  herders  who  were sent off to  Dakar  to  obtain  interviews  with  the  Minister  of  Interior, 
at that time Djibo  Ka,  a Fulani closely  related to the  settled  first-comer  herders. The protests 
concerned the sweeping  practice of discriminatory  watering  taxes  and  direct  exclusion of trans- 
humant herders at the wells. Also other delegations  were  sent off during  1993. These protests 
conveyed  much of the same message,  but also included  denouncements  of  the  new practice  among 
counsellors and village chiefs of “sellig“ rights of installation  to  transhumant  herders  described 
above. 
As in the case of Naor6 descibed  above,  these  ‘protest  initiative’ of the  FuutankoBe  herders, 
turned out quite successfully.  Shortly  after  the  delegations had  passed, the  Minister sent out the 
Governor of Louga on a  campaigning tour in  the  arrondissement of  Barkedji to mediate. The 
Governor vigourously  stressed  how all users  are  supposed  to  contribute on equal  footing  in the 
functioning of the deep well.  He  further  condemned  the  hostile  manner in  which transhumant 
herders  were received in the  area, and  lamented  the  way  in  which  they  were over-taxed at the 
boreholes  and  eventually  even  forced  away  after  a  few  days of  watering.  He also denounced that 
foreign  herders in some  cases  were  forced  to  move  their  camps  from  the  bush to stay  at  the same 
distance from the deep well  as the sedentaries,  and  that  cases had  occurred  where  they  had been 
forced to pay for their settlement. “Transhumants he  said, have  the  right  to  settle  and do not have 
to pay  more than others”. 
The governor instead  invited the audience to strive for peaceful  cohabitation.  He  enjoyned the 
population to prevent  straying  of  animals into areas  of  cultivation,  to  resist  purchasing  of  animals 
of unknown origin which  might be stolen  and  to refrain from admitring  foreign animals into ones 
own herd (a common  accusation  towards egge-egge herders  implying  ‘unconscious’  theft).  Finally 
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the audience was  asked to abstain  from using the  term  "egge-egge"'5  considered by some as 
pejorative. "We are all senegalese!" he  proclaimed. 
The  Minister of Interior  and  his  representative,  the  Governor,  in this way  fully  acknowledged the 
rights of the migrants to move  freely  over  the  range.  The  equal  rights of access to  water and 
pastures were confirmed,  whereas  the  dissent of the fist-comer population  was  overheard. 
This newly  acquired  ability to set  the  agenda  and  control  the  outcome of state interventions seems 
to  be  the result of a set of new  relations  knit  between  the  FuutankoBe  herders  and the  central 
spheres of influence in Dakar.  Access  to  the  channels of political  influence seems to be gained 
though a  variety of (clientelist)  channels  and  intermediaries,  revolving  around the two main 
properties of Fulani life,  Islam  and  livestock.  Islam  represents  itself  through the marabouts, 
notably the Tall  family  who  occupy  central  positions i  the  Tijanya  brotherhood  and are extremely 
influential  among  the  herders  from  the  Senegal  River  Valley.  The  'livestock  channel' goes through 
the influential director of the  Dakar  cattle  market who  according  to my informants "is much 
listened to in  govemment  circles".  The  latter  provides  the  advantage of being  easily  accessible 
either through personal  interviews  in his  noisy  and  untidy  office  in  the  heart of he cattle market 
or through the two continuously  busy  telephones  through  which  he  keeps in permanent contact 
with both the herders in the interior of the  country  and  his  relations in the  highest  government 
circles. 
l5 In FulBe  egg-egge  means:"those who are always on the move". 
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Obviously  the  above  quotations  is  telling  not  the least of  the  influence  held by  Amadou Talla in 
his own self-knowledge.Nonetheless, his doings  in connection with the FuutankoBe  delegations 
of protest appear  to have  had  considerable  effect. Indeed, the delegation-event  incarnate  some 
of the most open and  flexible  aspects  of  Senegalse politics.Through  connections,  such as Amadou 
Talla the  distance  &om the presumably marginalised herder to  the center of decision often turn out 
to be far  shorter than anticipated.  Despite it's negative attributes, the extremely  personalised'6  and 
clientelistic  features of Senegalese  politics  (the  so-called clan politics  mentioned  in  the first part 
of this  chapter)  contribute  to  the  establishment of connections between  the  bureaucratic entres 
(citizen) of the  Senegal River Valley  which  provides him with the qualities required for ethnic identitication 
'' In spite of Talla's  claimed  impartiality it is nonetheless  precisely his position as a ressorrissnnt 
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and the  largely  illiterate  rural  population  which by  and  large  have  proven  both  viable  and  efficient" 
To investigate  how  access to political  decisions  relate  to  social  differentiation  is  however  beyond 
the scope of this project. 
The  relative  facility  with  which  one  can get access  to  the  centres for decision-making is further 
illustrated by the recent introduction of public  telephones  in some of the  larger  ,villages  of  the 
Ferlo.I8  Very  quickly  these  telephones  booth,  which  constantly  attract  a  large  group  of ' listeners' 
eager to pick-up the latest gossip, have  turned  out to  be  important  instmments  for  disseminating 
rural protests. As was  experienced  at  several  occasions  during  fieldwork,  local  politicians do not 
hesitate to call  the  politically  most  influential  persons,  such as the  Minister of Interior, if decisions 
are  taken at local level of  which  they  do  not  approvel9. 
The use of intermediaries  between  the  different  levels of society is no  recent  feature  in  Senegal. 
Relations between state and  local  communities  have  long  traditions  for  been  ensured  through 
brokers  and  networks  of  political  patronage  where  favours are exchanged  for  political  allegiance. 
The most well-known example is that of the  mouride  saints  (the marabouts, see  Cruise OBrien, 
1971 and1975). Such use of  intermediaries is not  unique  to  Senegal.  Sara  Berry  describes  how 
throughout  Africa  the  outcome of  those  rural disputes which  are  regulated  outside  formal judicial 
proceedings hinges on relations among neighbours and kin and how situations of increased 
competition  over  land  and  labour  encourage  investment  in  social  relationships  (Berry,  1993:  162). 
In  the  case of the settled Fulanis of  the  Bakedji  arrondissement,  complaints a well  as  investments 
have  tended to pass  through  Daouda  Sow,  former  president of he Assemblke  Nationale  and  after 
his dethronement in 1989 his  nephew  Djibo Ka.  In  most  cases this is  done  even  before  they  have 
been presented  to  the  local  admjstrative  officers. In relation  with  case  from  1994  where  a  Mouride 
marabout transgressed the lot  attributed to himby the  rural  council  and  had  started  cultivating into
someone ekes fields,  a  villager  explained  how the upset  villagers  instead  of  warning  the sous- 
prefet, had  sent  a  politician from the  locality to the  recently  installed  telephone  booth of Barkedji 
to  complain  directly to D j h  Ka. "No, he  exclaimed, we did not have the sousprefet  to  intervene. 
Ka, whom one apparently  could  reach by  bribing  the  servant @lanfon) of Djibo Ka with  the  fairly  accessible  amount 
of 25.W CFA i.e. 250 French Francs 
l' Apparently  they are accessible even  for  people  with  relatively i i t ed  means, as in the  case of Djibo 
'* The public  telephone  booth  in Barkedji  was  installed  in 1991 as one of the  first  village  telephones  in 
the  Ferlo. 
cultivating some fields which  apparently  were the property of  some  local non-mouide fanners. A local  politician 
telephoned the Minister of Interior and shortly after he visited  the  place  in  question. 
l9 This was for example  the  case when  the mouide fanners of Samali  (near  Barkedji)  illicitly  had  started 
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He is not part of  the family. Here we are  SanraBe; we are  the kin of Djibo Ka” (Barkedji, 1994). 
But  while  such  political  intervention  until  recently  was  the  terrain  of the (highly politicized) settled 
kin of the Dakar  politicians,  the  increasingly  difficult  conditions  for gaining access to water  and 
grazing  lands  and  growing  economic  potentials, has, as  shown, also incited the transhumant 
herders to present  their  claims  further up  in  the  Senegalese  political hierarchy. 
Therefore,  the  perhaps  most  interesting  aspect  of  the  protest d legation incidence was how  the 
Minister  of Interior (although only  by  means  of an emissary)  chose to stress state ownership to 
pastures  and  wells.  Thereby  local  attempts  (by his own kin) to regulate access to natural resources 
were overruled. Obviously  the  interpretation  chosen  was i  in conformity  with the letter of the 
Land  Law.  But  bearing  in  mind  the  many  ambiguities  of  the  legal  framework, and the general trend 
towards  granting  more rights to local population  framework,  a  possibility must have existed that 
could have  provided for a  more  subtle  expounding of the texts, hads thos been the intention  of 
Djibo Ka. Such an  interpretation  would  obviously  have  appeased the position  of the decentralised 
state  administrators  in  charge of implementing  the  decentralisation  policies. These administrators 
have  long  traditions  of  favouring  the  local  settled  elite  and  have  been  incessantly  been urged to 
bring about a  settling  of  nomadic  pastoralists.  Nonethelss, is seems that the message  delivered, 
should  be  interpreted  more as the  continuation of the status quo rather than a firm victory to the 
mobile  population.  For  as  long as crucial  issues  such  as  the  discrimination  of Fuutankes in the 
composition of well  committees is left  unacknowledged,  the  local power relations  have  largely 
been  left  untouched.  Hence  the  incidence  is  rather an example of the functionnal  ambiguity, 
described  in  the  beginning  of this chapter  whereby  the  state,  by  maintaining  a situation of fluidity, 
manages to obtain  a  situation of non-expressed  consensus  between the different stakeholders at 
local  and at national  level. 
Straddling  between  different  identities: 
In  general  the  legal  framework  concerning  local  resource  management is co tradictory and  vague. 
The limits between  what is state  ownership,  what is open  access  and what is under local control 
remains rather unintelligible.  With  regard  to  the  wells  no  clear  definitions exist specifying, for 
example, who is to be  considered  a  ‘regular’  user  eligible to the board of the committee. The 
distinction  between  insider  and  outsider  being  contested  terrain, this situation  obviously lends itself 
to considerable  manipulations  and  redefinitions of rights  and  status. 
As mentioned briefly above, one of the means employed by Fuutanke herders to position 
themselves  most  favourably  in  the  struggle  over  access  and  control over resources has therefore 
been  to straddle between  different  identities. 
208 
In the  cases described  above,  transhumant  herders  have  chosen to launch their protest in their 
capacity  of strangers claiming  their  free  rights  to  make  use  of  publicly  owned resources. This 
pushed Djibo Ka, who  has  close  family  ties  to  the  majority f he local politicians of the area to 
intervene against the interest of his own relatives and in favour of their adversaries, the 
FuutankoBe herders. 
Other  cases  of  conflict  concern  the  definition  of  who  is  most local. This is in  partiv'cular the case 
of those conflicts  which  relate to the  functioning  of  the  well  committee.  Here the battle stands 
between those claiming to be the  genuine  "locals" - and  therefore  the  sole legitimate caretakers 
of the wells - and  the  FuutankoBe  herders  who  claim  to  be  as  legitimate  users. They refer to their 
protracted presence in the area  and,  not  the  least,  to  their  sigruficant contributions in  terms of 
watering fees to  justify their claims  for  more  equal  representation.. 
Consequently,  it is important to bear  in  mind  that,  although  the  position  of "f reigner" may offer 
substantial  advantages  in  certain  cases,  herders  also  strive  to  acquire  the  status  of  "local"  with all 
the  rights  and  privileges  pertaining  to  that  role.  Depending on the  nature  of the dispute the same 
individuals wil select the most  appropriate  social  identity  and  appeal to both customary tenure 
rules and  national  land  ordinances,  singly  and  sometimes  in  combination  and will invoke whatever 
ideology  and  cultural  symbol  are  most  appropriate  to  substantiate  the  claim. (Goheen, 1992:403). 
In the main  themes of conflicts  played  out  at  present,  the  free  access to pastures and the control 
over  the  deep wells,  herders  are  likely  the  choose  opposing  identities in the two cases. These roles 
are, however, not fixed but may change  in  the  course  of  the  conflict where this proves more 
convenient. 
Transgressing from stranger  to  local: officialiiing strategies 
a). The role of taxes: 
"Here the population is not  very friendly. But we pay our taxes  and  have our vaccination 
documents in order so that  we  can prove that our animals  are  not ill. Then they can't chase us 
away even though they  have tried. Back  home  in  the  Fuuta,  we  used to receive many foreign 
herds,  when  the pastures were abundant  there.Even  during  the  drought  of I983/84 people were 
more  hospitable.  Now  everyone  want's tofill up their pockets. The  change is related to the state 
of povee .  The transhumants  are  richer  than the firstcomer population". (Transhumant herder, 
Thiargny  febr.  1993) 
The need to have documents in order and to be in conformity with the law are generally 
recognized as important  preconditions for moving  freely  on  the  range. Lately also tax paying has 
acquired  prominence as a theme  played  through  at  the  local  level  when determining  how  and  when 
the Fuutanke herders  can  transmute  from  the  status of "foreigner" to that of "local". 
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The taxes referred to are those collected  by the rural council of  which a  certain percentage is 
returned  to  the  local  community for  development  purposes.  Although  taxes  are  moderate  even for 
small producers2'  only  a  very small minority  of the Fuutanke herders  pay  them.  Many  of  them, 
however,  claim to pay  their  taxes  in their area of  origin in the Fuuta.  This  has,  evidently,  been  the 
case  of  those  migrants  who  have  wished to retain rights over  land  in  the  Senegal  River  Valley  but 
were  afraid of loosing  these  rights  in case the land was subject to development  of  irrigation. 
Once people have  left for the  South  they don't have time to come  back  here  and pay their taxes, 
and I don't have  time  to  go  down  there to  collect them. Some village chiefs do go  there  to collect 
taxes.  People wm't to pay here. This is their  territory and they wan't to  keep  their  rights over the 
waalo land. (Ardo  Ururbe  DjougonaBe, Madina Ndiatabe (waalo)) 
As can be  read out of the  somewhat contradictory statement of  the ardo, the large majority  of 
newcomers  do  not  pay  taxes  anywhere. This situation is, however,  shared  with  a l rge part of the 
local  population2'.  Nevertheless the payment of taxes has all of  a  sudden  become  the  symbol f
division  between  locals  and  strangers. Although tax payment is a  requirement for those  wishing 
to present themselves  as  candidates to the rural  councils,  payment of taxes is no exigency  for 
obtaining  more  secure rights over  pastures  and  water. It seems, however,  to  have acquired some 
sort of  symbolic  meaning as it is often  referred to by  both Fuutankes present  in the area on a  more 
permanent  basis  and  by the local  leaders as a sign of political allegiance, a sort of tribute  paid to 
the  local  notabilities. In this way  tax  payment seems to have  become  one of several  ways of 
signalling  integration,  an  act  which is expected, on shorter or longer terms,  to  materialize in some 
sort  of  protection of use rights. 
Bourdieu  terms  such  activities  "officializing strategies" as they aim at transmuting "egoistic" 
private  and  particular  interest  into  disinterested,  collective, publicly  avowable,  legitimate  interests" 
2o Rural taxes are bead  taxes  of a fixed  amount; at the time of  fieldwork 1000 CFA  pr.  bead. The  taxes 
are  collected by  the  village  chief  who  transfers  the funds to the tax collector of the  Rural  Community. h principle 
they are given  a  receipt  for  the  total  amount f payment,  and  by  way  of  renumeration for the  services  rendered,  an 
indemnity of  normally 10% of the  tax  collected is provided  (Blundo, 19985). 
latest  administrative  reform of 1991 which transfers  the  responsibility of tax collection eom the sousprefet to the 
It is interesting to note that while  tax  payment is gaining some prominence  among newcomers,  the 
rural council has  resulted  in  a  dramatic  decline i  the amounts  collected. One of the  reason is that  the rural 
councillors, in  contrast  to  the  sousprefet, do not  collect  taxes  accompanied by the  police  forces.  According  to  the 
Minutes of the  Rural  Council of Barkedji  only 9oo.OOO CFA out of a possible S,9 million  CFA had been  collected  by 
the  newly  elected  councillors  in 1991. 
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(Bourdieu,  1977:40).  Hence,  payment  of taxes  represents  a  way of officialising  one’s  presence  in 
the  area  of  reception.  Another interlinked strategy is that of  being  recognized  as  village  chief. 
Precisely  because of these officializiig attributes, the payment of taxes  and the appointment of 
village  chiefs  (encharged  with collecting these taxes) have  become  a  matter of fierce  opposition 
among parts of the fust-comr population. For just  as local  herders  use the lack  of  taxpayment  as 
justification  for  limiting  the  rights  of  newcomers,  very strong political  pressure  and  creativity is 
invested in  constraining  development of tax-collection  among  foreigners.  The  various  political 
agendas  involved  in  the  simple  act  of tax paying is expressed  very  pertinently by  the  FuutakoBe 
accountant of  Yonofere: 
“It’s true that  conflicts  are  increasing.  There are more people and  more  animals  now.  More  and 
more  transhumants arrive from the North. The indigeous population fear that  these people also 
decide  to  settle  here for good. They fear that as the  FuutankoBe population increases they will 
start  claiming to be  represented  in  the  Rural Council. But  this goes only for those  who pay their 
taxes here. That is why it is sometimes very difsicult to get to pay your taxes. This  has  caused 
many  transhumants to give up paying taxes”. 
b). The  long  road to recognition; the appointment of ‘foreign’  village  chiefs: 
It is symptomatic  that  although officiiy appointed by the Ministry of Interior, the status of village 
chief  is  a  fairly  hollow  title  endowed  with  little  actual  powers.  The  rights  to  distribute  land  and 
control  local  resources  were  lost  already  with the passing of the 1966 Land  Law  (Loi SW le 
Domaine  National).  Today village  chiefs are first  of all in charge of overseeing  that  national  laws 
and  regulations  and  decisions  of  the  rural  council are  observed within his  village.  He is furthermore 
in  charge  of  keeping  the  civil  register  and,  more  important,  of  collecting rural  taxes  in  his  village”. 
The interest of the  Fuutanke  herders in the office  of  village  chiefs  lies  primarily  in its official 
attributesz3. By acquiring  the  symbols  and  roles of traditional  chiefs, these herders  validate the 
legitimacy  of  their  claims. In assuming the role of traditional  head  of  lineage  (a sort of  local 
representative of the ardo, the traditional clan leader) they  reproduce  a  social, not an 
individualized  identity  for  these are social not individualized  roles,  with  obligations  as  well as 
Decret  72-363,  Ministkre de l’hterieur. 
meetings. It isn’t very important for me. There is a guy at the borehole who informs me of what ’S going on. 
Yerim Sow expresses  his  priorities in this way: “I’m not very ojien asked to participate in  any 
Sometimes he is my stand-in at the meetings. I can’t go by cart  all the  time to Barkedji, I risk getting ill”. 
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rights attached (Goheen, 1992402). 
This symbolic  value is clearly  recognized by the local  population  and  is  manifested in the fierce 
opposition to any official appointment of Fuutankes as village  chiefs: 
“When our relatives  started  am‘ving  in  large  numbers  the  local  herders did all  they  could to try 
and chase us away, but they didn’t succeed. The FuutankoBe people are very earnest and 
responsible people, we don’t  steal  cattle  etc.  It’s 13 years  ago  that  the  village  was officially 
recognized.  People  didn’t  approve of it. But we  have  contributed a lot  to  the functionning of the 
borehole, so now people leave us alone.  There  are l1  different  FuutankoBe  subvillages  around 
Djagueli but only 3 villages managed to become officially recognized. To be officially 
recognized, you have to pass by  the  Rural  Council  and  the  sousprefet.  Barkedji is very  well 
represented in the  higher  spheres of the  state.  Djibo Ka, Daouda  Sow  and  Bira Sy Sod4 all  come 
from that area. When they  are  displeased  they  can  make a lot of noise.  But  they couldn’t do 
anything  against  our 3 villages  because we had paid our taxes and  everything was according to 
regulations. But they managed to get the  Sousprefet  mutated”. 
(FuutankoBeVillage  chief  of  Fidjiti,  borehole f Djagueli) 
Although  many  Fuutankes  have  applied  for  recognition,  only  a  few  hold  office.  The  rest  have  been 
rejected, Officially on the  basis  of  their  villages  being too small  or located iUegaUy within the 
borders  of a gazetted  forest (as above). In reality it is morelikelly  to  be  the  result  of  pressure from 
the local population  who  fear  that  official  recognition  will  give  the  village  more  permanent  rights 
and  eventually  enhance  recognition  of  territorial  claims  also.  Only  in 3 cases  have  ’foreign‘  village 
chiefs  gained  official  recognition.  And  even in those  cases  ,they  still  lack  the  final  official  approval 
from the Minister of Interior. This does  not,  however,  prevent  them  from  being  involved in local 
decision- making on equal terms  with  the other village  chiefs. 
M All three influential  FuutankoBe  politicians with close family ties to the  Arrondissement  of  Bark6dji  and 
the  D6parternent of Lingukre.  Djibo Ka (from  Thiargny  in  the Barkidji arrondisement) has occupied several 
Ministries, lastiy the  central post of Minister of Interior from 1991. In 1993 he was  removed fron this post as a result 
of the internal power  struggles of the  Socialist Party @‘S). Daouda  Sow, his uncle, was for numerous years  President 
of the  National  Assembly. He was removed  in  1989.  Biram  Sy  Sow also occupied  several  central  post  within  the 
state and party apparatus. The fall of Djibo Ka was  highly  lamented  by  the  Fulani  population of the  Ferlo,  who  felt 
they no longer had someone to represent  their  interest in the  highest  political  spheres. 
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The  explanations  given  by  the  authoritiues give several hints to the room of  manoeuvre  available 
to pahcipants m local  struggles  over access to resources. As stressed by the deputy of the PrJfet 
of Matam,  foreign  herders  who do not pay thek taxes in the area of settlement have less rights. 
This is used to justify  both  the  action  of  the  foreigners  and those of the locals. But, what these 
rights  actually  include  remains  unclear and hence  open for interpretations. 
For  the  sous-pr6fet, it is the  location  of  the  new  villages  within  the limits of  the  gazetted forests 
which  provides  the  justification  for  questionniug  their  legality. In contrast the deputy of the PrJfet 
stresses  the  provisional  character  of  their  settlements. O her arguments invoked during interviews 
with rural councillors  are  the  size  of the  agglomerations, that they  don’t  pay their taxes,  and  that 
they  are  too  mobile  to  constitute  a  village. 
To create a village you must  have a large family. If the village  isn’t large enough, it will not be 
recognized. For  recognition you go the Rural Council. They will decide if your petition is 
accepted. Those  who  were  rejected  were  not  stable here. They went on transhumance to the 
Saluum all  the  time in search of pastures and  they didn’t even pay their taxes here. 
(Former  president  of  the Ruml Council, Barkedji) 
The reference by the sousprlfet to the legal framework concerning the gazetted forests is 
problematic, as this legislation  from 196525 primarily aimed at limiting  the  uncontrolled  expansion 
of  peanut  cultivation  which  characterized  this  period  by  prohibiting cash crop production in certain 
areas. This law  clearly  stipulates  the  rights  of  local occupants to make use of pastures, tree 
products  etc. as well as the right to cultivate  annual crops if  only the choice of site is  approved by 
the  forestry  services.  Rights of settlement  are  not  explicitly  stipulated. 
The minimum  size of a  ‘legduable’  settlements  is another open question for which no official 
prescription  existsz6. With  regards  to the requirements of a  candidate, the decree 72-636 of the 
Ministry of the Interior  states  that  everybody  over 21 years,  who  has  principal  residence  in  the 
village  who  has  been  listed  regularly on the  list  of electorates is eligible. It is of course t h i s  
paragraph  that  the  deputy  is  refering  to.  Nonetheless, what is meant by principal  residence in this 
area characterized by  high  levels  of  mobility  among both first-comers  and  newcomers  remains 
open to interpretation. And concerning  the  registration on the list of electorates, this goes back 
to the  availability of a  village  chief  to  whom  one  can confide one‘s  taxes. In the actual climate of 
Decret no. 65-078 du 10 fewier, 1965 portant code forestike 
26 Interview  with  the  prefet  of  Linguere  1994.  His own proposition is a minimum limit of SO persons. 
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distrust, this can, as  shown  below,  not  be  taken  for grantedz7: 
When Ifirst arrived  the  people of the  neighbouring  village  of  Belkagne,  were  very much against 
us, but  they  didn’t  really  dare  to do anything  against us. Two  years afer we had settled, I started 
paying taxes  in BarEa’ji.  Several  of  my  relatives  had  settled  in  the  vicinities  and  we  decided to 
form a  village.  This  was  authorized by the  sous-pr4fet.  But  the  local  population  complained  and 
at the end, the sous-prefet was mutated.  Several  other  FuutankoBe  groups  had  also  tried to 
become recognized, but it only  worked  out for me  and for the  village  chief of  the UrurBe  Daka 
of  Djagw&8.  The  reason  why  we  were  recognized  was  that  we  could  show  the  receipts for having 
payed  our  taxes. It was  very fortunate that I had  kept  my  receipts for the  councillors  had  hidden 
away  the  book  into  which  payments  were  registred. werim Sow,  EuutankoBe  village  chief  of Yera Lop4  in 
the gazetted forest of Barkedji-Dodji). 
The limited security  of tax registration to a  foreign  village  chief  creates  a  paradoxical  situation 
where  newcomers are condemned for not  paying  taxes  while  taxpaying of newcomers,  with all its 
officializiig attributes, is  indirectly  constrained.  But as observed by the  sous-prefet of Ogo, the 
reverse is also true: 
‘‘Ifthe FuutankoBe  want to pay  their  taxes  here  they  should  go  the  the  nearest  village  chief: But 
they do  not want  to.  They want to make  their own villages  in  the  best  pastures.  They  want to 
establish property rights.” (Sous-prefet  of  Og0 1994.) 
Besides of uncovering  the many refined  ways in which  rights  and  duties are distributed  between 
fistcomers  and  newcomer,  the intricackk surrounding  the  official  establishment of new villages and 
village  chiefs furthermore illustrates  the  difficult  situations of the  administrative  authorities. On 
the one hand, the incorporation  of at least  some of the  ‘foreigner’  village  chiefs  enhances  the 
legitimacy of local  decision-making.  For this reason  the  existing  three  village  chiefs are regularly 
involved  in local  decision-making  routines in spite of the  missing  endorsement  from  the Ministry 
of Interior. 
On the other hand, it seems that by omitting to proceed to a f d  approval, the local 
administration is keeping  the  decision  open  for  later  renegotiation. In this way the  possibility  is 
kept  open for keeping  themexcluded or at least  marginalised as was  the  case in Naori where 70% 
of the  population  were  represented by  only two  persons  out  of  seven.  Finally,  proceeding  towards 
*’ In a  recent  article  Blundo  gives numerous  examples of  how tax embezzlement is occurring not only at 
the level of the  village  chief  but also among  councillors and  administrators  @undo, 1998). 
The intervewee has forgotten  the third officialized  FuutankoBe  village of Loumbi  UruBe 
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full official  recognition of these  semi-officialized  chiefs is, not the least  in the highly  politicized 
Barkedji arrondissemnt, a hazardous  endeavour It is at  least  unlikely to tempt the sous-prifet who 
keeps the mutation  of  his  predecessor (see above)  fresh  in  his  memory. On the contrary, the 
present situation of partial recognition enables the authorities to blame the actions of their 
predecessors,  should  the  legality of the  village  chief be brought into question. 
Securing  control through private  ownership. 
Common  for  the  FuutankoBe  strategies  mentioned  above  has  been that they all aim at  protecting 
resources hitherto governed  as  open  acccess  from attempts at reserving use rights to a  more 
limited  group. This does  not,  however,  demonstrate  any stronger propensity among  FuutankoBe 
herders towards  collectivity  than  what may be  found  among the fmtcomer population.  Indeed 
some of  the  most  successful  attempts  to  secure  individual  access to the range have come from the 
side of the  newcomers.  Among  the  most  striking  examples is the securing of individual  property 
rights  to part of the range  through  digging  a  private  well. Such operations evidently  involve 
considerable investmentz9  and  are  therefore  only  within  reach of a smaU minority  of the richest 
FuutankoBe  herders. 
For  natural  reasons, the devebpment of  private  wells is only taking place in the eastern part of the 
Ferlo  where  groundwater  table is within accessible  reach. In this area distance between  the  existing 
boreholes  tends  to be higher  than in the  rest of the  area,  making  private investment in wells  more 
attractive than would be the  case  elsewhere. In 3 cases  such  private wells have been  localized  by 
the  author, but according to the sousprqet of Ogo, the number of Fuutanke herders  who  have 
obtained  permission to dig  private  wells  is far larger. 
“The  borehole  is  where  everybody  meets.  It’s  also  were the animals contract diseases. That’s  why 
people  want  to  dig  a  well. They wan’t  to  be  able  to  water heir animals in peace. In the 20 years 
where I have  roamed  around  in  the  Southern  Ferlo  and i  the Saluum, I have  tried many times 
to get permission to sink  a  well.  This the first time that I have had a positive response. I sent 
a d m d  to the  Rural  Council  and  to  the  Sousprefet  of Ourosogui and to the officers from the 
Ministry  of  Waterworks  there.  The  Rural  Council  gave the authorisation. It was the people from 
the  Forestry Sewices who  located  the  place to sink the  well. I spent  a  lot of money on getiing  the 
authorisation.  Gallo  Gat0 [an extremely  rich  FuutankoBe  herder, who has been long  time  in  the 
area] helped.  Once  you  have an authorisation to sink a well you also have the authority over  the 
pastures in a radius  of 5 la. Then you are in peace. You will not be  chased away, and no one  will 
hamper your watering. You will  be  the  one  to  decide  who is permitted to use the well. If people 
According to the examples given, prices for a well in this area ranges from 600.000 to 1 mio CFA. 
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are  thieves  or in other  ways  doing  wrong,  you c m  tell  them not to use  the well. But  you can’t tell 
them  to  move  out of  the area. I think it will mainly  my own family who will use  the well. 
(FuutankoBe  well-‘owner‘,  Yonofere) 
The digging of private  wells  is  interesting for several counts. First of all, granting  a  permit for 
digging of private  wells  is  officially  subject o extensive bureaucratic procedures. They can be 
granted  by  the  Prefet,  after  a  technical  approval  by the Forestry Services, but are legal  only  after 
ratification by the Ministry of Interior. 
In the present  cases,  the wealthy  Fuutankes  had,  however,  literally “purchased the  permission 
directly fiom the  local  director of the  Forestry  Services. These purchases  were  all  the  more 
spectacular as they  involved  land  which  was  part  of  a n tional game reserve. In order  to  protect 
the habitat of the (indeed  very  sparse)  wild animals and fowl, settlement  in the game  reserve is 
authorized  only  near  already  existing infrastructure i.e. the areas already covered by the existing 
boreholes.  Nonetheless,  the  former  Director  of  the reserve acting in collusion with  the  President 
of  the m a l  council,  has  illicitly  granted  permission for digging of more than 30 wells, a situation 
which was now under scrutiny by the state administration3’. Despite the correct procedure 
depicted by the  FuutankoBe  well-owner  above, it is therefore not likely that  his  permission  was 
obtained  legally. 
Secondly,  it is interesting to note  how  the  FuutankoBe herders, otherwise fierce defenders  of free 
grazing  rights,  apparently  adhere to  restrictions  where their own wells are concerned.  According 
to herders,  the  advantages of such  private  wells are first of all, that they  enable  herders  to  settle 
in  previously  unused  pastures,  thereby limiting situations  where  transhumance  might be necessary. 
Such  advantages  would  easily  be  undermined if access to  the well, as  stipulated  in  the  law,  was 
held  open for all herders. Asked  whether  such  a  well would not  attract other users, one of the 
“fresh owners responded  that  he  had  been  granted not only rights of exclusivity to his private 
well, but also to pastures around. As mentioned above this may be interpreted as a clear 
tresspassing  of  both  islamic  and  customary  law, as well as of  national  jurisprudence: 
“We have had to intervene  at  several wells to tell  the village chiefs that it’s illegal to prohibit 
access  to water. This  the  case  even if people have paid all the expenses related to the  sinking 
themselves”. SousprGfet of Ogo, 1994 
Herders claims of property  rights  not  only to the well  itself but also the adjacent  pastures is 
The  President of the Rural Council  was  obviously  not aware of the illicit  character of his  doings as he 
proudly  boasted of having approved  the  creation of more  than 20 wells  in  the course of his  presidency’, just  as he 
stressed  that no  demand  had  ever  been  turned  down. 
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therefore a revealing re-interpretation. The allegation (and the preciseness with which the 
extension  of  the rights was decribed)  might  well  stem from a  (very  optimistic) reconsmction of 
an  existing  regulation prohibiting  installation of fields  within  a  distance of 1 kilometre  around  the 
wet season pond^^'. Hence it is yet  an  example of the  changes in mentality or transgressions of 
moral  codifications  which,  according, to Solway are likely to  take  place  in  a  period  of  readjustment 
after  a drought. For the appeal of  such  wells  is  not  merely  the  need for more  secure  watering 
facilities. The attraction lies just as  much in its attribution  of  being  a man-made well,  a  feature 
which  lends  more  readily to its  being  claimed as exclusive property.  Indeed,  the  fact  of  being  man- 
made is interpreted as providing  the  otherwise  communal  water  sources  with  more  extended  rights 
in  direction  of private propeiry. 
Heterogeneity of interests and politization of resource  management institutions. 
The emerging  claims of rights of  exclusion  towards  strangers  are,  as  could  be  seen  above, no 
longer  only  forwarded  by the settled indigenous  population,  but  are  increasingly  shared  by  ‘older’ 
Fuutanke  herders. Among these well-established  newcomers,  moral  rules  and  old  solidarities  are 
transforming as part of their  adaption to changing  conditions  and new  opportunities.  Increasingly 
they  desire to restrict  access  of  ‘new’  transhumants  i.e.  those  of  their  relatives from the  Fuuta  who 
have recently  rebuilt their herd  sufficiently to take  up  a  more  pastoral way  of living  and  who  are 
ready to start  copying on the production  strategies of their  prosperous kin. Much  seems  to  indicate 
that  these  herders are developing  into  just as fierce  defenders  of  the  rights  to  exclude  ’newcomers’ 
from the  local resource base, as were  another  group of  relative  newcomers, the FafaBe of  Ranerou 
(see chapter 4). 
The  incidences decribed above are thus illustrative of the ways  in  which  groups  and  solidarities 
tend to emerge or dissolve according to the opportunities  available  and of  how ethnic’  identities 
are under constant recreation. For while the labels ‘FuutankoBe’, ‘egge-egge’ or ‘foreigner’ 
contributed to give the drought-refugees of the Senegal  River  Valley  a  group  identity  they  had  not 
hitherto  posesssed, the economic  and  political  consolidation  of  part  of  these  herders  creates  a  new 
situation  where  these solidarities seems  to  evanesce  and  be  replaced  with other types  of  alliances 
with for example part of the settled local  elite. 
Nonetheless, this movement is not undirectionnal. For it was by stressing their situation as 
foreigners being deprived of their rights to move freely over the  range that the  basis  of  their 
present success was established. Once more firm’ rights have been yielded through official 
” The idea that control over a  source of water  also  confers  control  over  land  within  a  certain  radius of the 
well  may also stem  from the many mapping  exercises  and  delimitation f resource-regimes  and  “pastoral units” 
logic  in  the area. 
(unitis pastorales) in vogue among development  projects (such as PAPEL and PRODAM) working  along  the  same 
218 
establishment of ViUages  and  village  chiefs or  through  enforcement  of  ‘private-property-like’  rights 
over land adjacent to private  wells,  other  preoccupations  than  the  free and  open  grazing  and 
watering  rights  have  tended to take over.  But  it is still by  refering  to  their  group  identity as “those. 
who contribute  most  to  the  running  costs of the  well”  or as “ those  who  will  ensure  the  well-being 
of the animals by  making the well  function  properly”  that  claims  for  representation  in  the  well 
comittee and other similar  institutions  are  made. (This explains  the  ambivalence  towards  their 
present  numerical  reinforcement  expressed in many  of  statements  made  by  old‘  FuutankoBes  cited 
above). Furthermore the tendency for increased sedentarization is parallelled by a tendency 
towards  increased  mobility,  a  situation  which  goes  for  first-comers  and  newcomers  alike.  Hence, 
claims towards more exclusive rights are  likely  to  continue  to  coexist  with  claims  protecting  the 
free and open access to pastoral resources. 
So where  Solway states that  drought  hastens  and  renders  visible  what  has  previously  been  latent 
processes, and (in  a  somewhat  unilineal  interpretation of the  revelatory  proces)  stresses  how 
vitality of reciprocal use  entitlements  is  being  undermined  as  a  result of long-term  structural 
changes towards commodification,  privatization and class-formation (1994:492), the  case  of 
Senegal seems to point  towards  a  far  more  ambiguous  and  fluid  situation,  where  several  trends  are 
at  work at the same time. 
Whereas it is true that acquisition of land by individuals and commodification of formerly 
reciprocal arrangements are becoming  more  recurrent  features,  this  does  not conf i i  a  general 
trend  towards  individualisation or privatization  of  hitherto  communal  resources.  Apart  maybe from 
the cases of ‘spontaneous privatization’ of the  range  surrounding  the  private wells3’, few of the 
cases point towards individual acquizition. Rather these trends are inter-twined with more 
‘reciprocal arrangements’. For  as noted by Shipton and  Goheen  (see  chapter 3) people  use 
resources  such as water  and  land not only  for  survival  and  enrichment but  also  to  gain  control  over 
others and define personal  and social identities. 
The  attempts  by certain villagers to appropriate  the  funds of the  well  committee  are  for  example 
not so much  a  matter of personal  enrichment.  For  apart  from  constituting  a  source of profit  they 
are  first  of d important sources  of  social  and  political  legitimacy for those  who  control  them. In 
this way  they  have  become vital institutions  in  local  political  life  and areused as such  by the  local 
elites. 
As argued  in  chapter 3, a  persons  status  and  influence  binges  on his ability  to  mobilize  a  following. 
Well committees, especially those whose incomes swell from transhumants’ contributions 
obviously constitute a  very  important  source  of  capital  for  clientelistic  redistribution. For this 
32 But even here  the  owner  ackowledged his inability to exclude  others. 
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reason they  have not developed into closed  corporations  acting to exclude others. Instead they 
have  remained as arenas for individual  accumulation  and  mobility - acting  to expand the number 
of supporters. 
This is not to say  that  maintenance of a  clientele is financed  overtly  through  the taxing of foreign 
herders (although this might be the  case).  Rather,  as  proposed by Blundo, control over such 
renumerative institutions puts the  local  bosses  represented  in  the  well committee in a situation 
where they cannot refuse  their village  clientele  favours  (such as tax exemption) as they are the 
basis of clientelistic  exchange.  In  the  same  vein  cases of  fmancial borrowings are therefore also 
part of the explanation  for the frequently  empty  accounts of the well-~ommittees~~. 
It is important  to  recognize  that this monopolizing  of  (scarce)  resources for political power is not 
only  a  matter  of  a  divide  between fist-comers trying  to  retain  control over their local resources 
against the  economically  more powerful1  immigrants.  First-comers do not  speak with one voice, 
but are engaged  in  their own internal  struggles  over  the  available resoures. The attempts to 
maintain  monopoly  over  the  well  committees  are  therefore also  part  of another logic related to the 
internal  strives  between  political  factions  at  local  level. 
As revealed  maybe  most clearly in the  case of  Naor6,  disputes  over the composition of the board 
of the well-committee are just as much struggles to gain control over the means to compensate 
the clients  who  have  supported  the  winning  faction,-  and  with  the  equally important addition made 
by Blundo (1998:2) of  depriving  the  opponents of the  benefits  which  they in tum could have 
derived  from  these  resources. In this struggle,  the  rich  new-comers are not  only being used  by the 
various  local  political  factions.  They  also  manage  to  play  adeptly on the internal oppositions as 
a way of getting their share of the  political  power  and  resources  which are redistributed. Hence, 
it is an example of the  processes  described by  Kopytoff  of  how immigrants attempt to take over 
local  political  systems  and  remold  them  to  their  own  purposes  by killfull political  maneouvering. 
With  regards  to  the  role of the  administraton,  what  characterized the situation was how  deviation 
of  funds was left strangely  without any  sanctions. This was  the case both with the overtaxing or 
exclusion  of  foreigners  and  with  the  attempts of  technically constraining watering. The 
admiuistrative  centres  appear  generally  uninterested  in  the  misappropriation of funds taking place 
at the local level  and  only  intervene if protests  becomes too overhwelming - or if violence  is 
involved. This is the  result  partly of the  submission of the  administrative authorities to pressures 
stemming from the g a m  of  factions  and  from  the  political  and religious  notabilities which may be 
close to bankrupt as enonnous sums of money  had  been  lent  to  political nd religious  notabilities  with  limited 
motivation for paying off their martgages.  (See also Boone, 1990440). 
33 This is not  only  the case at  local level. Also the  national  banks of Senegal  have  in  several  cases  been 
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mobilized  in the course of struggles.  But it is also  because  many  of  these actions not  neccesarily 
imply  collective  reprobation. To a  wide  degree  they are accepted as  legitimate,  although  not 
uncontested, means in the general bid for political power. Involvment of the administrative 
authories is therefore no neutral  act,  but  is  immediately  used in the political battle, as shown in 
Naor6. 
Transfer of competences and  delegation  of the  responsibility for local resource management  to 
local comxn~&~ has, as can  be  seen,  not  generated  a  political ulture based on well-defined  rule- 
making  authorities  anticipated by the  Natural  Resource  Management Framework. Rather local 
institutions  whether  'new' or 'traditional'  have  remained  contingent and indeterminate in  character, 
as a  result of their  embeddedness  in  specific  political  and  economic structures. As  shown  above 
management of local  resources  cannot be  regarded as an  activity in isolation irespective of time 
and space. For precisely as proposed by the  negotiated  development approach (see chapter 3), 
the perception of both frst-comers and  newcomers  of the  object of negotiation changed in the 
course of  the  process.  From  being  a  matter of competition over access to water and  pastures it 
turned into a  strive  centered primarily  on control  over  the  key resources for accumulation  of 
political power (as expressed  in  the  curiously  pertinent  quotation  below). And in consequence of 
this also  the  social  relationships  between  the  negotiating paxties were altered. 
People don't want us here. If they  could  they  would  chase us away. We  haven't even made  any 
attempt to integrate the well-committee, or the  Rural Council. We haven't even participated in 
the meetings among the  FuutankoBe  village  chiefs,  and we haven't contributed to the delegation 
of protest. Village  Chief, Loumbi UrurBe,  Barkedji  april 1995. 
Ensuing this cognition  the  need,  expressed  in  chapter 3, of  studying tactics and strategies, not 






The  principal  objective  of the  present  research  was  to  ”analyse  the  changes  in  access  to  water  and 
pastures triggered by post-drought population  movements  and “to study the changing 
configurations of power and  obligations  which  have  resulted”. This was  seen  as  part of a  more 
general  exploration of “the institutions and  processes  through  which  individual  and  groups  gain 
access to,  exploit  and  exercise control over resources  and  how  these  proceses  interact  with  other 
social and  political processes over time”. To undertake this enquiry,  a  number of questions  were 
raised  concerning  the  ways in which  migrant  herders  had  adjusted  their  production  systems  to  the 
opportunities  offered in their new environment and  how  access  to  resources  was  negotiated  with 
the frst-comer population. Issues concerning the impact of migration on local institutional 
mechanisms  and the role of the decentralisation  process  herein  were  also  advanced in order  to 
open  a  more  general  discussion on how these processes  have  shaped  the  arenas of resource 
competition. 
Preliminary conditions for answering these questions were that the crisis scenario and the 
conception  of  herders as passive  victims  of  the  on-going  deterioration  of  their  fragile  environment 
were  abandoned. To capture the  ingenuity and adaptive  capacities of rural  producers of the  Ferlo 
a more open- ended framework was required.  Such  a  framework  was  developed in chapter 2. 
Using this framework as a backdrop, it became  clear that the situation  of  post-drought  Ferlo is 
neither an  absolute nor a structural decline  in  the  number of animals in the  pastoral  areas  and 
rather than a de-pastoralisation of household economies, development seems to favour the 
adoption of more  specialized,  mobile and labour  intensive  systems of production.As  shown in 
chapter 4, the  ‘drought  refugees’  have,  together  with  the  indigenous  population,  been  able  to  adjust 
to  the new  situation through conscious adaptation of a  large  number of different  innovations 
(notably  the  tube  and  the  donkey cart). This has  enhanced  the  ability of both  groups  to  cope  with 
constraints  and to  take advantage of  new  opportunities. 
One  important  explanation for  this abfity to adapt  and  persist is that  eco-systems  such as the  Ferlo 
are  unstable,  i.e.  they do not have as a prominent  characteristica  the  ability  to return to equilibrium 
after  a temporary disturbance (or  crisis).  Rather  frequent  occurence of random  perturbations  such 
as drought,  bush  fires,  etc.  produce  instability  in  the  sense  of large fluctuations  (turbulence).  Such 
production systems foster resilience  and  exhibit  considerable  capacity to absorb  changes  and 
disturbances.This in turn fosters flexible  and  opportunistic  management  systems  where  local 
producers  seek to take maximum advantage of  the  resources  available at any  given  moment. 
Hence,  when,analysing the fluid and porous  social  relations  within  such  unpredictable and  highly 
variable  production  systems, constancy of behaviour  becomes less important  than  the  persistence 
of relationships. 
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Persistance, in the sense of flexibility and the ability to manoeuvre economically as well as 
politically  have  been  equally  pertinent  elements  in  the  success  story  of  the  Fuutankobe  herders  and 
of  their (more or less  involuntary)  hosts:  the  sedentarised ago-pastoral Fulanis.  It is the  ability to 
absorb  changes  and  disturbances  which  explains the smooth  incorporation of the  large  contingent 
of drought 'refugees' who moved into the  area in the  aftermath  of  droughts.  This  is  in  contrast 
to  the linear view expressed in  mainstream  ecological  thinking,  which limits the-perspective to 
either the decline or the re-establishment of balance  or  status  quo. 
This smooth integration of  foreign  herds  and  herders may  partly  be  explained as a result of a 
generally  flexible  environment  where  both  herders  and animals are in a  position  to  respond  to 
externally driven change such as drought  and other climatic  hazards. In consequence of their 
restricted possibilities to  influence or control  localized  fluctuation  in  range  land  productivity (as 
fodder is scarce due to deficient  rains,  not  because of too many animals), herders  in  such  non- 
equilibrium environments are seldom motivated to coordinate or restrict access to available 
resources. Rather pastoral strategies tend  to  be  individalistic  and  opportunistic,  geared  towards 
seizure  of  opportunities  and  avoidance of hazards.  Such  opportunistic  systems  tend  in  general to 
favour open and unrestricted movement  over the range.  This  openness  is  reproduced  in  local 
interpretations of  'Fulaniness' as hospitality  towards  foreigners  and  in  the  belief  that  it is shameful 
to deny other herders access to water and pastures. 
Another part of the explanation  should be found  in  the human  capacities  to  persist,  absorb  and 
adapt  to  new  conditions. As shown in chapters 4 and 5, individual  economic  and  social  strategies 
are far more flexible than is usually  assumed. As exposed  in  multiple  ways  throughout my case 
m a t e a  people  are  often  very  &rt when it corns to directing  their  investments  and  labour  efforts 
towards the most profitable  acitivity at any given  time. This goes  not only for  the  changes and 
disturbances brought about by the drought  and the proliferation of irrigated  agriculture  in the 
Senegal River Valley. 
As d e s m i d  in  chapter 4, breaking  with  the crisis scenario and the  idea of  drought as an  epochal 
change also implies  recognition  of  a  turbulent  past  in  the cowe of  which  herders  have  been  forced 
to  adjust their productive capacities by  making the best  of  their  opportunities  given  at  any  point 
of time. Watershed  events,  such as the boosting  of the groundnut  economy  in  the  beginning  of this 
century or the borehole  'revolution'  in  the 1950s, provided  for  sustantial  change  in  the  production 
system  and in social  relations. In both  cases it provided  for  constraints as well as new possibilities. 
Evidently the rapid  proliferation of the  groundnut  economy  contributed  to an unprecedented 
encroachment on former grazing lands. But it also brought  about  a  substantial  boosting of cattle 
markets  and  hence  of  herders  prosperity.  It  even  triggered  the  venture  of  some  Fulani  herders  into 
groundnut cultivation. Hence, no uni-lineal  trend of deterioration  can  be  extracted. 
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The introduction of the  boreholes  could  likewise, as proposed by certain preservationists, be 
interpreted  as  undermining  previously  well-fimctionnjng  management sys ems and  consequently 
as the f i s t  step towards  overgrazing.  But  here,  focusing  on  resilience  instead of degradation 
revealed  how  herders  took  advantage  of  the  system by abandoning  the large energy-consuming 
transhumance  movements  between  the  Senegal River  VaUey and  the Ferlo. In this way  a  more 
‘pure’ pastoral space was  created,  freed  from  the  perpetual confrontations between farmers and 
herders. This did  not,  however,  involve  total  sedentarisation  or  intensification as was expected by 
the planners. Instead a system of micro-nomadisation was adopted, whereby mobility was 
preserved as a  crucial mans to limit  the risks and  calamities  related  to climatic variation. In short, 
the  drought-related  migration  acted  not  only  to  increase.  population  and animal pressure in the area 
of reception,  a  process  which  according  to the equilibrium  framework  would entail overgrazing 
and resource degradation. On the  contrary  the influx of drought refugees acted as  the prime 
catalyst  for  technological  innovation  of  pastoral  production,  a  process which triggered off a  whole 
series  of  other  technological  and  institutional  innovations. 
Looking at persistence of relationships  rather  than  at  constancy  of behaviour accentuates the 
adaptive  and  innovative  aspects  of  drought-related  migration.  For  herders th  crisis was perceived 
just  as much as persistence of relationsships as a rupture or an epochal change. Therefore 
adjustment  of the production  systems  to  the new conditions  offered was a less insurmountable 
constraint for migrants  than  anticipated.  Persistence of relationships in the context post-drought 
Ferlo  includes for example  the  ability to move  and  exploit  various  resource regimes as well as the 
ability to shift between  various  productive  strategies  according  to  what proves most profitable for 
the  moment. Also the  adaption or unwrapping of the  different  technological and institutional 
innovations  available  can  be  understood  as  a  expression  of  the  creativeness of local entrepreneurs 
in ensuring the perseverance of relations. Far from the stagnant, timeless, autarchic and 
conservative  pastoralist  victim of his  decaying  production  system,  a different picture of  pastoral 
producers emerges where  production  levels  are  a  function not of  a static level  of  sustainable 
production or canying capacity but  result  from  the  capacity  to  innovate  and‘enlarge, so to speak, 
the  commons from within’. 
Also with regards to social relations and the negotiation of access to productive resources 
focusing on resilience and  persistence  of  relations  seems  a  fruitfull  point  of departure. Instead of 
the collective ecological  concerns or  relative  poverty  which - according to for example Runge - 
should  motivate  villagers  independent  of  time  and  space  to  act  in  common, the examples from the 
Ferlo clearly show  how  interrelations  between  individuals  and groups are governed more by 
individual interests and  needs  than by consideration  for the weaker or by collective ecological 
concerns. 
But  in order to avoid  falling into the  trap of the  rational  herder  as  the lone hunter for benefits as 
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proposed in Hardin's  allegory of the  tragedy of the  commons, it remains important to  stress  that 
such needs are not all reducible to rational economic calculations. The many bargainings, 
manipulations  and  counterattacks  played  out in connection  with the well  committees  and the 
ongoing  negotiations  over  access  to  pasture  and  water  witness  how  many actions and operations 
fall short  of  any  resemblence to economic  rationality.  The  frequent  and often prolonged  inactivity 
of the boreholes  due  to  simple  fuel  shortages  or  delayed  minor repairs are provocked  mainly by 
the  unwillingness of herders  to  pay  the  taxes  due  or  by  the perpetual deviation of  funds to other 
purposes.  Together  with  the many cases of standstill prompted by struggles between  different 
political  factions  or  clan  groups  they  nevertheless  constitute  considerable economic contraints for 
both first-comers  and  new-comers.  Hence,  explanation for their frequent occurrence cannot be 
found in rationalities  related  to  pure  economic  gain.  Rather the key to undertand this apparent 
mess must  be  found  in  the multiple  and  competing  claims to legitimate use governing resource 
allocation in the  Ferlo  and  elsewhere.  These  conflicting  claims indicate that resource management 
institutions, far from the single purpose institutions anticipated by the Common Property 
framework,  serve  many  purposes  at  the  same  time.  Evidently  the well committees are concerned 
not only  with  the  operation  and  maintenance  of  the  borehole and its equipment, but also  with 
regulation of access to adjacent  pastures,  generation of support for the local political elites in 
control of the  well  committee  through  nurturing of the  village clientele through  favorable  taxing 
arrangements, as well  as  a  number  of  other  purposes.These  priorities  may at certain moments 
overshadow  the  simple  question of  securing  acessibility  of  water. Hence, it becomes  impossible 
to  get to grips  with the functionings  and dfunctionings of these local institutions if the entire 
political  dimension is omitted. 
As stressed in  chapter 3, understanding  how  rights of access and control over resources  change 
over time requires an understanding  of  how rules are  made  and remade through peoples'  practices. 
This in turn requires  an  understanding  and  appreciation of power  relations. For returning to  the 
issue  of  constancy  and  flexi%ility,  the  case  material  from  the  Ferlo certainly shows that peoples'  use 
of  rules,  norms  and  moral  obligations  far  from  being  constant are re-interpreted  continually  as  a 
function - among other things - of  the  prevailing power  relations, the position of the  individual 
actor  involved  and the resource  priorities  entailed. 
Difference  in  resource  priorities  could  for  example be read  out of the dissimilar attitudes towards 
transhumant herds  experienced  during  the dry years  of  1991  and  1993. Priorities in the eastern 
Ferlo,  (at  thepuits-foruges)  where  producers  to  a  larger extent are settled agro-pastoralists, were 
directed  pxjmarily towards  fabrication of technical  constraints to watering in order to  discourage 
large  herd-owners from settling. In contrast  to this, well committees in the western Ferlo,  where 
the  indigenous  herding  systems  were  more  prone to  copy  the newly introduced herding strategies 
displayed more  ambivalent  interests  in  the  newcomers. Here the newcomers were seen both as 
competitors, as sources of  economic  and  political  prosperity  and as a  numerical  and  political 
reinforcement of the pastoral population vis-%vis the  perpetual pressure from the Mouride 
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expansion  (as  decribed  in the situation from Barkedji and  Velingara). 
During  the  period  during  which  fieldwork was carried out  resource  priorities  and  power  relations 
between  Fuutankobe  and  indigenous  herders  have  changed  considerably s newcomers  and  certain 
layers of the indigenous population increased their wealth and influence. This had obvious 
repercusions  both on the  claims  raised  by the newcomers  as  well as on  the  rights  granted  them  by 
the  firstcomer  population. For as prosperity increased and  power  relations  altered, the objects of 
struggles  tended to shift from pure safeguading  of  productive  resources  towards other types of 
resources  more  closely  related  to the generation of  political  power. As shown  in the Naor6  case, 
struggles  around  the  well-committees  moved  away kombeig solely  a question of ensuring proper 
watering  and became just as much  a  struggle  over  political  power  and  influence as a  means  to  gain 
control  over  others  and efine personal and social identities. 
Within this fluid  situation  the  FuutankoBe  herders  are  manoeuvring  very  adeptly  to  position  them- 
selves  most  favourably  in the struggle over access and  control  with  the  natural  resources  in  the 
pastoral  area.  Although  they have been ‘used‘  by  the  local  political elites as  part of a  strategy to 
reinforce  political  positions, the  FuutankoBes  have  managed  to  play  very  skillfully on the  internal 
oppositions  in order to  get their share of the political  power  and  resources  which are being 
redistriiuted.  Indeed, their present strategy must be worthy of the  label of  ‘winning  strategy’ as 
proposed  by  Hesseling  and Mathieu.  Until  now  they  have  exhibited  considerable  intelligence and 
‘clairvoyance’  in  analyzing the content of ongoing  transformations. In spite of their  relatively  weak 
institutional  organization and not the least the geographic  and  political  distance  between  the 
centres  of  power  and  their own remote encampments,  they  have  managed at least  to  some  extent 
to influence the rules  of the gam. The result  can,  among  other  things, be read  out of the  changing 
attitudes  towards  transhumant  herders exhibited by  government  officials,  notably  those in central 
positions. 
As shown thoughout the text, the apparently  simple  story of increased  competition  leading  to 
greater claims for exclusivity does not lend itself to similarly  simple  conclusions. For although 
some  first-comers are united  in  a clear interest in  limiting  competition on resources, there is no 
general  interest  in  a  total  exclusion of foreigners.  Likewise  the  foreign  herders  who  generally 
display  a  considerable  interest  in  maintaining free and  open  access to water  and  pastures  have, on 
several  occasions,  shown  a strong propensity  towards  limiting  further  influx of those  members of 
their kin groups who  have  recently  managed to built  up  a  herd  and  who  are  on the verge of 
moving  southwards  and settle near their prosperous  kin. 
In the  ongoing  transformation of social and  cultural  systems  a  constant  strive  for  adjustment and 
accommodation is taking place where the different  social  actors  seek to manoeuvre  themselves 
into  those  positions  which are most advantageous to his or her  objectives  and  seek to maximize 
the opportunities  offered by the moment.  Hence, a closer look at so-called  communities  and 
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interest groups, shows that multiple  interests  are at stake in  the  process  of  securing  access  and 
increasing  control over the key resources of  the  area. In this struggle,  defining  who  is  and  who  is 
not a member  of a  community becomes the  subject of considerable  manipulations  and  reinterpreta- 
tions just as redefintion of custom and  invention of tradition  are  submitted  to  considerable 
political  manouevring. In contratst to the  structural  functionalist  view,  myths,  ritual  and  symbolic 
systems  were perceived as interesting  because of their  regulatory  role  in  ensuringthe  balance  of 
economic  and  social  systems, the struggles  over  the  meaning of  key concepts  such as who is and 
who is not  a legitimate user,  a legitimate taxpayer  or  -collector or a  legitimate  well-owner  have, 
turned  out to be essential parts of  peoples'  social  manoeuvering. This is also true  for  other  forms 
of  invented  traditions  and  symbolic rituals, which turn out  to  be  crucial  factors  in  the  transforma- 
tion of local systems of resource access and  control.And it is these  struggles  and  contradictions 
that run through the many  political  and  social  alliances  from  which  local  politics is fabricated. 
But as shown  in chapters 4 and 5 such  adjustments  and  manoeuvrings  may  in  a  number of cases 
transgress existing moral standards and  codes of proper  conduct.  The  most  prominent  examples 
mentioned  have  been  where  indigenous herders  have  denied  access  to  water  to  herders  victims of 
drought,  where rural councillors have charged  foreign  herders for settling on the  range  or  when 
parts  of  the  range has become subject to  private  appropriation  by  individual  herders  through  the 
establishment  privately dug wells. Obviously  processes  towards  increasing  degrees of  exclusivity, 
commodification and even privatization  were in  motion  before  the  droughts.  But,  as  shown by 
Solway, perceived crisis, such as the droughts,  overgrazing,  desertification and the deficient 
precipitation  in the early 1990s have with  smaller  or  greater  force  provided  the  necessary  licence 
for  actors to extend them to previously  unacceptable  levels.  Hence this period  must  be  analysed 
as a  series  of events through which people  actively  have  contested  and  revised  key  notions  and 
representations. In this way  they are part of a  practical  political  struggle  through  which  people 
defend their interests and  advance  claims. In this struggle  a  vast  range  of  direct and  indirect 
strategies are employed, involving  both  action and  inaction,  compliance  and  resistance, 
demonstrating the considerable skills and  adeptness of both  elites  and  subordinate  groups to 
identify  sources of power and  leverage. 
The  opportunities actors take  are,  however,  not  entirely  random,  nor  are  they  entirely  predictable. 
They consist first of all in the maintenance of flexibiliv, in the  diversification of options and  in 
keeping  opportunities open. As a  result  one  sees no clearcut  trend  towards  increasing  privatization 
and  consolidation of economic resources.  Rather  such  attempts  coexist  alongside  with  efforts  to 
consolidate the free and open access to resources  because  mobility,  diversification of  income 
sources  and  maintenance  of  diversified  networks  linger on as  fundamental  attributes of  pastoral 
production strategies. 
Returning to  the research questions concerning  the  impact  of  migration the  local  institutional 
mhanisms regulating  access  to  natural resources and  the effects of decentralisation, it seems  that 
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whereas the direct  effect of post-drought  migration  on  resource  management in the area has been 
considerablethis is less the  case  with  the  decentralisation  proces. In reality, the establishment of 
rural councils and the handing  over of responsibility  over  the  boreholes to the local populations 
provided relatively little change in local resource management practices. Instead, it was the 
swelling accounts  of  the  well  committees  derived from the new and  exhorbitant taxing policies 
which conferred a  new  and  central  role in local  resource  management o the hitherto relatively 
insignificant  well  committees. 
This statement nevertheless  requires  some  modifications. As shown  in chapter 5 it was  mainly 
through reference to the decentralkation  policy  that  the  indigenous  population legitimated their 
rights to restrict  access  of  ‘foreign’  herds to the  boreholes  and to the  adjacent pastures. Such 
emerging claims of  exclusivity  have  been nurtured not  only  in the rhetoric surrounding the rural 
councils  and  other  decentralised  management  institutions,  but  also by  various projects aiming at 
controlling  overgrazing  through  the  establishment of pastoral  units‘ or fenced paddocks. As such 
it has entered into the discourses  used  by the various  parties  to  legitimate  and support claims of 
exclusive rights over particular  resources or tracts of land. 
Attriiuting responsibility  for  deficient  local  resource  management on excessive state tutelage does 
not provide  any fmiful entry for understanding  the  intricacies of local  resource  management. As 
shown in chapter 4 and 5 neither  state  control  nor  local  authority  have  been capable of ensuring 
efficient  management of the  wells.  Neither  have  they  benn  able  to  secure  that at ribution of land 
is carried  out according to the requirements of the  law. In reality  many decisions regarding 
attribution  of  land or provisional  restriction  of  access to watering  troughs or wells are taken locally 
without  consent or approval  of  those  locally  elected.  Often  the  decisions are  in direct contradiction 
with the norms  and  regulations  goveming  the legal  framework.  But  due to a combination of 
logistical  deficiencies,  the  widespread  politicization f resource  management and the active role 
of local  politicians  in the rise and fall of  local  administrative  officers,  administrators trying to 
impose a  new order are severely  restricted  in  their  room of  manoeuvre. Independent initiatives 
seldom  receive  any  backing  from  the  central  state  administration  and may even, as was the case 
with the ban  on  administrative  involvement  in  the  functions of the well-committee2, be directly 
obstructed.  Confronted  with  the  overwhelming tasks assigned  them,  many  administrators instead 
resort to what m chapter 5 was t e d  insritutional autism. In this way  they  hope to avoid the fate 
of the sousprefet  of Og0 who in the  moment of interviewing  was  comtemplating demotion or at 
herders,  have been  attempted  by  several  projects  such as PDESO  (Projet  de Dtvelopement  de l’Elevage au Stntgal 
Pastoral production  units (unit& pastorales),  where certain  tracts of lands are reserved to a  particular  group of 
Oriental)  PAPEL  (F’rojet  Appui a  l’Elevage)  and  PRODAM  (Projet  de  DCveloppement Agricole  de  Matam),while 
fenced  paddwks have  been  established  in  the  Projet  Senegal0  Allemand  de  Reboisement  de  la  Zone  Nord f Vid u 
Thiengoli and  in  the  Ranch de Doli. 
’The letter  (circulaire)  from Jean Collin,  discussed p. ? 
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least  postponement  of any prospect of transfer  to  a  more  ‘civilized‘  posting. 
As shown,  the  process of decentralisation  has  not  given  way  to  the anticipated development of a 
political  culture  based on accountability.  Rather  it  has, as expressed by Blundo (1998) contributed 
to  reinforce  a  system  based  on  clientelistic  redistribution.  As  demonstrated above, such a system 
hardly conveys efficent  management or transparency  in  accounts. But it does provide a sort of 
functional  adaptation to the  rapidly  changing  management  priorities  and power relations of the 
local comunities through the creation of working compromises and alliances such as those 
emerging  around  the  control  over  key  resources  and  institutions.  Such alliances based as they are 
on the expectations of  reciprocal  benefits  among  people of unequal status obviously  facilitate 
privilege  and  have  contributed to increase the strength of certain layers of the political  and 
economic  elite.  Nonetheless  they  also  contribute  to create space for the more disadvantaged as 
power  in such systems  can  always  be  contested  and  the  redistributive features of the clientelistic 
arrangements to  a  certain  extent  inhibits  identification f clear  winners and losers. 
Changing arenas of resource  competition:  Hitting a moving  target. 
The present  dissertation has been  concerned  very  much  with ‘noise’:  with the noise,  impurities  and 
disturbances which  appeared  during  fieldwork,  but  which do not seem to fit within the broad 
framework of  Natural  Resource Managemnt, the  equilibrium  view  or  the Common Property  and 
Collective  Action  School. In the  case  of  both the physical  and  the institutional environment within 
natural resource management the analysis revealed how disturbances, random events and 
turbulence  tended to become so dominant  that  rather  than  treating  these a  exceptions, it became 
more  fruitful  to  think of noise  as  the  system  itself. 
Throughout  the  dissertation it proved  impossible  to  understand  the  many often contradictory and 
apparently  irrational  practices  carried  out  by  groups or individuals  in  the Ferlo solely  through the 
Common  Property or New  Institutional  Economic  lens.  According to this view  development is 
expected to be  an  ordered,  simple,  uni-directional  and  cumulative expansion  of  ‘civilised  behavior’ 
and  technological  progress.  Indeed  much  of  the  case  material  presented  by the leading figures of 
this school  of  thought  does  reveal  many of these  characteristica,  providing an apparently  sensible 
backdrop to the  issues of boundaries,  mutual  interests  and  communities bound together by  a 
common c u l m  etc.  But  how corn then,  that  the  case  of  Senegal, s shown above, provides such 
a  mess of exeptions, of fluid  and  apparently  contradictory  relations? 
An obvious  reason for this  semingly  congruence  between  reality  and theory is that much  of the 
case material used by the leading theorists of the Common Property School stems from 
compilations  of  secondary  material.  Through  such  a  process all the disturbing and contradictory 
trends  encountered  in  the  field  are  likely  to  have  evaporated as he  data is compartmentalised and 
made more uniform in  the name of comparabihty.  Information  concerning more subtle and devious 
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transactions  and aangernents has, intentionally or unintentionally been ignored:  being  too  difficult 
to measure,-predict or manage. The case material from the Ferlo, chaotic, incoherent and 
multidirectional as it was,  nevertheless showed that it was  precisely  in  the  unexpected  and  the 
ambiguous,  in  the  manipulated  and distorted, that the explanations for the  often  contradictory 
political  and  social  practices  could be found. 
At fist  sght most  of  the  cases  encountered  during  fieldwork  did  appear as relatively  simple  strives 
between a wellestablished group of  first-comers  trying to limit  the  influx of foreigners in order 
to safeguard the scarce fodder resources of the local community. This interpretation fitted 
splendidly  with  a  classic  within  New Institutional Economics,  the  vision  of the free  rider who 
exploits the resources  of a given  locality  without contributing to the  well-being  of  the  community. 
Nonetheless,  one  did not have to investigate  much further into the matter before  a  much  more 
complicated  picture was disclosed. For when looking at the conflicts over a longer time  span it 
turned  out  that  what  was  maybe the most  impoxtant  common  denominator  was the way in which 
not only the  object of the  struggle  but also the social composition of the  various  claimant  groups 
changed in the  course  of  the  operation.  Where  conflicts  in  the  immediate  aftermaths  of  the  drought 
were  related  primarily to competition over access to common  pastures and water sources, this 
shifted m the  course  of struggle  to be increasingly directed towards  the  control over these  assets 
as  part of a larger  bid for political  power  and private gain. 
Likewise  the  simple  and  mutually exclusive categories of  group  identities  and  -interests  between 
firstcomers  and  newcomers  tended to  evaporate in the course of fieldwork.  The  presumably  fixed 
analytical dichotomies, which structured my initial hypoteses (between the politically well- 
consolidated sedentary agro-pastoralists and the marginalised and individualistic foreigners, 
between  those  settled  in  comfortable distance of the wells  and  the  newcomers  avoiding  conflicts 
by  settling far away  in  the  bush,  and even between rich and  poor)  tended  to  dwindle  away  as  the 
process  of  post-drought rehabilitation proceeded. As the objects of struggle as well as the meaning 
of  certain  strategies  have  shifted in the process of  adaptation it proved  impossible  to  understand 
the  process of post-drought  rehabilitation in the  Ferloonly by  means  of dichotomies or mutually 
exclusive  categories  such as before  /after,  crisidrecovery, tunmillorder, degradationhehabilitation, 
private/common,  insider/outsider, newcomer/fustcomer and  even  rich  and  poor. 
Indeed  the  dissertation is full of examples  of  how  meaning  and  value  attributed to certain  objects 
or strategies have  transformed  in the course of time. The strategy of settling in the bush  which, 
for example  originally  had  character of a  largely  defensive  strategy (i.e. the choreography of 
movement  discussed  in  chapter 2), shifted  within  a  relatively  short  time  span into a 'winners' 
strategy through  which it was the foreign  herd owners who had positioned  themselves  most 
favorably jn the  on-going  competion over fodder resources.  Hence far from the  first  impressions 
of marginalisation,  settling  in the bush had transmuted into one of the prime  markers  of  the 
successful  strategy  carried out by the drought refugees. 
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Simikxly,  the  opportunities provided by the new  watering  techniques,  implied  that  the  'value'  and 
importance attributed to pastures located further away  from  the  boreholes  changed,  prompting 
also  previously settled herders to move out into the  bush. In some  cases,  this  even  entailed  a 
'domestication'  of  previously 'under-~tilised'~ land  as  grazing  within  formerly too bushy areas 
contributed  to  improve  the  palatability  of  species  composition  and  as  in the case of  Loumbi 
UrurBe,  keep  away  wild animals (and Mouride farmers),  making  the  area  more  attractive to  the 
'indigenous' population. And where it initially was access to the presumably scarce fodder 
resources  that  were at play, the objects of struggle shifted. As the  herds had recovered  from  the 
most  immidiate effects of the drought they  became  more  related  to  control  over  key  institutions 
andin the course of time it became the political  and  financial  gains  that  these  institutions  were 
likely to generate that were at the heart of the struggles. 
Finally,  the  successful  rehabilitation  in  itself  provided an opporhmity for the  drought  'victims'  to 
transgress their  previous status as  politically  marginalised.  Through sk i l l fu l  manipulation  and 
negotiation  with  political contacts (in  the  broadest  sense)  they  have  managed  simultaneously  to 
reinvigorate  or  recreate  hitherto  unacknowledged  institutions  in  the  area  of  departure  (such  as  the 
Maouloud, the local marabouts and their  religious  networks, the ardo's and  the  association of 
pastoralists to mention  but  a few) and  to  establish new  alliances  and  platforms  for  bargaining in
the  area  of  reception. In this process new interest groups  and  alliances  have  been  moulded  across 
previous  divides just as certain former communities  have  lost  importance. 
Hence, at the  end of the  analysis both the arenas on which  the  struggles  were  played out, the 
claims  expressed as well as the social actors staging  the  scene, had  transformed  and  have  merged 
into  new  and  unexpected combinations. 
The  conclusion  drawn  must therefore be that the  success  story  of  the  post-drought  migration of 
FuutakoBe  herders  was  largely  unpredictable.  Hence, it is very  likely  that  the  situation  described 
here is particular for Senegal, and therefore does not lend itself readily to generalisations. 
Nonetheless,  the case does point to the need,  expressed by  Salzman (1995:163), of adopting  a 
pluralist  perspective  which  stresses  multi-causality  and  which  focuses  upon  the  interaction  of  many 
different  factors as the  processes  generating  the  patterns  of  human custom and  action  that  we  wish 
to understand. Although human adaptation to an area takes account of the environmental 
conditions, it is important to stress that there are many  different  kinds  of  adaptation  and many 
liable  outcomes. 
situation  in  years  of  abundant  precipitation  where  biomass  production  was far beyond animal pressure pr6vost 
'?he term  under-utilised  (sous-p2turer)  was  initially  used by  my colleagues at CSE in Dakar to  describe  the 
1990). As mentioned in chapter 4, also  the staff from  the GTZ project in Vidou  Thiengoli  described  situations of 
under-utilised  pastures  causing  constraints  to  the  germination of high  qualitity  fodder  species. 
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But returning  to the questions of politics raised in the  introduction, it seems clear that  it is 
impossible  to-understand  local  management  of  water  and  pastures  independent  of the political and 
economic  context  within  which it is set. Due to the economic, human and  political resources that 
may be generated  from  the  process  of  post-drought  adjustment,  the  struggles ensuing over access 
to and control over resources  inevitably  become part of a wider  struggle  to  get  new objects and 
new rules under local control. And  therefore  even small conflicts  over  local resources tend to 
become politiced as they get mixed with struggles over larger political goals. Such fluid, 
contradictory and politicized environments are not ideal for fostering either equitable and 
sustainable  development.  Nevertheless,  omitting  to  address  the  political  environment as such, and 
directing  intervention  towards  imagined  homogeneous  communities  driven by mutual agreement 
about  ‘long  term  sustainable’  production  goals  and  maintenance  of  the  equilibrium  (i.e. status quo) 




Abrams,  Philip, 1982 “Historical Sociology” Ithaca,  New  York. p. 1-18,  190-227. 
Adam,  J.,1915:” Le Djoloff et le Ferlo”. A n d e s  de Geographie 132 p. 420-429, 
Adams,  Martin, 1982 The  Baggara Problem, Attempts at modem change in  Southern D& and  Southern 
Kordofan  (Sudan) Development and Change vol. 13 p. 259-289. 
Allisoutin,  Rosnert  Ludovic, 1 9 9 7  ‘‘ Pond  Management  in  the  Podor  department,  Senegal” Issue Paper no. 72. 
Inmational Institute  for  Environment  and  Development (ED),  London, 13 p. 
Amanor, K.S.,  1995:  “Dynamics of Herd Smclwe and Herding  Strategies in West Africz A  study of Market 
Integration  andEcological  Adaptation.”Africa  vol. 65 no. 3.4.351-393. 
Ammitzb~il, K., 1997:  “Decentralisering af Naturressourceforvaltning - en arena for institutionel  synergi”.  Speciale 
Internationale  Udvikliigsstudier,  Roskilde  Universitetscenter. 141 p. 
Anderson,  David  M.,  1993:  “Cow  Power: livestock  and  the Pastoralist in Africa”. Africa Affairs nr. 1  1993.  P.  121- 
133. 
Aubrexille,  A., 1949 ‘‘Climts, for& et desertification de I’Afnque Tropicale”, Socittei dEdition GBograpiques, 
Maritimes et Coloniales,  Paris 
Audiger,  Jeanne  1961: “Les Oulof du Bas-Ferlo” Les Cahiers  d’Outre-Mer, No. 54, p. 157-181 
Ba,  Oumar,  1975: “Les Peul  du  Diolof  au XRe sikcle”, Bulletin IFAN T.37,  s6rie B no. I. 
Ba, Cheick, 1986 ‘Zes Peul du Senegal, Etude GJographique”, Dakar. 385 p. 
Banal, Henri,  1982:”Le Ferlo des Forages: Gestion ancienne et actuelle de  l’espacepastoral” ORSTOM,  Dakar. 
85p. 
Barrows R.  and  Roth M., 1989: “Land Tenure and Znvesfment in African Agriculture: Theory and Evidence‘: Land 
Tenure  Center,  University  of  Wisconsin-Madison. 
Barth,  Fredrik, 1973:  “A  general  perspective on nomad-sedentary elations in the Middle Fast”, in Nelson, C.: The 
Deserf and the  Sown, N o d s  in a wider Society. Institute of International  Studies,  University of California, 
Berkeley. 
Barih,  Fredrik,  1969:”  Introduction” in Barth (d): Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, The  Socinl Organization of 
Cultural Difference. Oslo,  London.  pp9-38. 
Baxter,P.T.W.,  1991:  Introduction  in  Baxter,P.T.W: When the Grass  is Gone; Development Intervention in 
Afncamn Arid Lands”. Seminar  Proceedings no. 25: Scandinavian  Institute of African Studies,  Uppsala. 
Baxter,P.T.W andR. Hogg.,  1990: Property, Poverty and People: Changing Rights in Property andProblems of 
Pastoral Development, Manchester.  University of Manchester  press. 
Behnke, R.H., 1985 “Open  Range  Management  and Propmly Rights in  Pastoral  Africa: A case of Spontaneous 
Range Enclosup in  South  Darfur, Sudan”. OD1 Pastoral  Development  Network  Paper ZOf., London. 
Behnke, R.H., 1992  ”New  directions  in  African  Range  Management Policy” ODZ Pastoral Development Network 
Paper 32c,  March 1992. 
Behnke, RH. and  I.  Scoones,  1993:  “Rethinking  Range Ecology; Implications for Range  land  Management  in 
233 
Africa” in Scoones  et al.: “Range Ecology at Disequilibrium: New Models of Natural Variability and Pastoral 
Adaptation in . .  African Savannas” ODI, JED Commonwealth  Secretariat, London.  pp.  1-31. 
Benoit,  M.,  1988: La Lisiere du Kooya; Espaces pastoral et paysages  dans le Nord  du Stntgal (Ferlo), L’Espace 
Geographique no.2.pp. 95-108. 
Berkes and  Farvar,  1989:  “Introduction and Overview”  in:  Berkes  (ed)1989: “Common Properly Resources. 
Ecology and Community Based Sustainable Devebpment“ London. pp.1-18. 
Bernard,  Claire,  1993:  “Les dtbuts de  la politique de reboisement dans la Vallte du  Fleuve SCntgal(1920-1945)” 
Revuefrancaise d’histoire d‘outre-mer. T. LXXX no.298,  pp49-82. 
Berod-hard, Thierry  and  Di-Meo,  Guy,  1985: “ Crise  du nomadiime pasmral et modernisation  de5 &ansport dans le 
Sahel  sbnegalais du  Fer1o”Travaux de  I’Institut de Geographie de Reims  63-64,  pp.  95-1  12. 
Berry, Sara, 1994 “Resouce  Access  and  Management as Historical  Processes” in Markssen and  Lund (ed) 
“Access,  Control and  Management  of  Natural Resources  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa - methodological  considerations” 
Occasional Paper no. 13 IDS.,Roskilde. 
Berry,  Sara,  1993: No condition is permanent; The social dynamics ofAgrarian Change in Sub-Saharan Afnca. 
University of  Wisconsin Press, Madison,  USA. 
Berry, S., 1988:  ”Concentration  without  privatization? Some consequences of changing  patterns of rural land  control 
in Africa” in  Downs  and  Reyna  (eds.), Land and society in contemporary Africa, University Press of  New  England. 
Berry, Sara, 1989:  “Social  Institutions,  and  access to resources” Afnca no. 59 no.  1.  pp. 41-56. 
Biot,Y, P.M. Blaikie,  C.  Jackson  and R. Palmer-Jones,  1995:  “Rethinking  Research on Land  Degradation  in 
Developing  Countries” World Bank Discusion Paper 298,  World  Bank  Washington DC. 71 p. 
Bloch, P.1986 Landlssues in River Bassin Development in Sub-Saharan Africa, Land  Tenure  Center,  Madison, 
Wisconsin. 
Bloch,  P., 1989 “Land  Issues  in  the  Senegal  River  Valley:  Report on a  reconnaissance uip”, mimeo.  December 
1988.”  Land  Tenure  Center,  University  of  Wisconsin-Madison. 
Bloch, P,, 1990 An egalitarian Development Project in a strat@ed Society: Who ends up with the Land?, Land 
Tenure  Center,  University  of  Wisconsin-Madison. 
Blundo,  Giorgio,  1995a: “Les courtiers  de dtveloppement en  milieu mal sCntgalais”. Cahiers d’Etudes africaines 
137,XXXV-1. pp.73-99. 
Blundo,  Giorgio,  1995h:  “Gerer  les conflits fonciers au Stntgal: Le r6le  de  I’administration  locale  dans le sud-est du 
Bassin  Arachidier”.  Unpublished Draft, Institut #Etudes de Dtveloppement, Universie Catolique  de Louvain. 18 p. 
Blundo,  Giorgio,  1998:  “Decentralisation,  participation  and comption in Senegal”. Paper  presented at the  14th 
International  Congress of Anthropology  and  Ethnological  Science,  Williamsburg,  Virginia. 
Blundo,  Giorgio  and  Jean  Pierre  Jacob  et al., 1997:  “Socioanthropologie  de  la  &centralisation  en  milieu rural 
africain;  bibliographie stlective et commentte”, Itineraires, Notes et Travaux no.  49, IUED, Genbve. 
Bontiglioli, A.M.  and  Yiero  Doro Diallo,  1988: “Kisal, production et survie au Ferlo  (StnCgal)  Dakar”:  Rapport 
prtliminaire prtpart pour OXFAM. 
Bonte,  Pierre,  1993:  “Terres collectives, Droits  Coutumiers et Conflits  Fonciers”, in  Moorehead  and  Lane  (eds): 
Rapport de 1‘Atelier Sous-Regional sur Le Foncier Pastoral et le Developpement au Sahel,  Nouakchott 1993. Annex 
234 
II. London,  International Institute for Environment  and  Development (ED).  
Boone, Catherine, 1990 "The  Making of a  Rentier  Class;  Wealth  and  Accumulation  and  Political  Control in 
Senegal", The Journal of Development Studies, vol.  26,no. 3, April 199Opp. 42449 .  
Hunger and History pp.  185-209. 
Boserup, Ester, 1983:"The  Impact of Scarcity  and  Plenty  on  Development"  in:  Rothberg, R.I.  and  Rabb,  T.K., 
BoseNp, Ester, 1965: The Conditions forAgricultura1 Growth, London.125  p. 
Bowdieup., 1977 :Outline of a theory ofpractice, Cambridge  University  press. 248 p. 
Boutillier, J.L., 1982:  "L'Amknagement  de  fleuve Stnkgal et ses  implications  foncikres",  in: Le Bris E, Le Roy et 
Leimdorfer (eds.): Enjewr fonciers en Afrique Noire.Paris. Pp.301-308. 
Bovill, E.W., 1921 "The  encroachment of the Sahara on the Sudan" African  Affairs, Journal of the African Sociezy, 
v01 LXXX Juli 1921. 
Breman, H. and C.T. de  Wit : Rangeland  Productivity  and  exploitation i  the  Sahel", Science nr. 221  p.  1341-1347. 
Breman et al.,1985:  "Analyse des conditions  de I'devage et  propositions  de  politiques  et  de  programmes,  Burkina 
Faso". Etude preparke  pour le Club du Sahel et le CILSS. 
Brink, Roger van der, D.W Bromley and  J-P.  Chavas,  1995:  "The  economics of Cain and AbekAgropastoral 
Property Rights in the Sahel". Journal ofDevelopment Studies v01 31, n0.3  pp.373-399. 
Bromley, D.W and M. Cernea, 1989 "The  Management of Common  Property,  some  conceptual  and  operational 
falacies". World Bank Discussion Paper 57.66 p. 
Bromley, D.W., 1972: The Commons, Property  and  the  Common  Property  Regimes" in Bromley  (ed): Making  the 
Commons Work, Theory, Practice and Policy. San  Fransisco pp.3-15. 
Brown, Lester and E.P. Eckholm, 1974 By Breadalone, New  York. 
Brox, Ottar, 1990 "The  Common  Property  Theory:  Epistemological Status and  Analytical  Utility". Human 
Organization vol. 49, no. 3. pp.  227-235. 
BNCe, J., 1990 Community Forestry, Rapid Rural Apraisal of Tree and Land Tenure. FAO,  Rome. 
BNCe, J. 1988b: "Do  Indigenous  Tenure  Systems  Constrain  Agricultural Development?"  &eo,  Land  Tenure 
Center,  University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
Bruce, J. 1988~ "A Perspective on  Indigenous  Land  Tenure  Systems and Land  Concentration", in Downs  and  Reyna 
(eds.): Land and society in contemporary Africa, University Press of  New  England. 
Bruijn, Mirjam de and Hans van Dijk,  1994:  'Drought and Coping Sfntegies in  FulBe  society  in  the Haye (Central 
Mali) : A Historical Perspective'. Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines 133-135 XXXIV- 1-3  pp.  85-108. 
Bruijn, Mirjam de and Hans  van  Dijk 1995: Arid Ways: Cultural Understandings oflnsecurity in  FulBe Society, 
Central Mali, Thela Publishers, Amsterdam,  1-32,  pp.  497-506. 
BNijn, Mirj& de and Hans  van Dijk, 1992:  'Changing Fulani Society  and  Fulani  Security'in F. Von  Benda- 
Beclanann and M. Van der Velde  (eds): Law as a resource in Agrarian Struggles. Wageningse  Sociologische 
Studies no.33.  Wageningen  Agricultural  University pp.  45-59. 
Carl Bro International, 1988:  A  Livestock  Development Study  in  the  Sahel to Assess the  Potential Role of Livestock 
235 
in Integrated Fanning Systems,  Country  Report,  Senegal. 
Carney, J, And M. Watts,  1990:  “Manufacturing  Dissent:  Work,  Gender and the  Politics  of  Meaning  in  a  Peasant 
Society”, Africa Vol. 60, no.  2. Pp. 207-241. 
Caverivike, M. and  Debene M., 1988: “Le droitfoncier skndgalais“, Mondes  en  devenir,  Berger-Levrault,  Paris 
Caverivikre, M. 1991:  “Problematique  foncikre et amenagement de l’espace rural, le cas du Singgar, Atelier  sur  les 
nouvelles  approches de la planification regionale, Nations  Unies, Dakar4-8 mars  1991. 
Centre  de  Suivi  Ecologique  (CSE) 1992 “Estimation des effectifs du  b6tail  par  v01 systimatique  de  reconnaissance 
dans la  moiti6  nord  du Sinigal. Rapport  de  campagne”.  Document NT 92. 
Centre de Suivi  Ecologique  (CSE),  1991: “Etude de la distribution  spatiale  et des mouvements de Etail par enqu.&s 
airiennes; 1989-90. Document NT 91-02, 
Cohen,  A.P.,1985 The Symbolic construction ofsociety. London.  125 p. 
Colvin,  L.G., 1982 ”Land  Tenure  and higated Agriculture in the  Senegal  River  Basin”,  USAID  and OMVS Design 
Team,  Dakar. 
Cornoff, J. and Cornoff, J., 1992 “Goodly  Beasts,  Beastly  Goods”  in Comaoff, J. and Comatoff, J.: Ethno- 
graphy and the Historical Imagination. Westview  Press,  Boulder,  Colorado. 
Coppock,  D.L.,  1993:”Vegetation  and  Pastoral  Dynamics  in  the  Southern  Ethiopian  Rangelands:  Implications f r 
Theory  and  Management. in Behnke  et  al.: Range Range Ecology ai Disequilibrium, London,  Overseas  Develop- 
ment  Institute.  pp  42-62. 
Croll,  Elizabeth  and  David  Parkin, 1992 “Anthropology,  the  Environment and  Development”  in  Elizabeth  Croll and 
David  Parkin: Bush base: Forest Farm, Routledge  London, pp.  3-1 1. 
Cruise OBrien, DoM~,  1996 ‘The Senegalese Exception”  Review  article, Afnca 66 (3) pp.458464 
Cruise  OIBrien,  Donal,  1975: Saints and Politicians: Essay in the Organization of Senegalese Peasant Society, 
Cambridge,  Cambridge  University Press21 1 p. 
Cruise OBrien, Donal, 1992 “Le conmt social s6nigalais i I’epreuve”. Politique Africaine no. 45 p. 9-20. 
Natural Resources Journal 1975. 
Cyriathy-Wanthrup S .  and RC. Bishop,  1975  :“Common Property‘ as a  concept  in  Natural  Resources Poky” 
Dahl, Gudrun, 1979: Suffering Grass, Subsistence and Sociery of Was0 Borana. Stockholm  Studies in Social 
Anthropology. 
Dahl, G and  A.  Hjort,  1979: Having Herds;  Pastoral Herd Growth and Household  Economy. Stockholm  Studies  in 
Social  Anthropology  v01 2. 
Afncan Political Economy no.  64.F‘p.213-228. 
Davis,  Lucy,  1995:  ‘Opening  Political Space in  Cameroun: the Ambiguous  Response  of  the  Mbomro’. Review of 
Degnbol,  T. 1996 “The terroir approach to natural  resource  management:  panacea or  phantom:  the  malian 
experience”  Unpublished  Paper, IDS Roskilde. 
Demsetz,H.,  1967: “Towards  a  Theory  of  Property  Rights” American Economic Review Vo1.57,  pp.347-359. 
Dia,  Ibrahima,  1988:  ”Socio-logiques t 6cologie dans la probl6matique  des  aminagements  hydro-agricoles dans la 
236 
moyenne Vdl& du  fleuve Sin6gal (Rive Gauche)."  Thkse de doctorat de  troisilme cycle. Institut des Sciences de 
l'Environnement, Universit.5 Cheick  Anta  Diop,  Dakar. 
Dia, Fatimata,  1995:  "Place  de  l'embouche  paysanne dans les systemes d'devage  traditionnel  au  centre-est  du  Basin 
Arachidier".  Communication du Seminaire-Atelier  sur  la  production de Viande  en  Afrique Sub-Saharienne, 13-17 
Mars 1995 A Saly  Portudal, Shigal, mlt ig .  
Diallo, O., 1991 :"Suivi  des  systemes de production dans le  Ferlo Nord, rapport  preliminaire,  CSE, Dakar 
Diallo, O., A. Diouf, N.P.  Hanan,  A.  Ndiaye  and Y. Privost, 1991:"AVHRR  monitoring  of Savanna  primary 
production in  Senegal,  West  Africa 1987-1988."  International  Journal  of  Remote  Sensing  Vol. 12 no.  6,  pp.1259- 
1279. 
Diawara,  Ibrahima 1984" Evolution  de  l'Elevage  bovin dans la zone  sylvopastorale  du  Senegal  191  1-1980, Ecole 
Interetat des Sciences et Medicines  Veterinaires,Th&se,  Doc.Vet.Universit6  de  Dakar,  Senegal. 134 p. 
Dietz, Ton, 1993:"The  State,  The Market and  the  Decline of Pastoralism.  Challenging some Myths,  with Evidence 
Africa. Macmillan PRESS ,London. 4.83-99. 
from Western Pokot  in KenyaRTganda" in Markakis, J (ed.) Conflict and the Decline ofPastoralism in the Horn of 
Diop,  Amadou  Tarnsir, 1989 "L'amhagement et la genion des ressources  sylvo-pastorales  au  nord  du Sinegal, le 
cas de l'aire d'influence du forage  de  Tatki."  Thkse  de  doctorat du  3kme cycle en sciences  d'environnement,  Institut 
des Sciences de I'Environnement  (ISE),  Universit.5  Cheick  Anta  Diop,  Dakar. 
Diop, Amadou Tamsir, 1991(a):  "La  gestion des parcours  de  l'aire  d'influence  du  forage  de  Tatki.  Relations entre 
donn6es de vkg.g6tation, taux d'exploitation et transhumance"  ISRALNERV,  Dakar-Hann. 
Diop,  Amadou  Tamsir,  1991@): "L'am6lioration  du  syst&me  de  transport  de  l'eau  en  zone sylvo-pastorale du 
S6nntgak l'utilisation dun nouveau type de  charette",  Note pdiminaire I S M N E R V  Dakar-Hann. 
Diop, Amadou Tamsir, 1987 "Les ressources  de  l'aire  pastorale  de Tatki Inventaire  et  &de  du  mode  d'exploitation, 
proposition de plan  d'aminagement et de  gestion  rationelle".  Dakar-Hann,  ISRA/LNERV 
Diop, Moms  Coumba et Mamadou Diouf,  1990: Le Shiga1 sous Abdou Diouf Editions  Karthala,  Paris 436 p, 
Diop, Mamadou Coumba(ed), 1992 StMgaI, Trajectoire d'un Etat. Dakar. 
Diop, A-B., 1968:  "La  tenure foncike en  milieu  rural Wolof (Sinkgal):  Historique  et  Actualit6. Notes Africaines 
n'118, avril 1968. 
Diouf,  Makhtar,  1994: S&n&al, Les ethnies et la Nation. UNRISDI  Forum  du  Tier  Monde,  Paris. 
Dupire,  Marguerite,  1957: " Les  Forages  dans 1'Economie  Peuhle"  in:  Gouvemement  du Shegal, Services des Eaux 
et Forets, Inspection Forestike du Fleuve: Elements d'une Polifique Sylvo-Pastorale au Sahel Senegalais. Dakar, 
SBn6gal. Fascicules 1-7. Pp. 19-24. 
Dupire, Marguerite, 1970: Organisation Sociale d e s  Ped ,  Paris.  pp  250-287,515-583 
Nomadic Peoples 14:41-46. 
Dyson-Hudson N.& JT McCabe,  1983:  "Water  resources  and  livestock  movements  in  South T rkanaKenya" 
Perspective"  in M.M. Cernea (ed), Puning People First. Oxford: Oxford  University Press. 
Dyson-Hudson N. 1985:  "Pastoral  Production  Systems  and  Livestock  Development  Projects:  An East African 
Ellis, J. 1995: "Cli i te  Variability  and  Complex  Ecosystem  Dynamics:Implications for Pastoral  Development"  in 
Scoones fed): Living with Uncerfainfy:New Directions in Pastoral Developmenr  in Africa. London. 
237 
Ellis, J. Coughenour, M.B.  and  Swift  D.M.1993: "Cl i i te  Variability,  Ecosystem  Stability  and  the  Implications for 
Range  and  Livestock  Development"  in  Behnke  et al.Range Ecology at Disequilibrium; New Models of Natural 
Variability andPastoral Adaptation in African Savanws, London 
Ellis, J. Coughenour, M.B.  and  Swift  D.M.1991: " Climate  Variability,  Ecosystem  Stability  and  the  Implications for 
Range  and  Livestock  Development" in:  New  Concepts  in  International  Rangelands  Development; Theories  and 
Applications",  Proceedings  from  the  1991  International Rangeland  Development  Symposium,  Society For Range 
Management. Logan, Utah. 
Engelhard,  Ph.et al., 1986 Les enjew  de  I'aprbbarrage, ENDA,  Dakar. 
Fairhead, J. and M. Leach,  1996.: Misreading the Arican Landscape. Society and Ecology in a Forest-Savanna 
Mosaic" Cambridge  University  Press pp.l-24,279-296. 
Fatton, R.Jr., 1986 "Clientelism  and  Politics in Senegal"  in Africnn  Studies  Review 29  no. 1,  December 1986. 
Faye, A. and Marks M., 1990:  "Rapport de la  cinquikme  campagne denq&tes abriennes: dkompte du bitail", 
Document du CSE,  Dakar. 
Faye, A. et Malcolm  Marks, 1992 "Aerial  Monitoring of  Sahelian  Livestock  and  Determination of Rangeland 
Pressure.  Dakar,  Centre de Suivi  Ecologique  (CSE). 
Faye, Malick, 1995: "Gestion des ressources  pastorales  au  Ferlo.  Quelles orientations".Communication du 
Seminaire-Atelier s u r  la production  de  Viande  en  Afrique  Sub-Saharienne,  13-17 Mars 1995  a  Saly Portudal, 
Sbnbgal,  multigr. 
Feder and  Feeny, 1991:  "Land  Tenure  and  Properly  Rights:TheoIy  and  Implications f r Development  Policy". The 
World Bank Economic Review, vol. 5 no.  1,p.  135-153. 
Feeny,  David,  Fikret  Berkes,  Bonnie B.  McCay,.James A Acheson  The  Tragedy  of  the  commons: Twenty-Two 
Years  Later" Human Ecology, Vol. 18 no.1  pp.1-19. 
Feeny,  David, 1992 'Where do we  go from here;  Implications  for  a  research  agenda" in: Bromley  (ed): Making the 
Commons Work, Theory, Practice and Policy, San  Fransisco. Pp. 267-290. 
Feeny,  David, F h t  Berkes,Bonnie MC  Cay  and  James  Acheson, 1990 "The  Tragedy  of  the  Commons  Twenty  Two 
Years later". Human Ecology vol.  18,  no.  1.199O.F'p.1-19. 
Ferguson,  James, 1990 The anti-politics machine; Development, depolitization and bureaucratic power in 
Lesotho, University of Minnesota  Press. 
Fjellman S.M. and Miriam Goheen,  1984: "A prince  by  any  other  Name?  Identity  and Politics in Highland 
Cameroon",  American  Ethnologist, The  American Anthropological Association Vol  11.  No.3  pp.  473-486. 
Fortmann,  Louise, 1995: "Taking claims:  Discursive  Strategies  in  Contesting  Property". World Development v0123 
no.6 pp.1053-1063. 
Fratkin, E., 1997:"Pastoralism:  Governance  and  Development  Issues". Annual Review ofAnthropology 26 pp. 235- 
61. 
Freudenberger, Karen  Schoonmaker  1991: "The Incongeneous  Destluction of a  Forest  Reserve: The case of Mbege, 
Senegal." IIED Issues Paper. 
Freudenberger, MS. 1991:  "Losing,  Protecting  and  Regenerating  the Gum Arabic  Tree: Constraints to the 
Emergence of Local  Level  Resopurce  Management  in Northem Senegal"  Draft,  Land  Tenure  Center,  University of 
Wisconsin, Madison.43  p. 
238 
Freudenberger, MS., 1992  "The  great  Gum  Gamble:  A  Planning  Pewrspective  on  Environmental  Change  in 
Northern  Senegal". Unpublished PhD. Dissertation,  University of California, Los Angeles.  469 p. 
Freudenberger,  Mark  Schoonmaker,  1992: "Le rkglement des conflits en matikre de gestion  des terns'' in "La gestion 
des  ressources  naturelles  par  les  collectivites  locales''  Actes du s minaire  organis6  a l'Universit6 de Saint Louis du 3 
au 5 novembre 1992. 
Freudenberger, MS. and  P.Mathieu,  1993: 'The Question  of  the  Commons in the  SaheY'Preeliminary  Version Land 
Tenure  Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 39 p. 
Gallais, Jean, 1972a:  "Les  soci6t6s  pastorales ouest-afncaines face au  d6veloppement". Cahiers &Etudes  Africaines 
12,3. Paris. 
Gallais,  Jean, 1972b:  "Essai  sur  la  situation  actuelle  des  relations entre pasteurs et paysans dans le Sahel  ouest- 
africain",  Etude  de Giographie Tropicale  offerte a Pierre Gourou, Paris. 
Gellar,  Sheldon, 1995:" State Tutelage  vs. Self-Governance The Rhethonc and  Reality of Decentralization  in 
Senegal"  in  Wunsch J.S. and  D.  Olowu:  The Failure of the Centralized State; Znstitutions andself- Govemnce in 
Africa. 
Gbrmd,  Jerome, 1994 Un parti  vert au  StnCgal: Une  participation  militante. Politique Africaine 110.53. Pp.75-89. 
Geschiere,  Peter, 1984:  'Segmentary  Societies  and  the  Authority  of  the State - Problems  in  Implementing  Rural 
Development  in  the  Maka  Villages of Southeastem  Cameroun' Sociologia Ruralis vol. IMIV (1)  p.  10-29. 
Gibbs, C.J.N. and  D.W.  Bromley,  1989:  "Institutional Arrangements for Management of m a l  Resources:  Common 
Property  Regimes."  in  Berkes  (ed)  Common  Peoperty  Resources:  Ecology and Community  Based Sustainable 
Development.Belhaven  Publishers,  London  pp.22-33. 
Gilles, J.L. and  Jamtgaard,  1981:  "Overgrazing  in  pastoral  areas:  the  commons  reconsidered"  Sociologia Ruralis 
21(2) 129-141. 
Glantz,  Michael H., 1977:  "The  U.N.  and  Deserrification:  Dealing  with  a  Global  Problem"  in  Glantz (ed.): 
Desertijiation: Environmental Degradation in and  around Arid Lands, Boulder,  Colorado. 
Godwin  R.K.and  Shepard  W.B.,  1979  :"Forcing Squares, manmgles and ellipses into a circular  Paradigm:  The  use 
of the  commons  dilemma  in  examining  the  allocation of common resoources" The  Western Political Quarterly, Salt 
Lake  City,  Utah,  1979, Vo1.32  No. 3 p. 265-77. 
Goheen,  Mitzi  and  Parker  Shipton, 1992 "Introduction.  Understanding  African  Landholding:  Power,  Wealth  and 
Meaning". Africa Vol62.no.3  pp.307-327. 
Goheen,  Mitzi, 1992 "Chiefs,  Subchiefs  and  Local  Control:  Negotiations  over  Land,  Struggles  over M aning" 
Africa Vol62,no.3 pp389412 
Goody, Jack 1971:  Technology, Transition and the State in Africa,  London.85  p. 
Gore,  C.,1993:  'Zntitlement  Relations  and 'Umly' Social  Practices:  A  Comment  on  the  Work of A m m a  Sen". 
The  Journal of Development  Studies,  Vol.  29, No.3, pp.  429-460. 
Development  Network Paper 25%  London,  March 1988 
Graham,  Olivia,  1988:  "Enclosure  of  the East African  Rangelands;  Recent  Trends  and  their  Impact" ODZpastoral 
Grandin,  B.,  1983:  "The  importance of wealth  effects  on  pastoral  production"  in: Pastoral Systems Research in Sub- 
Saharan Africa,  ILCA,  Addis  Abeba. 
239 
Grannovetterjvi., 199YEconomic Action  and Social Structure:  The  Problem  of  Embeddedness" in Grannovetter, 
M. and R. Swedberg: The Sociology of Economic Life. Boulder. 4 .5341.  
Grenier,  Ph., 1960 "Les Peuls du  Ferlo", Les Cahiers  d'Outre-Mer no. 49, t.  13.  pp 28-58 
Grenier,  Ph., 1987 ' l  Les Problkmes tnergttiques du  Ferlo  (Sahel stntgalais) in  "Energie et espace au Stn&gal", 
Travaux et  documents de giographie  tropicale no.  60. Pp. 63-162. 
Gormaire, 1957 "Elements de  Politique  sylvo-pastorale au Sahel du Stntgal", Fascicule  1-17. 
Groot, W.T.de,  J.C.J. van Wetten  and  C.A.  Drijver,  1995:  "Drawing  the  Boundary:  An  Explorative  Model  of  the 
Defense of  the  Coomons" in: Van der  Breemer et al.(eds.): Local Resource Management in Africa, John  Wiley  and 
Sons, Chichester.  Pp. 21 1-229. 
Gueye,  Babacar,  1994:  "Historique de la Dtcentralisation au Senegal: les deux  premikres  phases"  in:  La dtcentrali- 
sation  au Stntgal : I'Etape  de  la  Regionalisation,  Actes  du Stminaire de  2 au  4Mai  1994: Mise  en  place  de  la 
rtgionalisation au Stntgal". Dakar.  Pp.41-47. 
Fandlne Village,  Senegal" IIED Issues Paper no.49. International  Institute for Environment  and  Development, 
Gueye,  Mamadou  Bara, 1994"Contlicts and  Alliances  between  Farmers  and Herders: A Case Study  of the  "Goll" of 
Dryland  Networks  Progmmme.  London 
Guyon, G., 1989 "Faut-il se pr6occuper  des questions  foncikres?  Jusqu'ou et comment?; Les enseignements du 
developpement d en  Afrique de  1'0nest".  Note de reflection,  Caisse  Centrale  de Coophtion Economique,  Paris. 
Hanan,  N.P.  Prevost, Y, Diouf, A and Diallo 0, 1991:  "Assessment  of  Desertification  around Deep  Wells  in  the 
Sahel  using  Satellite  Imagety" in Journal of Applied Ecology 28, 173-186. 
Hansen,  Tina  og Kurt S k h p  Kristensen,  1991:"Pastoralister,  Bistand og Breredygtig  Udvikling.  Speciale,  Institut 
for Geografi  og  Internationale  Udviklingsstudier,  RUC. 157 p. 
Hardin,  Garett,  1968: "The Tragedy  of  the  Commons", Science 1621243-1248. 
Hardin,  Garett,  1977:  "Living  in  a lieboat", Bioscience vol. 24 no. 10. P. 561-568. 
Hardy  Golan,  Elise,  1990:  "Land  Tenure  Reform  in  Senegal: An Economic  study of the  Peanut  Basin", Land  Tenure 
Center,  University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
Hellden, W, 1984:  "Drought  Impact  monitoring.  A  study of desertifkation in North Kordofan, The Sudan, 
Rapponer och notitser, N. 61,  Department  of  Physical  Geography,  University  of  Lund,  Sweden. 
Henriksen, G., 1974 Problems of Development in Turkana. Slaiftserie no. 11,  Occasional  Paper, soc i a~an tmpo~~  
gisk Institut, Bergen.  77p. 
Herskovits,  Melville J., 1926 "The cattle  complex  in East Africa". American Anthropologist 28 pp. 230-272,361- 
380,494-568,633-664. 
Hesseling G.,and Matthieu, P., 1986: "SWat6gies de I'Etat et des populations  par  rapport A l'espace." in: Crousse,B. 
Le Bris et Le Roy (eds): Espaces diputes en Afrique Noire. Paris. 
Hesseling, G.,  1985: "La refonne foncilre au Stntgal : Consensus entre paysans et pouvoirs publics?"  in  van 
240 
Bingsbergen, W. Reyntjens, F, and  Hesseling, G. (eds.) State and Local Community  in Africa. Bruxelles 
University Ress.198 p. 
Hill. Polly, 1986: Development Economics on Trial; The Antropological Case for Prosecution. Cambridge 
Hjort A. and Mohamed Salih, M.A.(eds),  1989: Ecology and Politics: Environmental Stress and Security in Africa. 
Scandinavian Institute of  African  Studies,  Uppsala,  Sweden. 
Hjort af h&, G.Dahl,  1991: Responsible Man;  the Atmaan Beja of Northeastern Sudan. Uppsala.  pp.1-13. 
Hobsbawm E. and T. Ranger,  1983: The inveniion of trodition, Cambridge  University  Press. 
Hogg,  Richard,  1986:  "The  New  Pastoralism:  Poverty and Dependency  in  Northern  Kenya" Africa 56 (3)  p.319-333. 
Holling, CS., 1973:  "Resilience  and  Stability of Ecological  Systems". Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 
Vol. 41-23. 
Homewood,  Katherine,  1995:  "Development,  demarcation and  ecological  outcomes  in Masailand, Africa vol. 65. 
no.3. 
Hussein, Karim, 1998:  Conflicts  between  Farmers Na  Herders  in  the  semi-aid  Sahel  and  East  Africa: A  Review. 
Pastoral Lund Tenure Series no.10,  Overseas  Development  Croup,  School f Development Studies,  University of 
East Anglia, B D ,  London. 
Haan, Cees de,  1990: " Changing  trends in the  World  Bank 'S lending program for rangeland  development"  in:  "Low 
input sustainable yield  systems:  Implications  for  the  Worlds  rangelands"  Proceedings  from  the  1990  international 
rangeland  development  symposium Nevada,  USA. 
Haan, Cees de, 1994? "An overview of the  World Banks  involvment in Pastoral  development".  Mimeo, Draft. 
Ingold Ti, 1986: The  Appropriation of Nature; Essays on Human Ecology and  Social Relations, Manchester 
University Press. 287 p. 
International Fund for Agricultural  Development (IFAD) 1995: Common Property Resources  and  the  Rual Poor in 
Sub Saharan  Africa. Special  Programme for Sub-Saharan Countroes  affected by  Drought  and Desertification. 
NewYorWAmsterdam. pp.  1-48 
ISRA 1992 Groupe de Travail sur l'autosuffisance en moutons  de  Tabaski au Senegal,  Mars  1992,  Dakar. 
Agricultural Development in Africa : Zssues of Public Policy. New York,  Praeger. 
Jacobs,  Allan H., 1980 "Pastoral  Masai and  Tropical  Rural  Development"  in  Bates,  R.H.  and  M.F.  Lofchies: 
Jamin,  P.Y. et J.F. Tourrand, 1986 "Evolution de  l'agriculture  et  de  l'elevage dam une zone de grands amenage- 
ments: le delta du fleuve S&n&gal", Les Cahiers de Recherche Developpement , no. 12 
Jamin, P.Y., 1986 "La double  culture du riz  dans  la vallie du fleuve  Sinegal: Mythe ou r&aliW", Les Cahiers de 
Recherche Developpernent ,no. 12 
Juul, K., 1996 "Post-drought migation and  technological  innovation  among  Fulani  Herders  in  Senegal:  the  triumph 
of the tube!". IIED  Zssues Paper no. 64, juli 1996.25~. 
Juul, K., 1994"Opportunistiske Gmsningsstrategier  i det  Nordlige  Senegal". Den Ny Verden no.2. Vo1.27:3849. 
Copenhagen, Denmark.  Center for Development  Research. Pp. 38-50. 
Juul, K. 1994 "Arealanvendelse og  forvaltning af namssourcr blandt  hyrder  og bmder i  det  nordlige  Senegal" 
Kulrurgeograjiske Hafter no 45,14 &g. pp.8-10,3640. 
24 1 
Juul,  K  1993a: “Pastoral Tenure  Problems  and  Local  Resource  Management,  The  Case of Northem  Senegal“, 
Nomadic Peoples, no. 3231-91. 
Juul,  Kristine,  1993b:  “Spontaneous  Privatization of  Rangelands as a Means  of  Pastoral  Self-Defense; The case of 
Northern  Senegal” in Marhssen: “Institutional  Issues in Natural  Resource  Management“ Occasional Paper no. 9 
Institute for Development  Studies,  Roskilde  University .pp.  167-181. 
Juul,  K.1991a: “Animal Counting in the  Northem  Senegal  (Ferlo)  -a  comment  in  the  reliability  of quantitative 
livestock data.” in  Poulsen and  Laweson: Dryland degradation; Causes and  Consequences; Proceedings from 
Danish Sahel Workshop 1990.7 p. 
Juul, K. 1991b:  “Commentaires a la cartographie  du  forage  de  Velingara,  Mai 1990. Unpublished  paper, Centre de 
Suivi Ecologique,  Dakar. 
Juul, K., 1991c: ‘‘Problbmes  Fonciers et amtnagement  territorial en zone ago-pastorale Le  cas  de  1’Arrondissement 
de Barkedji.  Mimeo.  Centre  de  Suivi  Ecologique, Dakar.  21  p. 
Juul, K. 1 9 9 0 ~  “Notes sur le Preenqu&esur les stlatigies des productem” Unpublished, CSE,  Dakar,  Senegal. 
Juul, K. 1990b “Pastoral Tenure  Systems  in  Senegal - A  discussion  of  Pastoral  Management  and  Exclusion Rights”, 
Documents  du  CSE,  Dakar. 
Juul, K., D. NDecky et 0. Tour6 1989 “ Comptage  de bttail dans  14  forages du  Nord  Ferlo.  Ami1 1989. 
Publication du Centre de Suivi  Ecologique, Dakar. 15 p. 
Kabeer,  Naila and Subrahmania, Ramya, 1 9 9 6  Institutions, Relations  and  Outcomes:  Frameworks  and  Tools for 
Gender-Aware  Planning”. IDS Discussion Paper 357,  Sussex. 
Kasberger-Sanftl,  G.,Richter, M. et  Tluczykont, S. ,  1991:  Le  p2turage control6 Un  systkme dexploitation sylvo- 
pastorale comme mod& pour la sauvegarde des ressources  naturelles”.  Mission Foresti&re Allemande, Saint Louis, 
Senegal. 
Khazanov, 1984: Nomads and  the Outside World. Cambridge,  Cambridge  University  Press. 
Klute, Georg, 1996:”Introduction”  in  Nomads  and  the  State, Nomadic Peoples no.38,  pp. 3-1 1. 
Kopytoff,  Igor,  1987:  “The  Internal  African  Frontier”,  in  Kopytoff (ed) The  African Frontier; The reproduction of 
Traditional African Societies. Bloomington.pp.3-84. 
Lamprey , H.F.  1988:  “Report on the Desert  Encroachment  Reconnaissance in Northern Sudan 21  October to 10 
November 1975”, DesertzJ7cation Control Bulletin no. 17  p.  1-7. 
Lamprey , H.F 1983: ‘ I  Pastoralism  yesterday  and  today:  The  overgrazing  problem”  in  Bourliere  F.@) Tropical 
Savannas.  Ecosystems of the World v01 13.  Amsterdam 
aux realitts du  terrain” Cahiers de Sciences Hwnaines 26  (1-2) p.  217-235. 
*Landais, E. and P h i l i p  L‘Hoste: “Association  agriculture4levage n  Afrique  intertropicale: un mythe  confront6 
Lane C., 1994:  “Introduction” in “Pastoral  Tenure  Overviews” Draft  Manuscript  submitted  to UMUSD. 
Lane, C., 1993: “Past practices, present  problems,  Future  Possibilities:  Indigenous  Natural  Resource  Management 
in  Pastoral  Areas of Tanzania” in Marhssen: “Institutional  Issues  in  Natural  Resource  Management “ Occasional 
Paper no. 9 Institute for Development  Studies,  Roskilde  University .
Lane,  C.,1990:  “Barabaig  Natural  Resource  Management:  Sustainable  Land Use  under  Threat  of  Destruction” 
Geneva: UNRISD Paper no.12 
242 
Lawry, S. 1989 'Tenure Policy Towards Common Property Resource Management in Sub-Saharan Afnca", Land 
Tenure  Center,  University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
Lawry, Steven W.,  1990: Tenure towards Common Property Natural Resources in Sub-Saharan Afiica. Land 
Tenure  Center,  Univeristy of Wisconsin. 
Le Roy,  Etienne, 1980 Le  sous-prifet,  le  President  de  la Communauti R u d e  et le$  paysans;  Limitations de la 
co@tences  judiciaires et adaptations  du  contentieux  adminsistratif dans le r&glement des codi ts  fonciers au 
Universitaires, Saint Louis et Bruxelles. 
S6nigal" in: Fonction de Juger et Pouvoir Judicinire, Tranfomatiom  et D6placements. Publication des Facultis 
Le Houkou, H.N.  1977:  The  nature  and  Causes  of  Desertization"  in:  Glantz,  Michael  H. fed). Desertijication; 
Environmental Degradation in  and  around Arid Lands. Boulder,  Colorado. 
Le Roy,E.  Karsenty  and  Bertrand, 1996 La Sicurisation foncidre en Afrque , Editions Kartahala, Paris. 
Leach, M., 1991:  "Engendered  Environments:  Understanding  Natural  Resource  Management  in  the  West  African 
Forest  Zone". IDS Bulletin v01 22 no.  4.pp. 1-4. 
Leach, M. Mearns,  R  and  Scoones, L, 1997:  "Environmental  Entitlements; a Framework for Understanding  the 
Institutional  Dynamics of Environmental  Change" IDS Discussion Paper 359, Sussex. 39p. 
Leach,  M  and  Meams, R. 1996 " Environmental  Change  and  policy;  Challenging  recieved  Wisdom  in  Africa"  in 
Leach, M.  and Mearns, R.: The Lie of the  Land; Challenging received  wisdoms on the African Environment, 
Oxford (pl-34). 
Lericollais, Andri,1989: "Risques  anciens,  risques  nouveaux  en  agriculture  paysanne dans la Vallie du Shegal", in 
Eldin, M. et P. Milleville: Le risque en l'agriculture. Editions  ORSTOM, Paris.419437. 
Lhoste,  P,, 1984: Enquttes en  milieu pastoral au Sine-Salown au Sin.&& GERDAT,  Montpellier 
Lhoste,  Ph.  et P. Mllleville, 1986: "La conduite des anirnaux;  techniques et pratiques".  in  Landais (ed.): Actes  de 
1'Atelier Milhodes pour  la  recherche  sur  les  systkmes  d'ilevage  en Afrique Internopicale. ISRA/IEMVT. Mbour, 
Senegal 
Li,  Tania  Murray,  1996:  "Images of community:  Discourse  and Strategy  in Property Relations" Development and 
Change v01 27, pp 501-527. 
Little,  Peter D.  1985:  "Social  differentiation  and  pastoralist sedentarisation in Northern  Kenya", Afiica 55 (3) p.243- 
261. 
Little,  Peter D., 1987 "Land Use  Conflicts  in  the  AgriculturaWastoral  Borderlands: The Case of Kenya"  in:  Little, 
P.D.,  M.M. Horowitz and  A.E.  Nyerges  (eds): Lands at Risk in  the Third World. Westview,  Boulder. 
Livingstone,  Ian,  1977:  "Economic  Irrationality  Among  Pastoral  Peoples: Myth or Reality? Development and 
Change no.8 (1977) p.  209-230. 
Long,  N.  and  van der Ploeg,  %D.,  1989:  "Demythologizing  Planned  Intervention: An Actors  Perspective" Sociologia 
Ruralis, v01 XWI, 3-4 pp.226-249. 
Lund,  Christian,  1995: "Land,  Power and Politics in Niger; land struggles and Rural Code". PH.D.dissertation, 
International  Development  Studies  Roskilde. 259 p. 
Lund,  Christian,  1994a:  "Law  Power  and  Politics  and  the  Rural  Code in Niger". Project Paper 12,  International 
Development Studies Rosldlde. 80 p. 
243 
Lund,  Christian 1994b "Tne rural code in Niger: A  social  process  of  formation a d  transformation. Prelimimy 
fragments of  an  analytical  framework".  Unpublished draft, Institute for Development  Research;  University of 
Roskilde. 
Lund,  Christian,  1994c:  "Tinkering  Methodology" in Lund (4): Access,  Control and Management of Natural 
Resources  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa-  methodological  considerations." Occasional Paper 13,  International Develop 
ment Studies Roskilde.pp.11-23 
Mac  Manus,  Patrick,  1995:'Dagen  og  vejen - om  nogle  livsstrategier i fattige samfund' Den Ny Verden no.2.  Pp. 
119-133. 
Markakis, J., 1993:  "Introduction"  in:  Markakis, J (ed.) Confictand the Decline of Pastoralism ifi the Horn of 
Africa. Macmillan  Press,  London. 
MC  Cay  and  Acheson (eds.), 1987: The question of the Commons, the culture and Ecology of communal 
Resources." Tucson. 
Mathieu,  P.  Niasse  M. et Vincke,  P,,  1986 :"Aminagements  Hydro-agricoles,  concurrence pour l'espace  et 
pratiques foncikes locales dans la Vallte du Fleuve Sintgal, le cas de la zone du lac de Guiers" in: Crousse,B. Le 
Bris et Le Roy  (eds): Espaces disputb en Afrique Noire. Paris. 
Mathieu, P. 1996:"Pratiques  informelles,  gestion de la  confusion  et  invention du foncier en Afrique." in Villers (ed) 
Phpnom2nes  informels et dynamiques culturelles en  Afrique" Editions I'Harmauan  ,pp.  64-89. 
Mearns,  Robin,  1995:  Commnnity,  Collective  Action  and  Common  Grazing,  the  Case  of  Post-  Socialist  Mongolia: 
Paper  presented at the  Common  property  Conference:  Reinventing  the  Commons,  Bode.  1995. 
recherches  effectuts de  1988 ii 1990  et valuation globale  provisoire de l'essai de p2turages  control16 aprls une 
Miehe,S., 1990 "Inventaire  et  suivi  de  la  v6ggCtation dans les parcelles  pastorales i Widou  Thengoly: Rtsultats des 
periode de  10 ans.  Unpublished  report,  Projet  GTZ  Exploitation  agro-sylvo-pastorale  des sols dans le Nord  du 
Sintgal. St. Louis. 108 p. 
Milleville, P,, 1989: "Activigs ago-pastorales et alia climtique en region sahtlienne" in Eldin, M. et P.  Milleville: 
Le risque en agriculture. Paris,  Editions  ORSTOM. Pp. 233-243. 
Moore, Sally Falk, 1994"Tne ethnography  of  the  Present  and  the  Analysis  of  the  Process,  from: Brorofsiq, Robert 
(d): Assessing Culiural Anthropology. New York .pp. 362-375. 
Moore Sally Falk,  1987a:  Explaining  the  Present :Tneoretical  Dilemmas in Proccesual  Ethnography"  American 
Ethnological  Society  Distinguished  Lecture,  San  Antonio, Texasjn American Ethnologist 1987 pp.727-736. 
Moore,  Sally  Falk, 1987b "Law  and Social  Change: ?he Semi-Autonomous  Social  Field as an  Appropriate  Subject 
of  Study"  in Moore, S.F. Law as Process; an Anthropological Approach. Routledge  and  Kegan  Paul,  London, 
Henley and Boston.  pp.54-81. 
Moore  Sally Falk, 1986 Social Facts  and Fabrications, Customary Law on Kilimanjaro 1880-1980. Cambridge 
University  Press, pp.l-13,320-329. 
Moorehead, R. and Lane, C.,  1993:  "Nouvelles  orientations en mati&  de  politique  et de tenure  foncikre des 
ressources  naturelles en terres de  parcorn" in: Rapport de  l'Atelie~ Sous-Regional sur Le Fonciex Pastoral et le 
Developpement au Sahel,  Nouakchott  3Ooct. 4 nov. 1993.  Annex I and IIJED, London. 
Moorehead,  Richard,  M.,  1991:"Shuctural  chaos:  community  and state management of common  property  in  Mali", 
Pb.D. thesis  International  Development  Studies,  University  of  Sussex. 420 p. 
Mons, Jon 1988:"  Failing  to  Cope  with  Drought:  the  Plight  of  Africa's  ex-pastoralists". Development Policy Review 
Vol.  6.  SAGE,  London.269-294 
244 
Mortimore, M.,  1995: ‘Topulation growth, agricuItmI expansion  and  natural  resource  degradation, a  oversimpliii- 
ed causality?”, Paper presented at the  1995  Sahel  workshop, Sglnderborg,  Denmark. 
Morton,  James 1994, “The  Poverty of Nations: The aid Dilemma at the  Heart of Africa”British  Academy  Press, 
London,  New  York. 
Muller,  J.O.,1988:  “The  land Laws and  Community  Reform as an  Example of Institutional  Change  in  Senegal,  Legal 
Principles,  Implementation  and  Preliminary  Results  from  the  Semi-Arid Land  in  the  Ferlo” Quarterly Journal of 
I n t e ~ t i o ~ I A g r i c u l t u r e ,  vo1.27,  no.1.  pp.80-101. 
Muller, J.O., 1989:’%isiken der Sedentarisierung und  Tranzhumanz-Verhalten  “aprks-forage” von der  Peul 
Nomaden  im Koya Word-Senegal) Vortrag  anliisslich  des  Symposiums  “Tierhaltung im Sahel”  Tropenzenhwn 
Universiat Gottingen 26-27 Oktoher 1989.12 p. 
Ndiaye,  Ousmane,  1993:  “Micro-level  small  ruminant  transaction  analysis nd  livestock  policy  in  Senegal“.  Plan  B 
paper for MSc. Michigan State University. 
Ndione,  Cheick Mbacke. 1994. “Impact de  la  dtvaluation sur les  filikres  animales du Stntgal“. ISM. Saint Louis. 
(&W) 
World Bank,Washington. 
Nelson,  Ridley:  “Dryland  Management-  The  desertification  problem”. Environment Depamnent Working Paper 8. 
Niamir, Maryam 1990: “Herders  decision-making  in  natural  resource  management  in  arid and  semi-arid Africa“ 
Communiry Forestry  Note 4, FAO, Rome. 
Niamir,  M 1989” Local Knowledge  and  Systems for Natural  Resource  Management in Arid  and  Semi-arid  Africa. 
FAO, Rome. 
Niane.  LC. 1 9 9 0  “Note sur la situation des  affectations foncihes (1988-90) et les litiges  foncikres inm et 
intercommunautaires (Dtppartement de  Matam,  Podor et Bakel)” PNUD/Cellule  A@s-Barrage,Dakar. 
Niane,  LC.  198?: “Du fonctionnement  des  conseils nuaux et des centres  d‘expansion  rurales  polyvalents  de  a V l16 
du Fleuve Stntgal“ Projet SEN/86.001. 
Niang,  Mamadou  1979:  “Regimes des terres  et  strategies  de  developpement rural au  Senegal (un exemple  de  la 
resistance du droit coutumier africain)” Afncan Perspectives v01 1. No.  45-51.. Leiden, pp..45-51. 
Niemeijer,  David, 1996 “The Dynamics of  African Agricultural  History: Is it Time for a New  Development 
Paradip?” Development and Change Vol27,87-110. 
North,  D.C., 1990 Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge,  Cambridge 
University  Press. 
Oakerson, 1992 Analyzing  the  Commons:  A  Framework” in  Bromely (ed) Making  theCommons Work. Institute  for 
Comparative Studies, San  Fransisco,  CAlifornia, 
Okoth-Ogendo, H.W.O., 1989:”Some Issues of Thwry in  the Study  of Tenure  Relations in African  Agriculture” 
Africa v01 59, no.1.  pp.6-18. 
Olivier de Sardan, J.-P,,  1991: Anthropologie et Developpement, Editions  Khartala,  Paris. 
Oloko-Onyango, J. et al., 1993: “Pastoralism,  Crisis and  Transformation in Karamoja”. IIED Issues Paper No. 43. 
London 
Olson, Katarina, 1984 “Long tern Changes  in the Woody  vegetation  in NKordofan, The Sudan- Study  with  the 
emphasis  on Acacia Senegal“. Lunds Universitets  Naturgeografska  Institution i   cooperation  with  the  Institute  of 
245 
Environmental  Studies,  University of Khartoum 
Ortner, S .  B.,1986 “Theory in  Anthropology  since  the  Sixties” Comparative Studies  in  Sociefy  and History, vo1.28 
no.2. London pp.  126-166. 
Ostrom and Keohane 1994 Introduction  in  Local  Commons  and  Global  Interdependence:  Heterogeneity  and 
Cooperation  in two Domains. J o u m l  of Theoretical Politics, v01  6. No. 4. 
Ostrom, E., 1992 The  Rudiments of a  Theory of the Origins, Survival  and  Performance of Common Property 
Institutions” In Bromley  (ed) 1972 Making  the  Commons Work, Theory, Practice and Policy. 
Ostrom.  E., 1990 Governing the Commons: The evolution of institutions for collective action. Cambridge 
University  Press,  Cambridge. 
Ostrom, Ellinor, 1988:  Institutional  arrangements and  the  dilemma of the  commons”  in  Ostrom,V.  Feeny,D.  And 
Pitch (eds) Rethinking Institutional analysis and developmenttlssues Altemtives and Choices. San  Fransisco 
(101-139) 
Approaches”  in  MC  Cay nd Acheson  (eds): The question of the  Commons” Tucson, Arizona. 
Ostrom, Ellinor 1987 Institutional  Arrangements for Resolving  the  Commons  Dilemma,  some  Contending 
Painter,  T,M,  1994:“Situating user based  Governance:  Peoples  livelihood  strategies  and  natural  resource  manage- 
ment in West Africa. in Marcussen, H.S.:  Improved Natural  Resource  Management.  The  role of the  State  versus  that 
of the  Loacl  Community. Occasional Paper no.12, IDS, Roskilde. 
Panzacchi, Comelia,l994:’The Livelihood of Traditional Griots in  Modem  Senegal‘ Africa 64 (2). 
Pedersen, Jon, 1995:  “Drought,  Migration  and  Population Growth in the  Sahel:  The  Case of the  Malian G o m a :  
1900-1991”. Population Studies, v01 49 p.  111-126. 
Peer R and M. Watts, 1996Liberation Ecologies,  Development,  Sustainability and environment  in  an  age of 
market  triumphalism”  in Pe t ,  R and Watts (eds.): Liberation Ecologies; Environment,  Development, Social 
Movements. London  p. 1-46. 
Pellisier, Paul, 1966 Les Paysans du Sknkgal, les civilisations agrarires du Cayor a la Casamance, Saint Yrieix, 
France. 
Pemer, G. 1995:  “New  Directions  in  Range  Management  Planning in Africa”, in  Scoones: Living With Uncertainty; 
New Diractions in Pastoral Development in Africa. Intermediate  Technology  Publications,  London 
Peters, Pauline 1994: Dividing the  Commons: Politics, Policy and  Culture  in Botswana. University Press of 
Virginia277 p. 
Peters, Pauline, 1992 “Manoeuvres  and  Debates in the  interpretation of land  rights in  Botswana”  in Africa, v01 62, 
no.3 pp.  413-434. 
Peters,  Pauline,  1987:  “Embedded  Systems and  Rooted  Models:  The  Grazing  Lands of Botswana  and the Commons 
Resources. Tucson, pp.  171-194. 
Debate”  in MC Cay  and  Acheson (eds) 1987 The question of the  Commons,  the  culture  and Ecology of communal 
Peters, Pauline, 1984 “ Struggles  over  Water  ,Struggles  over Meaning:  Cattle,  Water  and  the  State  in  Botswana” 
Africa vol. 54, no.3. pp. 29-49. 
Picardi, A.C and Siefert, W.W., 1976  “A Tragedy of the  Commons  in  the  Sahel”. Technical Review, May 1976 p. 
42-51. 
246 
Pouillon, F., 1990:  "Sur  la  "stagnation  technique"  chez  les pastern nomades: Les Peul de Nord-Senegal entre 
I'economie  politique  et  I'histoire  contemporaine". Cahiers des Sciences  humaines 26 (1-2). 
Pr6vost Y., 1990:  "Analyse  spatiale  de  la  pression  animale c o m e  facteur  de  desertification dans le Nord  du 
Senegal".  Publication CSE,  Dakar 
Prof1 de 1'Environnement de la VallLe dufleuve SLnLgal" 1990,  "Euroconsult" and "Institut National de  Recherche 
pour la Conservation  de  la  Nature". Document  pr6par6 h la  demande de la Direction GCn6kaIe de la Coop6ration au 
Ev8oppement (DGIS). Ministtre des  Affaires  Etrang&res,  Pays-Bas. 
Republique du  SBnkgal, Ministtre de I'Economie, des  Finances  et du Plan,  Direction de la  Pr6vision et de la 
Statistique,  1988: RLpenoire des Villages. Saints  Louis,  Louga. 
Reyna,  S.P.  and  Downs  R.E.,1988:  "Introduction",  in  Downs  and  Reyna  (eds.): Land and socieq in contemporary 
Africa, University  Press of  New  England. 
Ribot,  Jesse  1995:  "From  Exclusion  to  Participation:  Turning  Senegals  Forestry  Policy  Around?" World DeveJop- 
menr, Vol. 32, no.9, 1587-1599. 
Richter,M.,1991:  "Les  Peul  dans  la  zone du  projet"  and  other  articles  in  Kasberger-Sanftl,  G.,Richter,  M. et 
lluczykont, S .  1991: Le p2turage controle Un systtme d'exploitation sylvo-pastorale  comme modtle pour  la 
sauvegarde  des  ressources  naturelles". Saint Louis,  Senegal.  Mission  Foresti&re  Allemande,GTZ. 
Riesman,  Paul,  1974: Freedom in  Fulani  Social  Life;  an introspective Ethnography. University of Chicago  Press. 
Pp.52-116,195-226. 
Riesman,  Paul, 1990 "The  formation of Personality  in  Fulani  Ethnopsychology",  in  Jackson,  Michael  and  Ivan K rp: 
Personhood and Agency:The experiance of Self and Other in African Culrures, Uppsala. 
Roe,  Emery  1993; 'Wew Framworks  for  an  Old  Tragedy of the  Commons  and an Aging Common Properly Resource 
Management"Agricu1ture and Human Values, Vol.11  no.1  pp.  29-36. 
Roe,  Emery M, 1991:"Development  Narratives, or Making  the  best of Blueprint  Development" World Development 
Vol. 19 no. 4. pp  287-300. Great Britain. 
Rondinelli, D.  And  Minis,  H.P.,  1990:  Administrative  restructuring  for economic  adjustment:  decentralisation  policy 
in Senegal.  Jnternational  Journal of  Administrative  Sciences,  SAGE,  London.  vol. 56 Pp. 447-466. 
Rosebeny, W.,1989 Anthropologies and Histones, Essays in  Culture Histories andPolitica1 Economy. Rutgers 
University  Press,  New  Brunswick  (Introduction  p.1-14) 
Runge, CP., 1981 "Common Property Externalities:  Isolation, the Assurance  and Resource Deplation in  a  traditional 
Gradng context. American Journal of Agricultural  Economics v01 63 p. 595-606. 
Runge,  C.F., 1986 "Common  Property  and  Collective  Action i Economic  Development" World Development v01 
14, no. 25.4.623-635. 
Salih, M.1990:  "Pastoralism  and  the  State  in  Africa" Nomadic Peoples 25-27  Uppsala. 
Salzman,  P.C.,  1995:  "Studying  Nomads:  an  autobiographical  reflection" Nomadic Peoples no.36137 pp. 157-167. 
Sandford, S., 1983: Management  of Pastoral Development in  the Third World, London. 
Sandford,  Steven, 1982 "Pastoral  Strategies  and Desemfcation: Opportunism and Conservationism  in Dry Lands" 
in Spooner and  Mann  (eds): Desertiication and Development; Dryland Ecology in Social Perspective. London. 
247 
Santoir, C., 1994  "Ecadence t  risistance du pastoralisme.  Les  Peuls de la Vall6e de fleuve SCnCgal": Cahiers 
dEtudesafricaines 133-135; XXXIV-13 pp.231-263. 
Podor" Cahiers des Sciences  Humaines 29 (1) pp.195-229. 
Santoir, C.  1993: " D'une  rive  a  l'autre;  Les  Peul  mauritaniens refugiis au Sinegal (dipartements de  Dagana et de 
Santoir, C.,  199Oa: Le  Conflit  Mauritano-sinigalais: la genkse; Le cas des Peul de la Haute Vallie du Sinigal" 
Cahiers des Sciences Humaines 26 (4) pp.553-576. 
Humaines 26 (4) pp.577-603. 
Santoir, C., 1990b " Les  Peuls 'refusis'; Les  Peul maurimiens refugiCs  au Sknigal" Cahiers  des Sciences 
Documents de I'ORSTOM  no.166.185. 
Santoir, C.,  1983: Raison Pastorale et Developpement. Les societespeuls  face au amemgments. Dakar,  Travaux et 
Santoir, C.  1982:  "Contribution i l'etude de  I'exploitation du chepkl. Region  du Ferlo-Sinigal". Dakar,  ORSTOM, 
multigr 
Santoir, C. 1979: "Peuls  et  aminagements  hydro-agticoles dans la Vallie du  fleuve SCnCgaP. Dakar, ORSTOM, 
multigr. 
Santoir, C.,  1977:  "L'Espace  Pastoral  dans  la  Region  du  Fleuve  Senegal",  ORSTOM, Dakar. 
Sayer, A.1984 Method  in  Social  Science; A Realist Approach, London and New  York. 313 p. 
des Sciences Humaines Vol.  29,  no. 4, pp.  591-623.. 
Schmitz,  Jean,  1993:  "Anthropologie  des  conflits  fonciers  et  hydropolitiques  du  fleuve Sinigal (1975-91)" Cahiers 
UniversitL de  Wageningen  et  ORSTOM  (MimLo). 
Schmitz,  Jean,  1987:"Projet  de  la  cuvette  de Kaskas, fin de l'itude de la cuvette  de  Moutoul. SAED, ADRAO, 
Schmitz,  Jean,  1986a:"Projet dimgation de Kaskas et situation  des  @rim&res  villageois de la  zone".SAED, 
ADRAO, Universiti de  Wageningen  et  ORSTOM. 
Schmitz,  Jean,  1986b:"Agriculture  de ime,  unitis temtoriales  et irrigation dans la Vallie du Sin&aY Communi- 
cation pr6sentCe  au  seminaire '' Aminagements  Hydro-agricoles et sysemes de  production,  DSA-CIRAD 
Montpellier  dec. 1986. Les Cahiers de recherche developpement no. 12. 
African Culture. Chicago. Pp. 144-168. 
Schneider,  Harold, K. 1959:  "Pakot  resistance  to  change"  in  Bascom  and  Herskovits: Continuity and change  in 
New directions for Pastoral development  in Afnca, London. 
Scoones, Ian, 1995: "New  directions  in  pastoral  development  in Africa" in Scoones (ed): Living with Unceltainty: 
from  the workshop on New  directions  in  African  Range  Management and Policy,  Wobum, UK, June  1993. 
Scoones, I., 1994 Living with Uncertainly:  New  directions for Pastoral  development  in  Africa,  Overview  Paper 
Seck, S.M. 1991: "LaDynamique de  I'inigation dans la  vall6e  du  fleuve". In Crousse, B. Mathieu, P. And Seck, 
S.M.  (ed): La vallde dufleuve Skn&d. Karthala,  Parispp.17-45. 
Sepaa, Peka 1996 Negotiated  deveopment-  A  new  paradigm for Social Dynamics in  Rural  Africa" Nordic Journal 
ofDevelopment Studies v015 no.  2.  pp.84-98 
Serres, H. 1977 Essai de bilan des  politiques  hydrauliques  pastorales  GERDAT-IEMVT, Paris. 
Solway,  Jaqueline S .  1994:"Drought as a 'Revelatory  Crisis';  an  Exploration of Shifting Entitlements and  Hierachies 
248 
in  the Kalahari, Botswana." Development  and Change v01 25 pp.  471-495. 
Speirs,  Mike  and  Ole  Olsen, 1992" Indigenous  Integrated  Farming  Systems  in  the Sahel" World Bank Technical 
Paper no.179. Africa  Technical  Department  series. 
Spittler,  Gerd 1979 "Peasants and the State in Niger", Peasant Studies vol.  8 no.1,  pp. 30-47. 
Spittler,  Gerd 1984 "Introduction;  Peasants , the  Administration and Rural Development," Sociologia Ruralis No. 
24 pp. 7-9 
Spooner,  Brian  1993: "Ignoring Turbulence in Planning: Some Lessons,  Experience  and  Principles of  Chaos,  Hazard 
and  Conflict  from  the Horn of Africa".in  Brimer et ai: Narural Resources and Social Conflicts: Proceedingsfrom 
the 5th Sahel Workshop, Sandbjerg. 
Spooner,  Brian,  1987:  "Insiders  and  outsiders in Baluchistan,  Western and Indigenous  Perspectives  on Ecology  and 
Development" in Little, Horowitz and  Nyerges (eds): Lands at Risk in the  Third World, Westview,  Boulder. 
Spooner,  Brian,  1982: 'I Rethinking Desertification: the Social  Dimension" in Spooner  and  Mann  (eds) Deserjijica- 
tion  and Development; Dryland Ecobgy in Social Perspective. London. 
Solway, Jacqueline, 1994 "Drought as a  'Revelatory Crisis': An Exploration of Shifting  Entitlements and 
Hierarchies  in  The Kalahar, Botswana" Developmenr and Change v01 25, pp.  471-495. 
Stebbing , EP., 1938: "The encroaching Sahara.The  threat o the West African  Colonies:  A  paper  read  at  the 
Evening Meeting of the  Society.  on 4 March  1935". The Geographical Journal, The  Royal  Geographic  Society, 
1938  vol. 85 p. 506-524)London. 
Stroosnijder, L., 1994 "Population  density,  Carrying  Capacity and  Agricultural  Technology  in  the  Sahel" in: 
Proceedingsfrom the 6th Sahel Workshop. 64th January  1994.  Aarhus,  Denmark. 
Sutter, J.W. 1987:  "Cattle and Inequality:  Herd Size Differentiation  and  Pastoral  Production  among  the  Fulani of 
NorrheasternSenegal."Africa 57 (2) pp.196-218. 
Swallow,B. 1989 "Strategies and Tenure in Afirican Livestock  Development" Draft, Land Tenure Center, 
University of Wisconsin,  Madison,  USA,  Sept.  1989. 
Swift. J.J.,  1988:" Major  Issues in Pasroral Developrnenr with Special Emphasis on Selected African Countries". 
Food  and Agriculture  Organization (FAO) Rome. 
Swift. J.J., 1996: " Desertifcation; Narratives, Winners and  Losers" in  Leach  and  Meam5  (eds): The  Lie ofthe 
Land; Challenging Received  Wisdom on the Agrican Environment.The International  African  Institute  in  association 
with James  Currey, Oxford and Heinemann  Portsmouth, N.H. 
Thkbaud, Brigitte, 1995: "Pastoralisme  et  degradation du  milieu  nature1  au  Sahel:  Mythe ou rMit6?, l'experience  de 
$turage control6 B Widou Thiengoli (Ferlo Senegalais)  Document pdsent6 dans le cadre du seminaire  Sahel, 
Soenderborg janvier 1995. 
Thebaud,  Brigitte,  1994a: "Projet "Exploitation  agro-sylvo-pastoral des sols dans le Nord  du  Senegal" ( G m  : Bilan 
et  identification dun nouvean  projet.  Rapport  de  mission  28  mars au 5 mai 1994. 
ThLbaud, Brigitte, 1994b "Projet "Exploitation  agrc-sylvo-pastoral  des sols dam le N o d  du Sknigal" (Gm) : Bilan 
et  identificationh'nn  nouveau  projet.  Rapport  de  mission 28 mars  an 5 mai 1994. 
Theband,  Brigitte,  1993a: I' Le foncier  dans le SahelPastoral, situation et perspectives".  dec.  1993,  axticle in press 
prepared for the  Seminar of EHESS. 
249 
Thebaud,  Brigitte, 1993b "Causes et consequences de  la  desertification en Afrque: essai dinterpritation. Document 
prepari dans le cadre du  Panel  International  d'Experts  sur  la Disertikation. Gentve nov.1993. 
Afrique:  la question pastorale".  Document prepad dans le cadre du Panel  International  dExperts  sur  la Disertifka- 
Thebaud,  Brigitte and Camilla  Toulmin,  1993: "Causes et consequences socio-hnomiques de  la  disemfication en 
tion. Gentve nov.1993. 
Thebaud, B., 199O"Politique Hydraulique Pastorale et Gestion  de  1'Espace  au  Sahel" in Cahiers des Sciences 
Hwnaines Vol .l et 2, ORSTOM,  Paris. 
Thebaud, B., 1985: Elevage etdiveloppemenr au Niger - que1 avenirpour les dleveurs sahiliens,BlT, Genkve. 
147 p. 
Xiam, Algor, 1995 :"Le r&le du syst&me  d'elevage  extensif &lid dans la production de viande  au SMgal: 
Contraintes et perspectives"  Communication du Seminaire-Atelier  sur  la  production de Viande  en  Afrique  Sub- 
Saharienne,  13-17 Mars 1995 h Saly Portudal, Sinigal, multigr.. 
Thomas, D.S.G. and Middleton, N.I. 1994: DesertGcation: Exploding the Myth, Chichester.  (194  p,) 
Thomson J.T.1989:  "Options for Promoting User-  Based  Governance of Sahelian  Renewable  Resources  (prepared 
for CLSS) 136p. 
Thomson, J.T.,  1991:" Sahel  Decentralization  Policy  Report, Volume 1: Decentralization,  Governance  and  Problem 
Solving  in  the  Sahel".  Agency for International  Development. (28 p.) 
Tiffen, Mary and Michael Mortimore,  1994.  "Environment,  Population Growth  and  Productivity in Kenya: a  Case 
Study of Machakos  District. IIED Issues Paper No.  47.London. 
Tiffen, Mary, Michael Mortimore and  Francis  Gichuki, 1994 More People, less Erosion; Environmental Recovery 
in Kenya. Wiley Publishers, Chichester. 
Tluczykont, Siegfried 1991:"Le  modkle de phrage  controlt" in  Kasberger-Sa&, G. Richter, M. et  Tluczykont, S .  
1991: Le pfiturage control& Un systlme dexploitation  sylvo-pastorale  comme modtle pour  la  sauvegarde  des 
ressources  naturelles". Saint Louis, Senegal.  Mission Forestike Allemande,GTZ. 
Toulmin, C.  1993:  "Combatting  Desertification:  Setting  an  Agenda for a Global  Convention".  Dryland  Networks 
Progamme, ZZED Issues Paper no. 42. International  Institute for Environment  and  Development,  London. 
Toulmin, C., 1986 " Access to Food, Dry  Season  Strategies  and  Household  Size  amongst  the  Bambara  of  CenUal 
Mali" in IDS Bullerin, v01 17 n0.3. 
Toulmin, C., 1991: Natural Resource Management  at  the Local Level:  Will this bring  Food  Security to the  Sahel?" in 
IDS Bulletin 22-3. 
Touri, 0. 1991a:  "Mission  d'ivaluation  du  Projet Sinigalo-Allemand dexploitation ap-sylvo-pastorale des  sols 
dans le nod  du Sinkgal- Rapport  sociologique".  Unpublished. Dakar. 
Towe, Oussouby 1991b "Diveloppement pastoral et contraintes  foncikre  dans  la  zone  sahilienne  du Sinigal." 
Publication  du Centre de Suivi Ecologique,  Unpublished.  Dakar.25 p. 
Tour&,  Oussouby  1990a:  "Les sociitb peuls  du  Ferlo: continuitk changements,  menaces."  Publication  du  Centre de 
Suivi Ecologique,  Unpublished.  Dakar.15  p. 
Touri, Oussouby, 199Ob: "Where  Herders don't herd  anymore:  Experience  from  the  Ferlo,  northern  Senegal. 
Dryland  Networks  Progamme, IZED Issues Paper no. 22. International  Institute  for  Environment  and  Development, 
London. 
250 
T&%, ~ ~ d 9 , ~ ~ R ~ ~ P ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i i ~  &JW& k&d%J2? 
Publication  du  Centre  de  Suivi  Ecologique, Unpublished.  Dakar. 44 p. 
Touri, Oussouby  and J. Arpaillange: Peul du Ferlo, L'Harmattan,  Paris,  77  p. 
Tourrand,  J.F.,  1993:  "L'EIevage  dans  la kvolution agricole au  Waalo. Ruptures et continuiW. Thkse dEtat, 
Universiti de  Paris-W. 
Tourrand,  J.F. 1989 "Un  Pasteur  devient  agro-Pasteur:  une itude de  cas dans le Delta du fleuve Sinigal": Seminaire 
RESPAO.  Accra, 1989,13p. 
Tyc, Jean, 1994:  Etude  diagnostic sur l'exploitation  et  la  commercialisation  du bitail dans la zone des 'six forages', 
Rapport  de  mission,  Projet  d'exploitation  agro-sylvo-pastorale  des sol dans le nord  du Sinigal (G'IZ).80 p. 
UNCED 1992 Convention on Desertzjication. New  York. 
UNSOPNUD 1994:"La gestion  des  Ressources Naturelles  et les  Politiques  Pastorales  Nationales" Compte Rendu 
de l'Atelier Sous-rigional, Bamako Nov,  1993. 
van Dijk,  Hans,  1994:  'Livestock  Transfers  and  Social  Security in FuBe society  in  the  Hayre, central Mali', F o c a l  
no.  22/23 pp. 97-112. 
London  International  Institute for Environment  and  Development. IIED Issues Paper no. 46 . 
Vedeld,  Trond 1994 "The  State  and  Rangeland  Management:  Creation  and  Erosion  of  Pastoral Institutions in  Mali" 
Vedeld,  T., 1992; "Local  Institution  Building  and  Resource  Management  in  the  West  African  Sahel" Draft, 
NORAGRIC,  Norway. 
Vengroff,  R. and A.  Johnston,  1985:"  Senegals  Rural  Councils:  Decentralization  and  the  Implementation  of Rural 
Development"  Mimeo.  Center for Applied  International  Development  Studies (CADS) Texas Tech University, 
Report  prepared for USAID.  137 p. 
Vengroff, R. and  A.  Johnston  1987:"  Decentralization  and  the  Implementation  of  Rural  Development in Senegal: 
The  role of the  Rural  Councils" Public Administration and Development v01 7, pp.  273-288. 
Making  the Commons Work Theory, Practice and Policy. 
Warren,  A and Agnew, C.,  1987: An assessment of Desertification and Land Degradation in arid  and semi-arid 
areas. Dryland  Paper  no.  2.  KED.  London, 
Weicker, Martin, 1993: Nomades et sedentaires au Sinigal, ENDA-Edifons, s&ie Etudes et Recherches no. 139- 
140  Dakar, Sinigal. 
Wilson, F.,1990 "The Study of Institutions  and  the  Paradoxical Simtion of doing Research  in Occasional Paper 
no.1. IDS, Roskilde. 
Youmba,  Malick Abdoull983: Rapport  de  stage:  Hydradique  Pastorale et villageoise" Ecole Inter Etat des Sciences 
et Medicine  Veterinaire,  Dakar. 
Webb,  James, L.A.,1995: The Desert Frontier: Ecological and Economic Change along the Western Sahel 1600- 
1850. University of Wisconsin  Press.pp.  3-27. 
